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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis expands the currently available approaches to 
theorising the relation between subjectivity and the body – by developing a 
notion of an embodied subject. This is done by exploring the implications 
which Henri Bergson’s process philosophy has for understanding Judith 
Butler’s theory of gender performativity. 
I undertake an analysis of Butler’s account of the gendered subject, 
demonstrating its value for thinking the politics of sexual difference but 
emphasising its methodological short comings. Specifically, I criticise her 
reduction of the body to a signifying effect, her exclusion of a notion of 
self-reflexivity, and the way she explains the psychic investment in gender 
through a principle of melancholia. Taken together, I argue that these 
theoretical perspectives become problematic because they radically limit 
an understanding of how and why hegemonic subjects repeat normative 
signifying practices. In turn, this limitation distorts Butler’s understanding of 
how subversive repetitions can effectively de-naturalise gender norms. 
Following this critique, I use Bergson’s temporalised understanding 
of the relation between consciousness and language to theorise an 
account of the gendered self which conforms to Butler’s ideas concerning 
regulated subject positions, but provides the possibility of attaining 
reflexive distance from the norms of gender intelligibility. I then develop 
Bergson’s sensory-motor conception of the body, and its relation to 
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consciousness and memory, in order to re-evaluate the lived dynamics of 
repetition, gender investment, and identification. 
Through Bergson, I will demonstrate how historically sedimented 
gender practices are reproduced by forming the motor habits of individual 
bodies. This allows me to explain the circulation of gender norms in terms 
of bodily processes and tension rather than signifying effects and, I argue, 
grounds the basis of gender investment in the familiarity which habits 
provide for action. I then use Bergson’s principles that consciousness 
expands when action is indeterminate, and that memory forms general 
ideas in response to the present moment of action, to explore how variable 
processes of gender identification develop when habits are subverted. 
Through these perspectives I re-describe Butler’s notion of 
performativity as a lived, embodied process in which gender investment 
and identification are contingent upon an individual subject’s reflexive 
responses to the immediate social conditions of action. In order to clarify 
the nature of these responses I then call upon Yaak Panksepp’s 
neurological theory of emotion to characterise several prominent 
tendencies and, ultimately, argue that the effectiveness of subversive 
repetition depends upon producing the right emotional response. This, I 
suggest, provides a more diverse explanation of the naturalisation and 
potential transformation of signifying practices than is available in Butler’s 
own theoretical framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis has developed, on the one hand, from the contention 
that Henri Bergson’s philosophical works provide a rich, and as yet largely 
untapped, resource for cultural theory. While Bergson’s work has received 
increased attention in recent years, particularly in relation to his influence 
on Gilles Deleuze, this has largely been a philosophical enterprise which 
has attempted to explicate and clarify the nature of his ideas. There has, 
however, been little effort to apply his ideas directly to the use of cultural 
analysis, and as far as Bergson does enter the fray of cultural theory it is 
generally as a passing reference within a Deleuzian approach.1 One of the 
driving forces behind this thesis is, therefore, to begin opening up 
Bergson’s oeuvre to uses other than those already achieved within 
Deleuze studies. I will do this, primarily, by engaging his work with Judith 
Butler’s theory of gender performativity, but also by developing aspects of 
his philosophy, such as his conception of the nervous system, which have 
yet to receive significant attention. 
On the other hand, this thesis has also developed from an interest 
in the implications and possibilities of developing biological accounts of 
subjectivity, by which I mean any attempt to draw upon biological science 
                                                 
1 Notable exceptions to this can be found within the discipline of sociology. For instance, 
there has been cluster of articles which have used Bergson to present alternative ways to 
theorise processes of organisation within diverse areas such as community, office 
management and product innovation (Calori 2002; Chea 1999; Chea and King 1998; 
Hatzenberger 2003; Linstead 2002; O’Shea 2002; Styhre 2003; Wood 2002). In turn, Ann 
Game’s Undoing the Social has put Bergson to use in a more extended reflection which 
aims towards a ‘sociology concerned with the immediate, the lived of the everyday, and 
with transformations in the now’ (ix). 
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in order to view the self and sociality in relation to the body’s organic 
materiality. More specifically, my initial concern has been with the type of 
fraught relation which such accounts have with theories which prioritise 
language as the basis of subjectivity, particularly insofar as such theories 
tend to foreclose the biological as a theoretical point of reference. 
In the context of gender, and particularly feminist discourse, the 
implied danger of the biological sciences is that they result in the ideal of 
an essential and unchanging sexed nature which unilaterally produces 
behaviour. Butler herself has developed such a critique, arguing that 
biology does not reference a pure body but, rather, enacts a ‘construction 
of the gendered body through a series of exclusions and denials’ (2008: 
184). That is, biology does not simply reveal objective facts about the 
sexed body, but composes an object domain by limiting its field of 
reference. Insofar as this field of reference is ‘structured along matrices of 
gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality’ (198), then, Butler’s 
driving point is that biology does not so much reveal the true nature of sex 
as it re-enforces a ‘regulatory ideal’ (Butler 1993: 2) of sexual difference. 
The biological therefore can, and has, been used to justify the 
status quo by imposing false limits on the possibility of gendered life. 
However, while this is a genuine danger, the potential uses of the 
biological for understanding both the self and sociality are not exhausted 
by attempts to objectify sexual difference. For instance, my own recourse 
to a biological notion of the body will not attempt to define the nature of 
sex, but to clarify and explore how individuals respond to their discursively 
structured subject positions within concrete social situations. 
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Thought of from this perspective, the implied limitation of presenting 
the subject purely as ‘a linguistic category’ (Butler 1997a: 10) is that it 
produces only an abstract view of signification. As Veronica Vasterling has 
argued, explicitly referring to Butler, a ‘one-sided focus on language’ 
(2001: 121) neglects a consideration of how ‘what we see and understand 
[…] is also a result of the body’s intentionality’ (213). What is at stake 
here, then, is the idea that meaning is ‘dependant on, but not completely 
determined by, language’ (213), and that ‘the body’s passage through the 
world’ (213) is one aspect of the contingent production of meaning which 
requires exploration in the context of linguistic theories of the subject. 
Despite the potential complementarity of this perspective, language 
based theories of subjectivity are still pervaded by what Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick and Adam Frank have called a ‘reflexive antibiologism’ (16). In 
general terms, this is a phrase they use to define what they feel is an 
unwarrantedly hostile attitude towards biology, whereby the ‘distance of 
[any theoretical account of subjectivity] from a biological basis is assumed 
to correlate near-precisely with its potential for doing justice to difference’ 
(1). In other words, it denotes a tendency in which a necessary caution 
against essentialism has subtly transformed into ‘heurist habits and 
positing procedures’ (1) which automatically view the biological as 
necessarily essentialist. 
I share Sedgwick and Frank’s commitment to drawing upon 
biological insights as well as their concern with persisting habits which 
resist such engagements, (although I believe the current anti-biological 
climate is less extreme now than when they were writing in 1995). 
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However, I do not share their dismissive attitude towards language based 
models of subjectivity, which they broadly characterise as ‘a bipolar 
analytic framework that can all too adequately be summarized as “kinda 
subversive, kinda hegemonic”’ (5). This kind of attitude, I would argue, is 
unnecessarily reactive, and not only devalues the complexity of such work 
but continues to create a divisive atmosphere which prevents more 
productive dialogues emerging. In this light, part of what this thesis aims to 
provide is an inroads towards a more balanced approach to theorising the 
relation between language and the body within subjectivity.  
The reason Butler’s work has been chosen for this task is because 
her theory of gender performativity is an extremely subtle, insightful and 
valuable version of language based subjectivity which, nonetheless, is 
limited by its methodological foreclosure of the body. Indeed, Butler’s 
conceptual perspective tends toward the kind of dichotomy which 
Sedgwick and Frank caution against, whereby if the body is not presented 
in terms of its discursive constitution then it is being presented in terms of 
an essential nature.  
However, insofar as I take a critical attitude towards Butler on this 
point, my aim is not so much to discredit her theory of performativity, and 
certainly not to dismiss its claims as “kinda subversive, kinda hegemonic.” 
Rather, it is to show that Butler’s foreclosure of the body’s dynamic 
relation to discourse becomes detrimental to her own ideas concerning the 
potential for subversion and the persistence of hegemony. By 
demonstrating the body’s active role in signification, and incorporating a 
notion of embodied, self-reflexivity into her discursive theory of the subject, 
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I aim to develop a more comprehensive account of performative 
processes and their potential to be transformed.  
Bergson, as I will demonstrate, is a particularly apt figure through 
which to develop such a biological subject, since his work contains both a 
non-essentialist conception of the body and a critique of language which is 
relatable to constructionist views on subjectivity. Moreover, since 
Bergson’s notions of the body and language are developed within a 
broader theory of temporality and movement, he provides a common 
framework for them to be thought in conjunction. From this perspective, 
my intention is to bring the relationship between the body and language, 
as claims on subjectivity, closer together by conceiving the subject 
primarily in terms of action. 
Aside from its potential to draw language and the lived body into a 
common framework, Bergson’s work may at first glance appear an unlikely 
candidate for a productive engagement with Butler. He is, after all, a 
philosopher acutely associated with unrestricted creativity and change 
while Butler, as something of an antinomy, focuses on systems of 
regulation. Moreover, there is also a considerable difference between the 
historical contexts of their work, which in turn imply striking differences in 
both their methods and socio-political contexts. Butler, on the one hand, is 
working in the context of American feminism. Her writings date from the 
late 1980’s to the present day, and can be theoretically situated within the 
debates of French post-structuralist thought and the Anglo-American 
sex/gender distinction. Bergson, on the other hand, is working in the 
tradition of metaphysical philosophy in the late nineteenth and early 
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twentieth century France. His work does not engage the politics of sexual 
difference at all, but rather involves a sustained engagement with the 
emerging scientific knowledge of his time. 
However, despite these differences, there are important thematic 
congruencies which link their work in an uneasy alignment. Specifically, 
both advocate a non-spatialised view of temporality, and both share a 
critique of the metaphysics of substance which emerges as a suspicion of 
the reifying effects of language. Moreover, because the questions I am 
exploring in relation to Butler emerge as problems of lived experience and 
change, the different implications Bergson gives to these points of 
alignment are perfectly suited to address the problematic points which I 
will isolate in Butler’s texts. My thesis, in this sense, maintains the political 
motivation of Butler’s work as an object of analysis, reading and re-
interpreting her account of hegemonic gender regulation through Bergson. 
What I particularly wish to retain from Butler’s politicised approach 
is the idea that gendered acts, meanings and identities are not simply 
expressive of a natural body. They are performative in the sense that they 
only become intelligible through historically sedimented discursive 
practices. In turn, I will generally maintain the view that these discursive 
practices are structured primarily through laws, prohibitions and taboos 
which regulate the meaning of a body’s acts, gestures and desires.  
What Butler legitimately seeks to expose through this perspective is 
a ‘surface politics of the body’ (2008: 185) in which signifying practices tie 
certain types of body styles to an exclusive identification with either male 
or female bodies. Signifying practices, in this sense, constitute a system of 
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authorisation and punishment through which individuals become 
legitimised and humanised through the normative ‘stylization of the body’ 
(191). Gender is thus ‘a performance with clearly punitive consequences’ 
(190) for those who do not conform to the strict limits of these cultural 
articulations, and part of my explicit aim will be to further explore how 
punitive attitudes towards de-legitimised subjects emerge as contingent 
processes of identification. 
The primary issue I will take up with Butler is that she confines her 
discussion of performativity to an analysis of discourse alone. Insofar as 
Butler’s analysis focuses on the way the regulation of gender is a 
historically sedimented but unstable construct of discourse, she tends to 
present social relations purely as positions in language. In other words, 
she does not account for the way an ‘individual’s specific passage through 
the world [inflects] the meaning of what s/he sees and understands’ 
(Vasterling 2001: 213), and is therefore a source of experiencing social 
relations which in certain respects exceeds discursive structures. 
For Butler, discourse itself produces ‘a domain of abject beings’ 
(1993: 3) as an excluded otherness which is inherent to the structure of 
the hegemonic subject. My emphasis, on the other hand, will be on the 
way the discursively structured domains of subject positions are variably 
experienced by individuals through on-going psychological and embodied 
processes which exceed the constraints of discourse. Ultimately, what I 
am arguing in this respect is that in marginalising the lived temporality of 
signifying practices, Butler excludes an important aspect of how 
individuals respond reflexively to otherness. Her model, therefore, as Lois 
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McNay argues, is ‘far from adequate in capturing the complex dynamics of 
social change’ (1999: 178), and in understanding how the possibility of 
transforming discursive practices can emerge within immediate processes 
of signification. 
It is in the context of theorising an experiential dimension which 
exceeds discursive intelligibility that I will turn to Bergson’s concept of 
duration. In Bergson’s oeuvre, duration designates a continuous 
endurance of the past within the present moment, such that the past 
accumulates efficaciously. In contrast to Butler, the past is presented here 
as a fundamental source of change rather than a sedimented effect which 
regulates the present. In other words, duration means that ‘consciousness 
cannot go through the same state twice’ (Bergson 1960: 6) because it is 
‘being built up each instant with its accumulated experience’ (6). 
Consciousness, therefore, ‘changes without ceasing’ (6), and the 
endurance of the past ‘prevents any state, although superficially identical 
with another, from ever repeating in its depth’ (6). 
As an adaptation of Bergson into the context of Butler’s work, I will 
use this notion of duration and consciousness to define a ‘psychical life 
unfolding beneath the symbols which conceal it’ (Bergson 1960: 4). More 
specifically, I will extrapolate from Bergson’s explicit insights a notion of 
qualitative experience within which an individual undergoes a continual 
process of change but which, in the everyday dynamics of sociality, is 
generally concealed by the performative effects of signifying practices and 
habitual acts. However, because this qualitative process constitutes a 
mode of experience which exceeds the discursive structures of 
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intelligibility, I will argue that it can potentially enable individuals to 
transform their relations to their subject positions.  
What will be at stake in my Bergsonian engagement with Butler, 
however, is not simply an assertion of the creative potential of duration 
over the effects of sedimentation, but an attempt to understand the 
efficacy of duration in tension with the reiterative practices of 
performativity. In this sense, the type of questions I am asking from the 
outset are, for instance: given the sedimented effects of discourse how, 
specifically, can duration become a creative resource within the processes 
of re-signification?; or, conversely, given the creative potential of duration, 
what are the specific resistances to change which occur within social 
relations? 
In this respect, it is important to emphasise that Bergson’s work 
does not simply function as a celebration of change, and that my reading 
resists the tendency which sometimes infuses the secondary literature to 
simply present his work in terms of a set of rhetorical possibilities. 
Elizabeth Grosz, for instance, optimistically writes: Bergson’s ‘concept of 
the virtual may prove central in reinvigorating the concept of an open 
future by […] linking it to the unpredictable, uncertain actualization of 
virtualities’ (2005: 110). While I take no issue with this type of invocation 
as such, I would argue that such focus betrays a tendency to neglect the 
conditions of constraint which resist change. Furthermore, it is these kinds 
of rhetorical invocations which have led Joan Copjec to write: there is a 
‘contamination of modern thought by Bergsonian evolutionism [which] is 
so thorough that it often goes unnoticed and unquestioned’ (58).  
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What Copjec is warning against here is ‘an apolitical (naive) 
optimism regarding the inevitability of change [which] gives the slip to the 
rigidifying structures of the social order’ (58), and I would argue that this is 
an important caveat insofar as it portrays an atmosphere which 
occasionally surrounds Bergson’s work. At any rate, Butler’s work 
demands that I account for rigidifying social structures, rather than simply 
invoking the idea of an open future, in order for my thesis to engage a 
Bergsonian interpretation of performativity rather than an outright rejection 
of Butler’s premises. Accordingly, then, my own reading of Bergson will 
emphasise the way each of his texts depict processes of repetition and 
ossification which resist the effects of duration. Indeed, against Copjec’s 
inference that Bergson naively asserts the inevitability of change as a 
political premise, I will argue that Bergson’s conceptions of habit and 
conceptual language can be seen as producing reifying and naturalising 
effects within the way we construct our identities and the way we interact 
socially. As Bergson himself writes, for instance: ‘perception, thought, 
language, all the individual and social activities of the mind, conspire to 
bring us face to face […] with persons, including our own, which will 
become in our eyes objects and, at the same time, invariable substances’ 
(2002: 70). 
As I intimated above, an important correlation emerges here 
between Bergson’s assertion of the solidifying effects of language and 
Butler’s argument that the repetition of gender norms work to ‘produce the 
effect of an internal core or substance’ (Butler 2008: 185). Indeed, 
extrapolating from Bergson’s own arguments, he can be seen to resonate 
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with Butler’s claim that, in gender identity, ‘the appearance of substance is 
precisely that, a constructed identity, a performative accomplishment 
which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, 
come to believe’ (192).  
However, what is significant about Bergson’s own presentation of 
the substantialising effects of language is that our investment in them, as a 
formation of knowledge, can be understood as tied primarily to the 
possibilities of action which they enable. For instance, Bergson writes: ‘We 
do not, in general, aim at knowing for the sake of knowing, but […] to 
satisfy an interest [and to find out] what kind of action, step or attitude [an 
object] should suggest to us’ (2002: 177). My own argument in this respect 
is that this view provides a more nuanced approach to understanding the 
dynamics of identity. This is because, I will argue, the self-coherence 
achieved by repeating gender norms does not stem primarily from an 
investment in the regulatory borders of intelligibility. Rather, within the 
immediate process of signification, the feeling of self-coherence stems 
from the orientation which the expectations of the norm provide for action. 
The role of Bergson’s sensory-motor body comes in here in an 
attempt to clarify how normative gender expectations become ‘deeply 
entrenched and sedimented’ (Butler 1988: 524), on an individual level, 
through the body’s motor habits. By locating the naturalising effects of 
discursive regulation within the body’s active processes, I will ground the 
psychic investment in gender in a process of habit which is ‘lived and 
acted, rather than represented’ (Bergson 2005a: 81). Following this, my 
point is that when the naturalising effects of habit are disrupted, and 
12 
 
gender recognition becomes actively represented, the psychic processes 
of intelligibility and identification which result are equally a response to the 
body’s present moment of action.  
This is to say that unstable investments in gender do not follow 
unilaterally from the structure of discursive injunctions, but develop as 
contingent relations to these injunctions which can potentially unfold in 
different directions. Because the primary investment in gender is a non-
discursive attachment, unstable investments do not have ready-made 
responses in which, for instance, the hegemonic response to otherness is 
inherently one of abjection. Rather, the immediate dynamics of identity 
and exclusion develop variably depending upon the specific tensions 
towards action which an individual experiences within a scene of 
signification. 
Part of what will be at stake in this perspective, then, is the claim 
that subversion primarily disrupts the temporal dynamics of an act rather 
than a sedimented attachment to meaning. In turn, the meaning processes 
by which an individual responds to this disruption aim at re-orientating the 
self within its field of action rather than actually confirming self-knowledge. 
Thus, thought of in terms of an immediate process of signification, Butler’s 
claim that ‘new conceptual horizons [can be] opened up by anomalous or 
subversive practices’ (2004a: 14) cannot work simply by disrupting ‘the 
internal fixity of the self’ (2008: 183) in a way which challenges ‘the 
meaning and necessity of [its] terms’ (182). It is also dependant on 
fostering a field of action in which hegemonic subjects can orientate 
themselves so that they aspire to new conceptual horizons. In other 
13 
 
words, only under specific conditions of action can an individual’s relation 
to the meaning and necessity of discursive regulation be transformed. 
In the thesis I will explore these ideas by developing the relations 
which Bergson describes between consciousness, memory and the body 
in which, he argues, ‘psychic life may be lived at different heights, now 
closer to action, now further removed from it’ (2005a: 14). This means, for 
Bergson, that ‘consciousness narrows or enlarges the development of its 
[memory] content’ (166) depending upon how immediate or hesitant an 
action is in response to stimulus. Memory, thus, contextualises the present 
moment differently depending on the indeterminacy of action, and my 
extrapolation of this insight in relation to Butler is that the recognition of 
gender norms varies according to this relation between memory and 
action. In other words, specific ways in which indeterminacy unfolds allow 
the conscious representation of gender to open up the conceptual content 
of identity to past experience in different ways. 
In short, my argument here is that memory contingently inflects the 
intelligible relation between self and other with individual nuances, of 
varying degrees of complexity, depending upon the body’s specific tension 
towards action. I will argue, on the one hand, that because the conscious 
representation of an act tends to be ‘diminished whenever a stable habit 
has been formed’ (Bergson 2005a: 45), self-knowledge tends towards an 
unreflective identification with discourse. However, when habits are 
interrupted by subversive repetitions, identity processes become more 
complex because the tension towards action is rendered indeterminate. 
Memory is therefore allowed to inflect the discursive domain of intelligibility 
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with a greater degree of personal context, and which exceeds the shared 
structures of the norm in a way which facilitates variable interpretations of 
discursive borders. 
Finally, in order to explore different ways in which the tension of 
action can unfold I will sketch out a theory of emotion, which I will develop 
partly from Bergson’s theory of affection and his conception of the brain 
and nervous system in Matter and Memory, but also from Yaak 
Panksepp’s neurological research into the bodily basis of emotion. 
Drawing from these references, I will define emotion in terms of an 
anticipatory feeling of indeterminacy which spontaneously motivates 
action, and thereby produces different intensities of investment. 
In this respect, Bergson’s work already contains the basis of 
conceiving how ‘indetermination […] is implied in the structure of the 
nervous system’ (Bergson 2005a: 33), and how affection can be 
conceived as ‘consciousness […] in the form of a feeling’ (18) which acts 
as a motivating force during spontaneous actions. However, I will use 
Panksepp as a means to develop such principles in the light of modern 
neurological research. This is because Panksepp’s work contains two key 
factors which make it particularly apt for such an engagement.  
Firstly, his major work on this subject, Affective Neuroscience, 
brings together a vast amount of research which had formerly remained 
scattered and relatively unconnected. It thus stands as a highly 
comprehensive neurological study of emotion. Secondly, while Panksepp 
analyses an array of rigorous objective data drawn from behavioural 
neuroscience and other biological and psychological disciplines, he also 
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puts ‘a new twist on the evidence’ (Panksepp 1998: 6) which aligns him 
closely with Bergson. Specifically, he seeks to reverse a dominant trend in 
behavioural biology which treats organisms like ‘passive reflex machines’ 
(38), and which has also tended to treat human emotion in a similar 
fashion. Against this convention, Panksepp argues parallel to Bergson that 
the conscious feeling which accompanies the neural state of emotion is 
the vital element of its motivating force. His interpretation of the 
neurological evidence thus offers a solid conceptual basis by which to 
unite him with Bergson’s views on consciousness and the brain, while his 
in-depth study of emotion provides a way to explore the embodied 
dynamics of performativity and subversion more thoroughly than 
Bergson’s work alone would permit. 
Ultimately, my aim is to explore the persistence and instabilities of 
gender performativity in terms of immediate processes of action, 
expanding the object of analysis beyond discourse while maintaining 
Butler’s overall perspective of identity as a regulated signifying effect. This 
will, in the final analysis, produce an image of performativity which is quite 
different from that which resides in Butler’s own texts. In turn, it will 
produce an application of Bergson’s work which is equally different from 
his own philosophical intentions. However, I believe my adaptation of 
these two thinkers will enable a more comprehensive view of temporally 
unfolding processes of identity, and therefore the potential to transform 
them. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE THEORETICAL LIMITS OF PERFORMATIVITY 
 
 
Against the current of Butler’s own work, my approach to gender 
performativity will attempt to understand the regulated processes of 
signification in terms of a lived, embodied experience which exceeds 
discourse. That is, I maintain Butler’s definition of gender as a discursive 
‘apparatus of production’ (2008: 10) which regulates the social intelligibility 
of sexed bodies and identities. However, my emphasis on the actual 
process of performativity shifts away from Butler’s purely discursive 
definition as ‘that power of discourse to produce effects through iteration’ 
(1993: 20), and moves towards understanding the actual lived process of 
repeating.2 
What I want to clarify in these introductory remarks to this chapter is 
the particular strength of Butler’s purely discursive approach to 
understanding the subject, and the precise points at which I believe it 
becomes necessary to theorise performativity from the perspective of 
                                                 
2 My move away from Butler’s discursive definition of the subject towards a notion of lived 
experience should be distinguished from a common reservation towards Butler’s work, 
which has been influentially voiced by Nancy Fraser and concerns the ‘deeply 
antihumanist’ (1995a: 67) language through which Butler presents her ideas. Fraser 
writes:  
 
This idiom is far enough removed from our everyday ways of thinking about 
ourselves to require some justification. Why should we use such a self-distancing 
idiom? What are its theoretical advantages (and disadvantages)? What is its 
likely political impact? (67). 
 
In response to this, I would agree with Butler that her antihumanist language is 
theoretically useful precisely because ‘the received meanings that we have of gender are 
so entrenched in our everyday way of talking’ (Butler 2001a: 23). Thus, alternative modes 
of language are necessary, on the one hand, to provide a distance necessary to critique 
everyday meanings. On the other hand, if that critique was only made in an everyday 
idiom ‘we would, to some extent, be reaffirming the very language that we seek to subject 
to critical scrutiny (23). In this way, as I will clarify below, I support Butler’s “self-distancing 
idiom” insofar as it provides a unique means of critique, but take issue with the way this 
idiom tends to rigidify into an abstract view of the self. 
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experience. This will involve a more detailed overview of the political 
strategy which Butler develops, and the theoretical implications which her 
deconstructive work has for understanding her invocation of subversive 
repetition. 
An important part of what gender performativity means for Butler is 
that, because signifying acts are part of a ‘reiterative and citational 
practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names’ (1993: 2), 
an individual cannot be thought of as the author or initiator of their 
gendered acts. From a political standpoint, part of what Butler legitimately 
seeks to emphasise here is that ‘there is no possibility of agency or reality 
outside of the discursive practices that give those terms the intelligibility 
that they have’ (2008: 202). Agency, in this way, is ‘not a relation of 
external opposition to power’ (1993: 15) because the ‘subject who would 
resist such norms is itself enabled, if not produced, by such norms’ (15).  
The political salience of this point is the insight that positions of 
resistance are already radically co-opted and constrained by the terms of 
intelligibility which must be taken up in order to become subjects. I believe 
this argument is important, from a feminist perspective for instance, 
because it foregrounds that ‘the ways in which women are said to “know” 
or “be known” are already orchestrated by power precisely at the moment 
in which the terms of “acceptable” categorization are instituted’ (2004: 
215). Thus, to assume a politics which insists upon a coherent identity as 
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its point of departure precludes a consideration of how that identity is 
constituted by the very power formations it resists.3 
Two objectives follow from this rejection of stable identity positions, 
each of which has the same purpose of producing a politics which takes 
place as a struggle to expose and de-naturalise the effects of signification. 
Firstly, there is the invocation of subversive repetition, as a social practice, 
which aims to assist ‘a radical resignification of the symbolic domain [by] 
deviating the citational chain’ (Butler 1993: 22). In this strategy there is no 
need to assert a position of identity because, Butler argues, the very 
‘destabilizing [of] substantive [hegemonic] identity’ (2008: 200) would have 
the effect of ‘proliferating gender configurations outside the restricting 
frames of masculine domination and compulsory heterosexuality’ (193). 
Secondly, there is a strategy of deconstructive analysis which ‘asks 
after the conditions of […] emergence and operation’ (1993: 7) through 
                                                 
3 For Butler, the ‘internal paradox’ (2008: 203) of such a politics is that it unreflectively 
‘presumes, fixes, and constrains the very “subjects” that it hopes to represent and 
liberate’ (203). Moreover, identity politics tends to enact a ‘false uniformity’ (1993: 116) on 
its protagonists which can only consolidate its identity through a set of exclusions. In its 
worse cases, therefore, ‘a policing of identity takes the place of a politics in which identity 
works dynamically in the service of a broader cultural struggle’ (117), and ‘the strategies 
of abjection wielded through and by hegemonic subject-positions […] come to structure 
and contain the articulatory struggles of those in subordinate or erased positionalities’ 
(112). 
This definition of identity politics, and Butler’s correlative focus on negativity and 
exclusion as the ground of politics, commonly raises concerns that she limits the political 
field too harshly. Fraser, for instance, argues that it ‘surrenders the normative moment’ 
(1995a: 69) by which individual’s find common ground in order to rally effective activism. 
Likewise, Kathy Dow-Magnus suggests that a ‘negative notion of agency […] fails to 
express the full range of possibilities for subjective agency. Butler underestimates the 
power of subjects to work together to determine their lives and the social conditions that 
structure their existence’ (83). 
For Fraser and Magnus: ‘Feminists need both deconstruction and reconstruction’ 
(Fraser 1995a: 71) and they assert, moreover, that ‘we do not need to view these two 
positions as antithetical’ (Magnus: 81). Indeed, Butler herself has similarly qualified her 
work with the notion of ‘a double movement’ in which political groups ‘provisionally […] 
institute an identity [but] at the same time open the category as cite of permanent political 
contest’ (1993: 222).  
Ultimately, what is at stake here is understanding how identity can be invoked as 
a rallying point without it rigidifying into a violent system of exclusion, and I will argue in 
the second section of this chapter that it is necessary to theorise a sense of reflexivity in 
order to account for this possibility. 
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which subject positions are produced. Rather than assuming a politics on 
behalf of an individual or group who is thought to simply will an action, this 
strategy interrogates the discursive ‘matrix through which all willing first 
becomes possible’ (7). It aims, in this way, at ‘tracing the lines in which 
identification is implicated in what it excludes’ (119), and exposing the 
complex insidious workings and dissimulations which surround political 
struggles. 
My purpose in distinguishing these two strategies here is to make 
the argument that they represent divergent aspects of Butler’s work which, 
in effect, require different frameworks of understanding in order to support 
their aims. In turn, what I am suggesting is that, insofar as these different 
requirements are not recognised by Butler, the deconstructive strategy 
overshadows and tacitly provides the model for the way gender regulation 
works both within real events of subversion, and in signifying processes 
more generally. Indeed, while subversive repetition is Butler’s invocation 
for agency within the social dimension of gendered politics, most of her 
actual work takes the form of deconstruction, and thereby hampers a 
realistic theoretical account of subversion.  
I would contend that deconstruction is a highly cogent method of 
thinking through issues of discursive constitution and gender hegemony, 
and is particularly effective in Butler’s analysis of the way legal structures 
coerce and limit the kind of political struggles available to subjects.4 Thus, 
                                                 
 
4 A good example of how Butler demonstrates the insidious problems of identity politics – 
and, more generally, of forming any type of political critique – is her analysis of the 
controversies surrounding the legality of gay marriage. She argues that the way the 
politics of this issue is constituted ‘demands that we take a stand, for or against gay 
marriage’ (2004: 107). However, while Butler does not oppose such a political struggle as 
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my argument that Butler requires a notion of lived, embodied experience 
does not impinge on this aspect of her work, since in these contexts 
discourse can be analysed purely for its structural exclusions and 
implications. However, the problem of ‘assisting a radical resignification’ 
(22) is quite different from analysing the implicit structures of discourse 
because it involves active confrontations and ongoing temporal 
experiences. 
Butler’s sole emphasis on discursive constitution becomes 
problematic in this context; but this is not because it requires the subject 
who resists hegemony to presume a self-present, pre-discursive identity in 
order to ground the intentions of a subversive act. Rather, it becomes 
problematic because it misses the need to demonstrate how the discursive 
effects of subversion are reflexively experienced by hegemonic subjects, 
and therefore does not inquire into the experiential conditions which make 
subversion effective. From this perspective, subversion is not simply a 
matter of changing the way discourse signifies, but of changing the way a 
psychic economy relates to discourse.  
                                                                                                                                     
such, she brings into focus how ‘the sexual field is forcibly constricted by accepting those 
terms’ (107).  
Deconstructing the terms of this debate reveals, for Butler, how closely ‘sexuality 
is already thought of in terms of marriage and marriage is already thought of in terms of 
legitimacy’ (106). Thus, by shifting the claims for sexual legitimacy onto an argument 
about who will be legitimately included in the norm of marriage, the debate ‘unwittingly 
performs’ (108) a foreclosure which narrows the terms by which sexuality itself can be 
legitimised. From within these narrowed terms, then, ‘new hierarchies emerge in public 
discourse [which] produce tacit distinctions among forms of illegitimacy’ (106). For 
instance, it makes gay partnerships which seek marriage ‘eligible for future legitimacy’ 
(106) while leaving others outside the struggle for legitimisation.  
From this perspective, Butler argues, ‘the proposition that marriage should 
become the only way to sanction or legitimate sexuality is unacceptably conservative’ 
(109). However, her point is not to oppose the struggle for gay marriage, but to show how 
the ‘urgency to stake a political claim’ (108) can lead to a further naturalisation of the very 
oppressive options which are resisted. 
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In this respect, one of the vital points where Butler’s deconstructive 
method becomes problematic is in the limitation she places on theorising 
the body as an active influence within contingent signifying processes. 
This will be the subject of the first section of this chapter, where I will argue 
that deconstruction is an important reading method insofar as it exposes 
the regulatory principles which tacitly inform biological research into the 
body. However, it also commits Butler to an abstract account of the body 
in relation to performative acts.  
In this light, part of my aim in section one will be to present the case 
that understanding performativity and subversion, as immediate social 
processes, benefits from Bergson’s sensory-motor understanding of the 
body. While Butler’s deconstructive perspective validly aims to expose the 
exclusions and de-legitimisations which take place through 
epistemological frameworks for understanding the body, it does not 
consider how the body’s intentional relation to its environment forms part 
of the dynamics of any signifying event. What I want to account for is an 
understanding of social regulation in which gender norms and subversive 
repetitions work directly upon the body’s expectations and 
responsiveness, and provides a contingent basis for the reflexivity of 
signifying acts which is dependent on specific tensions towards action. 
This section, then, will lay out the rationale for this argument in terms of a 
response to Butler’s own theorisation of the body. 
Following this, my second section in this chapter will explore the 
need to account for a flexible, contingently specific experience of subject 
positions through the notion of a self which Bergson can provide. 
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Focussing primarily on the subject’s experiential relation to otherness, I will 
argue that Butler’s early account of abjection as a discursive structure 
does not theorise the self-reflexive distance from discursive intelligibility 
necessary to enable the possibility of its transformation. I will also show 
how Butler’s later work does actually acknowledge the need to theorise 
the psychic processes of the self, as distinct from the subject, and 
attempts to do this through Hegel’s notion of recognition. However, I will 
argue that this perspective still does not provide enough variability for the 
way the other can be experienced in order to account for the potential 
effectiveness of subversion. 
Aside from her adaptation of Hegelian recognition, Butler has also 
attempted to theorise the psyche through a psychoanalytic notion of the 
unconscious. This aspect of her work will be the subject of my final 
section, particularly insofar as it provides a model to understand how 
hegemonic subjects invest in gender norms.  
Butler’s aim is to defend her work from accusations of behaviourism 
by demonstrating that the unconscious exceeds and resists the 
interpellation of discourse. However, as I will argue in relation to her idea 
of gender melancholy, her model of the unconscious still remains too 
heavily modelled on her understanding of discursive structures. It thus 
problematically excludes individually contingent motivations for gender 
investment and, again, does not theorise the conditions and variability of 
lived experience necessary to analyse the effectiveness of subversive 
repetition as a political strategy of social transformation. 
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The Materiality of the Body. 
 
 
In her work on performativity, one of Butler’s most general concerns 
is to expose a ‘surface politics of the body’ (2008: 184) in which a series of 
laws, prohibitions and taboos discursively regulate the social intelligibility 
of the body’s signifying meaning. These regulatory structures enforce ‘the 
restriction of gender within [a] binary pair’ (30), whereby the ‘unifying 
principle of the embodied self [is maintained] over and against an 
“opposite sex” whose structure is presumed to maintain a parallel but 
oppositional internal coherence’ (30). Moreover, this unifying principle is 
‘structured along matrices of gender hierarchy and compulsory 
heterosexuality’ (198) which suppress and, at its worst dehumanise, those 
who do not perform their gender within the bounds of its regulation. 
For Butler, this regulatory principle tacitly guides epistemological 
research into the body, particularly, but not restricted to, research related 
to the biological sciences. Such knowledge forms are, she argues, driven 
by a ‘desire to determine sex once and for all’ (150), and determine it 
through ‘the construction of the clear and univocal identities and positions 
of sexed bodies with respect to each other’ (150). In this way, the very 
‘category of “sex” is, from the start, normative’ (Butler 1993: 1). It functions 
as ‘an ideal construct’ (1) which regulates in advance the framework in 
which research is undertaken. Sexual difference, as it is discovered and 
presented through such research, is therefore ‘never simply a function of 
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material differences’ (1) because such differentiation is always ‘in some 
way both marked and formed by discursive practices’ (1). 
Butler’s work, then, demands that the body be viewed in terms of 
the discursive apparatus which both enable and regulate our 
understanding of it, and that such apparatus be deconstructed in order to 
expose its implicit normativity. While I generally endorse the politicised 
perspective this understanding of the body provides, a contention of this 
project is that, in relation to the lived processes of performativity, Butler’s 
purely deconstructive approach to the body occludes important aspects of 
the body’s role in signifying acts. My aim in this respect is to use Bergson’s 
sensory-motor understanding of the body in order to support and develop 
Butler’s arguments concerning the discursive regulation of the body.  
In this sense, my thesis does not encroach upon Butler’s emphatic 
critique of aspects of biological science which continue to determine the 
category of sex ‘within the framework of reproductive sexuality’ (2008: 
150). However, because I approach the body in terms of its processes 
rather than as a signifying surface, my project still crosses the stringent 
requirements which Butler’s deconstructive method places on theorising 
the body. It is necessary in this section, therefore, to negotiate the relation 
between my own approach to the body and Butler’s deconstructive 
methodology, and to justify my approach within the broader context of 
gender regulation. 
 In doing this I will, firstly, clarify some of the confusion which 
surrounds the difficulty of reading Butler’s comments on the body. This is 
to say, I will determine more precisely how Butler understands the 
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relationship between discourse and the body, while illuminating the 
benefits and limitations of this approach. What I aim to show is that 
Butler’s deconstructive method alone is not sufficient for a politics of the 
body. It also requires positive statements to be made about the body’s 
nature, both in order to reformulate and expand the way the body is 
signified within epistemological and social contexts, and to further explore 
the means by which gender is regulated.  
 In respect to this latter point – which is the direction my thesis aims 
towards – this section’s focal point will be to highlight how Butler’s analysis 
of the body solely in terms of its visual signifying surface leads to an 
abstract account of the body’s role in signifying practices. Specifically, this 
perspective omits a consideration of how the body’s intentional relation 
towards its social environment contingently influences the way individuals 
interpret signifying events. At the end of the section, then, I will begin 
clarifying how Bergson’s sensory-motor framework for understanding the 
relation between the body and consciousness can compensate for this 
omission.  
 Firstly, however, the question needs to be resolved of how Butler’s 
notion of the body should be understood, particularly insofar as her purely 
deconstructive approach to biology has led critics such as Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone to accuse Butler of having ‘spirited-away’ (155) the body. On a 
similar note, Carrie Hull has also written that ‘Butler […] makes the 
Hegelian error of asserting that the object itself is nothing but what 
discourse claims of it’ (24). However, against the implication of such 
critiques, it must be insisted that Butler herself does not want to deny the 
26 
 
body a “natural” existence as such, but only to emphasise that the 
materiality of the body can only be made intelligible through discourse. 
Indeed, in Bodies That Matter, materiality means for Butler the way the 
body is forcibly brought into intelligibility through discursive production. In 
this sense, ‘to claim that discourse is formative [of the body] is not to claim 
that it originates, causes, or exhaustively composes [it]’ (Butler 1993: 10), 
as Hull and Sheets-Johnstone suggest. Rather, it is to claim that there can 
be ‘no reference to a pure body [which is not] always to some degree 
performative’ (10, 11).5 
                                                 
5 Sheets-Johnstone’s critique of Butler is particularly apt in demonstrating some of the 
subtle issues involved in Butler’s relation to biology, specifically in providing insight into 
the way tendencies to read Butler as denying the body a biological status confounds the 
very problematic which Butler’s work actually aims to expose. While I am in sympathy 
with Sheets-Johnstone’s most general position, which ‘urges […] an acknowledgement 
and closer examination of biology [within the context of constructionist theories]’ (155), 
her reading of Butler’s idea of the body as ‘an immaculate linguistic conception’ (155) is 
slightly distorted. 
Butler insists, rather, that ‘the point [in deconstruction] has never been that 
“everything is discursively constructed”’ (1993: 8) but only that discourse creates the 
appearance of a stable referent through a set of exclusions which limit the realm of 
intelligibility. In this sense, her attitude towards biology is not one which denies the body 
its complexity as a biological entity as such, but one which emphasises that scientific 
research into biological sex also frames its object through sets of exclusions. Butler 
writes, for instance, that it is ‘possible to concede and affirm an array of “materialities” that 
pertain to the body’ (66), and cites ‘the domains of biology, anatomy, physiology [and] 
hormonal and chemical composition’ (66) as examples. However, the ‘undeniability of 
these “materialities” in no way implies what it means to affirm them [or] what interpretive 
matrices condition, enable and limit [those affirmations]’ (67). In other words, descriptive 
accounts of a biological object always occur within a history of discursive arrangements 
of power which affect the way those objects are interpreted and circulated as knowledge. 
Butler’s critical focus emerges, then, in relation to the implicit normative intentions of such 
power relations, which are disavowed when materialities are presented as purely 
objective facts.  
Sheets-Johnstone’s own approach to biology could be viewed as problematic for 
precisely this reason. For instance, in response to what she sees as Butler’s denial that 
the body has an evolutionary history in favour of the body as ‘a mere synecdoche for a 
social system’ (155), she writes: ‘the evolutionary body […] does not stand for, refer, or 
function as a trope in any way’ (155), and has ‘an established identity […] that bind us to 
certain corporeal acts, dispositions, and possibilities’ (155). Here, then, there is a claim 
that evolutionary science can begin with ‘descriptive accounts of what is actually there’ 
(155) without considering how such descriptions are always already framed by the effects 
of discursive power relations. 
The problem I want to outline here is that of reading Butler’s work as an 
ontological claim about the body which implies, in Butler’s words, that ‘perhaps I really 
thought that words alone had the power to craft bodies from their own linguistic 
substance’ (1993: x). Once Sheets-Johnstone makes this assumption, then her 
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 When Butler stresses that the body is always and only a discursive 
construction, she is attempting to expose the moments when ‘material 
positivities appear [to be] outside discourse and power, as its 
incontestable referents, its transcendental signifieds’ (35). Indeed, what 
Butler is most concerned to convey in her emphasis on the discursive 
production of the body is that power is most effective when its construction 
is dissimulated, and ideas concerning the sexed nature of the body are 
made to seem like a natural given. If discourse always creates an ‘object 
domain, a field of intelligibility’ (35) through exclusion and delimitation, 
then, it is when this object domain comes to be seen as a ‘taken-for-
granted ontology’ (35) that power is at its most effective and dangerous. 
 In this sense, Butler does not legitimate Hull’s accusation that the 
body is ‘nothing but what discourse claims of it’ (24). Indeed, part of 
Butler’s point concerning the discursive production of the body is that 
‘bodies never quite comply with the norms by which their materialization is 
compelled’ (Butler 1993: 2), and the way the “real” body exceeds its 
discursive constitution and returns to ‘haunt the field of intelligible bodily 
life’ (54) is an important aspect of Butler’s notion of resistance. Thus, while 
Butler claims that discourse and materiality are ‘fully embedded in each 
                                                                                                                                     
opposition to this misattributed premise over-shadows Butler’s more salient cautionary 
arguments about the very possibility of making ontological claims about the body. 
 As a rejoinder to these kind of divisive debates, I would argue that what is most 
valuable about Butler’s politicised theory of the body is that it foregoes questions of what 
is a real gendered body or identity, asking instead how an assumption of an ontological 
status becomes constituted, and through such questions ‘tracing the lines in which 
identification is implicated in what it excludes’ (1993: 119). As Butler has commented in 
interview:  
 
My work has always been undertaken with the aim to expand and enhance a field 
of possibilities for gendered life. My earlier emphasis on denaturalization was not 
so much an opposition to nature as it was an invocation of nature as a way of 
setting necessary limits on gendered life (1998b: 277).  
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other’ (69), she also recognises they are ‘never fully collapsed into one 
another’ (69).  
 The confusion arises, I think, from the particular way Butler 
conceives this “real” body as an ‘elusive referent’ (1193: 90) which is 
irreducible to language. In her deconstructive framework, this irreducibility 
should not be thought of as ‘an ontological thereness’ (8) which can, 
potentially, be entirely disclosed by discursive means. Rather, the ‘referent 
persists only as a kind of absence or loss, that which language does not 
capture’ (67), and that which ‘cannot be wholly fixed or defined by the 
reiterative labor of [the] norm’ (10). The body itself constitutes only ‘that 
which escapes or exceeds the norm’ (10), but which ‘takes its place in 
language as an insistent call or demand’ (67) which language ‘repeatedly’ 
(67) attempts to capture but inevitably fails. As an elusive referent for 
discursive construction, then, the body represents for Butler only the ‘gaps 
and fissures [which] are opened up as the constitutive instabilities of such 
constructions’ (10), but not positive attributes or values. As a disruptive 
effect of what cannot be contained within discursive definitions, these gaps 
and fissures haunt the domain of intelligibility and secure for Butler the 
idea that discursive construction ‘is itself a temporal process which 
operates through the [unstable] reiteration of norms’ (10). 
 Again, this not a denial of the body as such but an attempt to retain 
focus on the ‘constitutive force of exclusion [and] erasure’ (8) in any given 
signifying process. It emphasises that these constitutive exclusions ‘can 
only be thought – when [they] can – in relation to that discourse, at and as 
its most tenuous border’ (8). The political imperative of Butler’s 
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deconstructive approach is, in this way, not a naming process which would 
attempt to fill the gaps and fissures in discursive constitutions. This would, 
for her, only lead to new constitutive exclusions. Rather, it is an attempt to 
‘understand how what has been foreclosed or banished from the proper 
domain of “sex” […] might be produced as a troubling return’ (23) which 
provides the ‘deconstituting possibility [of putting] the norms of “sex” into a 
potentially productive crisis’ (10). It advocates, then, a ‘preservation of the 
outside, [as] the site where discourse meets its limits, [whereby] the 
opacity of what is not included […] acts as a disruptive site of linguistic 
impropriety and unrepresentability’ (53).  
 What this means, in effect, is that the excesses of discursive 
regulation ‘cannot be translated into anything more specific for Butler 
because a positive description of material reality would become a 
statement of metaphysical primacy’ (Hull: 26). In this sense, Butler’s 
deconstructive approach remains exemplary in its aim of examining the 
conditions of statements concerning the body for implicit exclusions and 
regulatory ideals. However, taken as a singular method of theorising the 
body it becomes a highly limiting, even counter-productive, strategy. In 
other words, political work on the body also requires positive conceptions 
which produce new ways in which the body becomes intelligible, and 
therefore actively works to counter-act hegemonic models. 
While such work obviously cannot be undertaken within the 
framework of Butler’s deconstructive methodology, I would argue that it 
can be a vital resource in her broader political aim of ‘proliferating gender 
configurations’ (Butler 2008: 193). My concern with Butler’s work, then, is 
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not with the value of deconstruction in and of itself, but with the tendency 
of that framework to be interpreted or used rigidly. Indeed, Butler’s 
insistence on the sedimented historicity of discourse sometimes attempts 
to undermine in advance the potential to engage productive dialogues with 
biology, and theories of materiality more generally. For instance, after a 
discussion of Plato’s association of matter with a denigration of women in 
Bodies That Matter, she writes: ‘to invoke matter is to invoke a sedimented 
history of sexual hierarchy and sexual erasures which should surely be an 
object of feminist inquiry, but would be quite problematic as a ground of 
feminist theory’ (49). 
 This argument seems to miss Butler’s own assertion that the most 
important aspect of her deconstructive approach is to repeat signifying 
conventions subversively, and thereby to de-naturalise the effects of their 
sedimented history. As she writes, for instance: ‘To deconstruct the 
concept of matter or that of bodies is not to negate or refuse either term 
[…] but to repeat them subversively, and to displace them from the 
contexts in which they have been deployed as instruments of power’ 
(1995a: 51). In this sense, to engage in new theories of matter or the 
body, which produce new types of contextual associations, also provides a 
way in which hegemony can be displaced and re-signified. To foreclose in 
advance the possibility that a theory of matter, or biological investigations 
into the body, might have positive repercussions is to deny their potential 
for ‘deviating the citational chain [and therefore changing] the very 
meaning of what counts as a valued and valuable body’ (Butler 1993: 22).  
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 My argument in this respect is that while theories about the body 
should be provisional and open-ended – and interminably subject to 
deconstruction after the fact – they are still necessary in order to subvert 
current ways of thinking. Moreover, it is important to recognise that not all 
statements about the body make ontological claims in the same way. 
Some, for instance, can be made to subvert a prior claim to ontology, 
others might be necessary to relieve a suffering. As Susan Bordo notes, 
‘determining whether a particular act or stance is resistant or subversive’ 
(1995: 292) cannot be achieved in advance. It ‘requires an examination of 
its practical, historical, [and] institutional reverberations’ (292).  
 
Introduction to the Sensory-Motor Body: 
 
In the context of this thesis, what is actually at stake is not primarily 
an assertion of the value of theorising a subversive ontology of the body. It 
is a demonstration of how an understanding of the body’s processes can 
provide a different view of the temporality of repetition. When Butler 
herself proposes that the body exceeds its significations she has in mind a 
temporal instability – a ‘mode of becoming’ (Butler 2004: 217) – which is, 
to a large extent, conceived in terms of its visual signifying surface. Thus, 
because bodies are always ‘aging, altering shape, altering signification – 
depending on their interactions’ (217), these visual and contextual 
vicissitudes of the body imply that it can ‘occupy the norm in a myriad of 
ways, exceed the norm, rework the norm, and expose realities to which we 
thought we were confined as open to transformation’ (217). 
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 While I find no fault with this argument as such, this perspective 
leads to a limited view of how the body relates to its discursive regulation. 
In terms of the lived processes of signification, the body is only thought of 
by Butler as an object of knowledge, whereby this knowledge constitutes 
the body as ‘a surface whose permeability is politically regulated’ (Butler 
2008: 189). Even though her point, ultimately, is that the body itself 
remains an ‘elusive referent’ (1993: 90) for its significations, and therefore 
‘haunt[s] the field of intelligible bodily life’ (54), her understanding of the 
body itself remains limited to the signifying effects of its visual surface.  
 My question is whether this perspective exhausts the options of 
how the body’s relation to performativity can be usefully understood. 
Confining the theorisation of the body to its surface signification may 
function well, from a theoretical perspective, as strategy which exposes 
the insidious workings of those signifying practices. However, it 
simultaneously excludes the way the body’s processes are always 
responding to the relations it encounters in the world, and thereby 
influences the way individuals experience their acts of signification.  
 As I have intimated already, my aim in this respect is to think of the 
body in terms of its ‘sensori-motor processes’ (Bergson 2005a: 42), and to 
place this way of understanding at the centre of performative acts. Viewed 
from Butler’s deconstructive perspective it could be argued this is a 
‘reference to a pure body’ (1993: 10) which is thought to be prior to the 
constituting effects of discourse. Nonetheless, in the context of my 
engagement with Butler, what it means to affirm the body as a sensory-
motor system does not imply a problematic assertion of a gendered 
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ontology, or a view of the body which would be radically free of power 
formations. It thus avoids the main critical concerns of Butler’s work. 
 What it beneficially provides is a way of understanding how the 
body itself can be contingently formed by the power relations it 
encounters, and some of the general processes it goes through during its 
social encounters. As far as the body is concerned, Butler’s prioritisation of 
discourse as an object of analysis commits her to an abstract appraisal of 
these processes. Indeed, because she only conceives the body through 
the way its visual outline signifies meaning effects, its socio-historical 
formation is conceived only in terms of the ‘construction of stable bodily 
contours’ (2008: 180; my italics). 
 In effect, everything plays out for Butler on the level of signifying 
effects. Discourse constrains the intelligibility of the body’s visual surface, 
and these constraints compel the repetition of such signifying effects. 
What this omits is a consideration of how the body itself tends to undergo 
physiological transformation due to the formative influence of its physical 
interactions. More specifically, I want to suggest that the enforced 
repetition of the body’s literal acts produce habituated body attitudes 
which, eventually, incline the body towards naturalised repetitions.6  
                                                 
6 The idea that performativity can be explained through habit has also been suggested by 
Shannon Sullivan. She uses John Dewey’s assertion that ‘individual habits are formed 
under conditions set by cultural configurations that precede the individual’ (Sullivan: 28) 
to suggest an explanation of how we ‘stylize our being in accord to those norms’ (32). 
The idea of habit, she argues, ‘allows us to understand Butler’s claim that performances 
constitute our bodily selves in a “deep” and thorough going way’ (31). Habits are formed 
which ‘are familiar and comfortable to us because they are us’ (32), and this familiarity is 
what grounds our attachments to broader discursive structures of power. 
The reason why Butler herself does not consider such an explanation of 
performativity is evidenced in Excitable Speech by her critique of Pierre Bourdieu, whose 
concept of habitus has certain similarities to Sullivan’s portrayal of Dewey. In particular, 
while both provide a sense of how socio-historical conditions form the body, there is also 
an implication that the formation of the body is constitutive of an individual’s being: ‘What 
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In order to better understand the lived process of repetition it 
becomes necessary, I would argue, to move beyond the idea of the body 
as a signifying surface and towards that of the body as an open material 
system. Bergson’s sensory-motor understanding of the body, described in 
terms of the nervous system, can be understood as such a model insofar 
as it is said that a body ‘borrows its physical properties from the relations 
which it maintains with all others’ (Bergson 2005a: 24). In such a 
perspective, an individual body ‘owes each of its determinations, and, 
consequently, its very existence, to the place it occupies in the universe as 
a whole’ (24). Therefore, insofar as the relations between bodies are 
conditioned by the pre-established constraints of power, this view is 
capable of maintaining a correlation between the body and discursive 
injunctions. What it implies in distinction from Butler, however, is that the 
basis of naturalising gender norms is a process by which the body itself 
learns how to act in its environment.  
 In Bergson’s relational understanding of the body, the nervous 
system is described as a ‘conductor [for] transmitting, sending back or 
inhibiting [material] movement’ (45) which is ‘interposed between the 
objects which affect my body and those which I can influence’ (44, 45). 
                                                                                                                                     
is “learned by the body” is not something that one has, like knowledge that can be 
brandished, but something one is’ (Bourdieu: 73). 
For Butler, this formulation is too constitutive of the body. It results in a model in 
which the habitus simply ‘generates dispositions which “incline” the social subject to act in 
relative conformity’ (Butler 1997b: 155), but provides no indication of how resistance is 
possible. Her chief worry is the suggestion that ‘the body does not merely act in 
accordance with certain regularised or ritualised practices [but rather] is this sedimented 
ritual activity’ (154). Such a perspective ‘presupposes […] that this forming is effective’ 
(156), and therefore misses both the regulatory force of interpellation and the possibility 
of its failure. 
My own formulation of habit will, like Sullivan and Bourdieu, look to explain the 
sedimentation of social practices. However, in contrast, I will also place an emphasis on 
the susceptibility of habit to be interrupted and, as such, account for the instability of 
power which Butler insists upon. 
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Every event which is sensed in the world constitutes, for Bergson, a kind 
of virtual action upon the body which, in turn, ‘provokes […] movements, at 
least nascent, whereby we adapt ourselves to it’ (84). In short, the function 
of the nervous system is to receive the stimulus which acts upon the body 
and ‘convert it into practical deeds’ (44).  
 In my use of Bergson, this perspective provides an alternative way 
to demonstrate how the bodies of hegemonic subjects naturalise gender 
norms. Through it, I will speculate upon how the discursive ‘stylization of 
the body’ (Butler 2008: 191) becomes incorporated into habituated action 
tendencies of individuals.  
 Important here is the idea that, as the relationship between 
particular sensory impressions and particular movements of the body are 
repeated, the association between them becomes consolidated and 
‘stored up in a mechanism [within the brain]’ (Bergson 2005a: 80). This 
constitutes a process by which the body organises together the visual 
outline of a gendered body with a set of motor expectations for how that 
body should act, and a set of motor responses by which it adapts to its 
gendered others. Thus, when a habit has been formed, ‘the body 
responds to a perception that recurs by a movement or attitude which has 
become automatic’ (237). In this way, the body itself becomes familiarised 
with the social expectations of gender through its motor habits, and the 
tendency to repeat these norms unreflectively provides a basis to 
understand how individuals sediment the social expectations of gender. 
 This perspective has implications for exploring how gender norms 
come to be ‘perform[ed] in the mode of belief’ (Butler 2008: 192), and how 
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the effects of subversive de-naturalisation are reflexively experienced by 
hegemonic subjects. Because habit is ‘lived and acted, rather than 
represented’ (Bergson 2005a: 81) its performance takes place in 
conformity with, but in excess of, signifying meaning. Indeed, the principle 
I will work from is that habit generates a tendency to repeat signifying 
norms unreflectively. It thus operates beneath the level of discursive 
meaning because ‘a movement is learned when the body has been made 
to understand it’ (112). Thus, because this learning involves setting up 
motor mechanisms which ‘concern action, and action alone’ (33), they 
operate through an entirely different logic to discourse and ‘remain 
absolutely foreign to the process of representation’ (33). 
 This is not to say that discursive structures have no role in acts of 
repetition, but that I will base lived processes of performativity on a 
principle of action. While I will argue that habit preserves gender norms in 
the form of motor mechanisms that are repeated inattentively, for Bergson 
the ‘past survives under two distinct forms’ (78). In addition to motor habit, 
there are also ‘independent recollections’ (78) which I will use to theorise 
the way gender is consciously represented. 
 In this respect, part of what will be at stake in my re-theorising of 
the body will be using the relation it has with memory to explore the 
immediate dynamics of meaning processes. As Bergson puts it: 
‘intellectual life rests […] upon the sensori-motor functions’ (175). This is 
not only because it is through the body that consciousness ‘inserts itself 
into the present [moment of] reality’ (175), but also because the manner in 
which individual memories inflect the present moment is, in an important 
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way, both invoked and limited by the body’s tension towards action. 
Indeed, ‘consciousness narrows or enlarges the development of its 
[memory] content’ (166) depending upon the immediacy or hesitation of 
action. 
 As I will discuss further in my following sections, this facilitates a 
more nuanced image of gender intelligibility and investment than Butler’s 
model. Similarly, I will argue that habit enables a socially naturalised and 
regulated tendency of gender repetition which can be destabilised by a 
‘failure to repeat, a de-formity, or a parodic repetition’ (Butler 2008: 192). 
However, rather than defining the effect of this subversion in terms of the 
incoherence of gender intelligibility, I will focus on the way it renders the 
immediate action tendencies of hegemonic subjects indeterminate. As 
such, I will explore the way subversion initiates a series of variable 
psycho-physical responses by which individuals adapt indeterminacy.  
 To my mind, the relation between consciousness and the body 
which Bergson describes is an important part of the temporal dynamics of 
a signifying act, and one which requires a re-examination of Butler’s work 
on performativity. It enables a more complete demonstration of how an 
individual’s psychic economy relates to the discursive structures of 
signification. It can thus examine more closely how such an economy 
changes in response to subversion and can, potentially, lead to 
transformations in the social practices of signification itself. 
In the following sections of this chapter I will explore in more detail 
the way Butler herself conceives the dynamics of intelligibility and gender 
investment, and introduce more explicitly how I am using Bergson’s 
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notions of the body and consciousness to respond to the problems I find in 
these conceptions. What it remains to reiterate here is that Butler’s 
deconstructive strategy overshadows the need to demonstrate how the 
body responds to signifying events, and how the body’s responsiveness 
affects processes of conscious identification. In effect, Butler can 
demonstrate only how ‘a body shows […] its cultural signification[s]’ (2008: 
192) through the signifying effects of its acts, but not the dynamics of the 
act itself as it temporally unfolds in relation to its social environment. In the 
following section I will continue the general critical perspective that Butler 
provides only an abstract view of signifying acts which excludes its lived 
temporal dynamics, only in relation to her theorisation of the subject, the 
self, and the other rather than the body. 
 
The Subject and the Self. 
 
 
As I suggested in the introduction to this chapter, Butler’s paradigm 
usefully moves political analysis back a step to the discursive ‘matrix 
through which all willing first becomes possible’ (1993: 7). However, the 
disadvantage which follows from this perspective is that Butler is led to a 
view of signification which is abstracted from the real processes of 
experience, and this is particularly problematic for her strategy of 
subversive repetition. For Butler, the protagonist of performativity is the 
subject which, ‘rather than [being] identified with the individual, ought to be 
designated as a linguistic category, a place holder, a structure in 
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formation’ (1997a: 10). From this perspective, ‘it makes little sense to treat 
“the individual” as an intelligible term if individuals are said to acquire their 
intelligibility [only] by becoming subjects (11). However, in contradiction to 
this, my argument is that it is necessary to theorise a notion of an 
individual self, who reflexively experiences their subject positions, in order 
to understand the way these subject positions become sedimented and 
how they can be transformed. 
In order to further justify this claim I will, in this section, explore this 
aspect of gender performativity in relation to prominent critiques of Butler’s 
work, and some of the directions she has developed in response to these 
critiques. This will help clarify the reasons why the complementary theory 
of self-reflexivity I will offer in this thesis is necessary. I will also outline 
along the way some of the specific directions this theory will take in 
relation to my use of Bergson’s work. 
I will begin with Butler’s initial foreclosure of the self in her early 
work. Here, I will assert the need to distinguish the self from the subject in 
order to account for a reflexive distance from discursive intelligibility which 
makes resistance and re-signification possible. This will lead to a more 
detailed exploration of Butler’s structural account of abjection and self-
coherence, which necessitates a consideration of the temporal experience 
of acts of signification in order to understand how subversive repetition is 
experienced by hegemonic subjects, and how signification remains open 
enough to be transformed. Finally, I will explore the more recent 
development of Butler’s work in which she has begun to reconsider a 
theory of the self, as distinct from discursive subject positions, through a 
40 
 
Hegelian notion of recognition. This aspect of her work, I will argue, 
remains problematic in relation to performativity because it still fails to 
account for a dynamic relation between self and other that can 
demonstrate the relation between sedimentation and potential 
transformation within signifying practices.  
 
The Theorisation of Self-reflexivity: 
 
In respect to performativity, then, Butler forecloses recourse to an 
individual self insofar as it displaces a consideration of the political 
constitution of the subject. She insists, for instance: ‘If the “cause” of 
desire, gesture, and act can be localized within the “self” of the actor, then 
the political regulations and disciplinary practices which produce that 
ostensibly coherent gender are effectively displaced from view’ (2008: 
186). As I have previously argued, this perspective is productive insofar as 
it maintains a politicisation of gender which cautions against the often 
hidden implications of identity politics. Moreover, it is extremely successful 
in Butler’s own analysis of the discursive effects of law, and in analysing 
the ‘conditions of emergence and operation’ (1993: 7) of political agency. 
However, Butler’s strict adherence to discursive causality prevents 
a more dynamic account of subjectivity which is both historically produced, 
but also admits some kind of conscious reflexivity. Indeed, in her texts on 
performativity Butler presumes that a theory of self-reflexivity is detrimental 
to an understanding of the subject as a discursive structure.  She thus 
presents it in an entirely dismissive fashion: as either ‘a transcendental 
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subject who enables action’ (2008: 199), or ‘a capacity for reflexive 
mediation, which remains intact regardless of its cultural embeddedness’ 
(195).  
By presuming that any recourse to reflexivity must be based on an 
ideal of autonomy, Butler sets up a theoretical position which propagates 
what Lise Nelson has called a false dichotomy. It is false, that is, because 
the ‘dichotomy between the subject as a node in the discursive matrix 
[and] a notion of subjectivity as transparent and whole’ (Nelson: 336) 
effectively forecloses a more nuanced account of the self.7 
                                                 
7 Nelson’s critique here revolves around the difficulties of using performativity for the 
purposes of analysing the way institutions change over time, and she cites examples 
from her field of geography which ‘smuggle’ (344) notions of intentionality into 
performativity while wrongly attributing it to Butler herself. This demonstrates, for Nelson, 
a fundamental shortcoming of Butler’s work because without ‘some notion of self-
reflexivity and intentionality [it is difficult to use] performativity to analyze the production 
and contestation of heterosexualized spaces within particular spatial/temporal contexts’ 
(343). She thus concludes that, since Butler does not theorize a more complex reflexivity, 
it becomes almost inevitable that ideals of autonomous intentionality slip back into 
applications of her work. 
Nelson is right here to point towards the theoretical limitations of Butler’s model 
insofar as it has difficulty in capturing the ‘complex inter-subjective dynamics’ (344) at 
work within contextually specific gender configurations. However, it is quite different to 
claim that Butler’s work is haunted by autonomy because she fundamentally ‘forecloses 
inquiry into agency, change and the spatiality of identity formation’ (346, 347), and that 
‘Butler problematically jettisons agency altogether’ (332). Such statements seem to miss 
the purpose and the specific range of Butler’s work, which strives to analyse the 
discursive conditions of agency and the insidious implications of a subject’s discursively 
constituted intentions.  
From this perspective, Catherine Mills correctly counter-argues that ‘Nelson 
attributes much more weight to intentionality than is necessary’ (276). That is, in Mills’ 
terms, Nelson loses sight of ‘a crucial difference between the intentions of a subject to 
perform certain actions and their capacity to control or fix the effects of those actions’ 
(276). Indeed, within the course of her relatively level-headed critique of Butler, Nelson 
subtly reverts to a notion of reflexivity conceived in terms of intentional choices, whereby 
individuals ‘choose to create a particular image [of identity]’ (Nelson: 344).  
Because of this slippage, Butler’s assertion that performativity ‘in no way 
presupposes a choosing subject’ (Butler 1993: 15) is read by Nelson to imply that 
individuals are ‘incapable of reflexive thought’ (Nelson: 350). However, Butler’s aim is not 
to deny that individuals are in capable of choosing between, for instance, wearing 
different styles of clothing that have different gendered connotations. Rather, it is to 
create a framework from which to analyse the way such choices are always already 
constrained by the discursive effects of power, and to show the ways that these 
constraints are dissimulated when gender is considered in terms of a free choice.  
What I wish this critical perspective to highlight here is the difficulty of affirming a 
notion of self-reflexivity without undermining Butler’s specific theorisation of discursive 
constraint. Nelson admits that her aim of analysing the specific temporal and 
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Nelson’s important argument is that Butler ‘ontologically assumes 
an abstracted subject (ie, abstracted as a subject position in a given 
discourse)’ (332). Butler ‘thus provides no space for conscious reflexivity 
[…] in the doing of identity’ (332); and Nelson asserts such reflexivity 
should be considered in relation to specific institutions and social groups 
rather than the broadly applicable notion of law and prohibition which 
Butler tends to explicate. Indeed, developing Butler’s work in this direction 
is a necessity for the kind of sociological studies Nelson has in mind.  
However, the related point I want to emphasise here does not 
concern the specificity of Nelson’s ‘historical or geographical concrete 
subjects’ (332) as such. Rather, it is that by making the possibility of re-
signification ‘primarily a capacity of symbolic structures rather than 
individuals’ (McNay 1999: 178), Butler draws focus away from the specific 
psychic and embodied processes through which signifying effects are 
experienced from moment to moment.  
This has implications for analysing the dynamics of change. In 
effect, the dichotomy by which Butler excludes self-reflexivity means her 
theoretical framework can only re-examine contingent changes in 
signifying practices for the structural exclusions and hierarchies which 
either become temporarily disrupted or remain inherent within them. It 
cannot account for how such changes impact on, or are enabled by, the 
                                                                                                                                     
geographical influences on identity is an ‘ontologically distinct project’ (348) from Butler’s, 
but insofar as this is true both the image of a choosing self she invokes and the reasons 
for her critique are not directly applicable to Butler’s model. In contrast, my recourse to a 
self aims to have specific relevance for Butler’s notion of subversive repetition, using a 
very different notion of reflexive experience in order to explore the relation between the 
sedimented mechanisms of power and their instability. 
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variable experiences of the subjects who participate in them. It is in this 
sense that Seyla Benhabib has argued: 
 
A speech-act theory of performative gender constitution cannot give 
us a sufficiently thick and rich account of gender formation that 
would explain the capacities of human agents for self 
determination. […] What psychic, intellectual or other sources of 
creativity and resistance must we attribute to human subjects for 
[…] variation to be possible? (1995b: 110).  
 
While Benhabib’s reading of Butler is a poor interpretation of her 
actual theoretical perspective, it raises a genuine concern about where the 
capacity to resist and the creativity to re-signify comes from. In order to 
account for such a capacity it is necessary to theorise a performative 
subject whose agency and social intelligibility is at once conditioned by 
historically sedimented practices of signification, yet attains a degree of 
self-reflexivity which is not reducible to those signifying positions.8 
                                                 
8 The problem with Benhabib’s reading is apparent in the question she asks just before 
the above quotation: ‘How can one be constituted by discourse without being determined 
by it?’ (Benhabib 1995b: 110). Benhabib initially reads Butler’s statements concerning 
gender constitution as implying that ‘we are no more than the sum total of the gendered 
expressions we perform’ (Benhabib 1995a: 21). She thus fails to recognise that Butler’s 
notion of the subject is ‘distinct from what Benhabib will call a “self”’ (Butler 1995b: 134, 
135). She therefore ‘proceeds to reduce “performative constitution” to a behaviorist 
model’ (134). 
What Benhabib fails to adequately recognise here is Butler’s emphasis on 
performativity as a constitutive process of unstable repetition which never finally 
establishes its effects. Subject positions are never fully determined precisely because 
they must be continually repeated, and the ‘constitutive instabilities’ (Butler 1993: 10) 
within these repetitions enable the possibility of their transformation. There is, however, 
no possibility of deriving a position of resistance outside of established discursive 
structures. What Butler’s concept of the subject intends to emphasise, therefore, is the 
‘difficult labor of deriving agency from the very power regimes which constitute us’ (Butler 
1995b: 136). 
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As I explained in my introduction, my approach to this problem will, 
in Chapter Two, draw from Bergson’s Time and Free Will in which he 
depicts two aspects of the self. On the one hand, there is ‘the deep-seated 
self’ (Bergson 1971: 125) of duration in which even ‘the simplest psychic 
elements […] are in a constant state of becoming’ (200). An apperception 
of such deep-seated change can, therefore, account for a certain capacity 
for creativity and resistance because it denotes an underlying experience 
which continually exceeds the norm of intelligibility. On the other hand, 
there is a ‘superficial psychic life’ (125) whereby the ready-made 
structures of language ‘covers over the delicate and fugitive impressions 
of our individual consciousness’ (132). This superficial self is like an 
‘external projection’ (231) or ‘social representation’ (231) of durational 
experience within language. It thus constrains the possibilities of self-
determination in a similar way to Butler’s model of discursive subject 
positions. 
Importantly, these two selves are not separable for Bergson, but 
exist in a constant process of exchange and tension. The changing self 
must reduce itself into conventional subject positions in order to 
communicate, and in this sense does not exist as the possibility of an 
identity which can maintain integrity as an external opposition to 
discourse. At the same time, because it is constantly changing, duration 
                                                                                                                                     
Ultimately, Benhabib’s dispute with Butler rests on her assertion that Butler’s 
‘dissolution of the [autonomous] subject’ (Benhabib 1995a: 20) is ‘not compatible with the 
goals of feminism’ (20). Benhabib, rather, believes that ‘female emancipation’ (21) can 
only be achieved when it ‘strives towards autonomy’ (21). In this sense, the notion of self 
which Benhabib offers is incompatible with Butler’s concerns, and while I agree with 
Benhabib that Butler’s notion of the subject requires a self-reflexive ‘distance between 
itself and the chain of significations’ (20), I side with Butler on the point that the agency of 
such a self should not be understood as autonomous. Indeed, Butler’s theory of 
discursive constitution is intended to subvert the ‘unnecessary binarism between free will 
and determinacy’ (Butler 2008: 201) which structures Benhabib’s politics.  
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accounts for a degree of unique reflexivity in which subject positions are 
always taken up variably, and can therefore facilitate creative 
engagements with discourse. 
At any rate, the issue of creativity and resistance raised by 
Benhabib is only one aspect of the problem posed by Butler’s reduction of 
signifying practices to discursive structures. More urgent to her concerns 
about the potential for re-signification, I would suggest, is that her abstract 
model does not fully account for the effects of re-signification on 
individuals who are invested in norms. It cannot, that is, account for why 
and how a subversive act would attain the desired effect of transforming 
the subject’s naturalised relation to hegemonic power. 
In this sense, the reason why Butler’s work requires a compatible 
model of self-reflexivity is because, by focussing only on the discursive 
level, her work neglects the psychological and emotional conditions 
necessary for re-signification to have lasting effects. Indeed, as McNay 
argues, one of the effects of ‘regarding gender identity largely as a 
question of position in language and not as a lived social relation is that 
the dominant is left unproblematized’ (2004: 185). It is left 
unproblematised, that is, because although Butler suggests that identities 
are inherently complex, in her texts on performativity these complexities 
are depicted only in terms of the ‘relational nature of language’ (185). The 
ongoing conflicts, negotiations and tensions through which hegemonic 
identities develop are therefore ‘obscured’ (185) in Butler’s work because 
such dynamics ‘can only be perceived from the perspective of experience’ 
(185). 
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This argument is particularly apt in relation to the account Butler 
provides of the conflict between the coherence of hegemonic gender 
identities and their abject others. The logic of Butler’s perspective here 
stems from the idea that discourse can only produce coherent objects 
through a set of exclusions which limit the realm of intelligibility. In terms of 
subject formation, these discursive exclusions produce ‘the schemes of 
recognition that are available to us’ (Butler 2004: 2), and create a realm of 
intelligibility which determines ‘who qualifies as the recognizably human 
and who does not’ (2). In other words, the coherence of the gendered 
subject can only be constituted and sustained through an exclusion which 
creates a ‘domain of deauthorized subjects, presubjects, figures of 
abjection, populations erased from view’ (Butler 1995a: 47).  
In terms of self-coherence, these exclusions form what Butler calls 
a ‘constitutive or relative outside’ (1993: 39) which is ‘nevertheless internal 
to that system as its own nonthematizable necessity’ (39). Importantly, 
these constitutive exclusions emerge ‘within the system as incoherence, 
disruption, a threat to its own systematicity’ (39), and so always perform a 
‘disruptive return within the very terms of its discursive legitimacy’ (8). 
Every assertion of coherence, therefore, entails for Butler a correlative 
process of abjection that haunts authoritative subjects from within. This, 
indeed, is for Butler the reason why hegemonic positions are repeated: 
‘norms are continually haunted by their own inefficiency; hence, the 
anxiously repeated effort to install and augment their jurisdiction’ (237). 
While not wishing to deny constitutive exclusions as an inherent 
aspect of subject formation, I believe there is a need to distinguish more 
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closely between the structural factors of discourse and the experiential 
factors of abjection and disruption. If the shoring up of incoherence 
through abjection is fundamental to all hegemonic repetition then there is 
good reason to believe that subverting the coherence of subject positions 
can only result in a violent rejection of that subversion. In order to 
understand the conditions under which the subversive de-naturalising of 
gender norms might result in a transformation rather than in a further 
abjection, then, it becomes necessary to conceptualise performativity as a 
more versatile and self-reflexive experience. 
 
The temporal dynamics of the self: 
 
Butler herself has voiced a more nuanced explanation of subject 
formation when responding to criticism by Nancy Fraser, and it is useful 
here to briefly outline this response. This is because, in this context, Butler 
suggests that abjection is not the only possibility of subject formation, but 
nonetheless continues to exclude the experiencing self in favour of the 
discursive subject. It can thus help to clarify the need to account for 
experiential factors within processes of repetition and intelligibility.  
Responding to Butler’s condemnation of identity politics, Fraser’s 
critique calls for the need to ‘distinguish legitimate from illegitimate 
exclusions’ (1995a: 68). In her reply, Butler qualifies her usual position – 
which presents abjection as a fundamental characteristic of the subject – 
and presents it as only the worst kind of subject formation. She writes, for 
instance: ‘whereas every subject is formed through a process of 
48 
 
differentiation, […] there are better and worse forms of differentiation, and 
[…] the worse kinds tend to abject and degrade those from whom the “I” is 
distinguished’ (Butler 1995b: 140). 
With these worst kinds of subjects, then, ‘abjection is installed as 
the condition of [the] “I”’ (140), as it is in my explication above. From the 
opposite perspective, however, Butler also concedes the possibility of a 
subject whereby ‘an “I” is differentiated from another [but] does not mean 
that the other becomes unthinkable in its difference’ (139). Indeed, these 
types of subject are what Butler’s work calls for: ‘the development of forms 
of differentiation which lead to fundamentally more capricious, generous, 
and “unthreatened” bearings on the self in the midst of community’ (140).  
With this admission, a kind of implicit polarity can be detected in 
Butler’s notion of subject positions: one which ranges from the explicit 
need to repeat violent degradations to those ‘in which the violence of 
exclusion is perpetually in the process of being overcome’ (Butler 1993: 
53). The problem with Butler’s formulation is that, because of her 
reluctance to theorise an experiencing self, this polarity is presented only 
as a characteristic of the discursive system itself. That is, a subject 
position can be structured, in its discursive formation, as either violently 
abjecting or as unthreatened by difference.  
The point I want to emphasise here is not only that there are better 
and worse ways of experiencing subject positions. It is also that such 
differentiable relations to discourse must be available to individuals in 
order to account for a movement from a rigid system of discursive 
exclusion to one in which the violence of exclusion is overcome. This is to 
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say that, even thought of as a socio-historic process of change, discursive 
structures can only become more open through a process by which 
individuals negotiate their own tensions between the ideal of self-
coherence and discursive structures of exclusion.  
While part of my own analysis of the lived dimensions of self-
coherence and abjection will be explored in relation to emotional 
responsiveness, my definition of emotion itself will be drawn out within a 
broader framework of temporality. Before I introduce the role of emotion 
more fully in my next section, then, it is necessary to begin clarifying the 
more general role which temporality will play in this thesis. Indeed, in order 
to properly analyse Butler’s own conception of performativity and de-
naturalisation, it is necessary to look closer at the temporal relations 
inherent in her model of signification. What I want to specifically suggest in 
this respect is that, insofar as performativity is essentially described as ‘a 
constituted social temporality’ (Butler 2008: 191), a certain reflexive 
experience of temporality is actually already implicit in Butler’s work. 
Butler wishes to emphasise that signification is ‘not a function of an 
individual’s intention, but […] an effect of historically sedimented linguistic 
conventions’ (1995b: 134). She thus describes the temporal modality of 
performativity primarily in terms of discursive citations. In order for a 
present act of signification to attain the authoritative force of normativity, 
she argues, it ‘must draw upon and recite a set of linguistic conventions 
which have traditionally worked to bind or engage certain kinds of effects’ 
(134). Temporality is, in this way, first and foremost an accumulation of 
signifying effects which congeal over time. Nonetheless, re-reading 
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Butler’s ideas on normative repetition in relation to that of re-signification, 
the implication of a reflexive experience of signification is actually quite 
close to the surface of her work. 
It is clear from Butler’s texts that gender is at its most normative, 
and differentiation is most prone to violent exclusion, when the ‘subject 
takes itself as the single origin of its actions’ (Butler 1995a: 43). In such 
cases, the subject cites the sedimented conventions of the past but, in 
order to naturalise them and to produce the effect of an interior and 
autonomous essence of gender, ‘conceals and dissimulates the 
conventions of which it is a repetition’ (Butler 1993: 12). Performativity 
thus has a certain relation to the past, whereby the effect of repetition 
accumulates and sediments to the extent that each individual performer 
disavows their gendered acts as being a re-citation. In effect, the aim of 
re-signification is to de-naturalise this relation to the past, disrupting its 
dissimulated status and therefore allowing the possibility of ‘reworking the 
historicity of the signifier’ (Butler 1995b: 136). For re-signification to be 
effective, then, a hegemonic subject’s psychic relation to the past must be 
at least temporarily altered, allowing the effects of signification to emerge 
as a historical construction. 
The importance of temporality within immediate acts of 
performativity and re-signification is further underlined by Butler’s 
invocations of the future. On the one hand, ‘gender […] operates as an 
interior essence that might be disclosed, an expectation that ends up 
producing the phenomenon that it anticipates’ (Butler 2008: xv). To put it 
another way, we might say that normative significations project their 
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authority into the immediate future as an expectation which, in turn, is 
confirmed by the signifying act itself.  
On the other hand, a correlative image of the future is associated 
with the contestation of exclusionary structures of discourse. For instance, 
in order to perpetually overcome the violence of exclusion we must, Butler 
argues, ‘refigure this necessary “outside” as a future horizon’ (1993: 53). 
We must, in other words, withdraw the sedimented expectation which 
‘attributes a certain force to the law’ (Butler 2008: xv), and actively leave 
the future of differentiation open to contestation and change. 
These arguments imply that there is more potential agency to 
transform the discursive structures of differentiation when the future is 
open than when it is constrained within the bounds of an expectation, and 
when the past is consciously represented as a set of formative 
conventions rather than being disavowed. However, insofar as this 
temporal modality is presented as a function of discourse itself, it remains 
unclear how it is possible to pass from one state to the other. In order for a 
subversive repetition to have the effect of denaturalisation it must, in the 
first place, be enacted upon a psyche capable of changing its relation to 
the temporal modality of performativity. 
In short, ‘to open [a discursive] category as a site of permanent 
political contest’ (Butler 1993: 222) requires a sense of reflexive 
temporality which effects the psychic act of intelligibility. It requires that, 
within the very act of using the category to form an intelligible object 
domain, the individual actor remains self-consciously open to its 
provisional nature and the possibility of its future reformation. Such 
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temporal reflexivity is not given by the discursive structure itself, but is 
precisely a variable experience of discursive borders, of the force of 
convention, and of the relation between the intelligible and the 
unintelligible.  
This, in turn, means that the exclusionary borders of subject 
positions do not unilaterally determine the way that differentiation is 
psychically distributed, or the force by which such structures are regulated. 
While discursive conventions supply the socio-historic form of gender 
legitimacy and agency, the lived act of intelligibility is given, at least in part, 
by a variable psychic and temporal economy of responsiveness that is 
contingent to each immediate act. Without accounting for such a diverse 
potential of the experiencing self it is difficult to locate the mechanisms by 
which power is actively perpetuated or successfully rendered unstable. 
It is in response to this problem that I will draw upon Bergson’s last 
book, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, in Chapter Two. 
Extrapolating from Bergson, I will argue that even though ‘the subject is an 
accomplishment regulated and produced in advance’ (Butler 1995a: 47), 
the social relation between self and other manifests in a constantly 
changing tension between two opposing moral dispositions which Bergson 
calls obligation and aspiration. 
In this context, what is significant about Bergson’s model of 
aspiration and obligation is that it enables a view of signification in which, 
even within a single discursive convention, the response to its thematic 
incoherence is contingent to each specific signifying event. This is 
because the way the discursively produced “I” is internally differentiated 
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within a temporally unfolding event can be seen to depend upon the way 
an individual’s own immediate temporal apperceptions fluctuate.  
On the one hand, obligation is a tendency to conserve the past as 
an expectation, and to consolidate identity within ‘ready-made rules’ 
(Bergson 1935: 46). Here, I will argue, discourse becomes a rigid space 
because the past is presented to the self as a signifying expectation which 
is projected into the future, meaning that otherness is experienced by the 
self as disruption of these expectations. In this disposition, then, difference 
is externalised and, pace Butler, functions through the degradation of 
others who mark the borders of identity.  
On the other hand, however, for Bergson the past also accumulates 
efficaciously within duration. As a direct apperception of duration, the 
disposition of aspiration facilitates an open relation towards the immediate 
future. This is because the point of departure for experiencing the 
intelligibility of a signifying event is no longer an attempt to stabilise ready-
made meanings. It is an individual’s own internal experience of change. 
Thus, because the past is not psychically represented as a rigid 
expectation, an individual’s relation to discursive borders and otherness 
becomes much more fluid.  
In this way, aspiration can be thought of as an open reflexivity. It 
allows the self to change in response to otherness so that, in this state, 
subversion can indeed ‘compel a radical rethinking of the psychological 
presuppositions of gender identity’ (Butler 2008: 189). The apperception of 
duration, as an on-going and inexpressible movement, allows a more 
radical internal differentiation of the self’s relation to otherness than 
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discursive structures do. The other is ‘not […] unthinkable in its difference’ 
(Butler 1995a: 139), but is thinkable through a creative relation to the past 
and discourse which enables new experiences of intelligibility and 
recognition to emerge. Rather than shoring up its borders through 
abjection, the self’s response to discursive incoherence can be developed 
in relation to ‘a forward thrust, a demand for movement’ (Bergson 1935: 
45). In this moment, then, an aspirational impulse can emerge from an act 
of de-naturalisation which can motivate a receptive attitude towards re-
signification.  
Ultimately, as a transformative tendency of the self, aspiration can 
only be a rare transitional potential. This is to say, it cannot be maintained 
as a continuous relation towards otherness because the tendency towards 
obligation is a more prominent characteristic of everyday psychic life. 
Indeed, once aspiration has opened up an individual’s psychic relation to 
the other, it ‘tends to materialize by assuming the form of strict obligation’ 
(Bergson 1935: 51), thus returning the self to a closed disposition. 
At any rate, I will discuss the limits and possibilities of aspiration 
more fully in my following chapter. My primary point here is that Bergson’s 
framework can allow me to theorise a notion of the self without radically 
contradicting Butler’s view of the subject as a regulated position in a 
discursive matrix. Duration is not an unchanging essence which causes 
discrete gender identifications, but an immanent process of continual 
change. It therefore cannot be responsible for initiating the ‘illusion of an 
interior and organizing gender core’ (Butler 2008: 186) by which ‘political 
regulations […] are effectively displaced from view’ (186). 
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Theories of Recognition: 
 
It should be noted that Butler herself would be likely to resist my 
use of duration, as a means to understanding certain dynamics of the self, 
on the basis that it tends towards ideal of unity. I say this specifically in the 
light of some of her more recent work in which, through a reading of 
Hegel’s dialectic of recognition, she develops her own notion of the self. 
For the remainder of this section, therefore, I will address this aspect of 
her work in relation to my own interpretation of performativity. I will firstly 
examine the reasons behind Butler’s probable complaint against 
aspiration, and defend my own perspective as a valid way of thinking of 
the self. I will then explore more specifically why Butler’s own notion of self 
is insufficient to fully deal with the problem of transforming discursive 
structures. Finally, these reflections will lead me to foreshadow the role 
Bergson’s conception of the body and memory will play in conceptualising 
processes of self-coherence and instability. 
As with Butler’s theory of performativity and discursive intelligibility, 
her notion of the self begins with the idea that recognition is, from the start, 
beyond the control of any individual. However, in addition to the 
dependence on discourse to provide the structure of gender recognition, 
Butler reflects upon the ontology of self-knowledge implied by the need to 
have recognition conferred upon us by others. Insofar as ‘it is only through 
the experience of recognition that any of us becomes constituted as 
socially viable beings’ (Butler 2004: 2) we are not only interpellated by 
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desires and identities which ‘do not originate with our individual 
personhood’ (2). The self is also ‘marked by a primary enthrallment with 
the Other […] in which that self is put at risk’ (149). 
This is to say that it is ‘the Other who secures that self’s existence’ 
(149), and who therefore ‘poses the possibility of both securing and 
undermining self-knowledge’ (148; my italics). In Butler’s model: ‘whatever 
consciousness is, whatever the self is, [it] will find itself only through a 
reflection of itself in another’ (147). The dynamics of consciousness – or, 
more specifically, self-conscious awareness – are thus characterised by 
Butler by an ‘ontological primacy of relationality itself’ (150). The self that 
seeks recognition is never, in the first place, a self-presence which is there 
to be recognised. To find recognition for itself within the world, ‘it must 
pass through [a] self-loss’ (147) which condemns its ideal of self-
determination to a vulnerable, dependant, and ‘invariably ambivalent’ 
(147) relation to the other. It is a self, then, which is necessarily ‘outside 
itself, not self-identical, differentiated from the start. […] Its ontology is 
precisely to be divided and spanned in irrevocable ways’ (148). 
Thought of in this way, Butler’s notion of the self is certainly ‘one 
way of disputing the self-sufficiency of the subject’ (150). Because, in 
every act of recognition, the self is ‘ambiguously installed outside itself’ 
(150), this decentred relationality positions the self irrevocably beyond its 
own autonomous control. The conceit of self-determined identity which 
facilitates the naturalisation of gender norms is, therefore, continuously 
rendered unstable. While a sense of ambivalence and vulnerability can be 
covered over quite successfully by psychic acts of disavowal and 
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repression, such processes cannot finally disown the self’s dependency on 
the other. A hegemonic subject, or self, must continuously ‘shore up what 
it knows, [and often violently] expunge what threatens it with not knowing’ 
(35). 
From this perspective, Butler asserts the imperative of ‘thinking the 
self in its necessary (and ethically consequential) disunity’ (150). She 
argues, for instance, that a ‘nonviolent response lives with its 
unknowingness about the Other’ (35), and therefore lives with the 
ambivalence of not knowing the self. Ethics, in this sense, becomes an 
attempt to ‘learn to live in the anxiety of that challenge’ (35). 
It is this ethical standpoint which, I suspect, would lead Butler to 
read aspiration as an ideal of unity. This is to say that a notion of 
aspiration, as an internal experience of the self’s on-going processes of 
duration, would imply for Butler a model of consciousness in which the 
‘ontological status of the self is self-sufficient’ (150). Because it does not 
define the relation to the other as an invariable ambivalence and 
fundamental vulnerability, Butler would infer an assumption of transparent 
knowledge. 
In response to this probable critique I would like to stress that 
aspiration is the apperception of a movement within the self. While it 
proceeds through a process of differentiation which is internal to the self’s 
duration, such differentiation does not reveal the self as a unity in the 
sense of being a transparent and stable source of identity. Duration is a 
unity only in the sense that every passing moment consists of ‘a thousand 
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different elements which dissolve into and permeate one another without 
precise outline’ (Bergson 1971: 132; my italics).  
In the context of Butler’s conceptual framework, then, the 
apperception of this movement cannot be adequately characterised as 
knowledge because, at every moment, the self is in continuous fluid 
change. Therefore, because there is no stable experience of the self from 
which to confer recognition, aspiration provides an alternative way of 
theorising a movement ‘that […] takes the Other out of the narcissistic 
circuit of the subject’ (Butler 2004: 149). Insofar as an on-going 
apperception of change can be a source of experiencing the other, it 
provides a way of determining how relationality unfolds experientially 
which is neither an ideal of self-identity nor an ambivalent movement of 
self loss. 
Butler’s portrayal of recognition as a decentred process provides an 
insightful account of why the self should not be conceived as an 
autonomous entity. My concern is that her insistence that the self is not a 
unity pushes forward a perspective which denies other important 
dynamics, such as duration, which exist within the orbit of the self’s 
relationality. In effect, Butler conveys a monochromatic spectrum of 
psychic life which measures the dynamics of relationality through a sharp 
polarity between the ideal of autonomous self-knowledge and 
ambivalence. This framework, then, hinders an understanding of 
performativity and subversion in the sense that it elides the efficacy of the 
self to achieve many radically different states of consciousness, and 
therefore many varying relations towards the other. 
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The issue of theorising an experiencing self is not just a matter of 
demonstrating an excess of discursive positions, but of determining how 
change develops during immediate processes of signification. For 
instance, if a subversive repetition forces the coherence of the self to 
undergo a movement from relative stability to radical instability, what are 
the factors and variations which determine how that self regains stability? 
What different kinds of process lead an experience of ambivalence 
towards a state which lives with unknowingness rather than one which 
violently shores up what it knows? What psychic processes initiate 
changes in an individual’s relation to the past, and therefore the authority 
and conceptual content of signification, that may help determine how 
subversions may facilitate better or worse processes of intelligibility? 
When the self undergoes change, this change is not conceived by 
Butler as an experiential content which can be registered by the self, and 
through which that self can, for instance, draw from its past experience in 
a positive way. There is, simply, ‘a constitutive loss in the process of 
recognition, a transformation that does not bring all that once was forward 
with it, one that forecloses upon the past in an irreversible way’ (Butler 
2001b: 23). The self is displaced from its former state, transforming into ‘a 
self it never was’ (Butler 2004: 148). Aside from ambivalence, this notion 
of change does not entail any real efficacy in respect to that self’s on-
going relation to its subject positions.  
In contrast, my point is that recognition can develop along different 
paths, which not only have varying degrees of violence towards the other, 
but vary the memory content of consciousness by which the past informs 
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the present moment of signification. This is not just a question of invoking 
aspiration as transformative process, but of exploring the way recognition 
is ‘the concrete process by which we grasp the past in the present’ 
(Bergson 2005a: 90). Indeed, while I will invoke aspiration as potential 
means to relinquish attachments to meaning, this is only one part of my 
response to Butler. My main focus in chapters three and four will be on 
analysing the ‘utilitarian character of our mental functions’ (16) which 
influence the way the conceptual content of consciousness unfolds. 
Bergson’s ‘psycho-physical’ (131) framework provides a different 
way to reflect upon gender recognition, whereby knowledge of the other 
develops in the service of practical action. This is to say, we ‘do not, in 
general, aim at knowing for the sake of knowing, but [to find out] what kind 
of action, step or attitude [an object] should suggest to us’ (Bergson 2002: 
177). In any contingent moment, consciousness varies its content 
according to the specific needs of the present, bringing forward congruent 
memories which will ‘illuminate the present situation with a view to action’ 
(Bergson 2005a: 179). Thus, while ‘a contemporary “act” [only] emerges in 
the context of a chain of binding conventions’ (Butler 1993: 225), the way 
these conventions are consciously represented has a degree of individual 
variability.  
Rather than focussing on the decentring effects of a process in 
which ‘recognition […] becomes self-conscious’ (Butler 2004: 147), as is 
the case with Butler’s model of the self, I will use this aspect of Bergson’s 
work to explore the underlying psychic faculties which produce meaning. 
What is important in respect to both normative and unstable 
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representations of gender is the idea that ‘psychic life may be lived at 
different heights, now nearer to action, now further removed from it’ 
(Bergson 2005a: 14). That is, consciousness narrows or enlarges its 
memory content depending on how immediate or indeterminate an act is. 
As I discussed in section one, the sensory-motor body has a certain 
relational dependency on other bodies. However, this relationality is most 
generally played out through habituated acts which, pace Butler, have 
been naturalised by repetition. Following Bergson, I will explore the way 
habit facilitates a form of ‘instantaneous recognition, of which the body is 
capable by itself’ (92), and which selectively discerns object domains of 
perception without the need for self-conscious reflection.  
In short, the ‘basis of recognition [is] a phenomenon of a motor 
order’ (93) that has organised together movements and perceptions in 
order to create a sense of familiarity which guides action. I will argue that, 
as long as the body’s motor discernment is automatically converted into an 
action, this form of recognition inhibits ‘the decentering effects that […] 
relationality entails’ (Butler 2004: 151). In other words, it stabilises an 
individual’s sense of relationality insofar as recognition remains inattentive. 
Nonetheless, because the body itself is relational, I will also argue that the 
tendencies of habit can be interrupted by the performances of other 
bodies. 
By disrupting the projected continuity of habit, then, subversive 
repetitions can render action indeterminate. When this happens, the 
impending act requires a conscious effort to complete it, and the psychic 
relation between self and other can indeed become unstable and 
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ambivalent in the ways which Butler suggests. However, my own focus on 
how this indeterminacy unfolds will not be on characterising the self as 
decentred, but on the psycho-physical processes by which individuals 
attempt to re-establish order.  
Adapting Bergson to the problem of understanding hegemonic 
responses to subversion, I will explore the way consciousness expands its 
memory content in order to re-affirm gender norms and restore familiarity 
to the field of action. In this process, consciousness spontaneously 
responds to the disruption of inattentive recognition through ‘a series of 
attempts at synthesis, [by which] memory chooses, one after the other, 
various analogous images which it launches in the direction of the new 
perception’ (Bergson 2005a: 102). Memory thus modifies the way the past 
informs the present moment of signification in order to accommodate and, 
ultimately, appropriate the intended incoherence of meaning imposed on 
the recipient of subversion. 
This model can facilitate a more subtle interpretation of the on-
going stability and instability of gender norms. It suggests that the way 
processes of identification unfold in everyday practices of signification are 
more flexible than Butler’s perspective allows. Rather than a 
monochromatic polarity between ‘a conceit of autonomous self-
determination’ (Butler 2004: 149) and ambivalence, it draws into focus the 
processes by which gender intelligibility simplifies or complicates itself. For 
instance, the recognition of gender will ‘take a more common form when 
memory shrinks most, more personal when it widens out’ (Bergson 2005a: 
169). There are, in this way, multiple psychic tensions by which a 
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hegemonic subject can form their conception of discursive structures and 
their knowledge of self and other. 
In order to convey the situated and relational dynamics of this 
process, I will emphasise that these tensions of memory respond 
reflexively to the conditions of action rather to an ideal of self-identity. This 
is to say that the self’s primary relation to meaning is not a matter of 
securing the coherence of identity but of negotiating possible actions in 
relation to the other. Indeed, I am suggesting a more primary level of 
experience in which the unfamiliarity of the other manifests not as a 
disruption of self-knowledge but as an inability to act.  
As such, what I will explore is the way the pervasive naturalisation 
of gender, and the more intermittent tendencies to actively assert the 
coherence of its borders, are impelled by the needs of action. This 
framework, whereby the other appears differently depending upon the 
force by which action is disrupted and remains indeterminate, allows 
processes of relationality and identification to be differentiated in a much 
more complex way. Unlike Butler’s conceptualisation of recognition, the 
unstable achievement of normative gender identity is not just a matter of 
concealing the inconsistencies of intelligibility. It involves a complex 
psycho-physical process, by which memory-images attempt to project a 
sense of familiarity that facilitates action. In turn, responses to subversion 
can be thought out in terms of various types of relational instability which 
develop in response to indeterminacy, rather than a singular notion of 
ambivalence. 
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In closing, then, my central contention in this section has been that 
Butler requires a notion of reflexive experience in order to account for the 
lived process of signification and the potential effectiveness of subversive 
repetition. While I maintain Butler’s contention that discursive constraints 
set out the parameters of social intelligibility, I have attempted to show that 
her own analysis of gender intelligibility and repetition is insufficient. 
Thinking performativity purely in terms of the subject’s discursive 
constitution leads to an abstract account of the way hegemonic subjects 
relate to their gendered others, and an abstract account of the temporal 
dynamics of signification. Bergson, on the other hand, can provide a 
model which accounts for the performative repetition of subject positions 
while showing how the psychic and temporal economy of differentiation 
are variably determined in relation to the discursive structures of social 
intelligibility. 
Butler’s later work has gestured towards a notion of the self which 
exceeds discourse, and thus acknowledges the need to theorise 
experiences which cannot be characterised through the intelligibility of 
subject positions. However, because it reduces the relation between self 
and other to an impassable ambivalence, it lacks the nuances which 
Bergson’s framework can provide for understanding the diversity of this 
relation. As with Butler’s foreclosure of self-reflexivity in her earlier work, 
the question of how and why psychic states are capable of dynamic 
changes is side-lined. The insistence that the self is not a self-presence 
supersedes the issue of how something can be recuperated from a 
process of de-naturalisation, but also evacuates experiential content from 
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its depiction of consciousness and change. It therefore reveals very little 
about the actual psychic processes involved in either the dynamics of 
complex relational experiences or the hegemonic response of shoring up 
knowledge. 
In the following section I will explore a similar problem, which 
occurs within a different aspect of Butler’s work but still concerns the 
theorisation of experiences beyond the discursive constitution of the 
subject. In this line of analysis Butler turns to psychoanalysis in order to 
demonstrate how the unconscious exceeds the interpellation force of 
discourse. While this offers a very different perspective than her Hegelian 
model of the self, my concern will be that discourse again remains too 
operative within her description of psychic processes. 
 
Gender investment and the Unconscious.  
 
 
In her later work, and particularly in The Psychic Life of Power, 
Butler turns to psychoanalysis in order to address ‘the inadequacy of the 
Foucauldian theory of the subject’ (Butler 2000c: 151). This is an 
inadequacy which her own formulation of gender has been accused, and 
which Butler describes – in terms which echo Benhabib’s criticism of her – 
as relying upon a ‘behaviourist motion of mechanically reproduced 
behaviour’ (151).9  
                                                 
 
9 As I have previously argued, Benhabib has misread Butler’s theory of performativity in 
terms of ‘a behaviorist model’ (Butler 1995b: 134) in which ‘we are no more than the sum 
total of the gendered expressions we perform’ (Benhabib 1995a: 21). Butler has therefore 
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Butler engages psychoanalysis, then, to provide an account of how, 
from the perspective of the psyche, ‘the social norms which work on the 
subject […] do not operate unilaterally’ (151). As she argues, ‘the entire 
domain of the psyche remain[s] largely unremarked in [Foucault’s] theory’ 
(1997a: 2), and her response to this is to assert that ‘the psyche, which 
includes the unconscious, is very different from the subject’ (86). 
Butler presents the unconscious as an ‘an ongoing psychic 
condition in which norms are registered in both normalizing and non-
normalizing ways’ (2000c: 153). However, because this model confines 
psychic resistance to the unconscious, and so does not give enough 
credence to the dynamics through which gender norms are consciously 
experienced in ways which resist the normalising effects of discourse, 
Butler again provides little insight into the variability by which subject 
                                                                                                                                     
legitimately defended against this accusation on the ground that performativity is not a 
theory of the self but an analysis of the non-subjective production of power relations. 
Since Butler takes many of her cues for understanding the subject and power from 
Foucault, then, it is somewhat unfair that she accuses him of a presenting a mechanical 
account of behaviour without presenting his ideas on the same grounds that she defends 
her own work. 
Foucault’s own work analyses power relations as ‘both intentional and 
nonsubjective’ (Foucault 1998: 94) because, although power is always exercised with ‘a 
series of aims and objectives’ (95), it is ‘often the case that no one is there to have 
invented them’ (95). In this sense, although power produces objective effects ‘that are 
often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed’ (95), as with Butler’s 
theory of performativity this ‘does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of 
an individual subject’ (95). This perspective, however, is not intended to reduce 
individuals to mechanical effects of discourse, but to critique an outmoded view of power 
as ‘something that one holds on to or allows to slip away’ (94) and replace it with a view 
in which ‘power is exercised from innumerable points’ (94) that are irreducible to an ideal 
of transparent decision making.  
While Butler continues Foucault’s view of power as having objective aims which 
do not manifest from the choice of individuals, she believes a psychoanalytic theory of the 
psyche is necessary in order to demonstrate how these objective aims do not result in 
entirely efficacious effects of interpellation. It should be noted, then, that Benhabib’s 
critique of the ‘unthoughtout implications in [Butler’s] theory’ (Benhabib 1995b: 120) is not 
only aimed at her general theory of the subject, but also at the ‘interesting tension, almost 
a fissure, [between] psychoanalytic theory and Foucauldianism’ (120) in Butler’s work. 
From this perspective, I think Psychic Life can be understood as both an attempt to 
further defend and distance her own work from accusations of behaviourism, and to 
clarify her own specific way of understanding the relation between her use of Foucault to 
define the subject, and her complex relation to psychoanalysis.  
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positions are experienced. In addition, I will argue in this section that the 
ongoing processes which Butler ascribes to the unconscious are still 
modelled too rigidly on discursive structures, and do not provide a 
sufficiently dynamic view of unconscious processes.  
These problems are particularly apparent in Butler’s concept of 
gender melancholy, which will be my primary object of analysis in this 
section. This theory problematically bases heterosexual gender 
investment on an unconscious repudiation of its sexed others which is 
developed in infancy. It thus obscures the way investments are developed 
through experience, and I will argue that rather than simply securing the 
sense of historical contingency which Butler intends, it produces a reified 
model of identification which precludes individual contingency. Moreover, it 
implies a temporal modality which, having a distinct moment of origin in 
infancy, contradicts the idea that ‘the ground of gender identity is the 
stylized repetition of acts through time’ (2008: 192; my italics).  
A further reason for Bergson’s sensory-motor understanding of the 
body emerges here. I have already foreshadowed how relationality is 
stabilised when motor habits unreflectively enact processes of recognition, 
and I will add in this section a preliminary sketch of how the familiarity and 
coherence which habits produce provides an alternative basis to 
understand gender investment. This perspective conforms to the 
performative model of identity because habits are developed through acts 
of repetition rather than an inaugural moment. It also provides a way to 
conceive the individual contingency of gender investment which is missing 
in Butler’s account. 
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Just as habits provide a normative basis for processes of 
recognition, which become more complex when the indeterminacy of 
action allows memory to inflect meaning processes, I will argue that the 
indeterminacy of action affects the intensity by which individuals invest in 
these meaning processes. What will be at stake here is describing an 
account of emotion as an experience of indeterminacy which produces 
contingent states of investment when habits are disrupted. This will allow 
me to speculate upon a relation between memory and emotion which can 
replace the role of psychoanalysis in Butler’s work.  
 
Butler’s Appropriation of Psychoanalysis: 
 
Importantly, Butler’s recourse to psychoanalysis is not simply a 
critique of Foucault, but also aims to intervene in what she perceives as 
heteronormative and a-historical tendencies in psychoanalytic accounts of 
the unconscious. Indeed, she aims to correct this through Foucault’s 
model, and her stated aim in Psychic Life is to ‘explore provisional 
perspectives from which each theory illuminates the other’ (1997a: 3). 
From this perspective, she aims to produce a historically and discursively 
contextualised theory of the psyche. Therefore, while the focus of this 
section is to critique the primacy of gender melancholia in the psychic 
constitution of the subject, some preliminary points about Butler’s critique 
of psychoanalysis are necessary in order to contextualise her ideas.  
One of Butler’s specific lines of attack on this point is the Lacanian 
concept of the real, which she defines in Bodies That Matter as ‘that which 
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any account of “reality” fails to include’ (192). While this concept has 
distinct similarities to Butler’s own notion of the constitutive outside, she 
takes issue with the idea that the real is impossible to symbolise by 
definition, and that it is presented as having no specific content. Butler 
sees this notion of the real as ‘structurally static’ (Butler 2000a: 6), arguing 
that in psychoanalytic theory it is presented as ‘a quasi-transcendental 
limitation on all possible subject-formation and, hence, as indifferent to 
politics’ (6). However, despite Butler’s belief that Lacan presents a ‘fixity 
and universiality of this relation between language and the real’ (Butler 
1993: 207), it can be suggested that the real, far from implying the 
historical stasis of subject positions, has an absolute contingency which 
actually prevents the symbolic from becoming stable.10  
Part of Butler’s problem here is that, in her haste to critique what 
she sees as the exclusively heterosexual framework that Lacan works 
within, she reads the notion that the real is unsymbolisable too closely in 
relation to her own notion of unintelligibility. That is, she reads the real in 
                                                 
10 Butler’s writing on this matter is generally aimed at Slavoj Zizek’s application of Lacan 
into cultural theory rather than an explicit engagement with Lacan’s texts. Her problem, in 
this respect, ‘is related to the “quasi-transcendental” status Zizek attributes to sexual 
difference [as real]. If he is right, then sexual difference, in its most fundamental aspect, is 
outside the struggle for hegemony’ (Butler 2000c: 143).  
Contra Butler’s reading, Zizek rightly points out that: ‘For Lacan, sexual difference 
is not a firm set of “static” symbolic oppositions […] but the name of a deadlock, of a 
trauma, of an open question’ (2000a: 110, 111). To put this in a slightly different way: 
Lacan’s theory of sexual difference is not about the way symbolic norms of recognition 
dictate the possibility of becoming a subject, although this seems to be the context 
through which Butler reads Lacan. Rather, it has to do with the way the symbolic 
structures and imaginary meanings which are ascribed to sexual difference always fail. In 
Lacan’s words: ‘the signified misses the referent’ (1999: 20). 
The trauma, or the open question, which Zizek refers to is, in part, the ongoing, 
impossible attempt to unify the terms of sexual difference into a stable, complementary 
category which Lacan has referred to as the ideal of ‘the One’ (7). Sexual difference, he 
argues, ‘is marked and dominated by the impossibility of establishing as such, anywhere 
in the enunciable, the sole One that interests us, the One of the relation “sexual 
relationship”’ (6, 7). As such, the real is not a limitation placed on the possibility of 
becoming a subject, as Butler is inclined to read it. It is the name given to the contingent 
failure of any assumption of meaning to stabilise itself. 
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terms of that which is forcibly excluded from social intelligibility rather than 
that which exceeds and disrupts any particular instance of social 
intelligibility. From this perspective, ‘Butler becomes blind to the fact that 
[from Lacan’s psychoanalytical perspective] the symbolic, and the Law, 
are not the same for everyone in the social field, nor could they be’ 
(Rothenberg: 88). In this sense, Butler’s critique of Lacan reflects the 
general problem with Butler’s work which I outlined in my previous section: 
that she does not give enough weight to the way individuals inflect the 
shared structures of discourse with personal meanings. 
Nonetheless, Butler’s misreading stems from a genuine concern 
that Lacan’s psychoanalytic model elides questions of how the oppressive 
structures of gender work within actual historical moments. That is, this 
notion of the real, as an individual failure of meaning, does not meet 
Butler’s aim ‘to investigate what kinds of identifications are made possible, 
are fostered and compelled, within a given political field’ (Butler 2000c: 
150). 
In Butler’s view, ‘what is needed is a way to assess politically how 
the production of cultural unintelligibility is mobilized variably to regulate 
the political field’ (1993: 207). From this perspective, even though the 
concept of the real, as an excess of symbolisation, points to a psychic 
process in which norms never fully saturate the subject, it does not provide 
a way to analyse ‘the historical workings of specific modalities of discourse 
and power’ (Butler 1993: 205).  
Concerned only with how the symbolic, as it were, misses its mark, 
and not with how it produces normative values which de-legitimise certain 
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subjects, Lacan’s psychoanalytic model lacks insight into the compulsory 
elements of gender. It elides the way the symbolic produces historically 
contingent structures of intelligibility which humanise gendered subjects, 
while de-humanising others. Butler’s engagement with psychoanalysis, 
therefore, is valid in its attempt to produce a model of the psyche and the 
unconscious which directly takes account of the regulative and historically 
contingent effects of discourse.  
However, as I suggested above, Butler’s attempt to theorise a 
psyche that is not uniform across history, but dependant on specific 
structures of discourse, produces a detracted view of the unconscious 
which is described only in terms of those discursive structures. In the 
move to show how the unconscious has ‘no underlying essence other than 
the specific forms they assume [within contingent moments of history] 
(Butler 2000c: 154), Butler’s engagement with psychoanalysis does not 
integrate the individual specificity of the unconscious. She thus severely 
limits an understanding of the potential psychic processes by which 
individuals relate to discursive structures. Her emphasis on discourse is 
too rigid, and her description of psychic dynamics too reliant on a principle 
of ambivalence. It cannot, therefore, supply the necessary psychological 
dimensions to understand the potential for change and resistance. 
 
Gender Melancholy: 
 
The specific problems which arise from this perspective are evident 
in Butler’s theory of gender melancholy, which is her most enduring 
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attempt to situate psychoanalytic principles within her framework of gender 
discourse. In this theory Butler suggests that heterosexual orientation is 
conditioned along specific paths during infancy because of a discursive 
prohibition against sexual desire for the parent of the same sex. In doing 
so she confines the ongoing processes of heterosexual identification to an 
inaugural moment of loss which determines the way individuals invest in 
subject positions. This perspective, on the one hand, restricts an 
understanding of the motivation for heterosexual identification by reducing 
psychic processes to unconscious ambivalence. On the other hand, it 
conflicts with the temporality of performative acts because such motivation 
is conceived as primary to the effects of repetition. 
Butler’s concept entails a transformation of Freud’s theory of 
melancholia, where he argues that an individual’s acts of chronic self-
berating are actually ‘reproaches against a loved object which have been 
shifted away from it on to the patient’s own ego’ (Freud 1957: 248). This 
occurs, for Freud, when an object of love has been lost, but cannot be 
mourned because ‘the patient cannot consciously perceive what he has 
lost’ (245). The melancholic, for instance, may know ‘whom he has lost but 
not what he has lost in him’ (245). In such cases, a form of identification 
occurs which ‘involves resurrecting a lost object within the ego’ (Freud 
2003: 119). This means that the attachment to the lost object is not given 
up and abandoned as such, but preserved within the psyche through an 
internalisation of the attachment. In Butler’s words, ‘there is no final 
breaking of the object attachment. There is, rather, the incorporation of the 
attachment as identification’ (1997a: 134).  
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Butler, then, takes from Freud the idea that the ego is ‘the 
sedimentation of objects loved and lost, the archaeological remainder, as 
it were, of unresolved grief’ (Butler 1997a: 133). Following this, she 
asserts that ‘the heterosexualizing of desire’ (135) into masculine and 
feminine counterparts also takes place under conditions of loss which 
invoke melancholic characteristics. Because masculinity and femininity are 
discursively regulated along heterosexual lines, Butler argues that they 
‘are established in part through prohibitions which demand the loss of 
certain sexual attachments, and demand as well that those losses not be 
avowed, and not be grieved’ (135). This implies, for Butler, that during 
infancy the love for the parent of the same sex must be abandoned, but 
that this loss cannot be grieved because that very attachment is 
foreclosed as a possibility on the discursive level.  
Following the formula of melancholy, then, Butler asserts that this 
lost parental attachment is preserved within the ego as an unconscious 
investment, with the effect that ‘gender identification is a kind of 
melancholia in which the sex of the prohibited object is internalized as a 
prohibition’ (2008: 85, 86). In other words, the internalisation of loss 
produces ‘a domain of homosexuality understood as unlivable passion and 
ungrievable loss’ (1997a: 135), and which is preserved in the unconscious 
during infancy. From this perspective, ‘masculinity and femininity emerge 
as traces of [this] ungrieved and ungrievable love’ (140), whereby 
‘identification contains within it both the prohibition [of] and the desire [for] 
homosexual cathexis’ (136). This unconscious identification therefore 
causes an internal ambivalence which haunts the borders of the gendered 
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self, and ‘grounds the subject [in a contradiction] which always threatens 
to unsettle and disrupt that ground’ (23). 
 This argument informs Butler’s understanding of the subject by 
providing a rationale in which ‘rigid gender boundaries invariably work to 
conceal [this] loss of an original love’ (2008: 86). That is, in order to 
conceal the ambivalence of its internal relation to processes of 
identification, the ego patrols its borders by enacting violent repudiations 
of both homosexual desire and the opposite sex. Butler suggests, for 
instance:  
 
Becoming a “man” within this logic requires repudiating the feminine 
as a precondition for the heterosexualization of sexual desire […]. 
[T]he desire for the feminine is marked by that repudiation: he 
wants the woman he would never be. He wouldn’t be caught dead 
being her: therefore he wants her. […] One of the most anxious 
aims of this desire will be to elaborate the difference between him 
and her, and he will seek to discover and install proof of that 
difference (1997a: 137). 
 
This formulation is problematic partly because, as Rosi Braidotti 
points out, it is ‘reductive about heterosexual desire, as if it had to do only 
with domination and exclusion’ (52). However, insofar as my aim here is to 
theorise the investment in structures of identity rather than to speculate on 
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the nature of sexual desire, I want to be careful not to deny that these 
types of repudiating identifications occur.11  
My focal perspective is the relation between historical and individual 
contingency implied by defining melancholia as an inaugural moment of 
gender investment. The problem, in this sense, is not that Butler’s 
argument for a relation between a ‘hyperbolic and defensive’ (Butler 
1997a: 139) masculine identity and a discursive foreclosure of 
homosexual attachments lacks coherence and credibility. Neither is it with 
the idea that discursive structures form a constitutive outside which can 
impel the psychic economy of heterosexual identity towards a repudiation 
of its gendered other. Rather, my concern is with the specific way 
repudiation is presented as a psychic ‘precondition’ (137) of acquiring 
heterosexual identity; one which is deeply sedimented during infancy and 
preserved as an unconscious attachment. Specifically, I aim to 
demonstrate the consequences of this perspective for understanding 
performativity as a process. 
In general, Butler understands the unconscious to be produced and 
structured by ‘originary foreclosures’ (Butler 2000c: 249) which are 
                                                 
 
11 It should be remembered that Butler’s engagement with psychoanalysis is intended to 
historicise the unconscious. As such, an implicit part of her aim is to suggest that gender 
melancholy is not an inherent trait but a historically contingent one, and that there is 
therefore ‘no necessary reason for [heterosexual] desire to be fuelled by repudiation’ 
(Butler 1997a: 149). 
Moreover, it can be argued that: ‘For Butler, it is important that this idea of 
melancholia be understood not as a psychic economy, but as part of the operations of 
regulatory social power which are contingently organized through certain kinds of 
foreclosure’ (McNay 1999: 186). However, Butler also begins her discussion in Psychic 
Life by claiming ‘melancholic identification is central to the process whereby the ego 
assumes a gendered character’ (133). Despite her insistence that she makes ‘no 
empirical claims’ (138), Butler’s theory still results in a representation of a psychic 
economy whereby heterosexual desire is founded entirely on the abjection of 
homosexuality, as well as the opposite sex. 
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discursive in origin. Discourse works to ‘constrain in advance the kinds of 
objects that can and do appear within the horizon of desire’ (149), and the 
unconscious is the register which retains that which is denied intelligible 
reality. It therefore ‘exceeds the imprisoning effects of the discursive 
demand […] to become a coherent subject’ (Butler 1997a: 86) because it 
preserves modes of attachment and identification which continue to exist 
despite their foreclosure from legitimised reality. Indeed, at one point the 
complex of melancholy is described as ‘an unassimilable remainder’ (29) 
which the regulatory power of discourse cannot contain. 
As I have noted, part of Butler’s valid enterprise is to stress that 
states such as gender melancholia are not inherent and historically static 
structures of the psyche, but the result of contingent power formations that 
are transformable. However, she goes a step further by presenting the 
unconscious as the necessary condition of resistance and historical 
transformation.  
The idea of the unconscious as an unassimilable remainder marks, 
for Butler, the limit of discourse to interpellate hegemonic subjects. 
Melancholia ‘rifts the subject’ (23) because it grounds psychic investments 
in an ambivalence which ‘always threatens to unsettle and disrupt that 
ground’ (23). As an attachment to repudiated forms of identification, the 
unconscious thus ‘erodes the operations of language’ (143) and internally 
destabilises the regulatory effects of power. It is from this perspective, 
then, that Butler differentiates her model of discursive regulation from 
Foucault’s ‘behaviourist motion of mechanically reproduced behaviour’ 
(Butler 2000c: 151). Norms are psychically registered in non-totalising 
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ways because of their inability to domesticate the unconscious, and this 
psychic instability secures the possibility of transformation. 
This formulation of instability has two consequences for 
understanding the gendered psyche. Firstly, it implies that discourse fails 
to interpellate individuals only because the unconscious preserves 
prohibited spheres of attachment. As with Butler’s Hegelian model of 
recognition, it therefore conveys unstable processes of identification with a 
very limited spectrum of experience. It also gives little credence to the 
possibility that the conscious reflexivity of hegemonic subjects can resist or 
exceed the interpellation of discursive structures.  
Insofar as the only reason heterosexual psyche does not invest in 
gender norms with absolute conviction is because of unconscious 
ambivalence, Butler implicitly presumes that discursive regulation would 
be behaviourist if it were not for psychic conflict. Indeed, in a certain 
sense, the need to locate psychic instability and historical contingency in 
the unconscious is only necessary because Butler defines the conscious 
content of gender intelligibility in purely discursive terms. If, as discussed 
in my previous section, we consider that the self’s immediate conscious 
relation to their subject positions is much more variably reflexive than 
Butler suggests, then there is no need to rely on the unconscious to assert 
the instability of gender investment. Active repudiations, in which 
heterosexual identification will ‘seek to discover and install proof of 
[sexual] difference (Butler 1997a: 137), can be seen as one of many 
psychic possibilities rather than the absolute precondition of identification. 
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Secondly, just as Butler tends to collapse conscious processes of 
identification into discourse, there is a certain assimilation of the 
unconscious into an ambivalent register of discourse. This is to say that 
unconscious processes simply echo the constitutive exclusions of 
discourse, without providing a sense of how the unconscious itself might 
be a response to the individual contingency of lived experience and 
concrete social relations. The unconscious, in this way, is not simply 
historicised. It is enveloped into the discursively produced subject as its 
constitutive outside. 
When Butler assumes that the discursive foreclosure of 
homosexuality inaugurates infants into sociality, she presents this 
foreclosure as the founding moment of a subject’s unconscious within this 
specific historical moment. There is thus very little room to consider the 
contingency of individual experiences in determining the development of 
psychic investments, and forming the dynamics of unconscious processes. 
It is, for instance, a discursive foreclosure which is said to be internalised 
by the infant, and not the individually specific social relations which have 
occurred with the parents, or the particular way any loss of attachment 
might have come about.  
In effect, Butler leaps straight from her analysis of discursive 
structures to the psychic processes of the infant. The infants object 
relations are thus presented in terms of a general sexual desire and a 
structural foreclosure, but effectively exclude the infant’s on-going 
emotional relations. Given this erasure, it could be questioned to what 
extent any concrete loss of parental attachment would result in the 
79 
 
internalisation of a prohibition which can be generalised for all infants. 
Indeed, I would argue that such discursive foreclosures only affect psychic 
processes in later life when they are conceivable as prohibitions, and even 
then develop in relation to immediate emotional experiences. At any rate, 
even if we presume for a moment that an un-grieved loss inaugurates the 
unconscious during infancy, it would still be highly reductive to equate the 
unconscious itself only with the ambivalent sedimentation of a discursive 
prohibition. 
 
Temporal modalities of Melancholy and Emotion: 
 
It would be unrealistic to attempt a theory of the gender investment 
that could fully account for the individual specificities of all personal object 
relations. What I will present in my subsequent chapters, rather, is a 
generalised image of on-going emotional relations which, as an immediate 
form of social responsiveness, provide the theory of performativity with an 
alternate basis of understanding contingent processes of instability. This 
view, I believe, will provide a more dynamic account of the effects of 
subversion and the possibility of transformation than Butler’s image of a 
melancholic unconscious.  
Butler, it should be noted, does in fact make occasional gestures 
towards the need for an explicit theory of emotion. For instance, there is 
‘negotiation with love at the level of learning norms’ (Butler 2005a: 341) 
which, she argues, facilitates interpellation. In other words, a child’s 
‘passionate attachment’ (Butler 1997a: 7) of love for their parents is what 
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first ‘renders the child vulnerable to subordination [to normative gender 
relations]’ (7). However, this recourse to emotion as an on-going dynamic 
of sociality is again reduced to an inaugural moment which is 
conceptualised in terms of a sedimented unconscious complex. 
In this vein, Butler argues that ‘[n]o subject can emerge without this 
attachment [of love], but no subject, in the course of its formation, can ever 
afford to fully “see” it’ (8). The subject must ‘deny its formation in 
dependency’ (9) in order to delude itself to its autonomy, and is therefore 
‘condemned to re-enact that love unconsciously, repeatedly reliving and 
displacing that scandal’ (8). As with the concept of melancholy, then, the 
on-going dynamics of concrete emotional experiences are over-written by 
an unconscious which forms the parameters of future gender 
identifications. The role of conscious emotional experiences within 
immediate processes of gender investment is left unconsidered.12 
My broad argument in this respect is that Butler’s theory of the 
unconscious does not account for the necessary dynamics to explore the 
variability of on-going processes of investment. It yields a narrow view of 
psychic instability in which the repudiation of, or dreaded identification 
with, homosexuality and the opposite sex are the only variants of a 
hegemonic subject’s psyche. Moreover, as I will now discuss, situating 
                                                 
12 Lois McNay has also critiqued the way ‘Butler’s work on melancholia […] traces the 
emotional sources of agency back to a primary disjunction between psyche and society’ 
(2004: 187). In effect, she argues that the ‘problem with this narrowing of emotion to a 
certain delimited concept of desire’ (187) is that it reduces the efficacy of emotion to a 
self-contained, psychic disposition which is ‘detached from any social context’ (187).  
Similarly to my perspective, McNay wants to make room for the idea of ‘emotions 
as a form of social interaction […] within immediate everyday experience’ (187). However, 
while my focus will be on describing the intensity of responsiveness to subversive 
repetitions, McNay takes a broader look at the role of emotion in sustaining power 
structures. For instance, she suggests that ‘the “passionate attachment” of working-class 
women to a certain notion of femininity is not the result of a melancholic foreclosure but 
rather is a kind of emotional compensation for their marginal social standing’ (188). 
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melancholia as the founding moment of an individual’s psyche suggests a 
temporal modality which has contradictory consequences for Butler’s more 
general theory of performativity and subversion as a process of unstable 
repetition. 
In the performative understanding of identity, as individuals repeat 
social signifying practices their effects gradually congeal over time and 
‘produce the effect of an internal core or substance’ (Butler 2008: 185). In 
this sense, the attachment to signifying norms is only developed through a 
process of sustained repetition. From the perspective of the individual 
subject, then, the psychic process of repudiation emerges in order to 
sustain the illusion of a gender essence developed through such 
repetitions. However, in the melancholic gender argument, the attachment 
to gender and its correlative repudiations is, form the start, motivated by 
‘neurotic repetitions that restage […] primary scenarios’ (Butler 1997a: 10). 
In this sense, placing the defining characteristic of gender 
investment in an inaugural moment of infancy is a discrepancy in relation 
to the basic model of performativity. Through it, Butler implicitly sets up a 
temporality of the individual subject in which the psychic economy of 
melancholic ambivalence is primary to the effects of repetition. Identity 
does not emerge as ‘a performative accomplishment’ (Butler 2008: 192) 
which is congealed through repetition. It is more like a defensive 
mechanism which works to ‘conceal the loss of an original love’ (86). 
Indeed, Butler argues that ‘the stricter and more stable the gender affinity, 
the less resolved the original loss’ (86), so that the inaugural moment of 
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the unconscious becomes the driving force and measure of intensity for all 
future identifications. 
Understanding the instability of heterosexual gender investment in 
this way has detrimental repercussions for the subversive repetition model 
of social transformation. While Butler suggests that melancholia secures 
the historical contingency and non-behaviourist nature of gender, this is 
only because the unconscious is understood to preserve attachments 
which cannot be consciously recognised. What I want to suggest, against 
this model of historical contingency, is that because these unconscious 
investments imply a psyche fully structured by an original melancholic 
identification there is actually very little room to account for contingency 
and change on the level of the individual. 
In short, basing the failures of interpellation on an ‘ungrieved and 
ungrievable loss’ (Butler 1997a: 136) results in a much more rigid and 
immutable view of the individual psyche than Butler cares to realise. As an 
inaugural moment of the gendered psyche, melancholia does not only 
designate an on-going ambivalence. It suggests that a violent and 
defensive psychic mechanism, which conceals those psychic structures of 
ambivalence, is the basis of all hegemonic identification. This 
characterisation of gender thus marks an extremely narrow potential for 
relating to discursive borders. It suggests a model of a hegemonic 
subject’s psychic investment which has little or no malleability. Insofar as a 
strategy of subversive de-naturalisation aims to transform a subject’s 
investment in the borders of gender, therefore, Butler’s framework of 
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melancholy provides no psychological leeway for such a strategy to be 
effective. 
As a purely performative process, it is the ‘tacit collective 
agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders 
[which] “compels” our belief in its necessity and naturalness’ (Butler 2008: 
190). Gender is thus performed in an illusory mode of belief insofar as 
each repetition successfully conceals its discursive construction; but 
‘identity [is] tenuously constituted in time’ (191) insofar as the ideal can 
never quite be inhabited by anyone. As such, the efficacy of subversion is 
premised on the idea that a disjunctive performance ‘exposes the 
phantasmatic effect of abiding identity as a politically tenuous construction’ 
(192).  
If, however, the repetition of a rigid gender identity is driven by the 
psychic necessity of repressing the ambivalent identifications of an un-
grieved loss, then the potential effectiveness of subversive disjunctions is 
somewhat undermined. Rather than simply exposing the constructed 
nature of identity, a successful subversion would be more likely to cause a 
traumatic confrontation with the subject’s unconscious. This trauma, in 
turn, would resolve itself back into the defensive mechanism of rigid 
gender boundaries. 
Butler’s definition of the gendered ego as ‘the sedimentation of 
objects loved and lost’ (1997a: 133), then, belies the corrosive potential 
she attributes to it insofar as it theoretically limits the potential 
effectiveness of subversive repetition. Because melancholia preserves an 
individual’s past in a specific way – as an inaugural moment which 
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congeals the self’s on-going possibilities for identification – the psyche is 
not given the necessary fluidity to analyses the diverse relations to gender 
repetition which hegemonic subjects experience. Following this point, I 
want to assert that the dynamics of repetition should be maintained as the 
primary factor determining the consolidation of gender norms, and that a 
theory of performativity must look elsewhere to affirm and explore the 
failure of interpellation and the on-going instability of gender. 
As I have begun to explain in my previous section, I will re-describe 
performative processes in terms of sensory-motor tensions of action. 
Within this perspective, gender is congealed over time because individual 
bodies preserve the gendered actions of the past in the form of motor 
habits. Social norms are thus familiarised through naturalised dispositions 
that ‘determine in us [bodily] attitudes which automatically follow our 
perception of things’ (Bergson 2005a: 84). However, it is important to 
recognise, firstly, that this tendency towards unreflective repetition remains 
inherently unstable insofar as the relationality of habit can be disrupted by 
incongruent performances. Secondly, when the automatic repetition of the 
past is interrupted, causing action to become indeterminate, 
consciousness expands and gender is actively represented by recollection 
memory. 
I have already indicated how an important implication of this 
framework is that the contingent representation of gender can be drawn 
from an ‘infinite number of possible states of memory’ (Bergson 2005a: 
168), each of which creates the influence of the past differently as a 
spontaneous response to the present moment of indeterminate action. 
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This perspective thus provides a way to integrate the naturalising 
congealment of gender repetition with a more diverse image of how the 
formative dimensions of the past vary within contingent processes of 
identification, and can therefore be changed. What I want to add here in 
this respect is an intimation of how the experience of indeterminacy varies, 
creating different forms of investment which, in turn, influence the way 
memory is actualised to produce representations of gender. 
In Matter and Memory, consciousness actually has ‘two subjective 
elements’ (233): that of ‘affectivity and memory’ (233). Like memory, 
Bergson links affective states to the indeterminacy of action. They 
designate ‘consciousness […] in the form of a feeling’ (18), and arise when 
‘I find movements begun, but not yet executed’ (18). This is to say, they 
are a form of conscious feeling which develop within the hesitation of 
movement and compel spontaneous actions. What I will extrapolate from 
this image of affection, primarily in Chapters Three and Four, is a 
conception of emotional experience which motivates action in response to 
subversion.  
When the body is tensed towards an anticipated action, the 
hesitation of that potential action – its indeterminacy – can be intensively 
charged with various kinds of feeling states, of which I will explicitly 
describe that of fear, anger, separation anxiety and anticipatory 
eagerness. Each of these emotional states, I will argue, are adaptive 
tendencies which orientate action and, as such, can be understood as 
different ways in which the familiarised expectations of gender can be 
subverted. Each type of emotion, in turn, calls upon different regions of 
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memory, causing the dynamics of identification to be formed in 
idiosyncratic ways which are specific to that tension of action. 
This framework of automatic action and emotional indeterminacy 
supplies a different axis from which to co-ordinate the dynamics of gender 
investment. An individual’s primary basis for investing in the norms of 
gender is not that of a psychic internalisation of the discursive structures of 
prohibition, or even a belief in the coherence of signifying meaning. 
Rather, the way a gendered self derives feelings of coherence or instability 
in relation to the discursive borders of intelligibility rests upon the tensions 
of action which they develop within any contingent social field. Indeed, the 
coherence of discursive intelligibility is actually secondary to the temporal 
process by which an act unfolds. 
As a model of gender naturalisation, the norms of masculinity and 
femininity are consolidated into sedimented expectations simply through 
the repetition of past actions. There is not, in this way, an absolute identity 
between the acquired habit and the laws which have constrained its 
production. There is, instead, a tendency to repeat which approximates 
law within the inattentive performance, but is motivated by the familiarity 
which habit provides for the development of actions.  As such, a significant 
aspect of the naturalisation of gender practices takes place in excess of an 
explicit relation to the discursive framework of intelligibility. 
Because prohibition is not unconsciously internalised, forming an 
ambivalent but monopolistic basis of gender investment, there is no 
singular way in which the instability of gender develops. First and 
foremost, it is the projected continuity between the present and the 
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immediate future which is disrupted by subversion. Inattentive expectation 
is replaced by an active anticipation which can become emotionally 
charged in various ways, causing different psychic relations to the 
constraints of discourse. In effect, this means that an individual’s gender 
identity is discontinuous and susceptible to change because it is re-
created during each moment of indeterminacy. The exclusionary borders 
of discourse are thus continuously re-experienced depending on the 
specific character and intensity of emotional experience. 
When processes such as repudiation and abjection emerge as an 
active part of an individual’s gender investment, then, they tend to do so 
within emotional economies that alter the way they enter into the 
experience of self and other. For instance, a state of separation anxiety 
will tend to call upon memory-images of love and loss, and as such can 
form states of repudiated identification which are relatable to Butler’s 
theory of melancholy. Indeed, I will argue that psychic complexes of 
melancholy can only develop within a state of separation anxiety, and are 
therefore contingent rather than fundamental relations to discourse. 
Alternatively, though, an emotional state of anger will tend to recall 
previous gender experiences which are relatable to aggression, thus 
recreating the force of gender norms through a very different psychic 
economy. In such states, processes of identification may easily repeat the 
degradation of others who, designated as ‘abject beings’ (Butler 1993: 3) 
by the exclusionary matrix of gender discourse, ‘form the constitutive 
outside to the domain of the subject’ (3). Nonetheless, my argument will 
be that the force of exclusion at stake in the economy of aggressive 
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emotions does not involve the internal conflict which Butler designates as 
central to the hegemonic psyche.  
This preliminary sketch will become more detailed over the course 
of my following chapters. It only serves here to give some idea of how 
gender investment and identification can, within the general constraints of 
social and discursive regulation, be conceived as malleable. Along with 
anger and separation anxiety, my model will include, firstly, the tendency 
towards fear, which I will discuss in relation to a generalised apprehension 
which promotes complicity. Secondly, there is the emotion of anticipatory 
eagerness, which I will argue can influence both the rationalisation of 
gender hierarchies and the impulse to make gender norms more inclusive. 
These four adaptive tendencies each constitute radically different 
experiences of gender hegemony which are either conflated or elided in 
Butler’s perspective.  
What I am claiming in this respect is that they form the most 
common emotional responses to subversion. In addition, however, there is 
also the notion of aspiration I outlined in section two which, as I will clarify 
at the end of my following chapter, can be understood as a creative rather 
than adaptive emotion. This is to say, insofar as aspiration is ‘a forward 
thrust, a demand for movement’ (Bergson 1935: 45), it is also an 
emotional experience of indeterminacy; but it is not an experience of 
indeterminacy which, like the other emotions, compels an anticipatory 
relation towards the other and a closed relation to discourse. Rather, it 
promotes an open relation to the future and otherness. Hence, it forms a 
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basis for investments which aim to exceed the constraints of gender, and 
forms a source of experience which is radically occluded by Butler’s text. 
In closing, these emotional tendencies provide a way to theorise the 
variability of individual experience. This, I propose, is necessary in order to 
examine the diverse impact which subversion can have on hegemonic 
subjects and, ultimately, to understand how subversive practices can 
effect change. I believe this perspective goes some way to addressing the 
concerns involved in Butler’s critique of psychoanalytical images of the 
gendered psyche – concerns which, in part, initiate her development of 
gender melancholia into a principle of historical contingency. At any rate, 
my framework of habit, emotion and memory is certainly not ‘structurally 
static’ (Butler 2000a: 6), a-historical, or ‘indifferent to politics’ (6) in the way 
she accuses Lacan and Zizek’s work of being. In turn, my perspective also 
avoids the flaws in Butler’s own psychoanalytical model, and provides an 
image of the individual specificity of gender alongside the historical 
specificity premised by Butler. 
 
Conclusion. 
 
 
My aim in this chapter has been to clarify my critical perspective 
towards Butler, and to outline the rough direction of my responses to each 
specific problem I have isolated in her work. Most generally, my argument 
has been that in order to account for the effectiveness of subversive 
repetition it is necessary to view performativity as an individually 
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contingent process rather than a function of discourse itself. In order to do 
this I propose it is beneficial to theorise an embodied self which temporally 
experiences its subject positions in ways which exceed the structures of 
discursive intelligibility, and can thereby provide a more diverse account of 
the processes by which norms are sedimented and can be transformed. 
This is necessary because Butler’s own conception of the 
temporality of acts of gender repetition is, in general, confined to an 
abstract notion of reiteration in which ‘the historicity of the signifier’ (1995b: 
136) must be reworked. She therefore confines an understanding of the 
body to its surface significations, and does not consider the way the 
body’s immediate sensory-motor tensions ground social processes of 
signification within a situated urgency to act. In denying the need to 
theorise a reflexive self, she also fails to demonstrate the necessary 
temporal fluidity of experience which would allow the sedimented effects of 
signifying conventions to be opened up to a ‘future horizon’ (Butler 1993: 
53).  
Even when Butler attempts to theorise psychic processes as distinct 
from subject positions, her focal prioritisation of the constitutive effects of 
discourse remains the primary perspective by which such processes are 
conceived. This results, on the one hand, in a conception of 
consciousness which is, in effect, empty of efficacious content, and a 
notion of the self which is conceived only as a source of ambivalence in 
relation to discursive norms. On the other hand, it results in a notion of the 
unconscious which, equally, is only presented in terms of an ambivalent 
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register of discourse, and therefore excludes the effects of lived 
experience on psychic processes. 
In my following chapters I will attempt to maintain Butler’s position 
that ‘gender ontologies always operate within established political contexts 
as normative injunctions, […] setting the prescriptive requirements 
whereby sexed or gendered bodies come into cultural intelligibility’ (2008: 
203). However, by re-conceiving the processes of performativity from the 
perspective of individual actions, I will speculate upon a more 
comprehensive account of how these prescriptive requirements actually 
work upon the subjects who repeat them. I will thus explore in more depth 
the experiential dynamics necessary to transform hegemonic relations to 
them.  
I will begin this project in the following chapter by exploring in more 
detail the relation between self and subject which Bergson can provide by 
presenting them in terms of immediate temporal experience. I will then turn 
my attention to a thorough analysis of the role the body plays in these 
temporal dynamics. 
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CHAPTER TWO: PERFORMATIVITY AS A LIVED PROCESS 
 
 
In this chapter I will begin to explore performative processes of 
signification from the perspective of individual acts and selves rather than 
from Butler’s abstract view of historically sedimented discursive practices. 
Specifically, by adapting Bergson’s work on duration, consciousness, 
language and sociality into Butler’s notion of discursive gender regulation, 
my aim here will be to provide a reformulation of the temporality of 
performativity.  
Although Butler’s explicit comments on the nature of temporality are 
somewhat marginalised in her texts she clearly advocates the kind of de-
spatialised view which is associated with Bergson. As she writes, ‘the 
effect of sedimentation that the temporality of construction implies’ (Butler 
1993: 245) should, pace Bergson, ‘not […] be construed as a simple 
succession of distinct “moments”’ (244): 
Such a spatialized mapping of time substitutes a certain 
mathematical model for the kind of duration which resists such 
spatializing metaphors. Efforts to describe or name this temporal 
span tend to engage spatial mapping, as philosophers from 
Bergson through Heidegger have argued (244, 245). 
 
However, it is equally clear that, firstly, “the kind of duration” Butler 
has in mind here is conceived only in terms of ‘the accumulation and 
congealing’ (245) of past “moments” within acts of repetition. Secondly, 
this accumulation of the past is primarily understood in terms of a 
sedimentation of discursive practices which constrains the possibilities of 
signification in advance. In other words, past and present are irreducible 
into distinct moments because they are thought of specifically in terms of a 
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‘citational legacy’ (225) whereby ‘a contemporary “act” [only] emerges in 
the context of a chain of binding conventions’ (225). 
 For Bergson, on the other hand, the reason why there ‘can be no 
question here of a mathematical instant’ (2005a: 137) of time is, more 
generally, because ‘what I call “my present” has one foot in my past and 
another in my future’ (138). In this sense, the movement of time cannot be 
adequately divided into distinct moments because the present, to the 
extent that the immediate past is prolonged within it, comes to constitute a 
certain thickness of duration.  
What is important in this respect, particularly in contrast to Butler, is 
that ‘the continual progress of the past […] gnaws into the future and […] 
swells as it advances’ (Bergson 1960: 4, 5). The most profound influence 
of the past is not its structural congelation within the regulation of meaning 
– although, as I will discuss below, Bergson does account for such effects. 
Rather, the progress of the past indicates that no moment can ever be 
repeated in its depth because ‘consciousness cannot go through the same 
state twice’ (6). Thus, our ‘personality, which is being built up each instant 
with its accumulated experience, changes without ceasing’ (6), and ‘time is 
efficacious’ (Bergson 2002: 26) because the past accumulates creatively 
rather than sediments. 
In the first section below I will clarify how Bergson’s definition of 
consciousness in Time and Free Will, as a qualitative accumulation of past 
experience within duration, can provide a notion of the self which implies 
that every normative signification has a variable reflexivity. The important 
link to Butler here is that, for Bergson, language ‘cannot get hold of [this 
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qualitative experience] without arresting its mobility [and] making it into 
public property’ (Bergson 1971: 129). This relation between language and 
duration, then, will provide a way to theorise Butler’s notion of subject 
positions alongside a more variable process of self-reflexivity.13 
Part of what will be at stake in this section is an attempt to work out 
how an experiential tension between duration and discursive regulation 
can be recuperated to enable a transformative process. However, I will 
also aim to show how the pressures of social regulation work upon the 
individual to resist such change. It is to this end that I will turn to The Two 
Sources of Morality and Religion, adapting Bergson’s concept of moral 
obligation – as a ‘sub-rational’ (Bergson 1935: 68) tendency to become 
‘enclosed and materialised in ready-made rules’ (46) – in order to re-
describe the primary basis for repetition. The conclusion of these 
reflections, then, will be that both the ossification and potential 
transformation of signifying practices need to be thought of in terms of 
psychic tendencies by which individuals develop varying relations to 
discourse. 
                                                 
13 As I discussed in Chapter One, this recourse to a notion of reflexivity does not entail 
the same kind of projects which have previously provoked criticism of Butler on this 
matter. For instance, my concern is not with the ‘difficulty [of] using performativity to 
analyze the production and contestation of heterosexualized spaces within particular 
spatial/temporal contexts’ (Nelson: 343).  
Nelson’s argument addresses the problem of analysing case studies of 
institutional structures which, similarly to me, she argues requires an account of how 
individual’s reflexively negotiate their subject positions alongside a historicised framework 
such as Butler’s. However, her focus is on analysing a panoramic view of specific 
intersubjective relations over a period of days, weeks, or months. My aim, on the other 
hand, is to theorise the general psychological processes and tendencies which constitute 
the immediate experience of a signifying act. See Renold (2006) and Nayak and Kehily 
(2006) for the kind of sociological surveys which Nelson has in mind, each of which study 
the performative practices of gender within the context of school environments. 
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I will continue this theme in section two, exploring how these 
tendencies unfold within an immediate temporal process, as contingent 
responses to the present moment of action. Primarily, I will be concerned 
to begin demonstrating how the repetition of norms is driven by the sense 
of familiarity which habit brings to action. That is, insofar as habit 
unreflectively projects expectations into the immediate future, it produces 
a stable environment whereby the effects of discourse are passively and 
insidiously repeated.  
Rather than disrupting an individual’s attachment to the meaning of 
gender, I will argue that subversive repetitions primarily disrupt this 
temporal projection. I will also begin indicating how the resulting 
indeterminacy of the act affects processes of intelligibility. In short, the 
indeterminacy of action potentially allows qualitative experience to 
transform an individual’s relation to the constraints of discursive 
intelligibility. However, the sense of uncertainty implied by an act’s 
indeterminacy means that hegemonic subjects are more likely to re-affirm 
the borders of discourse in order to stabilise action. 
Finally, in section three I will expand upon this dynamic of 
expectation and indeterminacy, introducing more explicitly the themes of 
motor habit and emotion which will occupy my following chapters. In 
distinction from Butler’s claim that gender norms are ‘anxiously repeated’ 
(1993: 237) because they are ‘continually haunted by their own 
inefficiency’ (237), I will argue that habit implies an effortless and 
unreflective form of investment which only becomes psychologically 
complex when actions are driven by emotion. 
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The Changing Tensions of the Self and the Subject. 
 
 
For Butler, the regulatory effects of discourse are inherently 
unstable because, insofar as discourse fails to fully constrain the object it 
constructs, ‘gaps and fissures are opened up as the constitutive 
instabilities in such constructions’ (1993: 10). Her strategy of subversive 
repetition aims to work these instabilities to produce an ‘enabling 
disruption’ (23) of hegemony. However, I have argued that because she 
occludes a notion of self-reflexivity Butler portrays only an abstract 
account of how acts of subversion unfold within the immediate temporal 
processes of signification. 
Butler, legitimately, wants to ‘underscore the effect of sedimentation 
that the temporality of construction implies’ (245). For her, the 
‘accumulation and congealing’ (245) of the past produces what she calls a 
‘citational legacy’ (225), in which the discursive trajectory of an “I” only 
‘emerges in the context of a chain of binding conventions’ (225). In this 
context of her work, the self is thus thought of only in terms of an illusion of 
a stable gendered essence which disavows the construction of its identity. 
While this move is legitimate in its claim that ‘there is no “I” who stands 
behind discourse’ (225) – that is, as autonomous from its constitutive 
effects – what it does not account for is the way variable experiences of 
subject positions are lived through by individuals in tension with the social 
regulation of gender norms.  
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In effect, Butler excludes the temporal dynamics of the self – as an 
on-going experience of constraint and instability – in favour of the 
citational temporality of subject positions. In her account of temporality, 
then, the past is only conceived in terms of the sedimentation of 
convention within signifying practices, and social transformation inheres in 
the attempt to ‘undo the presumptuous force’ (225) of convention by 
negating the illusion of identity. However, my contention is that without a 
notion of a lived past, which exceeds the sedimented effects of discourse, 
there can be no indication how an individual might reformulate their 
relation to the convention.  
Bergson’s notion of duration can be beneficial here because the 
endurance of the past implies a continual variation of experience rather 
than an effect of sedimentation. I will begin this section, then, by 
demonstrating how Bergson can enable a view of the inherent instability of 
gender norms in terms of a lived experience which exceeds them, but 
which exists in an on-going tension with the regulatory constraints of 
discourse. My aim will then be to speculate upon how this points towards a 
notion of reflexivity which enables a more thorough understanding of 
signifying processes in general, and the dynamics of subversion in 
particular.  
Part of what is at stake here is the idea that the stability and 
instability of gender norms are not simply structures of discourse itself. 
Neither the fundamental attachment to regulatory norms, nor the potential 
to subvert them, can be clearly conceived without examining processes 
which take place outside the framework of discursive intelligibility. In order 
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to explore this idea I will turn to The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, 
where Bergson provides a theoretical framework to understand how 
different psychic ‘tendencies […], some above, some beneath […] 
intelligence’ (79), are ‘at work on our wills’ (51) within the immediate act of 
signification. This will enable me to begin clarifying both how duration can 
emerge as a transformative potential, and why this potential meets 
resistance from the force of socially ‘binding conventions’ (Butler 1993: 
225). 
 
The Deep-Seated Self of Duration: 
 
Bergson’s idea of duration, then, was first introduced in Time and 
Free Will where he observes that successive states of consciousness do 
not simply replace one another, as if they contained ‘mutual externality’ 
(108). This view of the mutual externality of successive moments 
represents, for Bergson, a spatial mapping of time in which mental states 
‘touch without penetrating each other’ (101). It therefore implies that past 
states have no means to affect the present and future. In contrast to this, 
Bergson argues that successive moments of consciousness ‘permeate 
one another, imperceptibly organize themselves into a whole, and bind the 
past to the present by this very process of connection’ (121). The 
processes of duration, in this sense, are ‘mental syntheses’ (121) which 
‘forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole’ (100) 
whereby the movement between them is continuous and unbroken. 
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Through this continuity of the immediate past and present Bergson 
asserts a kind of non-linear and unpredictable causality within the 
experiencing self. Because the past is continuous with the present it 
maintains an influence on the way the present is experienced. For 
instance, a feeling of sadness which lasted a certain amount of time would 
not be the same as a sadness which lasted half as long. Although 
superficially similar enough to define it under the same conceptual 
category of sadness, it ‘would no longer be the same feeling; it would lack 
thousands of impressions which gradually thickened its substance and 
altered its colour’ (196). Thus, as Bergson writes in Creative Evolution: 
‘Our personality […] is being built up at each instant with its accumulated 
experience [and this] prevents any state, although superficially identical 
with another, from ever repeating in its depth’ (6). 
Even ‘the simplest psychic elements […] are in a constant state of 
becoming, and the same feeling, by the mere fact of being repeated, is a 
new feeling’ (Bergson 1971: 200). Through this accumulation of 
experience ‘the self grows, expands, and changes’ (175), and the point I 
want to make here in relation to Butler is that this continual fluctuation of 
experience implies that, in coincidental agreement with Butler, any 
assertion that an individual has a stable gendered self is indeed an 
illusion. That is, because psychic life is in a continual process of 
becoming, the deep internal experience of being gendered is in a continual 
process of qualitative change. Even though gendered signifying acts are 
repeated normatively, the experience of this repetition is continually 
changing for each individual subject.  
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In the way I am interpreting Bergson’s principle of consciousness, 
and adapting it to Butler’s concept of the subject, my argument is thus that 
his assertion of change implies that there is no fundamental core to 
gender identity. In effect, then, Bergson’s notion of a ‘deep-seated self’ 
(1971: 125) secures the inherent instability of gender norms. However, the 
specific way Bergson is able to deny the possibility of a stable gender 
essence, and thus reject the ideal of self-presence, is very different from 
Butler’s.  
Butler’s own emphasis lies in the way the self’s coherence depends 
upon a ‘set of exclusions that are nevertheless internal to that system as 
its own nonthematizable necessity’ (1993: 39). Within the on-going 
constitution of identity the self will ‘only find itself through a reflection of 
itself in another’ (Butler 2004: 147), and is therefore ‘decentered through 
its identifications’ (137). This means that the ideal of self-sufficiency only 
takes place within a dialectical struggle with the incoherence which the 
other’s negating difference represents to that ideal. It means, in turn, that 
social transformation can only be effected through such negations by 
disrupting the illusion of coherence. 
On the other hand, the reason Bergson’s deep-seated self of 
duration cannot be conflated with a stable identity is because the 
movement of consciousness is, as it were, temporally decentred within 
itself rather than dialectically decentred through its relation with the other. 
From this view point, gender identity remains unstable because ‘duration 
properly so called has no moments which are identical’ (Bergson 1971: 
120), and the progression of the self proceeds through ‘an absolute 
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heterogeneity of elements which pass over into one another’ (229). 
Therefore, even though the external representation of that self – as a 
proscribed subject position – may appear relatively stable, there is also a 
constant process of internal differentiation occurring beneath that illusion 
of stability. 
While my aim in developing this perspective is not to deny Butler’s 
decentred understanding of recognition as such, my definite proposal is 
that Bergson points towards an excess of experiencing gender norms 
which takes place differently to Butler’s notion of oppositional instability. 
What is particularly significant in this respect is the way Bergson defines 
the nature of conscious duration in terms of a ‘qualitative multiplicity’ (121). 
In the general context of reading Bergson’s work, this notion of qualitative 
experience is vital in conceiving the type of differential continuity achieved 
within the movement of duration. In the more specific context of this thesis, 
it will provide a principle of differentiation which is essentially different from 
that achieved through language. 
Bergson argues that if we reflect introspectively on the movement of 
our own consciousness we can see that every passing moment consists of 
‘a thousand different elements which dissolve into and permeate one 
another without precise outline’ (132). Different elements of consciousness 
do not stand out as discrete from one another; they interconnect within a 
confused temporal movement and form, in their temporal continuity, a kind 
of open unity. There is, in other words, ‘a mutual penetration, an 
interconnexion and organisation of elements’ (101) which come together 
to form a fluid continuity within qualitative experience.  
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As Pete Gunter argues, this means that ‘the unfolding of our mental 
life is never simply the arrangement or rearrangement of mental states 
with respect to each other […], but consists instead of their global 
transformation’ (1971: 532). The elements of consciousness form a type of 
multiplicity in which each “individual part” mutually encroaches on the 
others. Each element ‘represents the whole’ (Bergson 1971: 101) in the 
sense that it intrinsically influences the qualitative nature of the others, so 
that any change in one specific aspect alters the entire nature of the 
whole.14 
                                                 
14 In The Dialectic of Duration, Gaston Bachelard makes a particularly forceful criticism of 
Bergson. He argues that the idea of duration ‘tones down’ (42) heterogeneity to the point 
where ‘succession seems like a change where things fade and merge into one another’ 
(42) and, in doing so, Bergson is ’imposing an essential unity on experience as though 
experience could never be contradictory or dramatic’ (42). However, it could equally be 
said that Bachelard reduces change to dialectical opposition and abrupt discontinuity. He 
thus ignores Bergson’s primary insight: that the mutual encroachment and accumulation 
of qualitative consciousness is a deeper stratum of experience than dialectical change.  
Moreover, because Bachelard reads Bergson’s language of fading and merging 
as metaphors which homogenise dialectical processes he fails to acknowledge precisely 
how the indivisibility of duration results in a process of differentiation. As Deleuze points 
out,  
 
it would […] be a serious mistake to think that duration was simply the indivisible, 
although for convenience, Bergson often expresses himself this way. In reality, 
duration divides up and does so constantly: That is why it is a multiplicity. But it 
does not divide up without changing in kind, it changes in kind in the process of 
dividing up. This is why […] we can speak of “indivisibles” at each stage of the 
division (1991: 42).  
 
 This is perhaps best clarified through the description of duration as ‘a unity 
resembling that of a phrase in a melody’ (Bergson 1971: 111). Bergson observes that, in 
the apperception of a melody, each new note blends with the memory of the previous 
ones to produce a specific musical effect. The continuous act of duration ‘keeps 
successive [notes] in mind and synthesises them’ (111) within the present moment. This 
synthesis then produces a form of organisation through which ‘sounds form an indivisible 
melody [and thus] give rise to a dynamic progress’ (125). In effect, this means that the 
successive notes ‘permeate one another without precise outline’ (132); but as they do so 
the experiential effect of music changes at each moment. 
As each new note synthesises with the previous ones it produces a ‘qualitative 
change […] in the whole of the musical phrase’ (101). For instance, if a note were 
changed or paced differently in a familiar piece of music the qualitative effect of the whole 
would be entirely different. This is why Bergson argues that each new element of 
consciousness ‘represents the whole’ (101). Its place in the global unfolding of a mental 
state is neither a mere addition nor an abrupt discontinuity. It constitutes the emergence 
of a new synthesis which results in a profound differentiation in the quality of experience. 
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This perspective, then, describes a movement of change which is 
different from the temporality of self-coherence and negation which, 
through her analysis of discursive structures, Butler ascribes to 
performativity. It will, therefore, be important below in counter-acting 
Butler’s assumption that otherness is always and only experienced as a 
negation of self-identity, and that social transformation only occurs through 
such negations. However, the point here is not to deny Butler’s conception 
of identity and otherness, but to suggest that where Butler sees only a 
discursive logic of external difference, ‘we must admit two kinds of 
multiplicity, two possible senses of the word “distinguish,” two conceptions 
[…] of the difference between same and other’ (121).  
For my purposes, the other type of multiplicity Bergson depicts, 
what he calls a ‘discrete multiplicity’ (121), can be thought of in terms of 
the ‘well-defined outlines’ (132) of conceptual language which order 
phenomena into distinct and homogenous categories. Similarly to Butler’s 
notion of gender discourse, it differentiates same and other through 
‘stable, common, and consequently impersonal […] impressions’ (132) 
which are sedimented in language conventions.  
Part of the significance Bergson draws from his reflection is that 
because qualitative experience contains only interpenetrating elements, 
whereas a discrete multiplicity is formed on the basis of distinct borders, 
our deep conscious experiences of our selves are not definable through 
the shared structures of language. Indeed, he goes so far as to assert that 
‘there is no common measure between mind and language’ (164, 165). 
                                                                                                                                     
Each “moment” of duration thus brings with it a global transformation that divides it from 
the effects of the previous moment because it has transformed into something new. 
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Different elements of consciousness ‘cannot be distinguished or isolated 
from [each other] except by abstract thought’ (101), and when we attempt 
to do so through conceptual language we inevitably resolve the qualitative, 
heterogeneous movement of experience into ‘general and homogeneous 
elements which might be compared with each other’ (200).15 
So, even though the qualitative processes of change which occur 
within the deep-seated self is Bergson’s primary insight, he also asserts 
that ‘our perceptions, sensations, emotions and ideas occur under two 
aspects: the one clear and precise, but impersonal; the other confused, 
ever changing, and inexpressible’ (129). Moreover, insofar as the 
necessity of language makes it ‘extraordinarily difficult to think of duration 
in its original purity’ (106), he implies that we tend to derive our 
understanding of what is natural and real primarily from the homogenising 
and ossifying effects of language. 
In this way, the concepts we apply to our experience in order to 
comprehend it – for instance, that of stable gender dualism – can only 
ever solidify the internal differentiation of that movement into 
homogeneous categories. If, then, my gender appears to me to be a 
stable and unchanging attribute ‘it is because I perceive it through […] the 
word which translates it’ (131) rather than through the deeper underlying 
                                                 
15 Critiquing this relation between the self and language, Dan Zahavi has argued that 
‘Bergson might be faulted for operating within too narrow an understanding of both 
conceptualisation and language’ (126), and that language can take ‘a multiplicity of forms’ 
(126) which are not all reducible to homogenisation. Indeed, insofar as Bergson defines 
language as a discrete multiplicity, Zahavi is justifiable in the claim that he tends to 
‘underestimate the protean character of language’ (126), or at least that he tends to 
shroud the potential of language to ‘enrich’ (126) our experiences rather than to simply 
‘falsify and distort them’ (129). However, for the specific purpose of developing Butler’s 
account of the regulatory effects of discourse Bergson’s narrow view of language, and its 
relation to duration, is an effective perspective. 
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processes of duration. Within everyday experience, the distinct and 
impersonal differentiations of discourse ‘overwhelms or at least covers 
over the delicate and fugitive impressions of our individual consciousness’ 
(132) and produces a ‘superficial psychic life’ (125) characteristic of 
repetition and stability. 
This part of Bergson’s argument marks a vital correlation with 
Butler’s concept of the subject. The superficial self ‘is, as it were, the 
external projection of the [durational self], its spatial and, so to speak, 
social representation’ (231). Like Butler’s conception of discourse, 
language conventions constitute ‘a set of meanings already socially 
established’ (Butler 2008: 191) which represent a limit on the way the self 
and other become intelligible within the midst of social interactions. In turn, 
because the effects of language ossify and, as it were, performatively 
name and overwhelm the apperception of duration, it can be understood to 
produce the tenuous ‘illusion of an abiding gendered self’ (191). 
Nonetheless, as I suggested above, from Bergson’s perspective the 
reason why the illusion of substance can be understood as tenuous is, 
contra to Butler’s work, because it only occurs in a kind of tension with the 
more profound reality of duration. The important point of emphasis I want 
to develop in this respect, however, is not simply that language covers 
over the processes of duration and produces an illusion of substance. 
This, in effect, would be to simply repeat Butler’s claims through a different 
conceptual framework. Rather, I want to emphasise that the tension which 
qualitative experience attains with discursive intelligibility constitutes a 
radically contingent experience of gender which is both closer to the 
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surface effects of signification and potentially more reflexive and positive, 
than Butler believes it can be. 
Butler herself says, in interview, that ‘I do not think there is a 
normative gendered life that does not know – at some level – its own 
radical contingency, the possibility of being otherwise’ (2001a: 22). 
However, she only conceives this contingency of normative gender as an 
experience of anxiety and ambivalence. She thus excludes the potential of 
more productive experiences of otherness which are necessary for radical 
re-signification. In turn, Butler excludes a consideration of reflexivity 
insofar as, in the theoretical paradigms she criticises, it is ‘usually figured 
as the capacity for reflexive mediation’ (2008: 195) in which the self which 
reflexively mediates is thought to have ‘some stable existence prior to the 
cultural field that it negotiates’ (195). 
It should be noted in respect to this latter point, then, that because 
the qualitative experience of duration is, essentially, ‘inexpressible’ 
(Bergson 1971: 129) within the spatialising effects of language, the notion 
of reflexivity I am considering here does not manifest as a capacity to 
speak or act beyond the productive effects of discourse. Neither does it 
manifest as a capacity for contemplation and intentionality through which 
the self might autonomously master the effects of discourse or reveal a 
true or stable essence of gendered experience. Rather, my contention is 
that the efficacy of duration can manifest as a transitional momentum in 
which the proscribed stability of the self’s subject positions are related to a 
deeper, on-going process of qualitative change in which ‘no moments […] 
are identical’ (120). Because this aspect of experience is ‘confused [and] 
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ever changing’ (129), it produces both an apperception of the self and a 
qualitative sense of relationality which cannot be contained within the 
distinct meanings which characterise those positions.  
Duration, therefore, constitutes a productive reflexivity only insofar 
as the self’s continual processes of qualitative differentiation can reveal 
gender norms as approximations and false resting places imposed upon 
the fluid nature of experience. It provides a deep-seated experience of 
contingency that exceeds and is irreducible to the discursive structures of 
gender, and can produce a reflexive distance from the effect of signifying 
constraints.  
Reflexivity, in this sense, is simply an ability to shift attention from 
the substantialising effects of gender norms towards the apperception of 
qualitative change in such a way that the self resists their totalising effects. 
What can be recuperated through this reflexivity is not the meaning of a 
true gendered experience or an ultimate liberation from the constraints of 
discourse, but a lived sense of the inherent instability of gender norms in 
which difference is, temporarily, no longer measured in relation to the 
ossifying and externally exclusive structures of identity.  
What is at stake in this assertion is not so much a critique of 
Butler’s general view of discourse but of the type of reflexive activity which 
is presumed to enable transformations of the discursive structures of 
intelligibility. However, while Bergson’s notion of duration is important as a 
means to productively de-naturalise identity, it is also necessary to look 
closer at the tendency towards naturalisation. That is, it is necessary to 
develop an account of the attachment to discourse as a dynamic process 
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which is susceptible to change, but also provides resistance to such 
potential transformations. 
 
Obligation and Aspiration: 
 
Developing a Bergsonian account of sedimented attachments to 
gender discourse requires more than simply attributing externality and 
ossification to language itself. It requires thinking of the stability of gender 
norms in terms of a movement, as it were, of the self towards ossification. 
This will allow a demonstration of how the relation between stability and 
instability develops as on-going tension within processes of signification. It 
is for this purpose that it is necessary to move beyond the framework of 
Time and Free Will, where the superficial self is, like Butler’s notion of the 
subject, a structure of language, and instead engage the account of 
sociality which Bergson conveys in The Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion.  
Bergson develops there a study of what he calls a closed moral 
disposition of obligation and an open moral disposition of aspiration. 
However, it is not so much Bergson’s notion of morality which concerns 
me as it is his depiction of obligation and aspiration as ‘two forces to which 
society owes its stability and mobility’ (Bergson 1935: 74). By adapting his 
account of these moral forces into a more general understanding of 
sociality, I will develop a more thorough explanation of the tendencies 
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through which individuals variably relate to discursive structures of 
intelligibility.16  
                                                 
16 Before I begin my development of obligation and aspiration it should be noted, firstly, 
that Bergson derives his understanding of these tendencies from the evolutionary 
perspective he develops in Creative Evolution. Secondly, insofar as my own aim is only to 
adapt the general dynamics of obligation and aspiration into an account of signifying 
practices, I will not explicitly take up the evolutionary context of The Two Sources in my 
primary discussion. Indeed, while I will discuss the evolution of the body and 
consciousness in my following chapter this will take place in the context of Bergson’s 
earlier work of Matter and Memory, which has a less developed philosophy of evolution 
than his two later books. Nonetheless, it is worth taking a cursory glance at some of the 
broader issues at stake in Creative Evolution and The Two Sources which, although 
omitted from my immediate concerns, remain on the periphery.  
In The Two Sources ‘all morality, be it [obligation] or aspiration, is in essence 
biological’ (82). Bergson’s framework is thus an exercise in socio-biology. However, as 
John Mullarkey observes, ‘there is no hint here that [Bergson] wishes to deflate culture to 
“merely” animal, biological or genetic forces’ (1999a: 89).  
In order to fully understand these claims we must first ‘give to the word biology 
the very wide meaning [which it has in Creative Evolution]’ (Bergson 1935: 82), where 
Bergson argues that scientific analysis cannot disclose the vitality of life. What the 
conventional practice of biology provides us with are in fact ‘partial views’ (Bergson 1960: 
32) of organisms: views in which ‘the mechanism of parts [are] artificially isolated within 
the whole’ (32). However, it is only by reflecting upon the ‘unity and continuity of […] 
animated matter’ (39) – through which ‘duration marks the living being with its imprint’ 
(39) – that we can rediscover the vitality of life. Thus, while isolating the ‘mechanistic 
tendencies of physiology’ (37) can explain the ‘functional activity of the living being’ (38), 
Bergson suggests that the ‘real whole’ (32) of a living organism is better understood in 
terms of the kind of ‘indivisible continuity’ (32) characteristic of duration. 
This is to say that Bergson translates his principles of duration and space into 
biological exigencies which, like the two selves of Time and Free Will, denote a force of 
change and a counter-active process of ossification. On the one hand, we should see in 
evolution ‘an inward impulse that […] carries life forward […] towards an ever higher 
complexity’ (Bergson 1935: 93). What this image of an inward impulse should suggest to 
us is that of ‘a real and effective duration which is the essential attribute of life’ (95). On 
the other hand, there is also the ‘resistance life meets from inert matter’ (Bergson 1960: 
103). This image should suggest to us the admittance of natural laws which impede the 
inward impulse of life, but also an understanding of matter as the medium through which 
specific organic forms are created. 
In effect, evolution is characterised as a ‘modus vivendi’ (263) between the 
tendency for living bodies to become fixed in relatively stable forms and the tendency for 
the vitality of life to break out of these fixed forms. Indeed, all organic life displays this 
conflict between indeterminacy and material constraint – albeit in different ways, and to 
different degrees, depending on both the species and the moment to moment experience 
of the individual. While the partial views of biology can provide a precise knowledge of the 
functional aspects of the body, this perspective conceives only the sedimented results of 
the evolutionary process. It generally fails to recognise the vital indeterminacy which also 
resides in and infuses those bodies. 
As such, practices which call upon biology to explain human society often 
gravitate towards deterministic explanations of power formations and behaviour. They 
focus only on the sedimented effects of evolution, while excluding Bergson’s wider 
meaning of biology as an inward impulse pertaining to the vitality of life itself. 
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s work, for instance, legitimately seeks to explore how 
the evolution of what she calls the body’s ‘animate form’ (156) facilitates ‘certain 
distinctive behavioral possibilities and not others’ (156). Rhetorically put, having ‘a human 
body [rather than] a crow body’ (156) means that ‘I can run [but] I cannot fly’ (156). 
Thinking about the relational dynamics of such correlative limitations and potentials as 
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Generally speaking, my analysis of aspiration below will continue 
the account of qualitative experience which I have begun above, only 
really expanding upon the way its potential for transformation manifests 
socially. More radically, what obligation brings to this discussion is a 
theoretical framework which distinguishes discursive structures – which 
regulate gender by constraining the possibility of social intelligibility – from 
the psychic tendency to repeat and preserve these structures within a 
concrete process of signification. It will thus provide a way to understand 
ossification as a process in which the ontological weight and exclusionary 
force of identity is not given solely by discourse itself, but develops 
contingently as a variable relation to discourse. In addition, The Two 
Sources provides a way to understand how the tendencies of ossification 
and qualitative change ‘meet […] in that region of the mind where 
concepts are formed’ (51), and it is this perspective which will enable me 
                                                                                                                                     
the result of an evolutionary process, Sheets-Johnstone argues, provides a biological 
basis for social analysis outside of the more usual anatomical or genetic perspectives. 
However, when she actually applies this principle of analysis to the sexed bodies of men 
and women she ultimately derives an extremely narrow view of sexual politics. 
She not only reduces human sexual dynamics to a comparative study of primate 
oestrus cycles and practices of presenting – from which she infers evolutionary meaning 
into social conventions such as the ‘proscription against human females’ adopting “legs-
spread” sitting postures, and the correlatively unconstrained adoption of “legs-spread” 
sitting postures by human males‘ (163). She also conceives this perspective as a more or 
less deterministic constraint: ‘sexed primate bodies […] are linked inescapably to certain 
power relations’ (157; my italics). In this way, Sheets-Johnstone presents the influence of 
evolutionary characteristics as relatively fixed formations of power, and forecloses the 
possibility that aspects of sociality can exceed those influences. 
Bergson’s socio-biology, on the other hand, generalises the tendency of life to 
establish itself in fixed forms into a correlative tendency for social structures to find and 
maintain stability. Nonetheless, this is simply a tendency for social groups to naturalise 
contingent formations of power. It is not, as with Sheets-Johnstone, an assertion that 
evolution has tied us irrevocably to any specific social structure which may presently 
exist. Indeed, Bergson insists on the inherent potential for social formations to become 
infused with the inward impulse which drives evolution. Thus, the point I want to close 
with here is that:  
 
the error of false sociobiology is its search for legitimising natural essences, when 
in truth the “sources” of society provide us only with natural tendencies, one of 
which will actually be the tendency to renounce all notions of natural essence in 
favour of the continual creation of new social forms (Mullarkey 1999a: 89). 
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to explore the stability and instability of signifying practices in terms of an 
on-going and variable tension which develops within psychic processes of 
intelligibility.  
Firstly, then, the disposition of obligation is a tendency to become 
‘enclosed and materialised in ready-made rules’ (46). In this sense, it 
echoes Butler’s emphasis on gender as the ritualised ‘repetition […] of a 
set of meanings already socially established’ (Butler 2008: 191) in which 
the past is sedimented within the effects of discourse. A further correlation, 
moreover, can be seen in the association of obligation with the need for 
stability and exclusion. On the one hand, Bergson writes that in closed 
societies ‘immutability is rated higher than mutability, which implies a […] 
quest of the unchanging form’ (1935: 209). On the other hand, the 
‘essential characteristic’ (20) of a closed disposition is ‘to include at any 
moment a certain number of individuals, and exclude others’ (20).  
An equally important correlation is that the specific direction which 
inclusion and exclusion takes is ‘ingrained in the customs, the ideas [and] 
the institutions’ (232) of a society. Similarly to Butler, for Bergson such 
customs amount to ‘a system of orders dictated by impersonal social 
requirements’ (68), and result in ‘an ideal being set up as a pattern [of 
behaviour]’ (65). Indeed, in a passage which might be mistaken for Butler, 
Bergson argues that it is through such rules and ideals that ‘that our ego 
generally finds its point of attachment [and] is itself socialized’ (6). This 
means that to cohere within a group ‘will mean to follow these rules, to 
conform to this ideal’ (65).  
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In this way, then, social cohesion is achieved for Bergson through a 
set of inclusive ideals which ‘binds [individuals] to the other members of 
society’ (67) by creating points of identification. Moreover, insofar as the 
truth effects of identity are constructed by these ideals, there is also an 
agreement between Bergson and Butler that ‘the adherence of each 
individual is reinforced by the adherence of the all’ (168), so that ‘truth will 
as a rule be this [universal] assent’ (168). 
The primary difference which I want to emphasise here is the 
manner by which truth and meaning are involved in social dynamics. For 
Butler, the unstable ‘reenactment and reexperiencing of [gendered] 
meanings’ (2008: 191) play a primary role in the repetition and de-
naturalisation of performativity. In The Two Sources, on the other hand, 
the ‘forces which act upon us’ (51) when we assent to the truth effects of 
exclusionary social ideals are not purely those of meaning itself. This 
suggests a crucial difference in the way we might understand both 
everyday gender attachments and the possible outcome of subversive 
repetitions. 
Butler’s political strategy aims to ‘expose the limits and regulatory 
aims of [the discursive] domain of intelligibility’ (Butler 2008: 24). In effect, 
her model of subversion aims to effect social transformation by de-
naturalising and disrupting the coherence of meaning. Thought of from 
Bergson’s perspective, however, I want to suggest that disrupting the 
coherence of meaning is, in itself, insufficient to radically transform an 
individual’s relation to their subject positions.  
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This is because ‘the usefulness of the rule solely accrues […] from 
the fact of our submission to it’ (Bergson 1935: 14). In Bergson’s model, 
discursive structures of intelligibility can be understood to ‘supply our 
[social] activity with a definite object’ (72). Nonetheless, the basis of 
conforming to the truth of these objects ‘does not come from intelligence’ 
(76). Rather, the peremptory force of law acts upon the will via psychic 
dispositions which are ‘something less than intelligence’ (50). In short, the 
‘original and fundamental elements’ (68) of obligation are, for Bergson, 
‘sub-rational’ (68). 
Butler does in fact convey the idea of sub-rational tendencies when, 
for instance, she argues that gender norms are always ‘anxiously 
repeated’ (1993: 237). However, my point in this respect is that she 
misrecognises the way hegemonic subjects live their sub-rational relations 
to everyday signifying practices. Anxiety is said to drive gender identity, in 
part, because ‘our belief in its necessity and naturalness’ (Butler 2008: 
190) is compelled by the ‘punishments that attend not agreeing to believe’ 
(2008:190). Thus, conformity is forcibly compelled, even upon hegemonic 
subjects. From my alternate Bergsonian perspective, social pressure will 
interpellate the individual into discursive practices, not because of the 
punishments involved in not repeating but by ‘weighing on the will like a 
habit’ (Bergson 1935: 15). The ‘tacit collective agreement to perform, 
produce, and sustain discrete polar genders’ (Butler 2008: 190) is, in this 
way, not compelled by anxiety. More fundamentally, hegemonic subjects 
are, as it were, placated by the need for the familiarised and stable social 
environment which the collective agreement provides.  
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I will discuss the role of habit in performativity separately, in my 
following sections, because my own interpretation involves a development 
away from Bergson’s explicit concept of obligation. For the present 
moment, I am more concerned to emphasise Butler’s tendency to 
subordinate psychic and sub-rational processes to her analysis of abstract 
discursive structures. In effect, she makes such processes equivalent to 
the stabilities and inconsistencies of discourse, so that whenever the 
structures of discourse are rendered incoherent it exposes the illusion of 
an abiding gendered self and makes transformation possible. 
If however, pace Bergson, we differentiate more strongly between 
the intellectual recognition of a gender norm and the sub-intellectual need 
for social familiarity, then we may be led to a different conclusion. Because 
‘the obedience of everyone to laws, even absurd ones, assures greater 
cohesion to the community’ (Bergson 1935: 14), the mere possibility of 
rendering the meaning effects of these laws incoherent does not 
necessarily affect a change in an individual’s attachment to them. 
What this implies for a reconsideration of performativity is that 
approaching an understanding of subversive practices only as a disruption 
of meaning becomes inadequate to understand the responses to such 
subversions. While social coherence requires distinct object domains and 
discursive borders in order to produce a consistent social field in which to 
identify, rendering the borders of this domain incoherent becomes a 
problematic strategy of transformation. The tendency to conserve identity 
persists, regardless of the strain its thematic coherence is placed under, 
because it is not driven by an individual’s need for the intelligibility of 
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gender to remain coherent. Indeed, I will argue that in many cases such 
de-naturalising incoherence further enforces the imperative to abject that 
which is excluded, and if anything makes the tendency towards 
conservation more complex and resistant to change. 
In short, disrupting ‘the internal fixity of the self’ (Butler 2008: 183), 
specifically by challenging ‘the meaning and necessity of [its] terms’ (182), 
does not necessarily affect the deeper need for social stability which is 
derived from them. Given, then, that the subversion of meaning does not 
trouble the primary attachment to norms, my concern now is attempting to 
draw from Bergson an understanding of how ‘our fundamental categories 
can […] expand to become more inclusive and more responsive to the full 
range of cultural populations’ (Butler 2004: 223, 224).  
As I suggested above, Bergson’s notion of duration can produce a 
reflexive distance from signifying constraints by enabling a qualitative 
sense of relationality which exceeds the discursive structures of identity 
and exclusion. In The Two Sources the correlate of this idea is the moral 
tendency of aspiration, which is capable of ‘opening what was closed’ 
(230) because it creates a social disposition which is not dependent on 
ready-made social practices. My initial claim in this respect is that social 
transformation is more readily possible on the basis of aspiration than it is 
through Butler’s strategy of negating identity.  
From my Bergsonian perspective, the problem with Butler’s 
framework is that she places the dynamics of exclusionary closure and 
inclusive openness on the same level of signifying meaning. What 
Bergson’s work implies, on the other hand, is that there are two opposing 
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tendencies by which individual’s relate to sociality and discourse, and that 
we ‘must discriminate the one from the other [if we are not] to 
misunderstand the nature of social evolution’ (65). In other words, the 
‘mistake is to believe that it is possible to pass, by a mere process of 
enlargement or improvement, from the static to the dynamic’ (231). 
Whether we think of signification from a social or a psychological 
perspective, we cannot pass from a process of violent exclusion to one in 
which the excluded become included ‘by any mere broadening out’ (230) 
of the dynamic of exclusion itself. 
Such an opening up of that which was closed, thought of as a 
transformation of an individual’s relation to signifying practices, requires a 
psychic process which is different in kind from that in which self coherence 
is achieved through the abjection of an other. Thus, if we postulate, as 
Butler does, only a discursively structured identity in which the excluded 
other poses a ‘fundamental threat to [that identity’s] continuity’ (1993: 53), 
and which therefore leads to anxiety and aggression in the face of the 
other, can we further postulate the expansion of exclusionary categories 
without including some other factor by which individuals relate to 
discourse? For subversive acts to perform effective de-naturalisations, 
they cannot simply negate the coherence of subject positions. They 
require the production of the kind of psychic attitude which Bergson 
associates with the moral disposition of aspiration.  
In Bergson’s formulation, aspiration is an ‘act by which the soul 
opens out’ (1935: 46), and through this opening out ‘broadens and raises 
[the aspect of the self which] is enclosed in ready-made rules’ (46). 
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Whereas obligation is ‘something less than intelligence’ (50) because it 
provides a peremptory force to the discursive object domain, aspiration is 
something ‘more than intelligence’ (50) in the sense that it ‘does not yield 
to the attraction of [a distinct] object’ (27). In the context of Butler, 
however, what needs to be worked out in this formulation, as a 
development of Bergson’s explicit ideas, is how specifically this ‘supra-
rational’ (68) notion of aspiration can produce a transformative process 
which is different from negation. 
The notion of aspiration I am attempting to convey here can be 
understood as ‘a return to [the] movement’ (40) of qualitative experience 
which I described above. Such a return can produce the ‘capricious, 
generous, and “unthreatened” bearings on the self’ (Butler 1995b: 140) 
which Butler calls for because it develops through a form of differentiation 
which does not produce a distinct object domain. Indeed, the qualitative 
multiplicity of duration progresses through ‘an absolute heterogeneity of 
elements’ (Bergson 1971: 229), which nonetheless ‘dissolve into and 
permeate one another without precise outline’ (132). Thus, because 
difference is imperceptibly organised into a whole, the qualitative 
apperception of social relations exceeds the exclusionary differentiations 
of discursive intelligibility. It can therefore influence sociality in potentially 
productive ways. For instance, rather than negating identity the self’s 
experience of otherness can, as it were, momentarily transcend the 
proscribed borders of gender recognition.17 
                                                 
17 The correlation between aspiration and the qualitative process of duration has also 
been suggested by Emmanuel Levinas. Nonetheless, his reason for making this 
association is quite different from my own, and draws upon Bergson’s account of religion 
rather than morality. The primary source of reference in this respect is the non-deifying 
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Insofar as this differentiation is achievable within the immediate 
dynamics of social responsiveness, my argument is that an apperception 
of duration can enable the spontaneous creation of ‘a new social 
atmosphere’ (Bergson 1935: 64). More specifically, as a means of 
transforming an individual’s relation to structures of discursive regulation, 
this qualitative social atmosphere ‘vivifies’ (34) processes of intelligibility 
by producing the ‘enthusiasm of a forward movement’ (39). That is, 
because duration ‘implicitly contains the feeling of progress’ (39), this 
atmosphere can develop as ‘an impetus’ (230) which is capable of 
opening up an individual’s relation to the closed structures of discourse.  
As I outlined above, an apperception of duration can provide a 
reflexive distance from the substantialising effects of discourse. However, 
in the Time and Free Will model language has an ultimately distortive 
relation with the qualitative movement of the self. What Bergson 
additionally implies in The Two Sources is that this movement can also 
                                                                                                                                     
idea that ‘the creative energy [of the vital impetus] is to be defined as love’ (Bergson 
1935: 220), and that ‘God […] is this energy itself’ (220, 221). 
Levinas argues, then, that: ‘In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, the 
[duration] of Time and Free Will […] means love of my neighbor’ (2006: 153). In this vein, 
he is reading Bergson’s initial invocation of duration as ‘the refusal to seek the meaning 
of reality in the persistence of solids’ (194). This refusal, in turn, ultimately implies for him 
‘the transcendence of a relationship with someone’ (194) beyond the ready-made and 
into a notion of ‘love, friendship, sympathy’ (194) which is characteristic of aspiration, and 
which can thereby be ‘interpreted as [an ethical] relation with the other and with God’ 
(194). 
Thus, Levinas is portraying a straight forward progression in which the former 
work on duration has developed in the latter work to imply love, and a notion of God 
which can correlate to Levinas’ own theological enterprise. This, indeed, may be a more 
or less accurate interpretation of Bergson’s oeuvre, and Levinas is certainly right to 
associate aspiration with a refusal of solids that results in a state which is ‘all love’ 
(Bergson 1935: 27). However, this is certainly not the only way to characterise the 
movements in Bergson’s work, and the deeper theological implications of The Two 
Sources would be an unnecessary excursion in the context of performativity. Moreover, 
Bergson’s own views on God, while clearly in some way synonymous with the creative 
impetus of evolution, ultimately remain somewhat ambiguous. As Nicolas de Warren 
points out: ‘Bergson stresses […] the philosophical ambivalence of any pronouncement 
on the question of God. Philosophical method remains solidly welded to experience, thus 
prohibiting any presumed knowledge that would exceed the given’ (185). 
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work in the opposite direction, so that qualitative experience ‘vitalises […] 
the intellectual elements with which it is destined to unite’ (34). It is not that 
qualitative experience produces a new intellectual representation of 
gender, but that its intangible excesses can be gathered into an impetus 
which aspires to new gender formations. As a potential of the self which is 
different from the faculty of distinct intelligibility, then, qualitative 
experience is capable of opening the closed representations of discourse 
in the sense that it ‘drives intelligence forwards in spite of obstacles’ (34). 
Ultimately, my argument is that it is by ‘absorbing aspiration’ (51) in this 
way, rather than through a process of negating the borders of identity, that 
‘obligation tends to expand and broaden out’ (51). 
What I want to derive from Bergson’s text in this respect is the idea 
of a kind of psychic topology which begins to demonstrate more clearly 
how this works. As psychic tendencies, aspiration and obligation are 
‘forces which are not strictly and exclusively moral’ (78), but can be 
understood more generally as different types of psychic tension or 
motivation which produce reflexive attachments to sociality, discourse and 
difference. As ‘two [opposing] forces which act upon us’ (51), they are 
‘projected on to the intermediary plane, which is that of intelligence’ (68) 
where they ‘intermingle and interpenetrate’ (68). Thus, as forces operating 
within intelligibility, the one ‘sub-rational [the other] supra-rational’ (68), 
they converge ‘in that region of the mind where concepts are formed’ (51).  
Bergson describes obligation and aspiration as the ‘difference 
between repose and movement’ (45) within a society as a whole. 
However, what I am suggesting is that they constitute a variable dynamic 
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by which an individual’s relation to social norms either sediments or 
changes. In effect, my argument is that within the contingent production of 
a mental concept there is a tension ‘at work on our wills’ (51) which drives 
individual relations to meaning in different directions. Thus, signifying 
practices become subject to ‘stability and mobility’ (74) depending on 
which force is more prominent at a specific contingent moment. 
What obligation adds to the immediate production of a mental 
concept is the force by which the discursive object domain becomes a 
‘taken-for granted ontology’ (Butler 1993: 35). Its tendency is to ‘alight 
directly on an object which attracts it’ (Bergson 1935: 27), and is ‘more 
unalloyed’ (23) the more it is ‘reduced to impersonal formulae’ (23). It 
therefore becomes ‘more potent’ (24) as the dynamics of social 
intelligibility become ‘more distinctly broke up into [the] impersonal’ (24) 
framework of discourse.  
In contrast, aspiration becomes ‘more cogent’ (24) as mental 
concepts ‘merge more completely with a man’s unity and individuality’ 
(24). That is, within the immediate impetus of aspiration the process of 
social intelligibility ‘does not yield to the attraction of [a distinct] object’ 
(27). Rather, it draws the dynamics of relationality away from the 
homogenising impersonality of signifying norms, and towards an 
apperception of individually contingent aspects of experience. If we 
understand this assertion in terms of Bergson’s deep-seated self, then, 
aspiration implies an experience of sociality in which ‘elements [of 
qualitative difference] dissolve into and permeate one another without 
precise outline’ (Bergson 1971: 132). It lacks a distinct object or identity 
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because sociality is experienced through a qualitative multiplicity in which 
relations interpenetrate, and thereby provides a psychic process of 
relationality which exceeds the meanings regulated by the discursive 
object domain. It produces instead an ineffable quality within the 
conception of meaning which is ‘confused, ever changing, and 
inexpressible’ (129). 
Within this experience of qualitative change there lies an inherent 
potential to reform social relations to discursive structures because it 
allows the immediate relation to the other to arise without a predetermined 
intellectual object or aim. The more the ‘mutual […] interconnexion and 
organisation of elements’ (101) becomes efficacious within a context of 
social recognition, the less the relation between self and other is derived 
from a logic of external difference by which social coherence is achieved 
through exclusion. Aspiration, therefore, produces ‘a new social 
atmosphere’ (Bergson 1935: 64) insofar as qualitative differentiations can 
become a point of departure for experiencing the relational dynamics of 
sociality.  
Rather than conserving identity, and exacerbating the peremptory 
force of regulation and exclusion within the moment of interaction, this 
enables the reflexive experience of the self to change in response to its 
relation to alterity. Because the self’s relationality ‘does not originate in an 
idea’ (200) but in a process, self-coherence is, at least momentarily, no 
longer achieved on the basis of a rigid ontological assumption but through 
an open-ended experience. Thus, insofar as the self gains its source of 
social coherence from qualitative differentiations in which self and other 
122 
 
interpenetrate without implying distinct object domains, the immediate 
response to de-naturalisation is not experienced as an abrupt negation but 
can develop through a more fluid dynamic of relationality. 
Indeed, in its simplest definition, a state of aspiration can be 
understood as a ‘faculty of adapting and re-adapting oneself to 
circumstances, in firmness combined with suppleness (195). In turn, the 
simplest formulation of my argument is that a subversive repetition must 
aim to produce such supple, re-adaptive responses for it to properly enact 
an ‘enabling disruption’ (Butler 1993: 23) within the experience of 
hegemonic subjects. A ‘radical rearticulation of the symbolic horizon’ 
(Butler 1993: 23) becomes possible not when identity is rendered 
ambiguous by a violent negation of its presumed certainty, but when the 
self strives to transfigure its underlying process of qualitative change into 
the ‘enthusiasm of a forward movement’ (Bergson 1935: 39). Thus, when 
‘a parodic repetition […] exposes the phantasmatic effect of an abiding 
identity’ (Butler 2008: 192) it produces a responsiveness in which the 
object domain can be rendered incoherent in a productive way. 
However, while my assertion is that this ‘return to movement’ 
(Bergson 1935: 40) of aspiration is a potential of any gendered subject to 
re-adapt their relation to proscribed meaning structures, it must be kept in 
mind that as a radically transformative process it is rare and exceptional. 
Obligation is a more prominent relation to discourse because it is through 
the submission to rules and ideals ‘that our ego generally finds its point of 
attachment [and] is itself socialized’ (6). Thus, because the nature of 
subversion is to de-naturalise the coherence of normative identities 
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structured by gender ideals it is inherently difficult to invoke aspiration 
within the midst of social dynamics.  
As I will clarify in the following section, the general relation between 
qualitative experience and language which I outlined above suggests that 
the impetus of aspiration cannot sustain itself within the structures of 
signifying practices. Because ‘our intelligence and our language deal in 
fact with things’ (45) they ‘are less at home in representing transitions or 
progress’ (45). There is, in other words, an unavoidable return to 
identification in which ‘the circle that was momentarily opened 
[necessarily] closes again’ (230), and ‘individual aspiration [will again] 
become social pressure’ (230). 
To reiterate, then, my aim in this section has not been to deny the 
constitutive effects of discourse in producing gendered identities but, 
firstly, to incorporate into Butler’s model a notion of the self who reflexively 
experiences difference in ways which exceed, and can potentially 
transform, their relation to gender norms. Secondly, it has been to argue 
that subversive repetitions cannot transform identities by negation alone 
because the fundamental attachment to discursive practices is a ‘sub-
rational’ (68) tendency which remains unaffected by rendering meaning 
incoherent. By pointing towards a tension between obligation and 
aspiration within the contingent formation of mental concepts, I have then 
begun to explore a model of signifying practices by which individuals 
project either peremptory or expansive dispositions into their relations to 
discourse. 
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What remains to be drawn out more explicitly is how the tension 
between aspiration and obligation develops experientially within the 
immediate temporal process of an act. This involves more than simply 
invoking the efficacious influence of duration against the constraints of 
discursive regulation. It requires an exploration of how a process of 
intelligibility unfolds, as a variable relation to discourse, amidst the 
pressures of social interaction. 
What is at stake here as far as temporality is concerned is the idea 
that the experiential dimensions of the past, present and future have 
reciprocal influences on each other which are themselves dependant on 
the tensions towards action which develop contingently within a social 
scene. In short, the way in which the past influences the present moment 
of intelligibility – either through the qualitative accumulation of experience 
associated with aspiration or the conservation of convention implied by 
obligation – depends upon the way the future is anticipated within that 
moment. In the following section, it is through this dynamic of temporality – 
thought of as a variable relation to the immediate process of action – that I 
will attempt to re-describe the way the tendencies of aspiration and 
obligation develop within concrete signifying practices. 
 
Action and Temporality. 
 
 
A vital part of my engagement with Butler is an attempt to 
reformulate her abstract account of temporality as ‘citational legacy’ (1993: 
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225). Equally, an important part of this involves the way Bergson’s notion 
of duration can help analyse the lived dimensions of signification. 
However, ultimately it is a more specific account of temporality which I am 
aiming to describe. It is one which adapts Bergson’s notions of duration 
and sedimentation to the political problems of Butler’s work, and attempts 
to outline the dynamics of an on-going process by which an individual 
subject acts within a regulated social field. My critique is not, then, simply 
a case of asserting Bergson’s central philosophical premise that ‘Time is 
invention or nothing at all’ (1960: 361), but of exploring how the efficacy of 
duration varies within the immediate process of signification. 
What I want to first make clear in this section, then, is the difference 
between my approach to the idea of social transformation and a more 
popular approach to Bergson which presents Deleuze’s interpretation of 
the virtual and actual as the unifying principles of his work. Rather than 
emphasising the tension between change and constraint which is 
apparent, for instance, in Bergson’s work on aspiration and obligation, this 
approach tends to emphasise the potential for radical emergence as a 
general principle of unpredictable change. It therefore develops in a 
direction which is problematic in relation to Butler because it excludes the 
social conditions of constraint which characterise performativity.18  
                                                 
18 While my primary concern is with the specific way Mikko Tuhkanen uses the virtual 
and actual, John Mullarkey has issued a much broader critique of this framework. 
Mullarkey argues, for instance, that ‘the biases [Deleuze] brings to his readings of 
Bergson’ (2004a: 469) result in explications of Bergson placing ‘an excessive weight on 
the concept of the “virtual”’ (469). For Mullarkey, this common tendency – which is ‘rapidly 
becoming an unchallenged “-ism”’ (469) – is structured so that ‘the virtual is given its 
ascendancy at the expense of the actual’ (470). This ascendancy therefore ‘generates an 
imbalance that fails to recognise the importance of concepts of actuality, like space or 
psychology’ (469).  
 There is perhaps some truth to this, and I agree with Mullarkey’s comment that 
the hegemony of such practices tends to occlude ‘other readings of Bergson which are 
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This approach, then, has been presented by Mikko Tuhkanen in 
terms of an explicit critique of Butler, and I will begin this section by 
analysing his article in order to highlight more clearly its problematic 
relation to Butler. What is specifically at stake in this analysis is the idea 
that Tuhkanen’s emphasis on the radical openness of the future, thought 
of in terms of performativity, effaces the much more pertinent issue of how 
the immediate future is experienced as anticipation. I will argue that an 
inherent part of aspiration is, pace Tuhkanen, the way the immediate 
future is lived as radically open. However, this openness is an 
achievement which must first overcome a tension with the more common 
tendency of obligation to anticipate the future in terms of sedimented 
expectations. 
In this way, while I have so far remained relatively close to 
Bergson’s text in describing obligation in terms of the necessity for ‘social 
cohesion’ (Bergson 1935: 22), in this section I will develop a more 
interpretive perspective. I will argue that a basic means of social 
coherence is achieved by anticipating the immediate future. This is 
because the projection of sedimented expectations creates a familiarised 
and stable social field of action by which individuals can become 
                                                                                                                                     
not so heavily mediated in one direction’ (2004a: 469). However, I do not agree with his 
much more damning argument that: ‘The passage of time […] is unthinkable in itself […] 
and to pretend to think it through what we call “the virtual” is philosophically confused’ 
(473, 474). This seems to deny one of the primary tenets of Bergsonism: that ‘the very 
operation of life […] consists in the gradual passage from the less realized to the more 
realized, from the intensive to the extensive’ (Bergson 2007: 185, 186) – in other words, 
from the virtual to the actual.  
Furthermore, other commentators such as Frederic Keck have conveyed a more 
balanced view of the relations between the virtual and actual. Keck argues, for instance, 
for understanding of ‘the virtual, the symbolic, and the actual’ (1134) as ‘three degrees of 
experience that are intertwined in complex and productive ways’ (1134). He thus not only 
complicates the virtual/actual framework with a third term – the symbolic – but, in doing 
so, uses the idea of the virtual and actual to facilitate a more sophisticated image of the 
role language plays in Bergson’s work. 
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comfortably orientated. This development provides the opportunity to re-
think the conservative tendencies of obligation as complex attachments 
which vary depending upon the way immediate processes of action are 
rendered indeterminate.  
In short, when entrenched expectations are disrupted by subversive 
repetitions, the indeterminacy of the future does not simply present itself to 
the individual as a radically open potential. Rather, the disruption of 
familiarity means that an individual is likely to experience an uncertain 
relation to the immediate future. This uncertainty then results in complex 
processes of intelligibility which ultimately aim to re-establish a sense of 
familiarity through identification. Thus, we cannot simply assume a 
‘process of radical emergence’ (Tuhkanen: 21), as Tuhkanen does, 
because this uncertainty overwhelms the open relation to the future 
necessary for aspiration. It thereby produces complex psychological 
responses, but not necessarily transformative ones. 
Tuhkanen argues, then, that while ‘the thrust behind the theory of 
performativity is her concern with becoming’ (2), Butler’s attempt to ‘build a 
philosophy of becoming on the negative’ (2) means that ‘performativity 
does not allow us to think forms of existence that radically diverge from 
what is currently available to us’ (22). For Tuhkanen, the emphasis on 
negativity in Butler’s ‘Hegelian-inflected paradigm’ (26) is problematic 
because it commits her to an idea of change which is only a realisation of 
‘already existing possibilities’ (22). In other words, the claim here is that 
Butler does not adequately theorise the process of change because she 
thinks of the future only in terms of the present. 
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This assertion stems directly from the conception of the virtual and 
actual which Deleuze extrapolates from Bergson, and which Tuhkanen 
puts forwards as a favourable alternative to Butler’s conception of change. 
The virtual, in Tuhkanen’s account, designates the efficacy of the past as 
‘an undifferentiated realm of potentiality that in no way predicts the actual 
forms of existence it produces’ (20). The actual, on the other hand, 
denotes the ‘potential process of radical emergence’ (21) which follows 
from this potentiality of the past, and Tuhkanen’s general argument is that 
this ‘creative dimension is absent in [Butler’s account of] performative 
repetitions’ (22).19 
 This potential of radical emergence constituted by the virtual and 
the actualisation of the virtual is contrasted by Tuhkanen, following 
Deleuze, to Bergson’s critique of possibility. For Bergson, the notion of 
possibility denotes a conception of the future which does not account for 
the effects of real duration. Briefly stated, his argument is that when we 
form an idea of something being possible in the future we are only 
reconstructing elements already in existence, and so ‘reduce the new to a 
                                                 
19 Part of my underlying issue with Tuhkanen is that his account lacks specificity as to 
what the passage from virtual to actual involves. The concept of the virtual has been 
associated primarily with the qualitative experience of duration and, as I will discuss in my 
following chapter, memory. However, in each case the term is used to describe a different 
kind of process. Indeed, Keith Ansell-Pearson (2002; 2005a) has been particularly 
prominent in outlining how the idea of the virtual does highly specific conceptual work in 
each context it is applied to, and can provide insight not only into duration and memory 
but also evolution and perception. 
My critique of Tuhkanen should, in turn, not be conflated with a judgement of 
Deleuze’s work, which is equally specific and diverse in its use of the virtual and actual. 
For instance, in Difference and Repetition the virtual is described in relation to memory 
but it is also given a broader meaning which denotes the way actual objects enter into 
contextual associative relations. In this context, ‘reality of the virtual consists of […] 
differential elements and relations’ (Deleuze 2008: 260) which exist between actual 
material objects. The modality of the virtual thus describes the indeterminate intensities 
which emerge in the relations between objects and, as a dimension of becoming, 
influences experience by contingently giving significance to those objects. 
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mere rearrangement of former elements’ (Bergson 2002: 104). In 
projecting an idea of the future in this way we eclipse the real conditions of 
creation – which are contained in an immanent relation between the actual 
present and the virtual past – and therefore ‘disregard the radical novelty 
of each moment of evolution’ (99). We thus misrepresent the future as 
something which ‘can be thought of before being realized’ (100).  
Tuhkanen places Butler’s conception of change firmly in the realm 
of the possible, and for this reason asserts that Bergson’s model of 
temporality is ‘unthinkable’ (Tuhkanen: 25) in terms of performativity. 
However, this flat assertion of incommensurability does not consider that, 
for Bergson, concepts like the possible and obligation depict aspects of 
experience which are different in kind to the virtual and aspiration but quite 
thinkable in relation to them. Moreover, insofar as the idea of 
unpredictability is put forward as a general principle of change it excludes 
Butler’s central concern with the way discursive regulations set limits to the 
present moment of becoming. 
In this sense, Tuhkanen’s ‘Deleuzian (or Bergsonian) assessment 
of performativity’ (6) is not an assessment of performativity at all because 
it does not attempt to re-conceive the virtual and the actual within a 
framework of discursive constraint. Tuhkanen simply summarises Butler’s 
‘goal of resignifying dialectics’ (26), describing it as ‘the political work of 
realization [and] legitimation’ (25) which involves ‘the reordering of 
symbolic reality’ (25) into more inclusive forms of social recognition. Thus, 
because this goal only involves the reordering of a pre-existing symbolic 
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reality, Tuhkanen concludes that these ‘dynamics of recognition do not 
adequately describe the process of actualisation (25).  
Superficially, this critique is similar to my arguments that the 
negation of discursive coherence does not describe the lived responses to 
such negations, and that negation tends to produce only further abjection 
rather than transformation. However, the way Tuhkanen constructs his 
critique poses the problem entirely in terms of a paradigmatic opposition 
between Hegelian and Bergsonian becoming, as philosophical principles, 
and therefore does not actually re-assess the dynamics of regulation. In 
effect, Tuhkanen displaces the main concerns of Butler’s concept of 
performativity, as a social system of regulation, and focuses only on the 
limitations of the theoretical framework which Butler uses to define 
temporality. 
My point here is that when Tuhkanen argues that ‘performativity 
has trouble conceptualizing becoming as a radically open and 
unpredictable process’ (6) it should rightly be countered that part of 
Butler’s aim is precisely to show that becoming is not radically open. It is 
not simply that Butler develops ‘a notion of becoming that makes 
assessable the possible, and not the virtual’ (26). Rather, it is that her 
object of analysis is itself a domain in which the possible governs over 
sociality.  
Discursive regulations do not simply form a realm of intelligibility, 
but also act by ‘foreclosing the possibility of articulation’ (Butler 1996b: 68) 
to anything outside that realm. If certain articulations are foreclosed by 
normative expectations then certain virtual potentials, however 
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unpredictable their potential emergence may be, have no way to become 
actualised within the social. What happens to the virtual, for instance, 
when its actualisation would transgress a constitutive prohibition? What 
happens when the radical emergences of one person becomes an object 
of violent abjection for another? 
From this perspective, the temporal problem inherent within 
performativity is not so much a theoretical one in which Butler’s 
‘Hegelianism cannot tolerate [the theorisation of] openness’ (Tuhkanen: 
26) – even though this may well be the case. Rather, the problem is 
whether or not hegemonic attachments to discursive structures of 
intelligibility can tolerate openness. It is, in other words, hegemonic 
subjects who project ‘deeply entrenched and sedimented expectations’ 
(Butler 1988: 524) into the future; and it is these lived expectations of the 
possible which blocks the potentiality of the virtual. What needs theorising 
in this respect, then, is an exploration of how, from a psychological 
perspective, entrenched expectations unfold dynamically when they are 
rendered unstable, and an indication of how these expectations can be, as 
it were, virtualised. 
In this light, neither Butler nor Tuhkanen provide satisfactory 
accounts of performativity and change. For Butler, on the one hand, a 
signifying act is ‘always a reiteration of a set of norms’ (1993: 12). The 
past is theorised only as a meaning sedimented within discourse, which 
‘confer[s] a binding power on the action performed’ (1993: 225) through its 
‘presumptive force’ (225). Thus, because gender expectations are only 
defined in terms of discursive structures, she provides no account of how 
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these expectations develop experientially when their naturalising effects 
are disrupted. Tuhkanen’s critique becomes pertinent here insofar as it is 
the virtual potential of the past, within the immediate qualitative experience 
of duration, which enables the self’s closed relation to discourse to 
become open enough to enable its re-articulation. On the other hand, 
however, Tuhkanen himself invokes the virtuality of the past without 
considering the dynamics of regulation, and thus omits the question of 
how entrenched expectations can be overcome. Indeed, critiquing Butler’s 
concept of negation only ‘as a philosophical paradigm’ (6), he does not 
consider that it is an inherent aspect of sociality which, in turn, constitutes 
a certain type of temporal movement that resists virtuality. 
Given the complementarity of these respective limitations, I want to 
argue that it is necessary to think of the virtual and the possible in terms of 
different relations to a gendered act or a process of intelligibility. Rather 
than two incommensurable philosophical positions, they constitute 
radically different ways by which the past and future unfold experientially 
within the immediacy of an act. Thinking of the virtual and the possible in 
this way, as tendencies of the self, thus enables the question to be asked: 
how exactly do we pass from a state of normative gender expectation to 
that of actualising the virtual potential of gender? 
As I suggested in my previous section, in the form of aspiration and 
obligation these radically different tendencies ‘meet […] in that region of 
the mind where concepts are formed’ (Bergson 1935: 51). More precisely, 
we can say that within the immediate temporal process of forming a 
mental concept there is the capacity for both tendencies to mediate the 
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dynamics of intelligibility. Nonetheless, this is not for Bergson an evenly 
balanced potential, but a tension which favours obligation. Because ‘our 
intelligence and our language deal in fact with things [rather than] 
transitions’ (45), the formation of a concept will always tend more readily to 
obligation. Therefore, while aspiration ‘tends to expand and broaden out’ 
(51) the sedimented expectations of signifying practices, this momentary 
opening of virtuality always returns to the constraints of expectation. 
If we think of this tension in terms of an experience of the imminent 
future it is possible to add a further, and perhaps more important, reason 
why obligation dominates the contingent production of mental concepts. It 
is also possible to discern more clearly the experiential conditions which 
enable the virtual past to produce creative relations to gendered meaning. 
On the one hand, the tendency towards the possible enacts a 
conservation of the past which constrains the future as a projected 
expectation. In this case, self-coherence is achieved in accordance to how 
closely those expectations are satisfied, and the result is the tendency 
towards normative signification. On the other hand, the tendency towards 
the virtual derives the self’s coherence from the on-going qualitative 
organisation of duration. In this case, the reflexive experience of the self 
apperceives the open-ended progress of duration, and thereby at once 
ceases to anticipate the future as an expectation and, pace Tuhkanen, 
virtualises the past as a potential. 
My point is, firstly, that the influence which duration and constrained 
expectation have on processes of intelligibility varies according to the 
contingent dynamics of practical interaction. Secondly, the problem of re-
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signification – that is, whether a subversive repetition effects change or is 
resisted by hegemonic subjects – lies in the dynamics of action rather than 
meaning. Bergson himself intimates that it is ‘not the idea [contained within 
a norm], but its action, which makes it obligatory’ (1935: 233), and my re-
interpretation of this point is that the action which the norm performs is the 
feeling of familiarity it gives to sociality. In an on-going experience of 
performativity, the gender expectations of past performances produce a 
sense of familiarity which orientates the self within the moment of action 
by anticipating the immediate future. In terms of the action of an individual, 
then, this familiarity provides the sense of social coherence which drives 
the self’s attachment to normativity. 
From this perspective, the danger of using subversive repetitions as 
a means of social transformation is that they do not change the primary 
attachment to the idea. Rather, because they interrupt the immediate 
temporal coherence of an act, they may result in giving greater peremptory 
force to normativity. For a subversion to be successful it is necessary for 
the causal expectations, which familiarity provides for action, to be 
replaced by a forward momentum which opens up the self’s relation 
towards the future. Self-coherence can thus be derived from the dynamic, 
virtual causality of qualitative change. 
However, in the context of socially regulated acts, the emergence of 
this virtual potential of the self is not a given, as Tuhkanen suggests, but 
an achievement in which we ‘recover possession of oneself, and […] get 
back to pure duration (Bergson 1971: 232). In other words, the virtual 
potential of an individual is limited by the constraints placed on the social 
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possibilities of action, and are therefore not easily attainable within a social 
field structured by these constraints. 
In general, we can presume that the possible is always a prominent 
element of sociality because knowing in advance the general parameters 
in which both self and other should and will act makes an individual’s 
immediate process of action easier. Conforming to the homogenising 
tendencies of law and signifying practices will, as Bergson notes in Time 
and Free Will, enable the individual to ‘answer better to the requirements 
of social life’ (139). Even when an individual does recover possession of 
duration’s virtual potential, the constraint placed on action and intelligibility 
‘is not abolished’ (Bergson 1935: 46) because they are still repeated by 
other individuals. This means that once aspiration has been actualised it 
again becomes subjected to social requirements, and ‘tends to materialize 
by assuming the form of strict obligation’ (51).  
Thus, virtuality is closed off to experience at either side of its 
potential emergence, and we should be careful about how far we 
understand its ‘creative dimension’ (Tuhkanen: 22) to produce effects 
upon broad social structures. It is not enough, however, to simply assert 
that the beneficial familiarity which expectation provides for action 
prevents the emergence of the virtual. Rather, it is necessary to look 
closer at how the relation between the possible and the virtual develop 
within the immediate temporal dynamics of action, and how this tension 
influences processes of intelligibility. 
As I suggested in the previous section, ‘obeying laws and 
submitting to obligations […] is almost always done automatically’ 
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(Bergson 1935: 10), through habit. In such cases a conscious 
representation of gender is minimal because ‘an action started 
automatically passes almost unperceived’ (10). From this perspective, 
then, an analysis of an act’s temporality needs to begin with habit, as a 
non-representational mode of repetition, and show how an active process 
of intelligibility is always in some way a response to the interruption of a 
habit.  
Part of what is at stake here is the idea that ‘psychic life my be lived 
at different heights, now nearer to action, now further removed from it’ 
(Bergson 2005a: 14). The self’s relation to knowledge varies depending 
upon its specific tension towards action because ‘consciousness narrows 
or enlarges’ (166) according to how immediate or hesitant an act is. On 
the one hand, consciousness diminishes when an act is automatic 
precisely because the immediacy of the act renders conscious awareness 
of it unnecessary. On the other hand, however, actions are ‘accompanied 
by acute consciousness’ (Bergson 1935: 10) when, by whatever means, 
they are rendered hesitant. In fact, for Bergson ‘consciousness is this 
hesitation itself’ (10), and its role is to ‘preside over action’ (2005a: 141) by 
allowing the past to inflect the present and influence an impending act.  
When we act through habit, we repeat the borders of gender norms 
unreflectively, and their sedimented expectations are, generally speaking, 
‘lived and acted, rather than represented’ (Bergson 2005a: 81). In a 
certain respect ‘we “are acted” rather than act ourselves’ (Bergson 1971: 
231), so that repetition is, as it were, a passive and unreflective effect of 
conventional discursive practices. In turn, because consciousness ‘is 
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diminished whenever a stable habit is formed’ (Bergson 2005a: 45), this 
indicates that the virtual potential of the past simply fades into inefficacy.  
Subversive repetition may be an important strategy in this context 
because it disrupts the passive repetition of habits, and potentially allows 
processes of aspiration to develop within the expansion of consciousness. 
However, we cannot take this virtual potential for granted, and my aim is 
primarily to explore the reasons why subversion may prevent it. In short, 
thought of in the context of an immediately impending act, the interruption 
of habituated expectations disrupts the sense of stability by which an 
individual orientates their actions. Thus, insofar as subversion 
disorientates the individual within their field of action, their experience of 
the immediate future does not become radically open to new emergences. 
Rather, it becomes a realm of uncertainty. 
There is, within this uncertain indeterminacy, a need to regain the 
coherence of the act which, I would argue, is most easily achieved by re-
asserting the borders of gender which have been subverted. This is 
because conceptual language gives us ‘the plan of our possible action on 
things’ (Bergson 1960: 165), and has a primarily pragmatic function which 
is ‘relative to the needs of action’ (161). Conceptual knowledge, in other 
words, helps ‘to tell us in precise terms the kind of action or attitude [an] 
object is to suggest to us’ (Bergson 2002: 177), and therefore provides the 
most direct means to restore coherence to the social field. 
What is significant here is that the discreteness of gender borders 
are now actively represented and consciously projected as a de-
legitimising expectation. The virtual potential of qualitative experience no 
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longer simply fades, as it does with habit. Rather, to borrow Butler’s 
terminology, its experiential excesses must be actively disavowed, and 
therefore radically foreclosed, so that the differences between gendered 
objects can remain fully externalised. By actively re-asserting the stability 
of an object domain, this response closes off the virtuality of the past in a 
more peremptory way than is the case with habitual repetitions. Thus, 
again, my point is that strategies of subversive repetition must avoid this 
type of response because it makes re-signification less likely. 
In conclusion, what I am outlining here, as a response to 
subversion, is a series of psychic changes in which a passive expectation 
first of all turns into a reactive experience of uncertainty, and then into an 
active projection of regulatory structures which aims to resolve this 
uncertainty. Insofar as the psychic process of intelligibility becomes a 
willed projection of gender regulation, my argument is that the peremptory 
force given to these norms depends upon how intensely the initial feeling 
of uncertainty is experienced as a lack of self-coherence.  
This, it should be noted, is a very general summary of these 
dynamics, which it will be the work of my following chapters to explain in 
more detail. In particular, I will develop an account of emotion as an 
experience of indeterminacy in order to differentiate a series of variable 
responses to uncertainty. I will also extrapolate from Bergson’s theory of 
memory a way to understand more precisely how processes of intelligibility 
develop in response to indeterminacy. However, remaining in these 
general terms for the time being, the point is that this action-orientated 
view of the psyche provides the opportunity to differentiate a whole range 
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of tensions or intensities by which the apperception of the past and future 
unfold to produce contingent processes of intelligibility.  
In the following section I will continue this theme of exploring the 
dynamics of gender signification directly in relation to the immediate 
tension of action, specifically by relating the processes of habit and 
indeterminacy to the context of gender investment. 
 
Habit and Emotion. 
 
 
In further preparation for my following chapters on the body, this 
section will expand upon the relation between habit and the indeterminacy 
of action within processes of signification and subversion. In doing so I will 
continue to move away from Bergson’s broadly stated concept of 
obligation in order to provide a more complex image of interpellation as 
both a normative and unstable process of repetition. Nonetheless, there 
are still relevant insights into the nature of gender investment which can 
be drawn from the account of habit and emotion provided in The Two 
Sources. Specifically, I will first reflect upon the relation between habit and 
regulation. I will then introduce the way I will use Bergson’s formula of two 
types of emotion to define different types of indeterminacy and gender 
instability. 
A large part of what is at stake here is a critique of ‘the psychic form 
power takes’ (Butler 1997a: 2) in Butler’s model. For Bergson, as for 
Butler, it ‘is impossible [to live in a society] without obeying rules and 
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submitting to obligations’ (Bergson 1935: 10). However, contra Butler’s 
analysis of this ‘mandatory submission’ (Butler 1997a: 7), which is ‘traced 
in the peculiar turning of a subject against itself’ (18, 19), Bergson 
describes obligation as ‘a system of more or less deeply rooted habits’ 
(Bergson 1935: 2). What this means, for Bergson, is that ‘if we restrict 
ourselves to the most usual case [of submitting to laws]’ (10) then it is 
clear that conformity ‘is almost always [performed] automatically’ (10), and 
that ‘there is no effort’ (10) involved in submitting to social pressures. 
On the one hand, then, Butler seeks to define the attachment to law 
within psychic processes of internalisation that take place, for instance, ‘in 
acts of self-reproach, conscience, and melancholia’ (Butler 1997a: 18, 19). 
The hegemonic assumption of power is thus characterised by a 
psychological struggle in which each act of repetition fundamentally 
involves a complex dynamic of repression and anxiety. Norms, in other 
words, are always ‘anxiously repeated’ (Butler 1993: 237) by hegemonic 
subjects because the discursive borders of those norms constitute an ideal 
which nobody can fully inhabit, and because what is excluded from the 
coherence of gender internally haunts its borders. Indeed, as I discussed 
in my final section of Chapter One, Butler’s theory of gender melancholy 
asserts that ‘rigid [heterosexual] gender boundaries invariably work to 
conceal the loss of an original [homosexual] love’ (2008: 86) which cannot 
be acknowledged within the framework of normative discourse. The 
original love therefore lives on only as an unconscious identification, and 
while Butler suggests that the ambivalence of the unconscious ‘erodes the 
operations of language’ (1997a: 143) it also continues to motivate 
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normative repetitions insofar as this ambivalence threatens the gendered 
self with dissolution. 
For Bergson, on the other hand, obligation ‘coincides with a 
tendency, so habitual that we find it natural, to play in society the part 
which our station assigns to us’ (Bergson 1935: 10). This means that ‘so 
long as we yield to this tendency, we scarcely feel it’ (10), and that when 
‘we lay down that obedience is primarily a struggle with the self […] we 
make a psychological error’ (11). 
While I am not denying that psychological complexes such as 
melancholia and self-reproach should form part of an overall account of 
gender, my point is that they do not ‘work in tandem with processes of 
social regulation’ (Butler 1997a: 19) in precisely the way Butler suggests. 
The problem is that the very psychic processes of anxiety and melancholia 
which, in her model, are responsible for the instability of interpellation are 
also said to drive normative repetitions of gender. As such, subversion can 
only have limited effects because it works upon a single complex which is 
already understood to compel the repetition of rigid gender identities. For 
instance, if such identities are, in the first place, a defensive mechanism 
which attempts to conceal melancholic identifications, then can a 
subversion which attempts to expose such ambivalence achieve anything 
other than reinforcing a defensive posture? At any rate, my recourse to 
habit, as a different basis for understanding the failures of interpellation, 
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aims to re-conceive gender investment as a dynamic which has a more 
diverse relation to subversion and potential transformation.20 
As with Butler, habits may be acquired and socially regulated 
through injunctions, such as “be more ladylike” or “act like a man” imposed 
on children. My model is thus still in agreement with Butler that the subject 
is produced as an effect of pre-existing forms of power which individuals 
must repeat in order to remain humanised. The difference is that individual 
subjects incorporate these norms into the body by actually performing acts 
rather than through internalising discursive limits. In other words, social 
injunctions are sedimented into the behaviours and investments of 
individuals primarily through a naturalising formation of the body’s motor 
tendencies. 
Within the immediacy of an unreflective act, what these motor 
tendencies repeat is not a complex of anxiety and repression but the 
‘coordinated movements [of] accumulated efforts’ (Bergson 2005a: 82). 
Thought of as coordinated movements rather than signifying meanings, 
the habitual repetition of gender is thus a non-representational process. It 
takes place, as it were, beyond an explicit relation to the logic of 
prohibition and negation which Butler ascribes to discursive structures. In 
short, habituated processes of repetition are not invested in the 
‘exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed’ (Butler 1993: 3), but 
only in the expectations of action they project. 
                                                 
20 See Rosi Braidotti (2002) for different kind of critique of Butler’s use of psychoanalysis 
and its implications for transformation. Braidotti finds some of Butler’s view ‘problematic 
both conceptually and ethically’ (43). She argues that in a psychoanalytical model of the 
psyche ‘changes hurt and transformations are painful’ (43), and she ‘finds insufficient 
respect for the pain of in-depth changes in Butler’s account’ (43). 
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It is useful here to invoke the more phenomenological perspective 
of Marcel Mauss’ body techniques, and Edward Casey’s development of 
this idea. Echoing Butler in some ways, Mauss describes the cultural and 
historical contingency of the way the body is styled in activities such as 
swimming and marching, stressing that although these styles feel natural 
they are acquired through education rather than being biologically intrinsic 
(Mauss: 97-105). Reflecting on how this education is conveyed in the 
specific example of swimming, Casey adds to this that there is a distance 
between the acclimatisation of the habit, the image we have of ourselves 
acting, and the rule which it follows. He writes: ‘neither the image nor the 
rule needs to be stated in so many words, that is, in anything like a text. 
[…] Ultimately, the water I place myself in and the body placed there teach 
me more than any set of words I read or hear’ (2004: 211).  
My point is that while the enforced imposition of laws and 
prohibitions may be necessary to produce gendered habits in their social 
generality, their embodiment within an individual is not inscribed through 
the same logic of negativity which is apparent on the discursive level. As 
Nick Crossley writes, also commenting on Mauss: ‘Embodied Knowledge 
is not discursive knowledge […] Knowing how to swim just is being able to 
do it’ (87). Just so, a habitual performance of gender can be understood 
as ‘lived and acted, rather than represented’ (Bergson 2005a: 81). Once a 
habit is acquired it is not strictly tied to or compelled by the prohibitions, 
exclusions and repudiations which regulate it at the level of discursive 
intelligibility. Performances are motivated, rather, by a ‘logic of the body’ 
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(112) which acts inattentively by producing ‘[bodily] attitudes which 
automatically follow our perception of things’ (84).  
This contiguity of response, whereby the body’s role ‘is to perform 
the appropriate gesture on any and every occasion’ (Bergson 1935: 272), 
explains why gender norms are so easily naturalised, and why they are so 
easily concealed as constructed norms. This is to say, because the body’s 
inattentive acts are ‘so habitual that we find it natural’ (10), they appear to 
express an essence of the body much more than they do a regulated 
‘stylization of the body’ (Butler 2008: 191) or a signifying effect. 
Nonetheless, I need to be careful here to retain a sense that ‘power is not 
mechanically reproduced when it is assumed’ (Butler 1997a: 21), and so 
always ‘runs the risk of assuming another form and direction’ (21).  
It is not that habits are mechanical or deterministic, and therefore 
cannot be changed and efficaciously interrupted. Indeed, as is the case 
with Butler’s subversion of signifying meaning, habits can be interrupted in 
a way which de-naturalises the expectations of the act. Rather, the point is 
that habits tend to produce unreflective acts which, in relation to the 
conscious representation of gender, ‘maintains in a virtual state anything 
likely to hamper action by becoming actual’ (Bergson 1935: 272).  
As such, gendered acts may appear to be the result of a complete 
and successful interpellation of hegemonic subjects into the behaviours 
and attitudes compelled by discursive structures. This is not the case, 
however, since the co-ordinated motor responses which constitute the 
actual physical performance are only an approximation of the laws which 
effect its constrained production. Individual subjects may repeat the norm 
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inattentively, and therefore repeat the exclusions and injunctions which 
structure the signifying meaning of that norm, but this does not mean that 
their conscious selves are interpellated in a behaviouristic manner. 
In turn, because the sedimentation and naturalisation of norms 
takes place primarily through a formation of the body’s motor habits there 
is no need to seek confirmation of the failures of interpellation within the 
unconscious. We do not, in other words, have to presume a fundamental 
psychic domain which represses a ‘dreaded identification’ (Butler 1993: 3) 
in order to ensure the unstable assumption of a hegemonic identity. The 
inconsistencies and experiential excesses of the norm, which might 
trouble the naturalised status of gender if they were to become conscious, 
are simply inhibited by the immediacy of habitual acts. Nonetheless, as 
soon as habits are interrupted, actions are ‘accompanied by acute 
consciousness’ (Bergson 1935: 10). The inconsistencies of discourse, and 
the psychic complexes of anxiety and repression which Butler describes, 
can therefore emerge when action becomes indeterminate. 
This model can provide a much more diverse account of the relation 
between naturalised processes of repetition and the instabilities of gender 
investment. To begin with, insofar as gender is performed habitually, it can 
be said with some certainty that the sedimented psychological relations by 
which Butler characterises the hegemonic psyche do not form a 
continuous and fundamental basis for investment. My contention on this 
note is that Butler takes only the most extreme hegemonic relations to 
discourse and objectifies them as the underlying experience of all gender 
repetition. In effect, she has ‘confused the […] tranquil state akin to 
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inclination’ (Bergson 1935: 11), which constitutes the primary mode of 
habituated investment, with ‘the violent effort we now and again exert on 
ourselves’ (11) when this inclination is disrupted.  
Following Bergson’s example in The Two Sources, then, I want to 
completely reverse Butler’s claim that repetition is usually performed as a 
response to anxiety. In fact, it is more accurate to say that the familiarity 
which habit brings to action enables a ‘feeling […] of individual and social 
well-being’ (39). This is why Bergson describes obligation as a tranquil 
state or an inclination rather than a struggle with the self, and why habit 
provides a much more pervasive rationale for the ‘tacit, collective 
agreement to perform [gender norms]’ (Butler 2008: 190). In a naturalised 
environment in which one feels comfortable there is nothing easier than 
performing the norm. Gender repetition, therefore, is unlikely to be 
underlined and motivated by anxiety in situations where it is supported by 
the universal consent of the social field because ‘the adherence of each 
individual [to the norm] is reinforced by the adherence of the all’ (Bergson 
1935: 168). 
As well as providing a less complex mode of attachment, thinking 
through gender investment in terms of action also facilitates a more 
variable image of how unstable processes of investment unfold in 
response to subversion. Ultimately, my point is that the physical 
tendencies and relationality of movement is more influential in acts of 
performative repetition and subversion than the meanings of signifying 
norms. Because the investment in gender is not tied primarily to the 
coherence of meaning, but to the immediate dynamics of action, specific 
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responses to the relational tensions of action allow an individual’s relation 
to gendered meaning to change in different ways. In short, the force and 
conviction by which individuals invest in the exclusionary borders of 
gender is contingent upon the way indeterminacy is emotionally 
experienced. 
Thought of as a lived temporal experience, what is disrupted by a 
subversive act is not the coherence of a gender ideal. It is the projected 
continuity between the present moment and the immediate future which 
the expectations of habit provide for an action. The response to this 
sudden indeterminacy is, in this way, also underlined by a reflexive 
temporal experience which anticipates the future in order to re-orientate 
disrupted expectations. As such, it is the different ways the indeterminate 
future is experienced or anticipated emotionally which indicate distinct and 
variable types of response to subversion and, subsequently, different 
investments in the borders of discourse.  
In my following chapter I will develop this idea of emotion as an 
anticipatory tension towards action more concretely and, as I discussed at 
the end of Chapter One, my key guidance for this will be Bergson’s Matter 
and Memory. Nonetheless, in closing here, it is useful to reflect upon some 
of the brief statements Bergson makes about the relation between emotion 
and morality in The Two Sources. This will help clarify how emotion needs 
to be theorised in the context of subversion in order to account for adverse 
responses which resist the subversion, but also more receptive responses 
that can facilitate transformation. 
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In ‘attributing to emotion a large share in the genesis of the moral 
disposition’ (Bergson 1935: 35), Bergson not only points towards a 
connection between feeling and action within the interpretation of law. He 
also argues that we ‘must distinguish between two types of emotion [or] 
two varieties of feeling’ (31) which he differentiates by their relation to 
action and representation.  
On the one hand, there is a creative form of emotion which is 
synonymous with aspiration. This type of emotion is ‘not attached to 
anything in particular’ (29). It is not caused by ‘the attraction of [a pre-
existing moral] object’ (27), and therefore does not seek to constrain 
meaning or identity within the ready-made terms of language. Rather, as I 
have discussed previously, it enacts an ‘upheaval of the depths’ (31) of the 
self which is capable of transforming an individual’s relation to discursive 
practices. On the other hand, however, there is a second type of emotion 
associated with obligation which Bergson describes in terms of a ‘surface 
agitation’ (31). In distinction from creative emotions, which we might say 
exceed the constraints of discourse, they are depicted as a ‘restlessness 
following upon a representation’ (216). 
The type of feelings which Bergson associates with obligation and 
agitation are ‘states of emotion caused in effect by certain things’ (29), and 
are ‘destined to spur us on to acts answering needs’ (29). Moving beyond 
Bergson’s text somewhat, I understand them as adaptive responses to 
uncertainties within the immediate future.  
In the context of subversion, these types of emotion agitate the self 
in the sense that they restlessly compel actions which abate 
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indeterminacy. For instance, fear might prompt a movement away from the 
field of subverted action, and will intensify feelings of apprehension until 
the de-naturalising effects of subversion are repudiated. Alternatively, 
anger will promote aggressive actions which seek to dominate the source 
of subversion and restore familiarity through active processes of abjection. 
As a motivation for the conscious representation of gender, adaptive 
emotions thus compel attempts to regain self-coherence by the kind of 
reflexive actions and attitudes they cultivate. In doing so, they may 
necessitate re-arrangements of the conceptual dimensions of identity, 
driving an individual’s conscious representation of gender in certain 
directions and emphasising the regulatory effects of gender in different 
ways. However, they do not tend to stir the kind of radical crisis of 
identification which Butler intends for subversion. Indeed, they may 
ultimately have the effect of reinforcing an individual’s relation to their 
subject positions and producing more forceful investments in the borders 
of discourse. 
In contrast, the reflexivity of creative emotions orientates the self 
within a field of action in an entirely different way, and therefore influences 
the ensuing dynamics of meaning differently. Because this emotion is not 
attracted by an object, its development during a moment of indeterminacy 
does not anticipate or compel a specific course of action. It unfolds within 
the immanent flow of duration, such that the self is at ease with the 
openness of its immediate future. Following the initial impact of 
subversion, this openness abates the need for a determinate identity by 
which to consciously represent the self, just as it counterweighs the need 
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for the feeling of social well-being derived from familiarity. The quality of 
feeling which arises, Bergson argues, ‘implicitly contains the feeling of 
progress’ (39); but it is not the progress of an explicit aim or definitive 
action. It is ‘the enthusiasm of a forward movement’ (39), where the 
enthusiasm itself is its own sense of reflexive growth. 
In this way, creative emotions obviously provide a productive 
source of experience from which to respond to the intended de-
naturalising effects of subversion. In Bergson’s terms, the conscious 
apperception of self and other ‘no longer starts from a multiplicity of ready-
made elements’ (34), and would therefore resist the totalising effects of 
gender regulation. The self would be ‘transported at a bound to something 
[…] which will contrive later to express itself, more or less satisfactorily, in 
concepts’ (34, 35), and which would aspire to change the discursive 
structures of meaning. Although such attempts at expression would still be 
constrained by discursive practices, and are essentially reducible to ‘a set 
of meanings already socially established’ (Butler 2008: 191), the emotion 
itself would produce a reflexive distance from the effects of those 
signifying constraints. It would form an open attitude which ‘vivifies […] the 
intellectual elements with which it is destined to unite’ (Bergson 1935: 34). 
These two different types of emotional tensions, then, arise within 
moments of indeterminacy and form radically contrasting relations to 
regulatory practices. The point I will be most concerned to develop, 
particularly in Chapter Four, is that understanding how emotions form and 
develop provides a useful way to strategize subversive practices. This is 
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because it suggests a way in which the efficacy of subversion can, to 
some degree, be predicted and guided.  
For example, while Butler claims that the instability of gender 
causes anxiety, under what specific social conditions might such anxiety 
actually ‘compel a radical rethinking […] of gender identity’ (Butler 2008: 
189) rather than cause an even more resolute repetition of a norm? While 
I have argued that a productive aim should be to invoke a creative 
emotion, we should ask the question: whether a certain act of subversion 
would be more likely to provoke an adaptive response such as anger? 
Attempting to answering questions like these is, firstly, an issue of 
comprehending how different emotions are responses to the specific way 
subversion impacts on the preceding state of action. Secondly, it is a 
matter of intuiting how any specific emotion will develop differently 
depending on the social context in which they unfold. This is to say, their 
effects will either dissipate or be extenuated according to whether their 
suggested actions are completed or remain indeterminate. The 
culmination of my thesis in Chapter Four will, therefore, aim not only to 
differentiate some common responses to subversion, but to distinguish the 
social contexts which cause and support them.  
In summary, the primary claim of this section is that habits sediment 
expectations; and these expectations form a basis for gender investment 
which is not strictly identical to Butler’s views on the exclusionary 
structures of discourse. Hegemonic identification does not involve an 
inherent melancholic ambivalence, and repetition is not fundamentally 
motivated by anxiety. Gender norms, as habituated acts, can thus be 
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interrupted in various ways, producing different emotional responses 
which, in turn, facilitate greater or lesser potentials for effective de-
naturalisation. 
I will explore this relation between expectation and interruption 
more closely in my following chapter. Firstly, I will develop a more detailed 
account of the relation between the sensory-motor processes of the body, 
consciousness and discourse. Secondly, I will draw upon Yaak 
Panksepp’s neurological account of emotion as a ‘value-laden internal 
guidance for behavior’ (2005: 46) in order to conceptualise the body’s 
specific role in emotion. Linking Panksepp to Matter and Memory through 
Bergson’s concept of the brain, I will use his conception of ‘fear, anger, 
sorrow [and] anticipatory eagerness’ (Panksepp 1998: 47) to work towards 
clarifying the most common hegemonic responses to subversion. Finally, I 
will explore the role the body and memory play in producing contingent 
processes of meaning. 
 
Conclusion. 
 
 
My aim in this chapter has been to begin describing performativity 
in terms of a self which variably experiences their hegemonic subject 
positions, specifically in order to move beyond Butler’s abstract view of 
repetition as citation. Alternatively, I have devised a framework which 
theorises the lived processes of signification, and which I believe can 
better understand the dynamics of change and sedimentation. 
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I have argued that these dynamics can be understood in terms of 
an on-going tension between a tendency to experience sociality through a 
process of qualitative change and an opposite tendency of the self to 
become enclosed in the ready-made structures of discourse. Thought of in 
terms of an on-going process in which an individual subject acts within a 
regulated social field, I have then begun to clarify this tension specifically 
as a relation towards the future. On the one hand, an apperception of 
qualitative experience can enable an open relation towards the immediate 
future which is capable of transforming an individual’s relation to 
discursive constraints. However, for subversive repetitions to achieve this 
they must disrupt the habituated tendency to project expectations into the 
future, and avoid the counter-productive emotional responses by which 
individuals respond to indeterminacy. 
I have, in this way, presented the efficacy of both normative and 
subversive significations in terms of the immediate temporal dynamics of 
action rather than in an investment in the coherence of meaning. What 
remains to be further explored in this respect is the way processes of 
intelligibility develop in response to the present moment of action because 
of the way the body ‘fixes our mind, and gives it ballast and poise’ 
(Bergson 2005a: 173). This will allow me to explore in greater depth how 
and why negative emotional responses develop during moments of 
indeterminacy, and thus to begin speculating upon how aspiration is 
achievable within on-going processes of signification. Indeed, while I have 
so far formulated the dynamics of action largely through Bergson’s 
conceptual terms of obligation and aspiration, ultimately this duality does 
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not provide sufficient insight into how the tension between these 
tendencies changes.  
In part, this is because the notion of obligation lacks the precision to 
fully explore the immediate dynamics of action. Therefore, in my following 
chapter I will turn to Bergson sensory-motor understanding of the body in 
Matter and Memory in order to explore these processes in more detail. 
This will provide a more thorough account of how norms are sedimented in 
the body’s motor habits as a primary basis of gender attachment, as well 
as a more diverse conception of emotion and its relation to intelligibility. In 
turn, while thinking of consciousness in terms of the qualitative 
differentiations of duration will remain important in theorising how the self 
can re-orientate its relation towards otherness, my primary aim is to 
explore how the conscious representation of the self develops during 
adverse responses to subversion. For this purpose, the perspective in 
Matter and Memory of ‘different planes of consciousness’ (241), which 
result from the way the indeterminacy of an act allows consciousness to 
narrow or expand ‘the development of its content’ (166), will be more 
useful. 
Following this point, it can be added that obligation and aspiration 
designate only social dispositions, in which an individual’s relation towards 
signifying practices tends either towards transformative or conservative 
tendencies. While I have argued that they influence processes of 
intelligibility by increasing the peremptory force of discourse or providing a 
lived sense of its contingency, this perspective lacks insight into the 
specific psychic processes by which conceptual content is actually 
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developed. What Matter and Memory offers in this respect is the 
opportunity to explore the way the conceptual content of meaning is 
derived from associative powers of memory, and inflects discourse 
variably depending on an individual’s tension towards action. 
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CHAPTER THREE: PERFORMATIVITY, THE BODY, AND MEMORY 
 
 
In Matter and Memory, Bergson understands the body as a ‘center 
of action’ (138) which is, ‘in its essence, sensori-motor’ (138). In turn, 
consciousness is conceived in terms of a capacity to retain the past and 
anticipate the future which ‘narrows and enlarges’ (166) depending how 
immediate or hesitant an action becomes. 
I have already begun to demonstrate how this way of understanding 
the body and consciousness can be used to develop an account of 
performativity. However, this has been largely limited to the general claim 
that gender is usually performed inattentively, through habit, while 
conscious processes of identification only develop when action becomes 
indeterminate. What I will introduce in this chapter is Bergson’s conception 
of the nervous system in Matter and Memory: as a system of material 
movements – ‘interposed between the objects which affect my body and 
those which I can influence’ (44, 45) – which delay an organism’s 
response to material stimulus. Through this perspective I aim to produce a 
more comprehensive explication of how motor habits are formed, and a 
more precise analysis of the body’s on-going involvement in gender 
signification.  
For Butler, the meaning and stability of a signifying act is dependent 
on a certain ‘congealment of the past’ (1993: 244), whereby the present 
moment of signification is given the authority of a gender norm through the 
‘invocation of convention’ (225). However, Butler does not explore how 
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this congealment and invocation is variably re-experienced by individuals 
within each act of signification. In order to explore how the relation 
between the past and meaning is dynamically experienced I will draw 
upon Bergson’s idea that the past is preserved in two different ways, each 
of which has a radically different relation to the nervous system.  
On the one hand, consistent acts of repetition result in ‘a record of 
the past in the form of motor habits’ (Bergson 2005a: 84). This record is 
conserved in the motor mechanisms of the brain, and sustains a form of 
‘instantaneous recognition’ (92). I will use this notion of motor recognition 
to explore how the body’s perceptive processes come to influence the 
normative repetition of gender. In short, when ‘swayed by habit’ (155), we 
come to see ‘in any situation [only] that aspect in which it practically 
resembles former situations’ (155). 
On the other hand, the past is also preserved in what Bergson calls 
pure memory. In this form of memory the past is not stored in the brain, 
and reproduced through acts of repetition. Rather, all the individual events 
of a person’s life are retained in ‘unconscious psychical states’ (141). 
When this form of memory is freely invoked we tend to see how any 
particular situation ‘differs from others and not how it resembles them’ 
(155). I will thus use this aspect of Bergson’s work to think about the 
variable influence of the past within the reproduction of gendered 
meaning. 
Ultimately, I aim to explore how complex processes of meaning and 
recognition develop through a changing relation between the body’s motor 
tendencies and unstable invocations of memory. In preparation for this I 
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will make some introductory remarks concerning Bergson’s understanding 
of the nervous system, consciousness and memory. Drawing out the key 
factors which have influenced my use of Matter and Memory, I will then 
briefly sketch out the trajectory of the chapter.  
 
The Evolution of the Nervous System and Consciousness: 
 
Bergson’s main objective in Matter and Memory is to determine a 
‘point of contact between consciousness […] and the body’ (65), and part 
of his method of demonstrating this contact is the bottom-up approach he 
takes to the evolutionary emergence of consciousness. Simply put, 
Bergson characterises evolution in terms of an ever increasing capacity for 
indeterminate action. He then correlates this increased potential for action 
with a ‘growing and accompanying tension of consciousness’ (248). In this 
way, he argues that consciousness emerges ‘at the precise moment when 
a stimulation received by matter is not prolonged into a necessary action’ 
(32). Consciousness is therefore associated with the body through ‘a strict 
law’ (31) which connects the intensity of consciousness to the ‘intensity of 
action at the disposal of the living being’ (31). 
Constructing this argument, Bergson develops a pared-down image 
of the nervous system. This is to say he focuses only on its primary 
function, which is ‘to receive stimulation [and] to provide motor apparatus 
[for the response to stimulus]’ (31).  
Following this reduction, Bergson observes that the evolutionary 
‘progress of living matter consists in […] the increasing complication of a 
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nervous system’ (248). As we move higher up the organic series of life we 
can see the activity of organisms moving further away from mere reflex in 
precise accordance to the complexity of their nervous systems and brains. 
This is because, Bergson argues, the passage which a stimulus takes 
passes through ‘a great multitude of motor tracts’ (30) and allows the 
response to be delayed. 
In other words, the growing complexity of the nervous system 
means that the stimulus of an organism’s environment is brought into 
relation to an ever greater number of motor mechanisms. Rather than 
causing an immediate and determinate response, therefore, a stimulus 
may ‘dissipate itself in innumerable motor reactions which are merely 
nascent’ (30). In effect, this dissipation introduces into organic life a 
‘faculty of waiting before reacting’ (222) and, ultimately, allows the 
development of increasingly indeterminate and spontaneous actions. 
This, in itself, is a relatively uncontroversial argument given the 
observable correlation between the complexity of an organism’s nervous 
system and their capacity for indeterminate and spontaneous actions. 
However, Bergson’s more profound insight is that the delay between 
stimulus and response which is enabled by the nervous system is ‘only the 
outward aspect’ (222) of indeterminacy. The more radical effect of this 
delay is that an organism’s moment of response attains a certain thickness 
of duration, and therefore manifests as consciousness.  
As I will discuss in section two, what is at stake here is the 
contention that consciousness is something more than the cerebral state 
which accompanies it. Consciousness is ‘made manifest […] by a greater 
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development of the sensori-motor system’ (221) because the delay 
between stimulus and response extends the moment which constitutes an 
organism’s present. The ‘present necessarily occupies a duration’ (137) 
during this delay because the original stimulus is already in the past, being 
considered as a course of action, while the action itself is in the future 
being anticipated. Nonetheless, the dissipation of the stimulus along the 
motor tracts of the brain is itself only a material movement, and is 
therefore confined to the quasi-instantaneous existence of material reality. 
The experiential phenomena of hesitation is thus, properly 
speaking, the domain of consciousness rather than the brain because only 
consciousness ‘prolongs a plurality of moments into each other, 
contracting them into a single intuition’ (219). It is, in turn, the growing 
development of consciousness rather than the nervous system itself which 
enables the evolution of free, indeterminate actions. Able to retain the past 
for prolonged moments, consciousness ‘throws light on the immediate 
antecedents of [a] decision’ (141) so that it can ‘preside over action and 
enlighten choice’ (141).21 
                                                 
21 Bergson’s evolutionism, and his general account of the nervous system, is thus much 
more than a purely biological account of living bodies. Indeed, it is a broad metaphysical 
image of the tendencies that pertain to life which, as I noted in Chapter Two, finds its 
fuller expression in Creative Evolution. 
Nonetheless, while it is clear that Bergson extends his principle of life beyond the 
biological, it is equally clear that in both Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution the 
specific developments of this principle remain in close proximity to the empirical facts of 
biology and physics. Thus, while the general idea of a vital impetus has been Bergson’s 
primary philosophical legacy to date, there have also been more concentrated attempts to 
update his work through integrations with modern biology. See, for instance: Wolsky and 
Wolsky (1992) who invoke Bergson in relation to knowledge about DNA-RNA-Protein 
transitions; Michael Vaughan (2007) who applies Bergson to the theoretical biology of 
Brain Goodwin; Pete Gunter (1999a) who examines the issues of ecology from a 
Bergsonian perspective; Erol Basar and Bahar Guntekin (2007; 2009a; 2009b) who apply 
Bergson to problems in understanding the quantum dynamics of the brain; and Milič  
Čapek (1971) who focusses primarily on Bergson’s relation to physics. 
In effect, what is implied by these studies is that Bergson’s conceptions of 
evolution and the body are unfinished, heuristic principles capable of being refined and 
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Bergson concludes three related things from this perspective by 
which he characterises the relation between the brain, consciousness and 
memory. As I intimated above, I will use the dynamics of these relations to 
explore the psychic states involved in performativity.  
Firstly, Bergson asserts that, within the synthesis of duration, there 
is a ‘complete and independent […] survival of the past per se’ (2005a: 
149), and that this preservation of the past ‘may cease to belong to 
consciousness without therefore ceasing to exist in some manner’ (141). 
In effect, he is arguing that once a moment of experience has passed by it 
has not ‘ceased to exist’ (149), but ‘has simply ceased to be useful’ (149). 
In other words, the memory of the whole of our past continues to exist 
within the present moment, only in an unconscious, ‘latent state’ (141). 
                                                                                                                                     
developed through their interaction with emerging biological research. In the more 
pessimistic view, Bergson’s part in such engagements provides only a philosophical 
antidote to the more mechanistic perspectives of the natural sciences: 
 
Bergson’s relevance for modern biology lies in his natural philosophy which, 
although not acceptable as such to the scientist, still has importance. […] It is not 
so much Bergson’s ideas as he originally phrased them, but his concern which 
keeps us awake (Wolsky and Wolsky: 168, 169).  
 
However, the more profound interaction must aim to place science and metaphysics in a 
position of ‘mutual aid and reciprocal verification’ (Bergson 2002: 44). Indeed, while they 
‘mark divergent directions of the activity of thought’ (44), Bergson believed that their 
progressive interchange could drive both towards greater clarity. ‘Metaphysics will thus, 
by its peripheral part, exert a salutary influence of science. Conversely, science will 
communicate to metaphysics habits of precision’ (44). 
In this sense, it is not enough to say that science is mechanistic, or that life is an 
expression of vitality: ‘this must be demonstrated by a careful interpretation of the latest 
research’ (Vaughan: 20). In turn, this demonstration must ultimately have an 
advantageous interpretability rather than simply aiming to discredit science as the merely 
mechanistic. Following this line of thought, Vaughan invokes the ‘appropriation of 
Creative Evolution for contemporary problems in biology’ (19) such as the need to 
‘establish a perspective on biology that transcends genetic determinism’ (20). As he 
notes, this is not just a philosophical issue. It is a problem which biologists such as Brain 
Goodwin struggle with as they attempt to formulate new research methods and 
interpretive frameworks which can account for ‘the dynamic organization of an organism 
in a way that re-integrates it in its real environment (21). In this respect, then, Bergson’s 
work may indeed hold the possibility of having a ‘salutary influence’ (Bergson 2002: 44) 
on contemporary biology. 
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Specific memories are only recalled by consciousness by ‘adopting the 
appropriate attitude’ (134) which makes them useful again. 
Secondly, while the brain is not itself the repository of 
consciousness or memory, it does have the specific role of allowing or 
inhibiting the retrieval of memory. Bergson argues that the function of the 
brain is only to receive stimulation and to turn it into a motor response. 
However, in doing so it determines what he calls ‘our attention to life’ (14). 
It ‘fixes our mind, and gives it ballast and poise’ (173) by grounding it in a 
present moment of material action. In this way, the ‘sensory-motor 
equilibrium’ (95) of the body has the capacity of ‘directing memory towards 
the real and binding it to the present’ (177), so that only memories which 
are useful to the moment of action emerge into consciousness. 
Thirdly, insofar as both the body and consciousness have evolved 
in relation to action, Bergson insists upon the centrality of action as the 
basis of everyday experience. He writes for instance that ‘perception […] 
has its true and final explanation in the tendency of the body towards 
movement’ (45), and that ‘we must never forget the utilitarian character of 
our mental functions’ (16). 
My aim in section one will be to adapt Bergson’s utilitarian principle 
to the repetition of gender performativity. I will reflect upon the way pre-
existing power relations form the sensory-motor dynamics of the body, not 
only by conserving habituated actions but by constraining tendencies of 
perceptual recognition. This, I will argue, provides a way to understand 
how the normative relations between gendered bodies are circulated 
through a process of mutual accommodation. 
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My second section will look more closely at the implications of 
Bergson’s understanding of the nervous system and brain. Specifically, I 
will focus on his relation to modern neurology and to the philosophy of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I will use these engagements to develop insights 
into Bergson’s work which point towards possible developments, but also 
to clarify how my own reading of Matter and Memory provides a limited 
way to understand the lived body during processes of performativity. 
Ultimately, these reflections will prepare the developments I will make to 
Bergson, through the work of Yaak Panksepp, concerning the experience 
of emotion during moments of indeterminate action.  
Finally, in my third section I will explore Bergson’s theory of memory 
in more depth. My aim here will be to adapt his general principles of the 
unconscious and his utilitarian psychology into a model which can account 
for complex processes of gender identification. 
 
Gender Repetition and the Sensory-Motor Body. 
 
 
In Matter and Memory, part of Bergson’s aim is to argue against 
perspectives which ‘sever [the body’s] motor activity from the perceptive 
process’ (46). For instance, he criticises forms of what he calls 
‘materialistic realism’ (26) in which perception is regarded purely in terms 
of the sensory apparatus. In such views, ‘to perceive means to know’ (28), 
but the perceived object ‘possesses an absolute value’ (26) which is then 
simply revealed by the senses as a kind of ‘pure knowledge’ (28) of the 
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object. Perception is therefore imagined to be ‘a kind of photographic view 
of things […] which would then be developed in the brain’ (38). 
For Bergson, on the other hand, ‘the actuality of our perception […] 
lies in its activity’ (68), and what he aims to show is that ‘there is a purely 
utilitarian origin of our perception of things’ (158). Perception is, from the 
start, sensory-motor. It reflects the capacity of an organism for activity 
within its material environment. It does not simply reveal an object, but 
selectively discerns it from a broader field of material reality. Neither does 
this discernment have ‘a purely speculative interest’ (137), but rather 
discerns the material world according to the elements within it which ‘can 
respond to a tendency or a need’ (158).22  
The important points in respect to this section are, firstly, that 
“knowing” an object is never simply a transparent act of perceiving it. 
Rather, it is an act of selective discernment which primarily involves 
‘knowing how to use [the object]’ (93). Secondly, for my purpose of 
analysing gender regulation, such discernment can be understood to take 
place to a large extent through the production and enactment of motor 
habits.  
In Bergson’s terms, these motor habits produce a ‘similarity of 
reaction’ (160) from stimuli in the environment which are ‘superficially 
                                                 
 
22 In an informative piece of commentary, Milič Čapek explains this argument using the 
example that human perception cannot detect infrared or ultraviolet light. Bees, however, 
can detect ultraviolet because some flowers reflect that part of the spectrum, while 
rattlesnakes detect infrared because it allows them to sense their prey (Čapek 1971: 36). 
Perception, in this way, can be seen to divide and delimit a broader filed of material 
reality according to what is useful for an organism’s potential actions, while disregarding 
‘those external influences which are indifferent to them’ (Bergson 2005a: 36). However, 
while Čapek’s commentary remains focussed on the emergence of perception from 
material reality, and its varied manifestation in different species, my focus below will be 
on the adaptability of human perception to produce more subtle discernments. 
 
165 
 
different’ (160). They create a kind of normative mode of recognition which 
‘cares little for individual differences’ (158), but which rather ‘goes straight 
to the resemblance[s]’ (158) which exist between bodies. In relation to 
gender, therefore, this process of perceptual deprivation can be seen as 
part of how the visual surfaces of recognisable objects are produced as 
signifying events. Just as discourse produces ‘an object domain, a field of 
intelligibility’ (Butler 1993: 35) through structures of exclusion, the body 
adapts to this domain in a relatable fashion. It produces a distinct field of 
objects by selectively excluding elements of the environment from its 
perceptual tendencies. It thereby forms part of the process by which the 
acts and gestures of bodies become associated with ‘discrete and 
asymmetrical oppositions between “feminine” and “masculine” [genders]’ 
(Butler 2008: 24).  
In this section, then, I will explore these relational processes in 
depth. I will argue that part of the way the discursive structures of 
recognition sediments itself, on an individual level, is by shaping the 
ontogenetic development of the brain, thereby constraining the body’s 
perceptive processes. I will also demonstrate the implications of this 
perspective for understanding the social dynamics of performativity. I will 
then conclude this section by briefly foreshadowing how Matter and 
Memory influences my explanation of the instability of gender norms. This 
will involve sketching out the body’s role in actualising memories during 
moments of indeterminate action, and clarifying the way I will use 
Bergson’s concept of affection. 
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The Naturalisation of Gender Relationality: 
 
Ann Game has argued that an implication of Bergson’s notion of the 
body is that, ‘like Foucault, [he] emphasises bodies acting in relation to 
each other’ (61). This is to say, via the associative invocation of Foucault, 
that the body has an inherently malleable relation to power. Moreover, 
from this perspective, Game affirms that it is possible to derive from 
Bergson a relational ontology in which bodies only come into being in 
relation to other bodies.  
What Bergson specifically asserts in this respect is that ‘the fiction 
of an isolated material object [implies] a kind of absurdity’ (Bergson 2005a: 
24). Because objects and living bodies are bound by the actions and 
potential actions they perform on each other, each ‘borrows its physical 
properties from the relations which it maintains with all others’ (24). A body 
remains inseparable from the rest of the material world, and therefore 
‘owes each of its determinations, and, consequently its very existence, to 
the place it occupies in the universe as a whole’ (24). We should not, then, 
‘regard the living body as a world within a world’ (44), from which it has a 
separate and autonomous relation. At any specific moment the existence 
of that body is constituted by the material movements which act upon it. 
This view offers the possibility of theorising ‘a materialist, relational 
and mobile conception of “the subject”’ (Game: 61). That is, for Game, 
neither the body nor the subject is self-sufficient because the way in which 
an individual self develops ‘cannot be accounted for by taking [that] self as 
a reference point (60). Because it is always a centre within a broader 
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environment which constitutes it, Bergson’s notion of the body is 
understood by Game as an idea which ‘radically refutes a conception of 
the subject as a source of meaning and action’ (60). 
While I sympathise with this reading insofar as it provides one way 
to draw Bergson into a dialogue with post-structuralism, Game’s own 
definition of the subject does not capture Butler’s emphasis on the way 
discursive injunctions constrain the possibility of becoming a subject. 
Indeed, Game’s reading of Bergson specifically constructs his relational 
view of the body as a ‘contribution to an understanding of the potential for 
transformation’ (61). It does not, in other words, consider how the body’s 
sensory-motor relations are also part of the process by which power is 
maintained. In contrast, by placing Bergson’s notion of the body into 
Butler’s socio-historic context of gender regulation, I will explore the basis 
for the formative effects of discourse.  
What I take from Game’s reading is the general assertion that an 
individual body is not the origin of its own relation to the world. From this 
starting point, my own use of Bergson takes a more specific turn in which 
the permeability of the body does not simply imply its transformative 
potential but, more importantly, the susceptibility of individual bodies to be 
moulded by existing power relations.  
In Bergson’s explicit words, ‘perception […] does not go from my 
body to other bodies; it is, to begin with, in the aggregate of bodies, then 
gradually limits itself and adopts my body as a centre’ (2005a: 61). In 
distinction from Game, who draws out the image of an aggregate of bodies 
as an implication of power’s inherent mobility, I am more interested in the 
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process of limiting by which the body adopts itself as a distinct centre 
within this aggregate.  
It does so, for Bergson, through the ‘experience of […] performing 
actions and feeling affections’ (61). For instance, it is through the 
‘comparisons and inductions’ (48) enabled by actions, and the internal 
feelings experienced in relation to external stimuli which affect the body, 
that the body comes to distinguish other bodies with which it can enter into 
distinct relations. Equally, it is through these relations that the body begins 
to discern itself as a distinct being which forms ‘the physical basis of my 
personality’ (61). Correlatively, then, this process can account for the way 
the body achieves ‘a sense of stable contour, and the fixing of [a] spatial 
boundary’ (Butler 1993: 14).23 
Thought of from Butler’s politicised perspective, we must conceive 
the aggregate of social bodies as arranged according to a form of power 
which pre-exists any individual body. The body, therefore, only adopts 
itself as a distinct being, a centre of action, by performing actions which 
are always already constrained by the social field which that body enters. 
What is at stake here, however, is not simply the idea that the material 
world limits the body’s tendencies to act. Rather, the point is also that the 
motor habits which are formed within the bounds of these limitations form 
the very perceptive processes by which the visual surface of gendered 
                                                 
23 Butler’s own theorisation of body contours and boundaries includes a psychoanalytical 
image of ‘bodily egos’ (1993: 64). This perspective echoes her notion of gender 
melancholia in the sense that ‘the way in which we achieve an “idea” of our own body’ 
(64) is haunted by what that idea excludes. See Chapter One of Jay Prosser’s Second 
Skins for a compelling critique of Butler’s misinterpretation of Freud, which wrongly 
defines the body ego as a psychic construction, and of her general denial of the body’s 
interiority as a discernible reference to its own experience. 
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bodies are formed as recognisable signifying objects. Indeed, from a more 
general perspective, part of the implication which can be drawn from 
Matter and Memory is that the specific ways in which the material world 
appears in terms of distinct objects is contingently developed rather than 
absolutely inherent to the body’s senses. 
Bergson notes, for instance, that during infancy, neither ‘sight nor 
touch is able at the outset to localize impressions’ (2005a: 48). In a certain 
respect, the visual and tactile world that we take for granted is only formed 
for us through ‘a series of comparisons and inductions […] whereby we 
gradually coordinate one impression with another’ (48). In other words, 
‘our senses require education’ (48), but not because of a poverty in the 
sensory organs themselves. Rather, it is because the potentiality of 
stimulus has yet to be coordinated with the body’s own position as a 
centre of action within the aggregate of stimulating images. It is only by 
gradually relating the confused movements of other bodies back to our 
own body’s internal feelings and its potential for action that the perceived 
world becomes a distinct object domain. In this light, then, the ‘training of 
the senses consists in just the sum of the connections established 
between the sensory impression and the movement which makes use of it’ 
(94). 
Thought of from Bergson’s non-representational understanding of 
the nervous system, the reason why an infant’s perceptions are confused 
is because they receive an excess of stimuli which they cannot yet convert 
into a response. The ontogenetic development of the brain occurs, for 
Bergson, precisely ‘with a view to the building up of motor apparatus 
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linked […] with sense stimuli’ (94). Through this growing organisation 
between the senses and motor tendencies, the body gradually discerns its 
over-determined environment according to the type of action it enables. 
More specifically, the development of motor tendencies establishes 
discontinuities in the material environment by diminishing certain aspects 
of stimulus while bringing others into clarity.  
What I want to emphasise here in relation to Butler is that, for 
Bergson, the development of motor responses is ‘equivalent to the 
suppression of all those parts of objects in which [the body’s] functions find 
no interest’ (36). The world can thus appear to us as occupied by stable 
gendered bodies because the qualities which appear to be stable and 
unchanging are isolated from extraneous and inconsistent stimuli, and 
therefore ‘become “perceptions” by their very isolation’ (36). In short, there 
is an elementary form of classification and generalisation at work in the 
body’s processes which, similarly to Butler’s notion of discourse, creates 
objects through a fundamental process of exclusion.  
This similarity should be emphasised with caution. Being part of a 
bodily process, the selective suppressions at work in Bergson’s notion of 
perception obviously function in a different way to Butler’s discursive 
constraints. Most importantly, for Butler discourse does not suppress a 
material reality as such, but rather the possibility of a body being socially 
valued. What is outside the borders of discourse is not an ‘ontological 
thereness’ (Butler 1993: 8), but a domain excluded from legitimacy 
through a ‘violent foreclosure’ (8). Gender norms, in this way, are 
conceived by Butler as an ‘ideal construct’ (1), to which the excluded 
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outside constitutes ‘a site of dreaded identification’ (3) that threatens the 
subject’s ‘own claim to autonomy’ (3). 
In contrast, the exclusions which the body itself effects within its 
material environment concern action alone. The ‘body extracts from the 
material or moral environment whatever has been able to influence it, 
whatever interests it’ (Bergson 2002: 55), on the basis of its potential 
action rather than a direct relation to prohibition. While ‘material reality […] 
outrun[s] perception on every side’ (Bergson 2005a: 229), that which is 
suppressed does not imply for Bergson ‘the threat of psychosis, abjection, 
psychic unlivability’ (Butler 1993: 15) but simply indifference. In turn, the 
objects formed by motor recognition do not have an idealised value in 
relation to the body’s actual processes, but a practical one. 
As I have begun to show in my previous chapter, this enables an 
account of the peremptory force of gender norms in terms of the 
coherence which their projected expectations provide for the immediate 
future of an act. In turn, complex relations to gender norms develop 
contingently through the processes of emotion and memory which occur 
when actions become indeterminate. I am thus not denying the existence 
of gender idealisation and dreaded points of identification, and I will 
continue developing my own Bergsonian perspective on this matter below. 
Rather, I am asserting that while discursive structures of exclusion are 
primary in the sense that they predate and constrain the formation of 
individual bodies, such structures are not the most basic aspects of 
immediate processes of relationality.  
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Motor Recognition as Gender Categorisation: 
 
What needs to be clarified in more depth, then, is the precise role 
the body’s selective processes play in the naturalisation of gender 
signification. Because motor habits are ‘acquired by the repetition of the 
same effort’ (Bergson 2005a: 80) their production is, as I have argued, 
constrained by the actions and body styles which are already prevalent in 
an individual’s social environment. In this way, the discursive constraints 
which, for Butler, structure the social on a historically contingent level tend 
to compel the actions by which an individual body forms its object domains 
and sense of self. Thus, whether it is due to direct injunction, its inverse 
counterpart of encouragement, or simple mimicry, gender norms ‘contrive 
a mechanism for themselves [within the brain and] grow into a habit’ (84). 
However, motor mechanisms do not simply preserve past actions 
for Bergson. More specifically, they result in ‘organizing together 
movements and perceptions’ (94), so that a complementarity between 
stimulus and response is ‘gradually built up by familiar relations’ (82). 
Even from infancy, as the senses are being trained, a relational sense of 
the environment is being conserved by this organisation. In respect to 
gender we might expect male and female adults to respond differently to 
children, and to expect and constrain different behavioural responses from 
boys than from girls. As such relations are repeated, the connections 
between different gendered stimuli and conventionally appropriate 
responses are consolidated within the ontogenetic organisation of the 
brain. This process therefore creates a tendency for the stimulus of a 
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familiarised object’s presence to be followed by motor mechanisms which 
automatically ‘guide the body toward the appropriate mechanical reaction’ 
(93). 
Simultaneously, what this organisation means is that gender is 
being classified and generalised at the level of sensory-motor perceptions. 
Insofar as male and female bodies are consistently performed as ‘discrete 
and asymmetrical oppositions’ (Butler 2008: 24), they each constitute 
distinct stimuli for the development of recognition. Motor habits thus begin 
to distinguish sexed bodies according to the acts, gestures and other 
visually distinct differences which are already established between 
conventionally male and female bodies. 
Gendered bodies become generalised through this process 
because, as Bergson puts it, motor recognition ‘cares little for individual 
differences’ (2005a: 158). If stimuli can ‘impress upon the body the same 
[motor] attitude, something common will issue from them’ (160). Indeed, 
once such motor attitudes are formed they will tend to automatically ‘seize 
from their surroundings that which […] interests them practically, […] 
simply because the rest of their surroundings takes no hold on them’ (159, 
160). 
This generalisation is ‘not an effort of a psychological nature’ (159). 
The motor tendency to generalise bodies according to their common traits 
does not internalise the signifying constraints of gender regulation, and the 
similarities between gendered bodies are not consciously represented 
within this process of recognition. Rather, ‘this [kind of] similarity acts 
objectively like a force [which] provokes reactions’ (159). Normative 
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gendered traits are thus experienced through a ‘similarity [which is] felt 
and lived, or, if you prefer the expression, a similarity which is 
automatically acted’ (160), while the individual differences go unnoticed 
because they provoke no response. In this way, then, bodies which are ‘as 
different as possible in their superficial details’ (160) tend to be 
homogeneously recognised according to the norm prior to the possibility of 
distinguishing individual distinctions. 
Equally, by generalising the effect which individual bodies have on 
each other, motor processes tend to consolidate the asymmetry by which 
gender styles and expectations are normatively classified. That is, by 
consolidating a whole set of gendered stimuli with the generality of a motor 
response, they can be seen to naturalise the normative associative 
expectations of gender. For instance, insofar as female anatomic forms 
are already normatively performed with feminine gestures, my contention 
is that these associative characteristics become, as it were, recorded in 
motor attitudes.  
Motor recognition, therefore, organises specific types of gesture 
exclusively with either male or female bodies, so that the distinct borders 
of gender dualism become sedimented within the body’s perceptive 
tendencies. Subsequently, when a motor habit seizes upon a resemblance 
it diminishes the subtle inconsistencies which exist between gender norms 
and the individual bodies of hegemonic subjects. In other words, even 
where the associations of gender are not performed entirely consistently, 
motor habits produce an economical mode of recognition which sharpens 
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and amplifies the perception that masculine and feminine traits are 
exclusively performed by male and female bodies respectively.  
In summary, my point for the moment is that, once the sensory-
motor processes have organised together associative stimulus and 
relational responses, motor recognition becomes part of the way gender 
norms reproduce themselves. The visual stimulus of familiarised 
environments ‘transmits itself to motor mechanisms’ (Bergson 2005a: 84), 
and these mechanisms ‘determine in us attitudes which automatically 
follow our perception of things’ (84). This motor disposition simultaneously 
recognises the stimulus according to a selective process which intensifies 
the resemblances between bodies which conform to gender norms, while 
diminishing subtle inconsistencies which exceed the norm. Motor 
tendencies thus become part of hegemonic gender signification in the 
sense that they reinforce the appearance that gender is a stable entity. 
However, they do this in a way which is ‘felt and passively experienced, 
before being represented’ (160), and which therefore precedes and 
prepares the conscious awareness of gender as a signifying event.  
 
 
 
The Circulation and Interruption of Habit: 
 
Before I discuss the conscious representation of gender, I want to 
underscore that the production and repetition of motor mechanisms is not 
a deterministic process but, as it were, a performative one. What must be 
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accounted for is the idea that ‘bodies never quite comply with the norms 
by which their materialization is impelled’ (Butler 1993: 2); and that ‘gender 
discontinuities’ (Butler 2008: 185) do not simply apply to abject subjects, 
but also ‘run rampant in heterosexual […] contexts’ (185). My contention in 
this respect is that motor habits extract and project stability through their 
processes of recognition and automatic acts, but they do not totalise it.  
In fact, no one performs gender in precisely the same way, and no 
one develops habits of gender that conform strictly to its idealised status. 
Nonetheless, because motor attitudes are more prone to become sensible 
of the resemblances which exist between same sex bodies, perception 
tends to conceal these discontinuities. Thought of as a mode of 
performativity, then, the generalising effect of motor recognition sustains 
the appearance of gender consistency without actually homogenising the 
bodies which circulate its effects. 
It is fruitful, here, to think of social interaction as ‘a physical system 
of perpetual, mutual, material adjustment and accommodation’ (Watson: 
30), as Sean Watson does in an article relating Bergson to complexity 
theory.24 As part of such a field of mutual physical influences, each body 
exceeds the norm in some way and constitutes an excess of possible 
actions for each other body. As a mode of responsiveness, habit reduces 
the indeterminacy of these interactions by diminishing the effect of 
excessive stimuli, and by adopting a prepared attitude towards action. 
Thus, in this sense, habits do not have explicitly regulatory intentions but 
simply adaptive ones. 
                                                 
24 Hugo Letiche (2000) and Jure Gantar (1999) have also made gestures towards 
integrating of Bergson’s work with the principles of complexity theory. 
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Because these adaptive processes occur prior to the conscious 
representation of gender, the body thus tends to form a dissimulated basis 
for the gendered relation between self and other. However, habit can only 
reproduce the inattentive appearance that gender is a stable essence to 
the extent that extraneous and disjunctive stimuli can indeed be 
suppressed.  
This is to say that the efficacy of habit to sustain a diminished field 
of recognition is dependent upon the subsequent actions of other bodies. 
In order for habit to form the basis of a socially normative field of action, it 
is not enough for one body to project its own repetitive tendencies into the 
present moment. There must be, in Watson’s words, a ‘circulation of 
processes of simplification, constraint and limitation’ (37).  
What I am pointing towards here is a kind of circuit – between motor 
recognition, the habituated movements which it provokes, and the 
subsequent actions of the other – which must be maintained in order for 
gender repetition to remain unreflective. In Bergson’s words, ‘every 
perception has its organised motor accompaniment’ (2005a: 94), and the 
series of habituated movements provoked by a perception are ‘connected, 
continuous and called up by one another’ (93). Each stage of a habituated 
movement ‘seems to lean over into the next’ (94) and, as it were, projects 
its following movement in the form of an expectation before it actually 
manifests as an act. Indeed, it is the ‘consciousness of these nascent 
movements’ (94) which constitutes ‘the foundation of [a] sense of 
familiarity’ (93) for Bergson. 
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This means that the ‘ordinary feeling’ (94) of motor recognition 
‘virtually contains’ (94) all of the movements which succeed it, and can 
only remain inattentive insofar as these virtual acts are followed 
immediately into actual acts. By extension, my argument here is that these 
virtual acts can only follow inattentively into actual acts to the extent they 
are accommodated by the consistent actions of others. That is, because 
bodies and actions are essentially relational, in order for the continuous 
movements of a habit to be sustained the bodies which that habit interacts 
with must continue to circulate its motor expectations.  
In short, the naturalising effect of selective discernment is 
dependent on the mutual agreement of other bodies, which accommodate 
that process of constraint by performing consistently with it. If, say, we 
take a homosocial male environment in which an individual suddenly 
performs a feminine gesture, this gesture interrupts the inattentive motions 
of those perceiving the act. The sudden inconsistency halters the 
circulation of habit, and brings the instability of gendered performances to 
the explicit attention of consciousness.  
On the other hand, social situations become, as it were, self-
regulating insofar as every individual’s gendered habits mutually 
accommodate each other. They therefore close up the circuit of 
recognition and response, and circulate normative processes of 
discernment. For instance, when a motor mechanism of an individual body 
seizes upon a conventionally gendered trait, that body will tend to respond 
with a complementary action. The performance of that conventionally 
gendered act therefore narrows the overall field of stimuli, and the 
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narrowed stimuli provides greater likelihood that the motor recognition of 
other bodies will develop into a habitual act. 
Within this pattern, the mutual adjustment of bodies to each other is 
directed along a specific path whereby social situations become 
progressively normative. Each act prompts a correlative process of 
recognition, and that recognition prompts further habituated acts. Gender 
norms are thus not only circulated within this process of simplification, but 
the circulation itself also tends to narrow into a more constrained, 
continuous and naturalised pattern. These increasingly naturalised 
movements therefore provide a bodily basis for ‘notions of […] a true or 
abiding masculinity or femininity’ (Butler 2008: 192). 
My underlining point to all this is that, within processes of material 
relationality, the role of motor recognition can be thought of as 
performative in several senses that Butler gives to the concept. Firstly, 
similarly to the way performativity is a ‘reiterative power of discourse to 
produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains’ (Butler 1993: 2), 
motor habits subtly delimit the visual surface of bodies. Perception does 
not simply reveal a gendered object but, by a process of selective 
discernment, produces the phenomena which it appears simply to 
perceive. In turn, because motor habits project past repetitions into the 
present they can also be thought of in terms of ‘an expectation which ends 
up producing the phenomena that it anticipates’ (Butler 2008: xv). In effect, 
they behave like a prospective tendency which discovers in diverse 
objects the similarities which comply with their actions.  
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Finally, the socially sustained and perpetuated circulation of habit 
can perhaps be thought of in Butler’s terms of a ‘tacit collective agreement 
[…] to sustain discrete and polar genders’ (190). As I previously argued in 
relation to obligation, this is because the lived experience of habit provides 
a sense of ‘individual and social well-being’ (Bergson 1935: 39) which 
prompts the collective acceptance of normative laws. There is thus an 
implicit agreement to sustain this feeling of social well-being which helps 
sustain the naturalisation of motor recognition and, in turn, facilitates the 
‘illusion of an abiding gendered self’ (Butler 2008: 191).  
As with my discussion of habit in Chapter Two, the implication of 
thinking about performativity as a bodily process is that the dynamics of 
repetition unfold in relation to the pressures of action rather than those of 
prohibition. While the discernments of motor recognition take place in 
approximation with gender injunctions, they account for the way 
hegemonic subjects naturalise gender norms without internalising the 
borders of discourse. Thus, when habits are subverted, and the regulatory 
force of prohibition becomes part of the conscious representation of 
gender, discursive structures themselves do not unilaterally determine 
every aspect of investment and identification. 
Following this re-statement of my previous chapter, I want to close 
this section by sketching out the new developments I will make to the 
dynamics of identification and investment through the course of this 
chapter. I have previously argued that an individual’s active representation 
of discursive structures is a response to indeterminacy and aims, primarily, 
to restore familiarity to the field of action. What Matter and Memory adds to 
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this is an account of how memory re-constructs the signifying effects of 
gender and produces variable processes of identification. I have also 
argued that the peremptory force by which gender is represented depends 
upon the intensity by which the indeterminate future is anticipated; and I 
will clarify below how Bergson’s concept of affection has influenced this 
assertion. 
First of all, Bergson’s understanding of memory provides the 
opportunity for a more complex analysis of how meaning is produced 
during moments of indeterminacy. From a Bergsonian perspective, we can 
understand the contingent production of gender intelligibility to occur ‘at 
the meeting [place of] two currents’ (155). On the one hand, there is the 
‘perception of resemblances’ (155) given to us by motor recognition. As I 
have demonstrated, this current of experience will tend to extract from any 
situation ‘a similarity which is automatically acted’ (160). On the other 
hand, there is recollection memory which, on its own, would draw upon 
entirely unique memories and show us how each situation ‘differs from 
others and not how it resembles them’ (155). It is the combination of these 
two processes, by which Bergson characterises the ‘internal mechanisms 
of psychical and psycho-physical actions’ (131), which contingently 
produces conscious representations of gender. 
In other words, the generalised discernments of motor recognition 
will tend to call upon analogous memories which, effectively, go about 
‘embroidering upon the similarity [a] variety of individual differences’ (165). 
My point is, then, that insofar as the response to subversion is to actively 
assert the discursive borders of intelligibility, the actualisation of different 
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memory-images makes it possible to form an ‘unlimited number of general 
notions’ (161) of gender. If the idealised “truth” of gender is supported by 
the ‘invocation of convention’ (Butler 1993: 225), by which the historicity of 
the past ‘authorizes’ (225) the legitimacy of signifying practices, then the 
authoritative force of the norm will be interpreted differently by different 
memories. What constitutes the acceptable borders of gender will be 
reconstructed according to the specific memory-images which are called 
upon, each of which form different kinds of connection between past 
experience and the present moment of action. 
It is important to note that the unlimited associative possibilities of 
memory do not imply that the psychic representation of gender is radically 
free to reform an individual’s relation discourse. Equally, while the 
spontaneous actualisation of memory-images aims to restore familiarity 
rather than to sustain the ideal of gender, it is likely that the associative 
image which restores familiarity will simply be a different way of asserting 
the ideal. As such, what I am indicating here is an interpretive variability 
which operates largely within with the bounds of the norm. 
For Bergson ‘our psychic life may be lived at different heights, now 
nearer action, now further removed from it’ (14), and depending on these 
different tensions towards action ‘consciousness narrows and enlarges the 
development of its content’ (166). Whatever the state of action, 
consciousness will be ‘preoccupied in […] determining an undetermined 
future’ (150), and its means of doing this is to actualise memories ‘which 
can be usefully combined with our present state’ (150). This means that 
consciousness can ultimately draw from memory ‘only that which can fit 
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into the sensori-motor state […] from the point of view of the action to be 
accomplished’ (168). These processes are, therefore, still subject to the 
relational circulation of motor recognition which persists in normative 
environments. 
In short, a ‘mental attitude […] must itself be engrafted on an 
attitude of the body’ (120), and the body attitudes which respond to 
subversion tend to facilitate normative images more readily than they do 
radical reformations of gender. This is not only because memory is 
constrained by the sedimented tendencies of motor recognition, but 
because responses to subversion tend to be followed by emotional 
tensions towards action which also play a role in directing the course of 
memory and identification. As I will clarify in my following section, 
emotional states are more complex than motor recognition because their 
body attitudes are accompanied by feeling states which intensify moments 
of indeterminacy. As such, they produce heightened investments in the 
immediate moment of action, and tend to evoke memory-images which 
produce more extreme or complex interpretations of gender.  
Bergson himself does not make these kinds of arguments in Matter 
and Memory, but his notion of affection as a feeling state which ‘arises 
within our body’ (58) provides several key guidelines for my own 
approach. Primarily, I have developed his association of feeling states with 
action and indeterminacy. However, I have also implicitly drawn upon 
Bergson’s rationale for the organic purpose of affections, which is to give 
‘warning to the species […] of the general dangers which threaten it’ (18) 
while ‘leaving to the individual the precautions necessary for escaping 
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them’ (18). This latter point provides the opportunity to characterise feeling 
states as spontaneous adaptive tendencies, and facilitates the integration 
of Yaak Panksepp’s evolutionary understanding of emotion into Bergson’s 
framework.25 
At any rate, Bergson writes that affection is ‘consciousness […] in 
the form of a feeling’ (18), and arises in moments when we find 
‘movements [which are] begun, but not yet executed’ (18). This is to say 
that affective states develop in moments of hesitation and indeterminate 
action. Like reflective consciousness and memory they guide action, but 
they do so through feelings which give the ‘indication of a more or less 
useful decision’ (18) and have an ‘undetermined influence’ (17) on the 
nascent movements which are about to be made. These principles, I want 
to argue, provide the ground work for understanding emotional states such 
as aggression or anxiety as a ‘value-laden internal guidance of behavior’ 
(Panksepp 2005: 46) which intensify responses to subversion. 
                                                 
25 Dorothea Olkowski has invoked Bergson’s notion of affection for a rather different 
purpose. Primarily, she extrapolates from the idea that ‘affections […] always interpose 
themselves between the excitations that I receive from without and the movements which 
I am about to execute’ (Bergson 2005a: 17), and argues that this presents the possibility 
of a fluidity ontology. The purpose of this assertion is part of a feminist project which 
follows the work of Luce Irigaray. The idea behind it is that the ‘mastery of the concepts 
that determine women’ (Olkowski 2000: 80) are based a logic of solid bodies and ‘[s]tatic 
modes of representation’ (78).  
In effect, Olkowski follows Irigaray in arguing that ‘what is silenced [by patriarchal 
modes of representation] is fluidity’ (79), and that such representational structures can be 
challenged and disrupted by finding ways to discover and express the fluidity of bodily 
experience and relationality. Such a possibility, then, ‘arises in Henri Bergson’s 
conceptualization of the […] interval of duration between affective excitation and reaction’ 
(82). During this interval, Olkowski argues, the ‘flow of affective sensations constitutes 
[…] a world memory in which nothing is originally separated from anything else’ (82). 
Indeed, ‘the body of affection is a fluid ontological memory’ (84). Its ‘streams of affectivity’ 
(80) produces ‘a becoming which orientates itself in accordance with its […] 
connectedness to the world’ (83) – a fluid connectedness which defies the mastery of 
language. Thus, instead of presenting Bergson’s affection as a way to describe an 
adaptive relation to the world – one which ultimately drives meaning – Olkowski uses it to 
invoke a mode of fluid experience which ‘resists adequate symbolization’ (78). 
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In conclusion, this section has constructed an embodied model of 
performativity by which historically sedimented gender practices are 
circulated by individuals through the repetition of motor habits. In 
distinction from my previous chapter, this understanding of habit organises 
the body’s tendencies towards movement with its capacities of sensory 
discernment. As such, I have shown how a relational process of motor 
discernment grounds the everyday perpetuation of gender categorisation. 
Whilst I have also begun to explain the relation which develops between 
motor recognition, memory and emotion when the inattentive acts of habit 
are disrupted, a more comprehensive account of these processes will be 
given in my following sections. 
 
The Broader Reflections on the Sensory-Motor Body. 
 
 
In this section I will explore Bergson’s description of the body in 
terms of the nervous system and brain more closely. The purpose of this 
evaluation is, firstly, to elucidate the specific theoretical scope of 
Bergson’s insights. In respect to performativity, it will also act as a guide to 
illustrate more explicitly how I am conceiving the sensory-motor body as a 
basis for the lived experience of gender. Secondly, it will facilitate the 
integration of Panksepp’s neurological theory of emotion into the sensory-
motor framework of habit and indeterminacy I developed in the previous 
section. 
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I will first analyse how Bergson’s framework for understanding the 
brain, consciousness and memory differs from the methodological 
paradigm of modern neurology. Primarily, I will discuss how Matter and 
Memory provides a unique insight which can translate neurological 
research into much more than a scientific image of the self. However, I will 
also infer that there can, and should, be something more at stake in 
Bergson’s sensory-motor image of the body than an objective 
understanding of the brain. Specifically, I will argue that his conceptual 
terminology of body attitudes and tensions also suggests the need to 
apperceive the body within the process of acting as part of a 
methodological approach. 
I will continue this reflection on body attitudes, apperception and 
objectification in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
perspective on the lived body. As a comparative analysis, this discussion 
will mark out some specific limitations of Bergson’s notion of the body and 
consciousness. However, it will ultimately claim that their parameters for 
understanding subjectivity remain well suited to explore the issues of 
performativity and subversion. 
Finally, having established that Bergson’s work can draw upon 
modern neurological research while retaining a more expansive view of 
experience, I will put this claim to work. Specifically, I will draw upon Yaak 
Panksepp’s evolutionary account of the brain and emotion in order to 
demonstrate an affinity with Bergson’s evolutionary model of 
consciousness; and his explication of discrete emotional circuits in order to 
expand upon and develop Bergson’s account of nascent acts. 
187 
 
To a large extent, Panksepp’s Affective Neuroscience offers itself 
as exemplary for this purpose because it draws together in one 
comprehensive text all of the data which had been compiled on the 
neurological correlates of emotion during the latter part of the Twentieth 
Century. This is to say that prior to Panksepp’s publication such data was 
being developed within separate scientific fields and institutes, but had yet 
to be linked together as part of the same research direction. His work thus 
contains the first extensive neurological study of emotion, and in effect it 
inaugurated affective neuroscience as a distinct scientific discipline. 
However, it is also the way Panksepp conceptualises emotion 
which makes his approach fitting for an engagement with Bergson. 
Indeed, while Panksepp’s actual hands-on research constitutes only a 
small part of the knowledge conveyed in Affective Neuroscience, his more 
profound importance lies in the way he conceptualises that knowledge into 
an overall theory of emotion. In this vein, he outlines criteria for defining 
emotion as an objective category for scientific study; but he also 
‘reinterprets many of the brain-behavior findings to try to account for the 
central neuropsychic states of organisms’ (Panksepp 1998: 6). In other 
words, Panksepp argues that both the objective neurological state and the 
subjective, psychical feeling of emotion should be bound up within the 
same strategy of analysis. Against the grain of behaviourist models of 
emotional responsiveness, therefore, he defines emotional feelings as a 
form of ‘simple value-coding’ (14) which provides ‘self-referential salience’ 
(14) for all mammalian life; and I will argue below that it is this 
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acknowledgement of conscious, subjective feelings which opens up 
explicit links to Bergson.26 
                                                 
26 Panksepp’s ‘objective neural criteria’ (1998: 48) for defining emotion focusses only on 
a certain type of basic emotion. Primarily, the ‘underlying circuits’ (48) of these emotional 
systems must be seen to ‘respond unconditionally to stimuli arising from major life 
challenging circumstances’ (48). For example, the emotions I will draw upon – fear, rage, 
anticipator eagerness, separation anxiety – are all characterised by behavioural 
motivations which ‘have proved adaptive in the face of […] life challenging situations’ (49) 
such as threats from predators, the need to forage for food, and the relative safety of 
community over isolation. As adaptive behaviours, the circuits which correspond to these 
emotions should also be seen to exhibit the criterion of initiating physiological changes in 
the body. That is, they initiate ‘motor subroutines and concurrent autonomic-hormonal 
changes’ (49) which prepare the body’s readiness for action, and also ‘change the 
sensitivities of sensory systems that are relevant for the behavioural sequences that have 
been aroused’ (49). 
These criteria, then, confine Panksepp’s study of emotion to a fairly narrow range 
of experience, and he acknowledges that there are, of course, ‘many more affective 
feelings, such as hunger, thirst, tiredness, illness, surprise, disgust, and others’ (47). 
However, an underlying contention here is that ‘emotions, feelings, and moods come in 
several natural types’ (47) other than the ones discussed by Panksepp, and part of his 
aim in this respect is to ‘establish better taxonomies’ (47) for categorising them. Through 
Panksepp’s taxonomic criteria, for instance, it becomes clear that affective states like 
hunger or tiredness are different forms of feeling to his adaptive emotions. For one thing, 
they respond to the internal regulatory processes of the body rather than external stimuli. 
Panksepp also highlights that they are associated with radically different brain regions, 
while their physiological dimensions relate to regulatory balances rather than adaptive 
sensory and motor changes (164-186). In a different vein, more complex social emotions 
such as contempt or shame fall short of Panksepp’s criteria because they are not basic 
evolutionary adaptations in the way fear or aggression are. Such distinctly human 
emotions are, at least from a neurological point of view, ‘a consequence of [the] neural 
expansion’ (302) of the human cortex. Thus, while Panksepp speculates that these more 
refined social emotions may be ‘linked critically to the more primitive affective substrates’ 
(301), he also presumes that their neurobiological characteristics cannot be isolated to 
those regions. 
Since its first formulation, Panksepp’s conceptualisation of emotion has had 
some influence on the field of neuropsychoanalysis. Most notably, Mark Solms has 
attempted to draw upon his work to form a biological basis for Freudian principles. See, 
for instance, his The Neuropsychology of Dreams: A Clinico-Anatomical Study (2014). 
However, there are also valid approaches to emotion, based on conventional forms of 
definition and visual markers, which draw out different but important dimensions of 
affective experience. 
One relatively prominent approach in psychology is to categorise and 
conceptualise emotion based on facial-feedback and posture. Silvan Tomkins’ work, 
which has recently be popularised for use in cultural analysis by Eve Sedgwick and Adam 
Frank, is a good example of how such frameworks can lead in interesting and insightful 
directions which are quite different from Panksepp’s. Tomkins categorises nine types of 
affect – shame, interest, surprise, joy, anger, fear, distress, disgust, and contempt – and 
emphasises the ‘dominance of the face’ (Tomkins 1963: 208) in experiencing and 
expressing these affects. 
All in all, each affect is analysed as a diverse model of responsiveness and 
reciprocal interaction, and Tomkins even begins to draw out a picture of how all nine 
affects interact with each other. So rather than the relatively simple motivational force 
which characterises both Panksepp’s subjective feelings and his objective criteria, we are 
presented with much more of an intricate picture of social relationality. Conversely, 
however, the actual feelings and motivational tendencies of states like fear and anger 
tend to get swept under the carpet. In Panksepp’s view, therefore, ‘taxonomies […] of 
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It should be said, on this note, that Panksepp controversially 
advocates an interdisciplinary approach to emotion which attempts to 
‘synthesize behavioural, psychological, and neurological perspectives’ 
(Panksepp 1998: 5). This is unusual because there ‘is presently no 
umbrella discipline’ (5) which ‘utilizes all of these approaches in a 
balanced manner’ (31) – scientific and psychological disciplines usually 
preferring to focus on only two of the three. For example, cognitive 
neuroscience and neuropsychology both seek to explore the relation 
between the brain and mind, but rarely complement such research through 
experimentation on behaviour. Cognitive psychology, in contrast, studies 
mental processes such as attention, problem solving, language skills and 
                                                                                                                                     
facial expressions’ (1998: 46) are a ‘less important criterion than an overall 
neurobehavioral analysis of action tendencies’ (46), at least in working towards an 
understanding of the most basic evolutionary origins of emotion. 
Aside from the issues of taxonomy and social complexity, the broader issue of 
what actually causes emotional feelings is far from reaching consensus. Still popular 
today is the James-Lange theory, which was put forward over a hundred years ago. It 
argues that emotions are a result of the physiological changes which happen to the body 
in direct response to stimuli, but that the actual quality of an emotion is a result of 
becoming aware of those changes and interpreting them.  
Antonio Damasio’s research in neurobiology (2000, 2003) has led him to draw 
out a particularly sophisticated version of this approach, based on modern research.  
Panksepp’s contention here, however, is that feelings themselves – what he calls the ‘raw 
feels’ (1998: 38) of emotion – are generated directly by the neural state rather than a self-
reflective act of interpretation. As such, there is an open debate between him and 
Damasio on this issue which I will touch upon again in footnote thirty-two. 
In addition to this, there is also a wide-spread strategy in psychology to explain 
feelings purely in terms of the cognitive appraisal we make of different life situations. The 
strong versions of this theory thus exclude any physiological or innate origins of emotion, 
and are at the heart of Panksepp’s criticism that the ancient origins of emotion ‘have been 
neglected by mainstream psychology’ (4). Nonetheless, such approaches do seek to 
answer important questions such as why different cultures have different psycho-social 
relations to complex emotions like shame and envy, or why different people can have 
unique emotional responses to the same stimuli.  
It should be noted, then, that Panksepp does accept the idea that the subjective 
feelings of emotion can be ‘filtered and modified by higher cognitive activity’ (122), as well 
as being influenced by social conventions and language. That, in fact, is part of his 
assertion that a full account of emotion needs to engage the subjective feeling state of 
emotion alongside objective studies. Again, however, the bottom line for Panksepp is that 
‘available evidence now overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that basic emotional 
processes emerge from homologous brain mechanisms in all mammals’ (51). In this light, 
his criteria does seem to be the best starting place to ‘provisionally’ (48) define the nature 
of emotion, so long as other areas of psychological and social research is kept in close 
proximity. 
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creativity through a vast array of behavioural experimentation which, for 
instance, show how different contextual situations elicit different 
psychological states. On the whole, however, it has little direct 
experimental engagement with the brain. Finally, behavioural 
neuroscience will generally work with experiments that relate observations 
in human and animal behaviour to brain functions, but is traditionally 
reluctant to draw conclusions concerning the subjective state of 
consciousness. This is partly because of the belief which I will discuss in 
the first part of this section that conscious states are coded in the brain, 
and partly because much of the behavioural and neurological data is 
drawn from animal research where subjective states are impossible to 
verify.  
As someone working primarily in the field of behavioural 
neuroscience, Panksepp has come under criticism from others doing 
parallel research on emotion precisely because he is seen to place too 
much weight on the idea that animals feel emotions. Joseph LeDoux, in 
particular, has taken issue with Panksepp’s contention that, firstly, ‘most 
animals – certainly all mammals – are “active agents” in their 
environments and that they have at least rudimentary representations of 
subjectivity and a sense of self’ (Panksepp 1998: 6). Secondly, there is an 
even greater resistance to the idea that, through ‘such assumptions, we 
can create a more realistic and richer science by recognising the number 
of basic processes we share with our kindred animals’ (6). The perceived 
problem here is that ‘we end up with a gap between what emotion theories 
are about (feelings) and what brain researchers can actually measure 
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(behaviour)’ (LeDoux 2002: 202). We cannot reliably ‘investigate feelings 
in animals’ (202) because they cannot tell us what or even if they feel, yet 
‘most of what we know about the detailed brain mechanisms of emotion 
[…] comes from brain research […] conducted in animals’ (202). Hence, 
there is a ‘credibility problem’ (202) when the brain states of animals are 
correlated to the subjective feeling states of humans. 
In LeDoux’s view, then, ‘Panksepp takes this approach in Affective 
Neuroscience’ (204), and apparently claims that because ‘animals and 
humans behave similarly when emotionally aroused […] they must 
experience the same subjective states as well’ (204). In Panksepp’s 
defence, however, he is certainly not making the wild claim to know what 
animals feel, but only making the much more reasonable assumption that 
animals do actually experience emotional feelings. Nor is Panksepp 
suggesting that the feelings of mammals’ are necessarily the same as 
human feelings. Indeed, there is an explicit need to recognise that basic 
subjective states of emotion such as fear or aggression ‘probably vary 
widely from species to species’ (Panksepp 1998: 4) due to ‘a host of 
variables’ (29) such as physiology, anatomy, environment, and the way 
higher brain regions interact with lower. 
Similarly, the claim that Panksepp makes concerning research into 
emotion is less radical than LeDoux depicts it. He argues that ‘carefully 
chosen animal models’ (3), in which the neural substrates of emotion are 
demonstrably homologous in humans and mammals, can legitimately 
become a source of knowledge about the neural basis of human emotions. 
This is not, then, as LeDoux interprets it, a case of correlating animal brain 
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states with human subjective states. It is a case of provisionally correlating 
animal brain states with human brain states. 
 In this way, gaps in the evidence of human brain research can be 
filled in by ‘utilizing information derived from simpler brains’ (Panksepp 
1998: 4). It can, that is, provide knowledge of the lower regions of our 
brains which evolved during a shared evolutionary past, and have 
changed little since. This, in turn, is possible because ‘[a]lthough detailed 
differences in these systems exist across species, they are not sufficiently 
large to hinder our ability to discern general patterns’ (4). Such knowledge 
of general patterns can then be related to human subjective, behavioural 
and brain research to begin drawing out a fuller picture emotion.  
While LeDoux finds this approach dubious, not least because he 
takes a fairly behaviourist approach to emotion in which ‘the brain 
achieves its behavioural goals in the absence of robust awareness’ 
(LeDoux 1999: 17), for Panksepp this is the only approach that can 
eventually lead to a realistic science of emotion. In other words, the only 
way a ‘comprehensive discussion of emotions’ (Panksepp 1998: 34) can 
progress is through ‘a difficult triangulation’ (34) in which ‘various lines of 
knowledge need to be blended together into an integrated whole’ (34). 
Despite LeDoux’s doubts, then, the brain, the mind and behaviour are 
interconnecting elements in emotional processes, and accepting the 
importance of subjective feelings and the common ancestry of those 
feelings with that of other mammals is a necessary leap neurobiology has 
to make. 
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At any rate, this is a dispute about the nature of consciousness and 
the possibility of interdisciplinary approaches which is confined to 
behavioural neuroscience. My own position will follow Bergson’s 
understanding of consciousness and the brain, which I will discuss shortly; 
and from that point of view Panksepp’s assertion of subjectively 
experienced emotions is not at all a problematic issue. Indeed, from a 
Bergsonian perspective, LeDoux’s presumption that the behavioural 
responses of animals are not indicators that they feel would amount to a 
mechanisation of life. It reduces animals to ‘passive reflex machines’ 
(Panksepp 1998: 38), whereas Panksepp’s account of emotion as 
subjective states which prompt spontaneous action feeds directly into 
Bergson’s evolutionary account of life. His conceptualisation of basic 
emotions as adaptive tendencies also supports my own theoretical need to 
account for spontaneous emotional states of gender performativity. 
My final part of this section, therefore, will explore these latter 
issues in more depth. By adapting Panksepp’s research into the affective 
dimensions of the brain and conscious feeling states into Bergson’s model 
I will clarify my own view of emotion as a temporal experience of 
indeterminacy. I will then sketch out some of the relevant insights which 
Panksepp’s text can reveal in relation to the process of subversion. 
 
Reflections on the Brain and Consciousness: 
 
It might be noted that the field of neurology has progressed 
significantly since Bergson’s own era. Nonetheless, despite this advance, I 
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would argue that Bergson’s ultimate assertion that ‘memory is something 
other than a function of the brain’ (2005a: 236) still remains a relevant 
insight of potentially wide reaching impact. What I want to point towards 
first in this respect is how the perennial problem in neurology remains that 
of determining how memory is stored. I will then characterise Bergson’s 
solution to this problem as a framework for re-interpreting the neurological 
underpinnings of the self. 
Bergson’s claim that memory is preserved in ‘unconscious 
psychical states’ (141), which are independent of the material processes 
of the brain, would no doubt be deemed a controversial statement. As 
Steven Rose observes, neuroscientists like himself ‘are committed to the 
view that […] the workings of the mind […] can be described in terms of 
the properties […] of the brain’ (2003: 3). Within this framework, then, 
memories must be seen as ‘embedded in the structure and processes of 
the brain’ (3), and the basic premise is that they can be accounted for in 
terms of changes which occur within its cellular structure and processes.  
In short, Rose summarises that when ‘an animal […] confronts 
some novel experience’ (370), this experience can be registered on a 
neurological level because ‘cells in its central nervous system change their 
properties’ (370). Specifically, changes occur both within the electrical and 
chemical processes involved in the firing of synapses and, perhaps more 
importantly, within the connections which exist between synapses. If such 
changes are ‘prevented from occurring’ (370), Rose explains, then ‘my 
experimental subjects cannot remember’ (370). It is thus presumed that 
‘memory [is] coded for by the strengthening of synaptic connections’ (345). 
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In effect, this is just the same principle of adaptation which Bergson 
ascribes to motor recognition, only the understanding of the brain has now 
been extended beyond Bergson’s general inference of neural connectivity 
to a precise knowledge of the brain’s fundamental elements. However, 
unlike Bergson’s insistence that changes in the brain ‘concern action, and 
action alone’ (2005a: 33), the neuro-scientific perspective attributes to the 
change in synaptic connections a representation of the event. 
The problem with conceptualising changes in the brain’s 
connectivity as a stored representation of events is one that Rose himself 
recognises, but has no alternate paradigm through which to resolve it. 
That is: how are material changes in synapses able to store, and bring 
back to remembrance, the events of diverse psychic and perceptual 
phenomena? How can details such as ‘the sequential memory of an entire 
scene’ (Rose 2003: 381) – with all the sensations we experience from 
moment to moment, and all the conceptual details and interpretations of 
events which we experience –  be contained within those changes in a 
way which actually correlates to the lived phenomena of memory?27 
                                                 
 
27 It is notable that modern neuroscience has developed a similar distinction as Bergson 
between habit-memory and recollection-memory. On the one hand, there is what is 
termed implicit or non-declarative memory, which denotes ‘an unconscious, automatic 
basis of responding that does not rely on the ability to recollect’ (Hay et al 2002b: 1324). 
On the other hand, there is explicit or declarative memory which is ‘characterised by a 
conscious, intentional and effortful ability to recollect a previous episode’ (1324). 
This distinction is not only designed for conceptual purposes, but because these 
types of memory have been shown to correspond to different localised areas in the brain: 
‘the neural mechanisms that give rise to […] automatic responding are different from the 
neural mechanisms involved in declarative memory’ (1325). It should be emphasised, 
then, that discovering localised areas of the brain to be associated with specific types of 
memory does not contradict Bergson’s model. In this respect, the appropriate Bergsonian 
caveat would be that such areas are not involved in storing memory, but in producing the 
motor-attitude which allows recollection to emerge in consciousness. 
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If the brain is presumed to store memories, then the totality of that 
scene’s perceptual and conceptual experience would have to be 
simultaneously and collectively preserved within the synaptic changes 
which occurred in the brain during each of its successive moments. 
Moreover, such changes would also need to account for the diverse and 
complex ways such memories are reformed in consciousness – 
sometimes appearing to be forgotten, but eventually remembered with 
sustained effort; sometimes being half-remembered as a general 
impression, but given as vivid but discontinuous and incomplete details at 
another. In the final analysis, Rose has to admit: ‘psychotherapists can 
share a field day with the novelists in describing the phenomena of 
memory […] without us being able to even define the corresponding 
neurobiological tasks’ (381). Indeed: ‘Truth to tell, […] we still haven’t the 
slightest idea of just how re-membering occurs’ (381).  
From Bergson’s perspective, neurology reaches this impasse 
because it is structured by the idea of a ‘parallelism between the […] 
psychical and physiological’ (Bergson 2005a: 12). That is, it presumes that 
the state of the brain at any one moment correlates precisely to the state 
of consciousness, so that ‘mental states and brain states are held to be 
two different versions, in two different languages, of one and the same 
original’ (12). Rose, for instance, betrays this in his claim that synaptic 
changes ‘are memory, as written in the language of biochemistry and 
physiology’ (2003: 364).  
While there is obviously a connection between the brain and 
consciousness, Bergson insists that there can be no parallelism because 
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‘there is infinitely more, in human consciousness, than in the 
corresponding brain’ (Bergson 2007: 40). The brain is, in Bergson’s model, 
just what neurology studies it as – a system of material movements, which 
have now been resolved into the subtle distinctions of chemical and 
electrical changes. However, the phenomenon of consciousness is much 
more than a material process because it partakes of a temporal synthesis 
which prolongs the past within the present. If, in this way, we think of 
‘inward experience [as] a “substance” whose very essence is to endure’ 
(Bergson 2002: 74), there is no need to determine where memories are 
stored. The immediate past persists within a present moment of 
consciousness because of its inherently temporal nature as a process of 
duration. The psyche preserves the totality of this past independently of 
the brain for the same reason, although in a virtual and unconscious state. 
 
 
 
Re-Interpreting Neurology: 
 
Part of what is broadly at stake here is the nature of the self. While 
the brain can be studied objectively, such studies cannot for Bergson 
reveal ‘every detail of what is going on in the corresponding 
consciousness’ (Bergson 2005a: 12). Subjective experience ultimately 
exceeds anything which can be determined by analysing the brain. 
Nonetheless, it is just this excess which the methodological frameworks of 
neurology are, to varying degrees, satisfied to ignore. Thus, part of what 
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Bergson offers to cultural theory – and, indeed, neurology itself – is a way 
to engage knowledge of the brain without reducing the self to its chemical 
and physiological processes.28 
A Bergsonian interaction with neurology is neither one which 
accepts an objective view of the self in terms of the brain’s functions and 
structures, nor one that is entirely divisive towards such perspectives. In 
other words, if the relation between consciousness and the brain 
categorically differentiates Bergson from the disciplinary domain of 
neurology, this is not just the position of a critical antagonist. It is a whole 
interpretative framework for determining the specific role of the brain in 
conscious thought. It provides the possibility of extending the research of 
neurology beyond the paradigmatic borders of that discipline, and putting 
such knowledge to use within an alternative psychological framework. 
The key to this interpretation is identifying the brain as a complex 
sensory-motor organ which focusses the attention of consciousness on a 
moment of action. In effect, the present state of the nervous system 
provides motor cues that tend to evoke the actualisation of similar 
memories and, at the same time, hinders memories which cannot be 
easily embodied within the sensory-motor situation. Thus, while Matter 
and Memory denounces the possibility that memory can be stored in the 
brain it also presents the general idea that ‘memories need, for their 
                                                 
28 See Catherine Malabou (2008) for an adaptation of neurology into cultural theory which 
propagates almost the opposite view. She argues, for instance, that: ‘The self is a 
synthesis of all the plastic processes at work in the brain’ (58).  
See, also, Chapter Seven of Nikolas Rose (2007) for one aspect of the complex 
politics involved in viewing the self only in terms of the brain. Broadly speaking, Rose 
analyses how the ideal of ‘neurochemical selves’ (188), which are open to precise 
chemical intervention, has been driven largely by the profiteering of pharmaceutical 
companies and has problematic implications for the way the social perception of mental 
health is understood and addressed. 
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actualization, a motor ally’ (120). While Bergson ‘considers memory itself 
as absolutely independent of matter’ (177) the brain nonetheless 
contributes to the recollection of useful memories, and provisionally 
inhibits others, because it directs consciousness along a specific path. 
In respect to my own use of Bergson, I have already intimated the 
importance of the principle that a ‘mental attitude […] must itself be 
engrafted upon an attitude of the body’ (120). Insofar as the motor state of 
action inhibits or facilitates certain kinds of memories, different bodily 
tensions fundamentally influence the ‘invocation of convention’ (Butler 
1993: 225) which binds and authorises normative acts of signification. 
What I want to add here, as part of an explanation of my own 
methodological approach, is a brief reflection on why translating modern 
neurological insights into Bergson’s psychology is necessary in relation to 
expanding the scope of his own work. 
Understanding more about the mechanisms of the brain is 
important insofar as it suggests a way to expand the notion of a ‘bodily 
attitude’ (Bergson 2005a: 106) or a tension towards action which prepares 
memory and thought. For instance, the psychology of Matter and Memory 
revolves around the idea that the associative dynamics of meaning 
develop through the interpenetration of, and oscillation between, ‘two 
extreme states’ (155) of memory and action. There is the disposition 
towards immediate response which gives us the resemblances of motor 
recognition, and there is what Bergson refers to as the ‘plane of dream’ 
(242) in which action is completely relaxed and memories proliferate 
capriciously. In this way, we are presented with a polarity which, I would 
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argue, demonstrates certain diversities within the movement of memory 
but fails to identify the qualitatively different motor states which guide this 
movement. 
Bergson himself stipulates that between the poles of dream and 
immediate response there are an ‘infinite number of possible states of 
memory’ (168), each effectively corresponding to a different tension of 
action. Nonetheless, this qualification remains vague and undeveloped. It 
provides a framework for the laws of association – as I will discuss in the 
final section of this chapter – but it lacks insight into the complex motor 
states which might develop within the social reality of gender dynamics. 
What neurological research can potentially add to Bergson’s 
psychology is precisely a subtler and more diverse image of body 
attitudes. It can contribute more specific examples of the kind of motor 
tendencies which can influence the direction of memory and thought. It 
can also elaborate upon the way the brain, as an ‘intermediary between 
sensation and movement’ (177) can mediate and delay action in radically 
different ways.29 
                                                 
29 Bergson’s contention that sensory-motor actions ground psychic processes has in fact 
been taken up, independently of his influence, by a neurologically based field of research 
broadly referred to as embodiment psychology. See, for instance: Hosttetter and Alibali 
(2008); Niedenthal, Barsalou et al (2005); Niedenthal, Winkielman et al (2009); 
Oosterwijk et al (2009); Wilson (2002). 
The profound correlation to Bergson is that mental concepts require ‘actual bodily 
states and […] simulations of experience’ (Niedenthal, Barsalou et al: 184) in order to 
bring them to consciousness awareness. This means that ‘the inhibition or facilitation of a 
specific motor behavior […] correspondingly inhibits or facilitates conceptual processing’ 
(205). What it usefully provides, as a possible extension of Bergson’s work, is a 
broadened image of what might constitute a bodily attitude. For example, it demonstrates 
how motor activities such as smiling and frowning, affect the way judgements are made 
(Niedenthal, Winkielman et al). In parallel to this, experiments have also shown how 
being engaged in conceptual activities such as evaluating happiness or sadness result in 
correlative changes to the subject’s body posture (Oosterwijk et al). 
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At any rate, thought of as a way to explore the psychological 
processes of identification, Bergson’s texts only take the possibilities of his 
psycho-physical model so far. I will thus further develop his account of the 
brain and the motor states of action in the second half of this section, and I 
will begin to widen the psychological diversity of memory in my following 
section. Before moving on to these discussions, however, what needs to 
be brought to light more clearly is the specific role which objective 
knowledge of the brain plays in Bergson’s overall method. 
 
Apperceiving Body Attitudes:  
 
While Bergson constructs his view of the body from knowledge of 
the physiological and anatomical structure of the nervous system, his 
understanding of bodily attitudes and tensions is not a simple matter of 
reiterating objective knowledge. In practice, reflecting on the body as a 
centre of indeterminate action, and intuiting the body’s direct relation to 
changes in consciousness, requires a methodological approach which 
exceeds a strictly neurological account of the brain. This is not just 
because Bergson asserts the immaterial reality of consciousness and 
memory. It is also because fully comprehending the way bodily tensions 
prepare or inhibit consciousness and memory involves directly 
apperceiving such attitudes as a lived process. 
In fact, I want to argue that there is an implicit oscillation in 
Bergson’s thinking whereby his analysis of the internal structure of 
sensory-motor processes informs, but makes way for, reflections on 
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distinct experiential dimensions of the body’s action tendencies. Given this 
assertion, it is useful to draw out its validity in relation to Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, who explicitly criticises Bergson for lacking a sense of the lived 
body. This will allow me to place Bergson in the broader context of 
phenomenology, and facilitate a more precise outline of the limitations and 
benefits of my reading of Matter and Memory. 
As Mark Sinclair explains, Merleau-Ponty’s work is premised on the 
idea that we ‘exist as embodied beings in a manner that both escapes and 
precedes the objectifying approach to the body in the modern sciences’ 
(Sinclair: 187). What neurology gives us in this respect is ‘a set of 
processes in the third person’ (Merleau-Ponty 2007: 87). It thereby 
provides a kind of ‘removed knowledge of [the body]’ (87), and it is only by 
‘going back to the body which I experience’ (87) that philosophy can 
properly ‘understand the function of the living body’ (87). From Merleau-
Ponty’s perspective, then, Bergson’s emphasis on the nervous system and 
the motor pathways of the brain means that ‘the body remains for him 
what we have called the objective body’ (91). 
To be clear, I do not dispute the strict opposition which Merleau-
Ponty sets up between the objectification of the body and its direct 
apperception insofar as it clarifies the parameters of his own work. Indeed, 
in emphasising ways in which the immediate experience of one’s body is 
irreducible to objective analysis, he opens up an array of insights into 
bodily experience which makes Bergson’s sensory-motor perspective 
appear lacklustre and unsophisticated in comparison. Considering the 
human body as ‘the outward manifestation of a certain manner of being-in-
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the-world’ (64), Merleau-Ponty seeks to discover the way ‘existence 
realizes itself through the body’ (192) and ‘establishes our first 
consonance with the world’ (192). Rather than isolating aspects of the 
body in terms of discrete functions and systems, as is the manner of 
biological research, he thereby gives us a framework for reflecting upon 
the body as a primordial ‘unity of the world and our life’ (xx). 
That said, I would still question Merleau-Ponty’s absolute claim on 
what constitutes a direct experience of the lived body and, hence, whether 
a project of going back to experience is strictly incommensurable with the 
physiological insights of neurology. While Bergson’s analysis of the 
nervous system and brain no doubt diverts reflection away from the deep 
phenomenological experience of the body’s being-in-the-world, it offers 
something that is both more than a simple objectification of the body but 
also something more than a rejection of objective knowledge. It conveys a 
rather narrow range of focus through which we might consider the lived 
activities of the body, but one which is no less valid as a mode of 
reflection.  
This is perhaps best surmised from the passages in Matter and 
Memory on attention. When Bergson defines attention as ‘an adaptation of 
the body’ (100), he does indeed go on to talk about the physiological 
mechanisms involved in visual and auditory recognition. However, this 
analysis is underlined by the more general image of adopting dispositions 
towards objects or interlocutors. Bergson argues that when we listen 
attentively, with the ‘desire to understand’ (121) another’s words, we do 
not simply passively wait for the combination of motor recognition and 
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memory to interpret the others intended meaning. Rather, we actively 
involve ourselves in listening by ‘adopting a certain disposition, which 
varies with our interlocutor, [and] with the nature of the ideas he 
expresses’ (121). 
In effect, what Bergson is deliberating on is a process by which we 
actively adjust the tensions and postures of our body, and therefore the 
tensions of consciousness, ‘as if we were choosing the key in which our 
own intellect is called upon to play’ (121). For example, understanding the 
explanation of a complex intellectual problem, following an emotional 
event, or judging the legitimacy of a gendered act, requires a very different 
attitude of attention in each case. What is common to all, however, is the 
development of a circuit in which the object of contemplation, the motor 
attitude which adapts itself to the object, and the memory-images which 
interpret it ‘hold each other in a state of mutual tension’ (104). 
In adapting our bodily dispositions to receive the meanings of 
another, we prepare consciousness to accommodate appropriate thought 
processes. In other words, ‘we jump at once into a certain class of abstract 
ideas’ (Bergson 2007: 167) which then go to work interpreting and re-
creating meaning. My point is that in order to fully grasp the kind of 
processes being presented here it is necessary to actively observe our self 
performing an act of attention. Indeed, Bergson himself implores us to 
‘question our own consciousness, and ask of it what happens when we 
listen’ (2005a: 121). If we take this instruction seriously, then, we are no 
longer thinking about the body in terms of a third person perspective, but 
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as part of the dynamic progress of a psycho-physical circuit that is lived 
subjectively. 
What Bergson wants us to conceive is not a set of isolatable 
physiological facts, but ‘the fluidity of a continuous undivided process’ 
(123). In doing so we may first obtain insights into the body attitudes of 
such processes through an objective study of the brain but, pace Merleau-
Ponty, the process as a whole should also be understood as a subjective 
act of concentration. Insofar as the body situates the mind within this act, it 
is necessary to re-enact the lived attitudes of the body and attempt to 
reflect upon the way they are directly involved in the world and directly 
involved in consciousness. The objective analysis of the body is thus 
revealed to be a stage in a description of the body which ends up being re-
imagined in terms of the lived postures and ‘movements of one’s own 
body’ (Merleau-Ponty 2007: 370). 
It should be noted that Bergson’s own emphasis prioritises 
consciousness and memory as the primary object of apperception, and 
that this is an important point which differentiates his work from the wider 
field of embodiment at stake in Merleau-Ponty’s work. What would be 
fundamental to analysing Bergson’s psycho-physical process of attention 
is an apperception of the way the body discerns its object of recognition, 
and inhibits or directs the subjective processes of memory according to its 
possible actions. In effect, the body is thought of primarily as the ‘pointed 
end […] in the shifting plane of experience’ (Bergson 2005a: 152), through 
which consciousness and memory are directed towards a present moment 
of action. It is not considered in relation to the more refined phenomenal 
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experiences of the body which interest Merleau-Ponty, such as the 
conscious feeling of tactility or how the apprehension of sensory 
phenomena is ‘bound up with a whole perceptual context’ (Merleau-Ponty 
2007: 9). 
On this note, it can be affirmed that the main reason Bergson 
cannot convey the ‘body as a genuine subject’ (Sinclair: 198), at least in 
Merleau-Ponty’s terms, is ‘because of his basic dualist position’ (198). This 
is to say that ‘memory constitutes the very essence of the self’ (198) for 
Bergson. He reserves for memory alone certain aspects of subjective 
experience which, for Merleau-Ponty, would belong to a more intimate and 
ambiguous relation between body and mind. Whether we focus on the 
dynamics of physiology or lived experience, understanding the body’s 
relation to the world is limited to the way sensory-motor processes of 
discernment and tensions of action orientate the memory content of 
consciousness.  
I have already suggested that this provides a narrow image of 
embodied experience in comparison to Merleau-Ponty, and in my 
conclusion to this thesis I will discuss some of the broader possibilities 
which phenomenology offers in relation to Butler. Suffice to say here the 
idea of disclosing the ‘global presence of a situation’ (Merleau-Ponty 2007: 
91), as an intimate collusion between the body and the world, might 
provide a deeper understanding of the acquired harmony of gender norms 
and expressive tendencies of the body. For example, the project of 
apperceiving the ‘synergic totality’ (369) of the perceptual field, or ‘the 
melodic unity of my behaviour’ (67), may show more clearly than my own 
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image of familiarised expectations how gender hegemony is lived as a 
substantial identity. Nonetheless, far from being a simple deficiency, the 
different relations Bergson depicts between the sensory-motor processes 
of the body, consciousness, and the world have definite theoretical 
benefits in relation to Butler.30 
Part of what constitutes a living body for Bergson is its ability to 
discern certain aspects of its environment while excluding others. In 
relation to perception, then, ‘dissociation is what we begin with’ (Bergson 
2005a: 165) rather than unity. His work therefore prompts us to explore 
how the experiential unity of the perceptual field is bound up with a 
simultaneous diminishment of the body’s object domain. As I discussed in 
my previous section, this process of motor discernment provides a useful 
way to explore how norms are circulated, but also remain inherently 
unstable insofar as they are dependent on the accommodation of other 
bodies. In turn, the framework of different tensions of action and levels of 
consciousness offers the possibility of exploring how gender intelligibility 
varies in relation to the norm, and how complex psychological states are 
developed in response to subversion.  
What I want to emphasise in this respect is that all of the processes 
I have so far discussed and will continue developing can, and should, be 
conceived as lived experiences of the body. When, as I have argued, 
familiarised stimuli act upon gendered subjects like an objective force, 
                                                 
30 Since much of Merleau-Ponty’s work revolves around either an adaptation or critique of 
Bergson, there is a significant amount of commentary which compares their work in 
different ways. For essays of particular relevance to this thesis, see: Morris (2000) on 
Bergson’s motor recognition and Merleau-Ponty’s Body Schema; Casey (1984) on habit; 
Al Saji (2007; 2008) on temporality; Gutting (2010) on science and lived experience. 
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provoking prepared responses, they do so because the mechanisms of 
habit have been sedimented into the body’s physiology. However, such 
mechanisms are also lived postures by which individuals dispose 
themselves towards their environments. I have thus used methods of 
apperception in order to interpret their role within the social circulation of 
performativity; and such methods are particularly important in conceiving 
the way habits involve implicit expectations which promote the temporal 
experience of social well-being. Equally, the role of the body in producing 
the variable dynamics of gender identification which I will discuss at the 
end of this chapter, and in Chapter Four, has been developed by shifting 
focus back and forth between knowledge of the brain and direct reflections 
upon the active processes of memory. 
In summary, I want to contend that within Bergson’s framework it is 
quite possible to translate the ‘abstract schema’ (Merleau-Ponty 2007: 
408) of neurology into a sense of first person experience. The objective 
study of sensory-motor processes can therefore provide knowledge of the 
basic functions that underpin the nature of the body’s lived action 
tendencies, which can then be re-assessed by Bergson’s understanding of 
psycho-physical dynamics and honed by methods of apperception. While 
this does not result in the kind of embodiment propagated by Merleau-
Ponty, it presents the possibility of developing insights which are not 
necessarily obvious from a purely phenomenological reflection. 
Bergson’s different potential to conceive the lived body is thus in no 
way an inferior perspective. Rather, thought of purely in terms of what can 
be seen and known concerning lived bodies, Bergson simply provides an 
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alternative emphasis. Characterised by tensions and dispositions, his 
sensory-motor view facilitates a more action orientated and directly 
motivated apperception of social relationality than that which appears in 
Merleau-Ponty’s work. By focussing on individual bodies as ‘centers of 
indetermination’ (Bergson 2005a: 36), as opposed to reflecting on the 
‘antepredicative unity of the world and our life’ (Merleau-Ponty 2007: xx), 
his work thus allows important aspects of such actions to be clarified and 
explored.  
For example, it draws attention to the motor discernments which 
underlie any given experience of unity, and so demonstrates how 
gendered perceptions are naturalised by diminishing a broader field of 
possible perceptions. Likewise, it brings into focus a greater awareness of 
how changes in the body’s responsiveness develop as contingent modes 
of attention and intelligibility. Finally, Bergson’s specific conception of how 
the body ‘fixes the mind, and gives it balance and poise’ (Bergson 2005a: 
173), and how different attitudes towards action enable or inhibit different 
kinds of memory, facilitates insights into the nature of identification which 
would not be apparent from Merleau-Ponty’s point of view. Indeed, the 
conception of different planes of consciousness, which follow from the 
body’s different tensions towards action, will be a vital part of my 
interpretation of the sedimentations and instabilities of gender identity in 
Chapter Four. 
Bergson’s conception of the body, then, draws attention to aspects 
of experience and socially embodied psychic processes which are 
marginalised or excluded within the phenomenological perspective. 
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Moreover, Bergson’s insights into the nature of the nervous system and 
brain offer a uniquely expansive view of the objective sciences which 
produce knowledge of them. As such, the motor tensions and 
discernments of sensory-motor processes can be explored through the 
neurosciences much more profoundly than is given credit by Merleau-
Ponty.  
This, however, does not mean simply resorting to ‘the form which is 
traced out in the nervous system […] as a set of processes in the third 
person’ (Merleau-Ponty 2007: 87). It means, firstly, gaining an intuition of 
‘the purpose and function of our nervous system’ (Bergson 2005a: 160) in 
terms of an evolutionary principle whereby its increased complexity 
correlates with the development of increasingly spontaneous and 
consciously directed actions. The terms of interpretation therefore change, 
and the nervous system comes to be seen less as an objective structure 
viewed externally, and more of a ‘material symbol’ (222) of spontaneous, 
lived action. Secondly, as I have outlined above, it means confining the 
brain’s role in consciousness to focussing attention and inhibiting or 
facilitating the actualisation of memory. Thinking about the sensory-motor 
body thus takes another step away from being an objective view of the 
body, and instead becomes about situating consciousness in the present 
moment via tensions of action which, through neurology, can be 
increasingly differentiated. 
Thirdly, and most directly in response to the criticism that objective 
science turns the body into an ‘interiorless thing’ (Merleau-Ponty 2007: 
64), it means reflecting upon the actual biological processes of the body in 
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a highly specific and philosophical way. It means viewing any given 
organic process as part of an ‘indivisible multiplicity’ (Bergson 1960: 32), 
whereby the ‘vital properties’ (13) of organisms are ‘not so much states as 
tendencies’ (13). These tendencies, in turn, no longer constitute living 
bodies as interiorless things, but as vital and indeterminate wholes. 
Essentially, what is required here is a translation in which we ‘break with 
scientific habits’ (31) and reconceive the objective knowledge of the 
nervous system, or any other scientific references to the body, as inwardly 
experienced tensions and tendencies. Thus: ‘The same thing which, seen 
from the outside, can be decomposed into an infinity of parts co-ordinated 
with one another, may perhaps appear, if realized from the inside, [as] an 
undivided act’ (Bergson 1935: 93).  
In this way, Bergson’s principle of the lived body actually runs in 
directions other than just a return to the apperception of lived experience. 
Where Merleau-Ponty confines organic process to the mechanisms of 
objective science, Bergson’s approach extends towards a principle of 
organic vitality. It extends towards a process of reflection which can 
envision the tendencies of internal processes – tendencies that, despite 
Merleau-Ponty’s scepticism, underpin the phenomenological experiences 
of the lived body – without mechanising them. In the light of his 
philosophy, therefore, the possibility of a more advantageous engagement 
with neuroscience, and other biological resources, is presented.  
Such an engagement is neither satisfied with a third-person 
conception of the brain and body, nor confined to a critique which 
disavows their physiological processes as a vital element of experience. 
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Rather, biological knowledge becomes a resource capable of being 
transformed into a metaphysical image of life, and as such can supply 
Bergson’s metaphysical image with lines of fact that clarify the major 
tendencies of living bodies.  
Modern neuroscience in particular offers a way to differentiate the 
body’s tendencies of action. It therefore presents the possibility of 
extending Bergson’s account of the sensory-motor tensions which 
orientate consciousness in new directions. 
 
Panksepp’s Theory of Emotion: 
 
It is such a possibility which will now concern me for the remainder 
of this section. Using Panksepp’s research into the nature of emotion I will 
first outline a specific way in which modern neurology can develop 
Bergson’s image of the brain as an organ that prepares and delays action. 
Developing an account of how different kinds of emotional body attitudes 
produce conscious feeling states, I will then suggest how this perspective 
facilitates insights into the lived processes of subversion. 
As I outlined in my previous section, there are specific correlations 
between Panksepp’s outlook and Bergson’s concept of affection. Part of 
the deep implication which Bergson shares with Panksepp here is the idea 
that the internal feeling states of the body evolved in relation to the needs 
of survival. The difference is that in Matter and Memory this correlation 
primarily concerns the evolutionary ‘significance of pain’ (55). In 
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Panksepp, on the other hand, an organism is motivated by a range of 
emotional feeling states.  
In common vernacular terms these emotions can be understood as 
‘fear, anger, sorrow, anticipatory eagerness, play, sexual lust, and 
maternal nurturance’ (Panksepp 1998: 47). These seven states ‘provide 
self-referential salience’ (14) which, Panksepp argues, evolved in order to 
inflect an organism’s environment with a certain intensive relationality, and 
thereby give rise to spontaneous action. As such, they have provided for 
organic life a ‘greater behavioral coherence and flexibility’ (50) which 
guides action in ‘a variety of primal situations’ (50; my italics).31 
While there is a definite correlation between Panksepp and 
Bergson in the general evolution of feeling states and action potentials, 
                                                 
31 As I noted earlier, Dorothea Olkowski has provided a very different interpretation of 
affection. In addition to this alternative possibility, it is worth making reference to a 
broader trend of theorising the body’s affective capacities which is growing in popularity, 
and is equally different to my framework of emotion. 
This trend is highly diverse. However, its salient points are, firstly, that affect often 
denotes an aspect of the body which exceeds representational experience, and even 
takes place in excess of consciousness. Thus, rather than guiding action through self-
referential and subjective states, the body’s affects often defy the possibility of achieving 
tangible relations between self and other.  As such, the language of affect theory tends 
towards images of heterogeneity and fluidity; of the in-between rather than the positioned, 
the unassimilable rather than coherent, and of the pre-individual rather than the 
conscious. 
Secondly, it is highly relevant to my own project that there is a wide-spread 
engagement with biology within this trend. Nonetheless, the general approach in this 
respect is again distinct from my own, which focusses on the relatively tangible processes 
of motor habits and emotional tensions and uses neurology to clarify the nature of these 
processes. In contrast, the emphasis in affect theory is to focus on emerging research in 
fields such as molecular biology and complexity theory which suggest non-linear 
dynamics of causality. 
In short, while valuable in its implicit critique of essentialism and its exploration of 
the body’s heterogeneity, the general manner of describing affect is inapt for my concerns 
regarding the regulatory dynamics of gender. However, I will actually return to this issue 
in the conclusion to my thesis in order to note some of the alternative opportunities that 
affect theory might offer to an analysis of performativity.  
At any rate, for a sense of the diversity in the way affect is theorised and applied 
to cultural analysis see: Sara Ahmed (2010), Lauren Berlant (2010), Anna Gibbs (2010), 
Melissa Gregg and Gregory Siegworth (2010), Lawrence Grossberg (2010), Elspeth 
Probyn (2010), Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank (1995), Silvan Tomkins (1995), 
Patricia Ticineto Clough (2007), Karen Wendy Gilbert (2007), Gilles Deleuze (1998a; 
1998b), Deborah Gambs (2007), Luciana Parisi (2004) and Brian Massumi (2002). 
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Panksepp offers a much more complex image of the brain than Bergson 
does. In Matter and Memory, the evolution of the brain is simply 
characterised as a complication of the sensory-motor system, whereby the 
greater complexity of the brain allows the passage from stimulus to 
response to be delayed. The actual structure and function of the brain is 
generalised in terms of motor pathways, so that the potential of a complex 
brain is that ‘a great multitude of motor tracts can open simultaneously’ 
(30). This descriptive framework, then, produces a somewhat 
homogeneous image of the brain in which a stimulus may either be 
transmitted into a definite movement or may ‘dissipate itself in 
innumerable motor reactions which are merely nascent’ (30). 
Panksepp’s evolutionary understanding of the nervous system is 
useful in this context because it associates the brain with the development 
of motor potentials, yet has a more differentiated account of the basis of 
spontaneous actions. In parallel to Bergson, he characterises evolution in 
terms of a passage from relatively passive reflex responses to the 
potential of spontaneous and indeterminate actions which, importantly, 
also correlate to the emergence of an efficacious consciousness. 
However, he differentiates the functions of the brain more subtly than 
Bergson, and therefore offers a more complex view of the development of 
spontaneous action. 
Panksepp explains that there have been ‘relatively long periods of 
stability in vertebrate brain evolution, followed by bursts of expansion’ 
(1998: 43). These bursts have resulted in the conservation of three distinct 
and ascending brain areas called the basal ganglia, the limbic system and 
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the cortex. While ‘all three […] operate together’ (61) within the everyday 
dynamics of behaviour, the important point is that ‘each contains a variety 
of distinct operating systems’ (61) which relate to specific action potentials.  
In the lower, most ancient regions these systems are concerned 
with regulating ‘essential bodily functions’ (70) like breathing, heart rate, 
and ‘the basic motor plans animals exhibit each day’ (70). As the brain 
expanded along the course of evolution the ‘higher levels [have provided] 
increasingly flexible control over these lower functions’ (79): first the limbic 
system, which is well developed in most mammals, and then the cortex 
which, in the human brain, is heavily associated with language and 
conceptual processing. Thus, the ‘stereotyped and relatively fixed 
behaviour patterns’ (352) of lower levels become more flexible due to their 
interconnection with more complex brain systems. 
Panksepp’s research focuses on the limbic system, as it is here he 
discovers ‘seven innate emotional systems ingrained within the 
mammalian brain’ (1998: 47). Broadly speaking, these brain circuits are 
correlative with the evolution of diverse action tendencies relating to the 
‘environmental challenges’ (50) of survival needs. They facilitate 
‘spontaneous psychobehavioral potentials’ (24) by which mammals adapt 
to the immanent conditions of their environments. 
In my context, what is of primary importance is that an emotional 
state of the nervous system is a generalised tension of the body which 
indicates a possible course of action. Rather than re-enacting a definite 
sequence of movements which have been preserved by past actions, as is 
the case with motor habit, they prepare the body only by initiating ‘a host 
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of physiological changes’ (49) such as the balance of hormone levels or 
tensed muscles. As such, the arousal of an emotion circuit prepares a 
stereotyped body attitude which is specific to each emotion, but leaves 
actual movements indeterminate and therefore open to spontaneous 
choice and hesitation. In short, we could say that each of Panksepp’s 
emotions ‘contains, after its kind, an invitation to act, with at the same time 
leave to wait and even do nothing’ (Bergson 2005a: 17, 18). 
What Panksepp provides, in addition to Bergson’s model, is not 
only more specificity as to the nature of different affective states, but more 
subtlety to understanding the development of nascent acts. Every 
emotional system is in fact ‘hierarchically arranged throughout much of the 
brain’ (Panksepp 1998: 27), and has ‘ascending interactions with higher 
brain areas’ (27). Thus, neural interactions between these circuits and the 
cortex provide ‘flexibility […] for the more primitive emotional and 
motivational systems’ (72). In Bergson’s terms, this is because the 
passage from stimulus to response is delayed to a greater degree, 
allowing movement to hesitate and consciousness to expand. However, 
given the insights of Panksepp, we are no longer limited to the rather 
indistinct claim that ‘the higher centers of the cortex […] indicate a number 
of possible actions at once’ (Bergson 2005a: 30, 31). 
Because of the hierarchical structure of a sensory-motor response, 
the motor pathways of a hesitant act must pass through the centrally 
placed emotional systems before they reach the potential innumerability of 
the cortex. The passage from stimulus to response therefore ascends to 
indecision via motor tendencies which first delimit the body’s tension 
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towards action. This means that ‘diversity is always supported from below 
by a variety of shared mechanisms’ (Panksepp 1998: 122), and a nascent 
act is rarely simply the sum of innumerable possible actions. Under the 
pressure of responding to uncertain situations the dissipation of possible 
motor tendencies is motivated by and constrained by the brain’s affective 
circuits. 
While this perspective alone makes it possible to re-conceive the 
dynamics of indeterminacy and sensory-motor responsiveness in more 
diverse terms, Panksepp also facilitates valuable insights into the nature of 
conscious reflexivity. In effect, each emotion circuit is a distinct state of the 
nervous system which executes stereotypical behaviour tendencies; but it 
is important to emphasise in this respect that, as with Bergson, Panksepp 
argues that the cerebral state itself does not account for the totality of 
behaviour. This is because the arousal of these brain systems is 
‘accompanied by subjectively experienced feeling states’ (Panksepp 1998: 
15), and these conscious feelings are not, for Panksepp, ‘mechanistically 
passive by-products of […] neural activities’ (32). They have a real, 
efficacious influence on the actions of organisms.32 
                                                 
32 Panksepp’s primary competitors for conceptualising emotion from a neurological 
perspective are Joseph LeDoux (1999: 2002) and Antonio Damasio (2000, 2003). 
LeDoux’s research focusses only on fear, and while he locates fear within the same 
neural substrates as Panksepp he conceptualises emotion in a relatively behaviourist 
manner. In other words, ‘the brain accomplishes its behavioural goals in the absence of 
robust awareness’ (LeDoux 1999: 17). While ‘feelings result when we become 
consciously aware that an emotional system of the brain is active’ (302), they have for 
LeDoux a relatively inefficacious role in behaviour. 
Damasio also conceptualises emotion as an automatic reaction of the nervous 
system that is independent of consciousness, but gives more weight to feeling states in 
influencing behaviour. The opposition between Panksepp and Damasio is thus staged in 
a different way. While Panksepp fundamentally associates feeling states with motor 
tendencies, Damasio stresses that ‘something felt [is] the result of a sensory process’ 
(2003: 217). This is to say that ‘feelings are largely a reflection of body-state changes’ 
(Damasio 2000: 288), whereby ‘somatosensory structures of the brain’ (287) cause the 
emotional state of the body to be consciously represented. As such, feelings occur after 
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Insofar as Panksepp defines emotion in terms of motor states of the 
nervous system and conscious feeling states, then, they should be 
understood as both bodily and psychic processes. In fact, pace Bergson, 
what I am suggesting is that the sensory-motor state of an emotion adapts 
the body towards a tension of readiness which can be followed by an 
automatic action. However, when this tendency is not resolved into a 
direct action the moment of hesitant action begins to span a broader 
breadth of duration. The emotional state of action therefore emerges as a 
feeling because consciousness expands during the moment of 
indeterminacy.  
Panksepp himself does not explicitly correlate the possibility of 
conscious emotional feelings with duration and indeterminacy, but he does 
suggest that the efficacy of emotion is due to the temporal nature of 
consciousness. Specifically, he argues that the evolution of ‘behavioral 
flexibility was achieved by the conscious dwelling on events [through] 
emotional feelings’ (38). Moreover, emotions have for Panksepp an 
‘anticipatory character’ (39) which, as it were, foreshadow future events.  
What is important in the temporal image of emotion suggested by 
Panksepp here is that the immediate past is retained through the feeling 
rather than in the form of recollections. Equally, we can surmise from 
Panksepp that it is the feeling itself which anticipates the future. From this 
perspective, what I want to convey is the apperception of emotional 
feelings as a state of temporal reflexivity, and the consciousness of these 
                                                                                                                                     
emotions for Damasio. Their efficacy is not that of an immanent force of motivation but as 
a means to reflect upon emotional events. Feelings, for Damasio, thereby allow us to 
reason about the causes of emotion and to facilitate more considered responses in the 
future. 
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feelings as something different from reflective consciousness. In 
Bergson’s framework consciousness has ‘two subjective elements’ 
(2005a: 233), which are ‘affectivity and memory’ (233). The former of 
these is ‘consciousness […] in the form of feeling’ (18); or the 
consciousness of an ‘internal state [which] arises within our body’ (58). 
The latter emerges in consciousness in the form of detailed images and 
associations. Reflecting on this distinction as an apperception of emotion, 
then, I want to emphasise a specific way the temporality of a feeling 
emerges as an intensive experience of the moment of action. 
As a temporal experience, emotion is not a consciousness which, 
like memory, retains ‘details out of our past experience’ (33). It is a 
reflexivity which dwells on the past, but not through a process which 
‘throws light […] on past recollections’ (141). Rather, the immediate past 
endures as a precursor to the immediate future through the way it charges 
the present moment with fervent importance. In turn, the feeling itself does 
not anticipate in a way which reflects, calculates or deliberates, but 
precisely through the way this fervid intensity prompts the self towards 
action. 
In any complex psychic process emotional feeling states will 
actually be indivisibly unified with memory-images and reflective 
processes of thought. My point is that the specific role emotion plays in 
consciousness is that of intensifying both the need for action and the 
thoughts which orientate the self within moments of indeterminacy. It 
designates, as it were, a force of consciousness rather than its content, 
but nonetheless influences the course such content takes. Thus, part of 
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what is significant about emotional responses in the context of subversion 
is that the sense of intensive relationality it produces invigorates the 
contingent representation of gender intelligibility. Moreover, because it 
quickens the impulse to action, the intensity of emotion heightens when 
action remains indeterminate and therefore affects the processes of 
signification more strongly.  
 
Emotional States of Gender Investment: 
 
Ultimately, my development of emotion as an intensive experience 
of indeterminacy will take place primarily in Chapter Four. What remains to 
be outlined here are the specific emotional tendencies which are important 
in relation to subversive practices. 
As I noted above, Panksepp describes seven emotional systems, 
but for my purposes I am only concerned with the tendencies of rage, fear, 
anxiety and expectation which Butler references in her work. In 
Panksepp’s framework, these are the emotions of RAGE, FEAR, PANIC 
and SEEKING, which he designates through block capitals to emphasise 
that they represent rigorously defined neural systems. In this respect, part 
of what I will clarify below is how this neurologically researched 
classification amends the vernacular image of emotion which tacitly 
informs Butler’s work. 
Firstly, ‘the SEEKING system of the brain’ (1998: 144) is a 
‘motivationally generalized’ (155) emotion which, Panksepp argues, has its 
evolutionary origin in activities like ‘foraging [and] exploration’ (145). Its 
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arousal produces an ‘invigorated feeling of anticipation’ (145) which ‘drives 
and energises many mental complexities’ (145), such as ‘curiosity, 
sensation seeking, and […] the search for higher meaning’ (145). 
Unlike the other emotional systems Panksepp describes, the 
SEEKING system is ‘commonly tonically engaged rather than phasically 
active’ (149). In other words, it is constantly active whenever, for instance, 
we experience the ‘impulse to become actively engaged with the world’ 
(145). Part of my reason for including this emotion in the context of 
performativity is thus to emphasise the influence it has in social 
relationality and the formation of identity. It points towards a specific way 
of exploring hegemonic investments in gender norms, whereby 
anticipatory emotions invigorate, in Panksepp’s words, ‘the impulse […] to 
extract meaning from our various circumstances’ (145). 
Butler herself, in the preface to Gender Trouble, associates the 
performativity of gendered meaning with ‘an expectation that ends up 
producing the very phenomenon that it anticipates’ (xv). I have, in turn, 
previously argued that the prospective tendencies of habit can be seen as 
an unreflective aspect of how expectations come to regulate the social 
field. However, the appreciation of an influential emotion which projects 
‘positive expectancies’ (Panksepp 1998: 151) into the world provides a 
further means to understand this dynamic of regulation. In short, my 
argument is that the pleasant feelings we enjoy when we actively 
anticipate meaning forms part of the immediate investment hegemonic 
subjects place in the ideal of a true gender.  
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Indeed, Panksepp specifically argues that the SEEKING system 
may be both ‘a major source of […] the tendency to selectively seek 
evidence for our hypotheses’ (145), and a primary reason why we so 
easily ‘yield [to] a consensual understanding of […] a “reality” that most of 
the social group accepts’ (162). Thus, while habit projects a realm of 
familiarity by selectively discerning a normative object domain, and 
thereby provides a constrained focal point for individual processes of 
memory, the emotional states involved in expectancy provide a 
‘conformational bias’ (145) for these processes. 
Given this use of Panksepp to explain an aspect of gender 
investment, it is also useful to follow his assertion that ‘unfulfilled 
expectancies within the SEEKING system activate the neural patterns of 
frustration’ (189). These neural patterns are what Panksepp calls the 
RAGE circuit. They produce feelings of anger, and promote aggressively 
competitive and violent behaviours which, as an adaptive evolutionary 
tendency, ‘aim […] to increase the probability of success in the pursuit of 
[…] resources’ (189, 190). As such, this system is aroused whenever, for 
instance, certain ‘precipitating stimuli […] restricts our freedom’ (189), or 
‘when one does not receive expected rewards’ (189). 
In Chapter Four, I will discuss this emotional tendency in terms of 
an abjection which, pace Butler, promotes degradation and violence 
towards otherness but, contrary to Butler’s view, does not involve a 
complex of internal conflict. I will argue that when a subversive act disrupts 
an immediate process of gender expectation it may be experienced simply 
as an obstacle to that expectation rather than as a ‘nonthematizable’ 
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(Butler 1993: 39) excess. In such cases, the hegemonic subject 
experiences a ‘specific kind of internal pressure or force controlling [their] 
actions and views of the world’ (Panksepp 1998: 191).  For instance, it 
becomes easy to externalise others when under the influence of this 
affective pressure, and therefore to re-affirm the exclusionary structures of 
discourse. However, it is because this impulse to externalise originates 
from a sensory-motor state that I will argue that this specific response to 
subversion does not involve internal conflict. 
A particularly significant insight which Panksepp brings to Butler’s 
vague invocations of emotion is the distinction between two different types 
of anxiety. One of these comes from the FEAR system, the experience of 
which ranges from a ‘generalised apprehensive tension’ (212) to ‘powerful 
feelings of foreboding’ (214), and promotes the impulse to avoid the cause 
of anxiety. In Chapter Four I will discuss this emotion in terms of 
complicity, whereby apprehension motivates a reluctance to directly 
challenge gender hierarchy and prejudice. However, my primary focus will 
be the form of anxiety produced by the PANIC system, as this provides a 
means to explore more complex psychic processes such as Butler’s theory 
of gender melancholy.  
From Panksepp’s evolutionary stand point the PANIC system is 
‘aroused when […] animals are separated from their support system’ 
(261), and he invokes it in order to think about the ‘neurobiological nature 
of social bonds’ (262). In the human world, for instance, it ‘mediates such 
negative feelings as loneliness and grief’ (212), but there are also ‘good 
reasons to believe that [the] neurochemistries that specifically inhibit [this 
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system] also contribute substantially to the processes that create social 
attachments’ (262). In other words, the ‘affective components of this 
system are dichotomous’ (262). They are involved in ‘behaviors and 
feelings of separation distress on one hand, and those of social […] 
comfort on the other’ (262). 
I suggested above that RAGE promotes processes of aggressive 
abjection without producing complex psychic states. Because the PANIC 
system has a dichotomous involvement in processes of attachment and 
feelings of loss, it provides a way to understand the kind of melancholic 
ambivalence which Butler herself associates with abjection.  
In Panksepp’s general terms, when the PANIC circuit is aroused 
‘animals seek reunion with individuals who help create the feeling [of 
social comfort]’ (266). My question is: what happens when, as with Butler’s 
notion of gender melancholy, the loss is in some way foreclosed by the 
borders of discursive intelligibility? For instance, insofar as a discursive 
condition for ‘[b]ecoming a “man” […] requires repudiating the feminine’ 
(Butler 1997a: 137), a subversion might expose the constructed 
discontinuities between masculinity and femininity. An example of this 
might be parodying a masculine identification with a football player through 
hyperbolic images which associate it with characteristic traits of a young 
girl’s idolisation of a male pop star. In such cases, an effective subversion 
may unsettle a primary basis of an individual’s social attachments. This 
then initiates an emotional impulse for social comfort and reassurance, but 
simultaneously taints the structures of identity through which such social 
attachments are formed. 
225 
 
In Chapter Four I will argue that internal conflicts like this result in 
contingent dynamics of abjection and gender melancholy similar to those 
Butler depicts. More generally, I will reflect on the involvement of each 
emotion in the contingent stability and instability of gender, and how they 
influence the on-going processes of identification and the potential for 
transformation. What will ultimately be at stake is the idea that emotions 
like rage and anxiety are responses to specific ways in which norms are 
subverted, and allow attempts to de-naturalise gender to be met by 
hegemonic subjects with varying degrees of efficacy. They should 
therefore be considered when forming strategies of subversion. 
In conclusion, I have argued in this section that the insights of 
Matter and Memory provide an interpretative framework for using 
neurological research within cultural theory. I have then begun to convey 
how Panksepp’s work facilitates one possible development of Bergson 
that can shed light on the lived processes of performativity and 
subversion. While Bergson’s approach to the body is limited in comparison 
with Merleau-Ponty’s, his psychological framework of tensions of action 
and consciousness has the benefit of specifying a more diverse image of 
how psychological states change. It is, therefore, to this psychology of 
‘psycho-physical actions’ (Bergson 2005a: 131), and the possibility of 
developing it in relation to gender, which I will now turn. 
 
Memory, and the Contingent Production of Meaning. 
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Bergson’s basic principle of memory is that of a ‘survival of the past 
per se’ (2005a: 149). The past is never forgotten, but is rather intrinsically 
preserved within a ‘psychical state which is unconscious’ (141). Bergson 
argues, in this vein, that the whole of our past is preserved in its entirety 
and is ‘continually pressing forward, so as to insert the largest possible 
part of itself into the present’ (168). However, in our normal circumstances 
almost all of our past experience is ‘hidden from us because it is inhibited 
by the necessities of action’ (154). Thus, what Bergson calls pure memory 
has a passive and virtual psychic existence, which is ‘outside of 
consciousness’ (142).  
The existence of memory as an unconscious or ‘virtual state’ (240) 
has, for Bergson, an inherently creative potential. When the mind strives to 
‘transcend the conditions of the useful’ (15) it may liberate the potential of 
memory from the constraints of action and ‘come back to itself as pure 
creative energy’ (15). As a philosopher, this creative energy is Bergson’s 
seminal insight, and focus, throughout his oeuvre. It has, therefore, rightly 
been a main focus of attention in developing Matter and Memory.  
At the end of Chapter Four I will invoke a much less radical dynamic 
of memory’s creative power. Specifically, I will reflect upon its potential to 
transform the intelligibility of gender when the immediate future of an 
action is experienced through the open-ended disposition of aspiration. 
However, my main focus will be on the involvement of memory in 
normative relations to gender. Thus, my aim in this section is not explore 
how memory functions when a philosophical effort of the mind transcends 
the conditions of useful action. Rather, in preparation for my following 
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chapter, I will focus on how psychic processes develop when, in Jean 
Hyppolite’s words, ‘the spontaneous functioning of memory […] adheres to 
the mechanisms of the body and is limited by them’ (116).  
I will begin by setting out the general parameters of the kind of 
‘psychological analysis’ (Bergson 2005a: 16) available through Matter and 
Memory. This will involve, firstly, expanding upon Bergson’s description of 
the process by which pure memory is actualised in order to show how 
such processes inform the way socially sedimented gender conventions 
are developed as individual representations. Secondly, my aim will be to 
show how ‘the laws of the association of ideas’ (163) which Bergson 
proposes can be related to the dynamics of gendered meaning. I will then 
suggest how these dynamics of meaning production are involved in the 
problems of resignification, and how we might extrapolate from Bergson’s 
basic model of memory more complex psychic processes that can 
reformulate Butler’s Freudian understanding of the gendered psyche.33 
                                                 
33 My focus on the everyday psychology of memory is not only a digression from 
Bergson’s philosophical emphasis on the creative potential of memory, but from the 
popular Deleuzian emphasis on the ontology of pure memory. In this perspective, 
Deleuze draws upon Bergson’s assertion that the pure, unconscious memory of the past 
has a real existence; and that when we are actively trying to remember we ‘detach 
ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves in the past in general’ (Bergson 
2005a: 134). From this image, Deleuze extrapolates the initial claim that an act of 
memory is a ‘leap into ontology’ (Deleuze 1991: 57) – a ‘true leap into being’ (57). 
However this provocative catchphrase is just the surface of a profound rethinking of the 
nature of the past, and the passing of time, which both draws out Bergson’s own implicit 
claims and extends them beyond their initial intentions. 
For my own purposes, the deeper ontological issues at stake in Deleuze’s 
reading have no immediate bearing on my psychological use of memory. I will thus resign 
myself here to two interrelated comments. Firstly, while it can be fairly claimed that 
‘Bergson’s use of the virtual past [in Matter and Memory] is overtly psychological rather 
than ontological’ (Mullarkey 2004a: 475), unlike Mullarkey I do not believe the present-
day enthrallment with the ontology of memory is misplaced. In this respect, Alia Al-Saji 
(2005; 2007; 2008), Keith Ansell-Pearson (2002), Leonard Lawlor (2003), and Stephen 
Crocker (2004) all take Deleuze’s ontological reading of Bergson as a primary object of 
explication, but each take it as a starting point which leads them in different but equally 
productive directions. 
Secondly, it is at once an indication of Deleuze’s profound influence on Bergson 
studies and a testament to the depth and breadth of Bergson’s work to consider that rich 
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The Psychology of Gender Intelligibility: 
 
In developing Bergson’s psychology, whether it is for my aim of 
elucidating the dynamics of gender identification or any other type of social 
analysis, two basic premises must provide the starting point. Firstly, it is 
important to recall that in Matter and Memory ‘the chief office of 
consciousness is to preside over action’ (141). Bergson therefore 
highlights the essentially ‘utilitarian character of our mental functions’ (16) 
and, as I have already outlined, argues that ‘a mental attitude […] must 
itself be engrafted upon an attitude of the body’ (120). Consequently, 
memory ‘brings to the light of consciousness only that which can fit into 
the sensori-motor state’ (168), and tends to actualise only ‘those past 
recollections which can usefully combine [with the present moment]’ (141).  
This premise provides a basis for how, given the inherently creative 
potential of memory, individual representations of gender generally remain 
within the bounds of the habituated norm. However, it does not explain the 
diverse and changing potential of memory necessary to describe the 
instabilities of gender identification. Secondly, then, it is also important to 
recognise that while the past is preserved in its entirety, this preservation 
does not amount to a linear record of our lives. Memory has a virtual 
                                                                                                                                     
veins of interpretive commentary thrive both with and without engaging what is now 
widely considered his seminal idea. For instance, commentators such as Pete Gunter 
(2008), Ian Alexander (1957), Milič Čapek (1987; 2002), Jean Hyppolite (2003), and A. E. 
Pilkington (1976), who worked prior to or contemporary with Deleuze barely, if at all, raise 
the issue of ontology when discussing the dynamics of memory. What this demonstrates, 
I believe, is the fertile philosophical ground Bergson has left, which offers multiple 
different directions to move in and still much to explore in each of these directions. 
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existence, and ‘passes into something else by becoming actual’ (136). 
This means that a memory ‘actualized in an image differs […] profoundly 
from pure memory’ (140), and it is this translation of the virtual into actual 
images which makes the dynamics of recollection and recognition 
something much more than a simple chronicle of stable and well-defined 
images. In effect, memory always produces ‘representations that are 
unstable and evanescent’ (161). 
In their unconscious state, individual memories do not have a ‘fixed 
and independent being’ (166), as if they were ‘laid side by side like so 
many atoms’ (171). Rather, Bergson suggests that the whole of our past 
exists together in an interpenetrating state. Just the individual elements of 
consciousness which I discussed in Chapter Two ‘dissolve into and 
permeate one another without precise outline’ (Bergson 1971: 132), so too 
are unconscious psychic elements organised in a kind of ‘confused mass’ 
(Bergson 2005a: 171). This is to say that in its virtual existence the whole 
of memory is bound up in an undivided continuity, and that it is only when 
it is ‘materialized in an actual perception’ (239) that it becomes divided into 
‘distinct fragments’ (166). 
Ultimately, this model provides the image of ‘a supple memory 
which spontaneously contracts itself or develops itself according to the 
demands of adapting to the world’ (Hyppolite: 117). When, for instance, 
we enact a process of recollection, we do not proceed by ‘plunging into the 
mass of our memories, as into a bag’ (171). We first focus our attention on 
the possibility of remembering; or, in Bergson’s words, ‘replace ourselves 
[…] in the past in general’ (2005a: 134). Then, by ‘a work of adjustment, 
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something like focussing a camera’ (134), we gradually locate the certain 
region of memory which we seek. In this process, ‘we go from the whole to 
the parts’ (165) through an act of discernment which consists in 
contracting the past, in its entirety, around certain ‘dominant memories’ 
(170). However, once we have located a region of memory, the rest of our 
past continues to form a kind of ‘vague nebulosity’ (171) around these 
dominant images. Thus, consciousness can enact a ‘growing effort of 
expansion, by which the memory […] spreads out its recollection over a 
wider surface’ (171), enabling more specific details of the past to be drawn 
into focus.  
For the purposes of a psychological analysis which can provide 
insights into the contingent representation of gender conventions, what 
this description highlights is the malleability of memory. The work of 
adjustment I just described is capable of stopping at different levels of 
contraction, and at each of these levels the past, in Alia Al-Saji’s words, is 
‘rearranged [and] undergoes transformation and fragmentation’ (2005: 
225). When the work of memory focuses on a dominant image the whole 
of the virtual past remains undivided around it, but the elastic indivisibility 
of the virtual past will reform itself in relation to that image. In effect, the 
nebulous mass of past memories will tend to re-organise themselves 
according to the associative connections of resemblance they have to the 
dominant image.  
This means, on the one hand, that if an effort is made to expand the 
memory content into other regions of the past this process will be 
constrained by the nature of the initial contraction. Some memories will 
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thus be easier to locate than others because of their associative proximity, 
while others still may be completely inhibited. In this latter case, then, a 
renewed and separate effort of memory will be required in order to locate 
them. On the other hand, it also implies that if and when these nebulous 
images are actualised, they will tend to be divided from their original 
context in some way. That is, they will not necessarily emerge, in an 
image, as entirely detailed memories of past events. Rather, they will be 
fragmented according to their associative relevance, so that aspects of the 
memory which resemble the dominant image will be emphasised while 
dissimilar elements of the past will tend to be inhibited from 
consciousness.34 
This idea is important for my interpretation of gender intelligibility 
because it highlights the way processes of memory are not just about 
explicitly remembering events, but about how the past creates mental 
images which contextualise the present. Memory is capable of ‘distinct 
degrees of tension or of vitality’ (Bergson 2005a: 170), which enable 
consciousness to represent the past in different ways because the process 
of actualisation develops variably. Indeed, Bergson’s model presupposes 
that we can ‘discover thousands of different planes of consciousness, a 
thousand integral and yet diverse repetitions of the whole of the 
experience through which we have lived’ (241).  
                                                 
34 Patrick McNamara has compared Bergson to a recent approach in the neurological 
study of memory which he calls ‘Mental Darwinism’ (1999: 1). This theoretical framework 
applies the principles of natural selection to the working of memory, and McNamara 
argues that Bergson’s notion that memory is inhibited by the needs of action places him 
tentatively within this category. As such, he examines neurological and psychological 
research uncovering ‘experimental evidence for Bergson’s model of remembering’ (44). 
However, in translating Bergson’s metaphysics into purely scientific terms most of the 
important dynamics of actualisation get lost in McNamara’s account. 
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There are then, in principle, an ‘infinite number of […] possible 
reductions of our past life’ (Bergson 2005a: 169). In my context, this 
means that there are an infinite number of differences, both subtle and 
radical, by which our memory can inform the image we have of gender. 
For instance, on one plane of consciousness the perception of a 
masculine posture may recall the memory of a specific person we know 
making such a gesture at a specific time. In this case, the virtuality of 
memory becomes arranged around a precise event. An effort of expansion 
will thus allow the event to unfold sequentially in consciousness, or else 
may lead to other chains of association concerning that event or person 
which are grouped nebulously around the originally dominant association. 
On another plane, however, consciousness may remain narrow and 
produce an extremely contracted tension of memory. The same perception 
might thus cause us to think about the masculine posture more generally, 
but will produce more or less impersonalised images which are almost 
entirely fragmented from their specific context as past events.  
In Bergson’s framework: ‘These two associations by similarity’ (169) 
– the one which recalls specific memories of gendered acts, the other 
which invokes generalised images – ‘are not due to [an] accidental arrival’ 
(169). They ‘answer to two different mental dispositions, to two distinct 
degrees of tension of the memory’ (169), which are themselves 
‘determined by the needs of the moment’ (169). In other words, the ‘choice 
of one resemblance among many’ (243) is ‘not made at random’ (243) but 
follows fundamental rules of association that are determined by the body’s 
tension towards action. 
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The lowest plane of consciousness is ‘more disposed towards an 
immediate response. The past is simply acted through a motor habit, and 
psychic life is reduced to a recognition in which similarity is ‘felt and 
passively experienced’ (160). At the highest, consciousness would be 
completely ‘detached from action’ (167), so that the ‘necessities of life are 
no longer there to regulate the effect of similarity’ (168). In this latter case, 
then, memories proliferate capriciously: ‘any memory may be set 
alongside the present situation’ (167), through any kind of fanciful and 
weakly grounded association, because there is no purposeful discernment 
driving the process. 
Bergson argues that ‘psychical life […] oscillates normally between 
these two extremes’ (168). Indeed, it is to this oscillation that he attributes 
the formation of general ideas, and to which I will attribute the unstable 
representation of gender. The initial principle here is that motor recognition 
produces ‘automatically acted generalities’ (Bergson 2002: 54), and that 
these passively experienced resemblances are ‘the essential [foundation] 
of generalization’ (55). From this basis, on-going processes of reflective 
generalisation are formed as ‘habit [rises] from the field of action to that of 
thought’ (55). Memory will actualise similar images from past events, so 
that psychic acts such as inductive reasoning can develop ‘general ideas 
which will be nothing more than ideas’ (55). 
Following this, my contention is that when we spontaneously 
develop an idea of gender – such as a normative conception of 
masculinity or femininity – we do not passively repeat the borders of 
discourse which constrain and legitimise that norm. Rather, the psychic 
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process begins from ‘a confused sense of the striking quality or of 
resemblance’ (Bergson 2005a: 158) by which motor recognition discerns 
the bodies around us within that contingent moment. This experience of 
the body’s motor attitude presents us with resemblances that are only 
lived and felt, but which we then ‘translate into generalities’ (Bergson 
2002: 56) when memory unifies that resemblance with images from past 
experience. For instance, we may recall previous events in which the 
same gestures were performed, thereby confirming the convention of 
performing gender that way. The habituated norm thus becomes a 
consciously represented norm, and the complexity of this representation 
depends upon the indeterminacy of action which allows memory to expand 
or narrow its range of associative images. 
This process is more diverse than the ‘reexperiencing of a set of 
meanings already socially established’ (Butler 2008: 191) implied by Butler 
because it is not simply a re-experiencing of the discursive framework of 
law and prohibition. It is a re-experiencing and reformation of an 
individual’s lived past, and thereby offers a multitude of possibilities for 
subtly re-interpreting discourse.  
In general, we can say that images of gender will ‘take a more 
common form when memory shrinks most, more personal when it widens 
out’ (Bergson 2005a: 169), but Bergson’s framework also allows the 
diversity of this process to be considered in more precise terms. Firstly, 
memory will produce different dominant images of gender depending on 
the initial motor resemblance; while different planes of consciousness will 
also represent that resemblance in different ways. Secondly, by ‘grafting 
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distinctions upon resemblances’ (160), memory may also tend to 
discriminate between individual nuances in the way gender norms are 
performed.  
 
The Psychological Truth of Gender: 
 
Part of the significance of this dynamic of meaning production is 
that it provides a way to think about the variability of gender intelligibility, 
while retaining a sense of how meaning is socially regulated. Our 
‘intellectual life rests […] upon the sensory-motor functions by which it 
inserts itself into present reality’ (175). Its spontaneous images therefore 
remain largely constrained by the circulation of motor recognition which, in 
section one, I argued maintains the social regulation of gender norms. My 
aim in this respect is not simply to affirm the potential spontaneity and 
variability of gender representation, over and above Butler’s own 
perspective, but to explore the psychic tendencies which make re-
signification difficult. 
If bodily recognition constrains the direction of associations, and 
different tensions towards action allow broader or narrower planes of 
consciousness to contextualise the present in different ways, then each 
contingent plane of consciousness allows specific kinds of interpretive 
processes to unfold. In effect, memory associations constitute a set of 
contingent preconceptions which provide the semantic nuances for an 
individual’s immediate interpretation of gender norms. On each different 
plane, the potential to rationalise the norms of gender or to reform its 
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expectations will be biased by the associations which are prominent there. 
Thus, because associations which are grouped ‘together on one plane 
may be separated or allocated to different regions on another’ (Al-Saji 
2005: 225), our tendencies for negotiating meaningful relations to 
otherness may be radically different from one moment to another. 
The guidance Bergson provides for understanding how these 
processes of memory unfold as inter-subjective relations suggests, I would 
argue, tendencies to misrecognise and appropriate meaning as much as it 
does the possibility for understanding. Once we have prepared a bodily 
disposition, thus taking up an attitude towards the world, ‘we jump at once 
into a certain class of abstract ideas’ (Bergson 2007: 167). Having 
‘adopted this intellectual tone’ (167), Bergson suggests we then project the 
preconceptions of these ideas into the present moment of social 
interaction. In this way, ‘to recognise intellectually, to interpret, may be 
summed up in a single operation’ (Bergson 2005a: 117) in which we place 
ourselves ‘at once in the midst of the corresponding ideas’ (116) and then 
‘reconstruct intelligently’ (116) the intended meaning of whatever we aim 
to interpret. 
In short, comprehending someone’s meaning, whether we are 
‘following an argument, reading a book or listening to a discourse’ 
(Bergson 2007: 165), involves recreating that meaning for ourselves. If, for 
instance, someone conveys to us an argument concerning the debates 
over gay marriage, in order to understand that argument we must first 
adopt a plane of consciousness sympathetic to recreating its meaning. 
Although that argument may, through suggestion and osmosis, guide us 
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towards this sympathy, it is the adoption of the proper state of 
consciousness which ultimately determines whether we find the argument 
to be true or not.  
In this vein, Bergson argues that: ‘when we read a psychological 
novel, […] certain associations of ideas there depicted for us are true 
[because] they may have been lived’ (2005a: 169). However, ‘others 
offend us, or fail to give us an impression of reality’ (169) when they 
express ideas which shift between different planes of mental life too 
sharply. In such cases, we feel that the connections are ‘mechanically and 
artificially brought about’ (169), and are thus dissonant to our own lived 
expectations. 
Similarly, my contention is that the ‘different mental levels’ (169) we 
attain during our everyday interactions determine our affinities with the 
gendered others we encounter, and so the legitimacy of their 
performances. In effect, the “true” image of gender will be the one which 
conforms to our own contingent plane of consciousness. This truth may be 
more nuanced, and open to differences which exceed the norm, on some 
planes because the conceptual distribution of difference is made by 
broader ranging and more personalised associations. However, our 
gender expectations may be more rigid on other planes because they are 
disposed towards a narrower range of gender expectations. In this latter 
case, slight or sudden disjunctions may easily bring about dissonance and 
be represented as false. 
Either way, the important point I want to emphasise in preparation 
for my analysis of re-signification in Chapter Four is that when we adopt a 
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mental attitude it ‘throws abstract thinking into a definite direction’ 
(Bergson 2007: 167), and we interpret the borders of discursive legitimacy 
by our own lights. ‘Each of us has her/his own plane[s] of memory to which 
s/he jumps most readily’ (Al Saji 2005: 225); our own habituated 
tendencies to contextualise and interpret gendered acts and ideals 
through specific tensions of memory. Whether they are rigid reiterations of 
discursive borders, or whether they tend to loosen the force of convention, 
it will always ‘take a concerted effort to find and be attuned to other levels 
dissonant from one’s own’ (225, 226). Thus, while my primary aim in this 
section so far has been to demonstrate the potential excess of meaning 
over discourse, I also want to emphasise that this model of psychic life 
maintains an inherent difficulty in disseminating new representations. 
 
The Complexities of Action and Psychic Repression: 
 
The notion of gender meaning I am conveying here is, significantly, 
an extrapolation of Bergson’s text rather a than direct translation of it. 
However, the most extreme divergence I am taking from Bergson’s explicit 
psychology of memory is the general impression he conveys of ‘a “well 
balanced” mind’ (2005a: 153) which is ‘nicely adapted to life’ (153). A 
limitation of this perspective is, as Marie Cariou observes, that it portrays 
‘a sort of ideal functioning of memory’ (104) rather than an ‘exhaustive 
description’ (104). For instance, Cariou argues that Bergson’s ‘concept of 
“utility” sometimes leads to the obscuring of many motives which could 
account for difficulties in evocation, or even harmful or corrupt evocations’ 
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(104). What she thus calls for is ‘a more rigorous conception of the 
negativity of forgetting’ (104), by which Bergson’s understanding of 
memory can be ‘enriched and completed’ (104) by the insights of Freudian 
psychoanalysis.  
While it is certainly not my intention to enact a full engagement with 
Freud here, I will conclude this section by sketching out a Bergsonian 
interpretation of some of the Freudian mechanisms at play in Butler’s 
work. Specifically, I want to offer Bergson as an alternative way to think 
about the complex and unstable identifications in which, for instance, 
‘uninhabitable’ (Butler 1993: 3) zones of meaning threaten the self with 
‘psychotic dissolution’ (243). 
For Butler, these uninhabitable zones are authorised by the strict 
heteronormative exclusions of discourse itself. However, they constitute 
ambivalent psychic investments in the norm because, during infancy, the 
prohibition on homosexuality is understood to produce ‘unresolved object 
relations’ (Butler 2008: 86). That is, because homosexual attachments are 
foreclosed from possibility at the level of discursive regulation, Butler 
argues that the loss of an ‘original’ (86) homosexual love remains 
‘unacknowledged’ (86), but nonetheless continues as an unconscious 
identification. The ‘sedimentation of objects loved and lost’ (Butler 1997a: 
133) thus haunts the unstable boundaries of the gendered ego, and 
unconsciously drives gender investments through ‘neurotic repetitions that 
restage [those] primary scenarios’ (10). 
In this way Butler, pace Freud, reduces the role of past experience 
in psychic life to a ‘precipitate of abandoned object-relations that form the 
240 
 
ego’ (Butler 2004: 146), and with this in mind a vital difference between 
Bergson and the Freudian notion of the unconscious must be noted. 
Bergson’s notion of pure memory, as a complete preservation of the past 
in unconscious states, does not include the idea of repressed desires and, 
as such, does not store sedimented gender investments. Rather, the past 
is preserved in a virtual, inactive state which only becomes efficacious in 
response to the present.  
This, then, is the important distinction by which I wish to reform the 
complexities of gender identification. By replacing Butler’s view that 
unstable identifications revolve around sedimented structures of the 
psyche, I aim to construct a more variable interpretation of how ambivalent 
relations to meaning develop. If the on-going influence of the virtual past is 
indeterminate, and only becomes active through planes of consciousness 
which rearrange this virtual potential differently each time, then there is no 
fundamental psychic relation to gender. Insofar as these re-formations of 
the past are responses to contingent tensions of the body, rather than pre-
established psychic relations to discourse, this model offers a more 
dynamic view of how individuals respond to subversive acts which disrupt 
the coherence of gender ideals. 
It must be noted in this respect that ‘Bergson is less attentive than 
Freud to the way in which [the past] reappears disguised, metamorphosed 
[and] transferred’ (Cariou: 109). Matter and Memory thus lacks a direct 
means to account for latent psychic influences which are unacknowledged 
by consciousness. However, we can infer from Bergson that because 
memories interpenetrate in their virtual states they are, in principle, 
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capable of condensing an unlimited number of past moments together into 
a single actual image. Indeed, virtual memory ‘passes into something else 
by becoming actual’ (Bergson 2005a: 136), and tends to combine with the 
moment of conscious perception on the basis of resemblance. Past 
experience can therefore influence the present, through ‘a whole work of 
elaboration, condensation [and] figuration’ (Cariou: 104), in ways which 
are not explicitly conscious. 
Moreover, Deleuze argues that in the movement of actualisation 
described by Bergson we can discern ‘a psychological unconscious [which 
is] distinct from the ontological unconscious [of pure memory]’ (1991: 71). 
There is, in this movement, a ‘full-scale repression originating in the 
present’ (72; my italics) which, in Deleuze’s expository reading, will simply 
and effectively ‘ward off useless or dangerous recollections’ (72). 
Nonetheless, while this completely effective notion of psychological 
repression is certainly a correct interpretation of Bergson’s view, there is 
no necessary reason to maintain it. With certain adaptations, Bergson’s 
principles are capable of accounting for mechanisms of actualisation 
which induce psychic conflicts, and are only partially effective at inhibiting 
these conflicts from consciousness.  
Bergson describes two interlinked conditions for actualisation by 
which memory brings to light ‘what it is important to know to understand 
the present and anticipate the future’ (Bergson 2007: 141), but only that 
which ‘fit into the sensori-motor state […] from the point of view of action’ 
(Bergson 2005a: 168). These two tendencies simultaneously draw out and 
inhibit memory on the basis of useful resemblance. However, as Cariou 
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suggests, Bergson can give the impression that memory always perfectly 
aids the present moment of action, and part of the problem in this respect 
is that he presumes a simple and unified correspondence between the 
body’s motor recognitions and the psyche’s anticipatory relation to the 
future. 
As I argued in my previous section, Bergson tends to homogenise 
the action tendencies of the brain in terms of habit, and I have added to 
his model ‘affectively valenced’ (Panksepp 1998: 144) neural circuits. 
Rather than preserving definite responses to definite stimuli, these circuits 
produce generalised motor responses that induce urgent impulses to act 
and, when these impulses remain hesitant, are accompanied by an 
anticipatory feeling which intensifies the moment of indeterminacy. My 
contention here, then, is that insofar as preserved motor habits and 
emotional tensions both project nascent actions during moments of 
indeterminacy, they may have a conflicting influence on the way memory 
responds to the present. 
The image of the brain which needs to be conveyed here is one in 
which ‘the movements of the cerebral mass […] remain inseparably bound 
up with the rest of the material world’ (Bergson 2005a: 24, 25). Every 
excitation which the body receives ‘determine unceasingly, within its 
substance, nascent reactions’ (232), so that the body is continually 
adapting to the changing conditions of the material present. In moments of 
indeterminacy, when memory is called upon to aid the moment of action, it 
is these adaptive responses which ‘mark out the field in which we shall 
seek the image we need’ (95). In turn, ‘these images themselves are not 
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pictured in consciousness without some foreshadowing […] of the 
movements by which these images would be acted’ (13).  
This means that, during the process of actualisation, memory 
‘enters […] into a kind of circuit with the present’ (Deleuze 1991: 66) 
whereby the object of action and the mental image refer back to one 
another. Analogous images are thus launched towards the object in ‘a 
series of attempts at synthesis’ (Bergson 2005a: 102; my italics) until one 
is adequately ‘capable of interpreting our actual perception’ (103).  
Insofar as it is the body’s motor attitude which provides a ‘common 
framework’ (102) for this circuit and this synthesis, my point is that 
Bergson only portrays the dynamics of memory in relation to a simple 
sensory-motor state. This is to say that his idea that the body, as it were, 
scans an object with habituated or ‘imitative movements’ (107) suggests a 
relatively stable basis for the circuit recognition. As such, he presumes 
that images either can or cannot combine usefully with the present, but not 
that the appeal the present makes to memory may itself be confused; nor 
that this confusion can lead to enigmatic, unsettling or even harmful 
images making their way to the fringes of consciousness where they have 
unproductive effects. 
As an illustration of how such a process unfolds – which is certainly 
not comprehensive – my proposal is that during a state of emotional 
indeterminacy the body’s reflexive attitude inflects the object with an 
intensive importance. At the very least, this relational intensity produces 
an unstable object of attraction for the circuit of memory which, in turn, 
potentially complicates the dynamics of association. More radically, 
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however, it may also evolve as an on-going state of anticipatory urgency 
which agitates the relational dynamics of recognition and, in relation to the 
discernment of motor habit, produces a conflicting interest in the 
movement of actualisation. 
What I want to stress here, then, is that there can be at least two 
conflicting motor tendencies presiding over the circuit of memory and 
inhibiting the final moments of gender representation. More to the point, 
this sensory-motor conflict can produce conflicts of meaning and self-
representation which not only necessitate repression but undergo complex 
processes of transformation in order to facilitate this repression. By way of 
suggesting how such how such psychic conflicts develop and are resolved 
I want to briefly return to the example I began to sketch in my previous 
section of how the PANIC system can be related to gender melancholy 
If a subversive repetition denaturalises the constructed 
discontinuities between masculinity and femininity it may result in a loss of 
social coherence. This may then trigger the sensory-motor responsiveness 
of the PANIC system. Subsequently, the circuit of memory will be 
orientated not only by motor habits, which will tend to invoke images 
specifically related to the aspect of gender which has been denaturalised, 
but also by ‘the behaviours and feelings of separation distress’ (Panksepp 
1998: 262). 
In this way, the denaturalisation may induce a spontaneous leap 
into a contracted tension of memory which, responding to the anxiety to 
regain a feeling of social attachment, produces dominant images of 
gender which affirm the intentions of the subversion. Thus, memory may 
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produce associations with the present in which the borders of masculinity 
and femininity are ambiguous, and in which the gendered representation 
of the self does not conform to social preconceptions. However, while 
these associations, as images which are still confused and nebulous, may 
be loosely compatible with the disrupted tendencies of motor recognition 
on the virtual level of memory, they may yet still be inhibited during the 
final moments of actualisation. This is because the associations that can 
be represented on that plane of consciousness are not necessarily useful 
in relation to the habituated tendencies of action, which aim to discern a 
distinct gendered object domain. 
A conflict in the production of meaning and identification arises here 
because, from the perspective of the feeling state, the virtual images may 
help to ‘understand the present and anticipate the future’ (Bergson 2007: 
141). They will therefore tend to force themselves upon consciousness in 
proportion to the urgency of emotion. However, they cannot be resolved 
into a distinct image because they are, firstly, constrained by the relational 
circulation of habit, but also by the regulatory constraints of discursive 
intelligibility.  
The virtual associations motivated by feelings of anxiety and loss 
cannot be avowed, and must be repressed, narrowed and transformed in 
order to sustain a coherent image of gender hegemony. My point is, then, 
that insofar as the on-going representation of gender remains motivated 
by those feelings, and are actualised on the same plane of consciousness 
initiated by the subversion, their ‘uninhabitable’ (Butler 1993: 3) 
associations cannot simply fade into ‘an immense zone of obscurity’ 
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(Bergson 2005a: 85). Rather, they remain, as it were, on the fringe of 
consciousness as a spectral instability. 
What is at stake here is the idea that associations begun on a 
virtual level, once repressed, take the form of ‘a repudiated identification’ 
(Butler 1997a: 137) which continues to motivate the meaning of the norm, 
although unconsciously so. Normative gender representation no longer 
follows placidly from the appeal of habituated motor tendencies but, pace 
Butler, develop though ‘neurotic repetitions’ (10) which are truly bound up 
with internal conflicts and melancholic ambivalence. Nonetheless, the 
difference this model has from Butler’s is that this on-going repression is a 
contingent response to the present moment of action rather than a 
sedimented structure of the psyche. It originates in the final moment of 
actualisation; and only on a specific plane of consciousness produced by 
an equally specific conflict of sensory-motor indeterminacy. 
I will explore these dynamics of melancholic identification in more 
detail at the end of my following chapter. For now, I want to conclude this 
section by reiterating that I am using Bergson’s concept of memory 
primarily to explore the way conscious representations of gender achieve 
individual nuances of meaning which exceed Butler’s logic of discourse. 
Different conditions of action change the way meaning is produced in 
relation to the past, so that gender intelligibility is contingent to specific 
planes of consciousness rather than given entirely by socially shared 
discursive structures.  
A gender representation which is ‘prominent on one plane may be 
hidden on another’ (Al-Saji 2005: 225), so that the possibility of changing 
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the way gender signifies is radically dependent upon how the associative 
dynamics of memory unfold on each contingent level of consciousness. 
One level may produce a rigid representation of convention; another, 
perhaps following the open-ended anticipation of aspiration, may produce 
‘a tone of intellectual vitality’ (Bergson 2005a: 170) that may easily enable 
a radical transformation signifying meaning; another still may induce a 
melancholic relation to gender. 
This model, then, provides a more variable way to understand the 
psychic attachments to discursive exclusions, whereby each plane of 
consciousness facilitates different possibilities of identification, and 
therefore different kinds of repression. 
 
Conclusion.  
 
 
In Chapter One I criticised Butler for reducing the psyche and the 
body to an effect of discourse, and therefore lacking a dynamic view of the 
way hegemonic subjects experience gender norms in excess of discursive 
structures. In response to this, I argued in Chapter Two that Bergson’s 
‘deep-seated self’ (1971: 125) constitutes a reflexive distance from the 
regulated structures of gender identification. I then suggested that a 
medium of social transformation lies in the possibility of experiencing 
social relationality through the qualitative experience of duration rather 
than through the substantialising effects of pre-established subject 
positions. Nonetheless, this potential is limited because qualitative 
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differentiations cannot be expressed in language without homogenising its 
effects, and is generally eclipsed by the more dominant tendency of the 
self to become ‘enclosed and materialised in ready-made rules’ (Bergson 
1935: 46). 
In this chapter I have extrapolated from Matter and Memory a 
sensory-motor understanding of the body’s role in performativity. This 
framework, again, attempts to throw light on experiential aspects of 
hegemonic gender performances and attitudes which exceed discourse. It 
follows directly from Chapter Two in the sense that the theme of habit has 
been sustained as the primary tendency to repeat gender norms, and in 
the sense that gender representation varies when action becomes 
indeterminate. However, it has focused on different aspects of how this 
dynamic functions in relation to performative acts. 
The understanding of the self and subject I conveyed through Time 
and Free Will and The Two Sources designates only a psychic tendency 
to conserve or transform relations to discursive structures of identity. 
Through Matter and Memory I have radically re-described the 
conservation and circulation of gender norms in terms of motor habits, by 
which existing power relations constrain the body’s tendencies of 
inattentive recognition and action. In turn, rather than focussing on the 
potential for individuals to momentarily transcend their attachments to the 
discursive constraints of identity, I have emphasised the way ‘intellectual 
life rests […] upon the sensori-motor functions’ (Bergson 2005a: 175). This 
has enabled a more dynamic view of how the conceptual content of 
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gender intelligibility varies, within the bounds of the norm, during the 
moments of attentive recognition. 
In this context, then, the relation between habit and indeterminacy 
determines processes of meaning rather than intensity of investment. I 
have, however, retained from Chapter Two the idea of emotion as an 
agitator of gender investment. Although I have re-described emotion in 
terms of a sensory-motor state of the nervous system, this model 
continues the theme that emotion intensifies the way individuals orientate 
themselves during moments of indeterminate action. It thereby influences 
the way memory contextualises signifying processes. For instance, a 
gender norm conceived under the influence of an aggressive state of 
RAGE will be different from one developed through the separation anxiety 
of the PANIC system. 
What remains, for the following chapter, is to take a closer look at 
how these processes unfold during immediate acts of performativity and 
responses to subversion, and to explore more explicitly what they reveal 
about the instability of gender recognition which Butler’s framework does 
not. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMBODIED DYNAMICS OF PERFORMATIVITY 
AND SUBVERSION 
 
 
My most general thesis on Butler is that her theory of gender 
performativity, thought of as an ‘interrogation of the terms by which life is 
constrained’ (Butler 2004: 4), provides a profound way to approach the 
political problems of sexual difference. In this respect, its usefulness lies in 
exploring the way historically sedimented structures of discourse confine 
in advance the way sexual difference is made socially intelligible. 
However, Butler’s deconstructive framework results in an abstract account 
of the subject which excludes the lived and embodied dimensions of social 
temporality. It thus falls short of theorising the actual process through 
which performative significations occur. This omission, then, leads to 
problems in understanding both how normative attachments to gender 
become sedimented and how subversive repetition can work as a potential 
for social transformation. 
Broadly speaking, my Bergsonian response to Butler has outlined 
three themes of experiential excess which underlie the unstable ‘social 
temporality’ (Butler 2008: 191) of normative signifying practices. In 
Chapter Two I introduced Bergson’s notions of duration and language as a 
way to emphasise the temporal experiences of individuals in relation to 
their discursive subject positions. From this perspective, I argued that the 
qualitative differentiations of duration provide a potential reflexivity which 
exceeds the constraints of discursive intelligibility, but are nonetheless 
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denied efficacy as soon as consciousness reverts to the homogenous and 
externalised differentiations of language. In Chapter Three, I then explored 
the idea that socio-historic norms form individual bodies by constraining its 
tendency towards habitual actions. This sedimentation of gender exceeds 
the exclusionary logic of discourse precisely because it takes place 
through a dynamic of action rather than representation. In turn, I argued 
that the conscious representation of gender exceeds the discursive 
framework of intelligibility because it is drawn from individual processes of 
memory. 
As an attempt to refocus the possibilities of analysing performativity, 
all of these experiential excesses revolve around the idea that the 
temporal processes of action are central to the way a gendered 
performance or representation unfolds. The body’s different relational 
tensions produce varying complexities of repetition and identification 
because consciousness narrows or expands in relation to the 
indeterminacy of action. In order to provide a more diverse sense of how 
indeterminacy is reflexively experienced I have thus added to Bergson’s 
model of psycho-physical actions an image of emotion as an anticipatory 
motivational tendency. In particular, I have argued that emotions intensify 
relationality in response to subversion, and therefore complicate the 
resulting processes of identification. 
So far, my analysis of this understanding of performativity has been 
primarily concerned with negotiating the theoretical complexities involved 
in adapting Bergson and Butler’s respective frameworks to each other. As 
a result, I have yet to provide a direct account of the practical implications 
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of using Bergson as an alternative way to understand performativity. In 
this concluding chapter, then, I will draw out a more comprehensive 
explanation of what this model can reveal about the immediate processes 
of performativity and subversion. More specifically, having critiqued 
Butler’s view of the subject as a discursive position, I will contrast my 
psycho-physical understanding of performativity to Butler’s various 
theorisations of the psyche. Via these engagements, I will respond more 
concretely to the general political problems of gender regulation and the 
possibilities of transformation. 
In section one I will again respond to the way Butler theorises the 
past. I will focus on the relation between law and psychic repression which 
her work stipulates, arguing that this produces a generalised image of both 
which cannot account for the diverse ways in which gender norms can be 
repeated and subverted. In contrast, I will show how the model of different 
tensions of memory which Bergson offers enables a more dynamic view of 
how the social sedimentation of gender convention is psychically 
experienced.  
In section two I will expand upon the complexities of this model, 
using Bergson to develop an image of embodied gender recognition as an 
immediate responsive process. As a direct rejoinder to Butler, this section 
will address her use of Hegelian recognition to assert the inherent 
ambivalence of gendered self-knowledge. I will argue that subversion 
rarely produces radical experiences of such ambivalence because the 
body’s tension towards action rapidly appeals to complex processes of 
memory which restore coherence and abate instability. 
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Finally, in section three I will explore the way emotions guide 
responses to subversion, and influence memory in different ways. This 
analysis will reconsider Butler’s notion of melancholic gender investment 
and identification. I will offer an image of separation anxiety as an 
alternative way to think about melancholia, but also consider other states 
such as fear, anger, and the apperception of duration as alternative modes 
of gender investment.  
 
 
Memory and Law. 
 
Butler, in my view, rightly argues that ‘the assumption of “sex” is 
constrained from the start’ (1993: 12) by the productive power of laws, 
prohibitions and taboos. What is at stake in my critical re-working is the 
manner in which these laws produce and sustain their effects on an 
everyday basis. As I have argued, the normal lived experience of 
gendered acts is often performed habitually. This experience therefore 
approximates the regulatory borders of discourse through naturalised 
repetitions but is not, strictly speaking, motivated by the regulatory force of 
law. However, what I want to focus on in this section is the more direct 
psychic experience of gender by which individuals reflectively relate to its 
borders. Specifically, I will critique the narrow image by which Butler 
characterises the hegemonic psyche’s relation to gender law, and offer 
Bergson’s notion of memory as a useful alternative by which to understand 
the dynamics of its repetition. 
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The boundaries of what constitute legitimised sexed bodies and 
identities are, for Butler, produced by a set of injunctions and exclusions 
which she often generalises under the banner of law. It is important to 
recognise in this respect that ‘this “law” can only remain a law to the extent 
that it compels the differentiated citations and approximations called 
“feminine” and “masculine”’ (Butler 1993: 15). In other words, gender law 
‘consolidates the ruse of its own force’ (15) only by the sheer accumulation 
of its citations. It is ‘fortified and idealized as law only to the extent that it is 
reiterated as law’ (14).  
In this way, Butler asserts that gender hegemony gains its authority 
only by ‘citing the conventions of authority’ (13). In order for the normative 
ideals of masculinity and femininity to be legitimated as an essential truth 
of sexual difference, a signifying act simultaneously ‘draws on and covers 
over the constitutive conventions by which it is mobilized’ (227). On the 
one hand, convention provides the present moment of signification with a 
‘presumptive force’ (225). On the other hand, in order for a gender ideal to 
take on a ‘naturalized effect’ (10) a signifying event must dissimulate its 
status as part of a ‘citational legacy’ (225). 
This formulation is designed to show that law has no authority or 
lasting resilience outside of the repetitions which naturalise and conceal its 
constructions, and to locate a possibility of resistance within this instability. 
From Butler’s perspective of analysis, the repetition of law is ‘not 
performed by a subject’ (95) because the process of repetition is itself 
what ‘constitutes the temporal condition for the subject’ (95). A vital part of 
her project is thus the denial of any kind of intentionality which is assumed 
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to be autonomous from the effects of discourse. Nonetheless, the fragile 
relation between the presumptive force of law and the dissimulation of its 
construction facilitates the possibility of an ‘agency as a reiterative of 
rearticulatory practice’ (15). If gender norms simply fail to be repeated 
then, in principle, ‘gaps and fissures are opened up as the constitutive 
instabilities in such constructions’ (10). 
My concern here is not with the idea of an agency which is 
‘immanent to power’ (15), conceived as a failure to repeat rather than an 
autonomous act. Rather, what can be seen as problematic is that Butler’s 
insistence on conceiving individuals in terms of reiterative subject 
positions ignores the active psychic element involved in on-going 
processes of intelligibility. In this respect, what I will reconsider in this 
section is the way in which the past, as the authoritative ‘invocation of 
convention’ (225), enters into processes of repetition. For the main part, 
what Butler herself means by convention is the ‘binding power’ (225) 
which the sedimentation of the past confers on the present in order to 
produce the tacit acceptance and concealment of law as an essential truth 
of gender. However, my point is that experiencing something as 
conventional also requires an individual act of memory to ‘grasp the past 
in the present’ (Bergson 2005a: 90), and therefore to connect previous 
occasions of gender performance to the present moment of signification. 
Butler does gesture towards the psychic representation of the past, 
but her concern is not really to understand processes of memory as such. 
Rather, it is to affirm that the repetition of gender conceals its status as a 
historically produced and sedimented norm. In this context, the past is 
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conceived as ‘the accumulation and congealing’ (Butler 1993: 245) of 
reiterative practices but, perhaps even more so, as ‘domains of the 
repressed, forgotten, and the irrecoverably foreclosed’ (245). Because, in 
Butler’s analysis of discursive structures, ‘that which is refused 
construction [is] as crucial to its definition as that which is included’ (245), 
this centrality of the excluded is, in effect, translated into the central 
mechanism of memory. Thus, sedimentation is understood to be ‘a 
repetition of what cannot be recollected, of the […] haunting spectre of the 
subjects deconstitution’ (244), and ‘an “act” is always a provisional failure 
of memory’ (244) in the sense that it must conceal its construction. 
In this way, the psychological dimension of a citation is reduced to 
an entirely negative process which represents memory as a process that 
simply mirrors the exclusionary structures of discourse. Taking Butler’s 
logic to the extreme, it is as if an individual’s past consists of nothing but 
the sedimentation of an exclusionary act – one which must be continually 
repressed, and which continually haunts the present. What this obscures 
is not simply the fact that an individual’s experience, and therefore their 
reserve of memory, is much more diverse than such a structural 
understanding admits. More importantly, it omits a consideration of the 
functional dynamics of memory by which the past actively informs a 
present moment of gender representation. 
 As such, Butler does not acknowledge that the expectations of 
convention do not emerge in the same way when, for instance, they are 
conceived in relation to different kinds of memories. Indeed, Bergson’s 
work posits ‘we can discover thousands of […] integral yet diverse 
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repetitions’ (2005a: 241) of our past, each of which might reconstitute the 
expectations of convention in a different way. Memory needs 
reconsidering in relation to performativity, then, because the psychic 
representation of gender is never simply a verbatim repetition of 
discourse. It therefore suggests a fundamentally variable resource for 
experiencing the effects of law, and for enacting judgements of legitimacy 
on gendered acts. 
On this note, Alexandre Lefebvre has recently used Bergson’s 
notion of memory to produce a theory of judgement by which to analyse 
procedural law. While his perspective does not encompass Butler’s sense 
of discourse as productive of the subject, nor the dissimulation necessary 
to secure its naturalising effect, it is useful here in establishing relations 
between law and memory which Butler excludes.  
Lefebvre argues that ‘rules of law have a double existence’ (145). 
On the one hand, ‘they fill and are found in […] books, the corpus of legal 
rules’ (145).  On the other hand, these written rules of law are not simply 
mechanically applied to individual cases. Rather: 
 
for a rule of law to be embodied in a state of affairs […] something 
else must happen: an act of memory. Someone – whether a litigant, 
a lawyer, a judge, or someone else – must connect that raw event 
[of criminality] to law; only that can initiate the use of the actual, 
written texts (145). 
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Adapting this image of law to Butler’s framework we can say that 
the rules of gender can be found in actual laws such as, for example, 
those which denote the legality of marriage or of sexual acts. However, 
they also exist more diffusely in the general ‘domain of language and 
kinship’ (Butler 1993: 7) which set the boundaries of gendered life. This 
discursive domain does not only act as the ‘network of authorisation and 
punishment’ (225) from which judgements of legitimacy are made, but 
constitutes the very terms of intelligibility by which gender comes into 
being. There is therefore no ‘raw event’ (Lefebvre: 145) of gender which is 
subsequently interpreted by law, as is the case with Lefebvre’s model. 
Law, for Butler, is always already at work in the very possibility of social 
interaction, determining how we are ‘constituted as socially viable beings’ 
(2004: 2).  
Nonetheless, an act of memory is still necessary for the discursive 
domain of law to be represented in consciousness as a meaningful reality 
which persists in people’s lives. Meaning, in other words, is not simply 
embedded in the relational structures of signifying practices and social 
structures. It requires the present moment to sustain an on-going relation 
to processes of memory which actively contextualises gender 
performances with the rule that structures them as a signifying event.  
The important point here is that, in memory, ‘the past of law is 
virtual’ (Lefebvre: 144). Memory does not simply store discursive 
structures as discrete, ready-made conceptions, but preserves the whole 
of the past in an interpenetrating state. As I discussed in my previous 
chapter, this means that memory is capable of ‘distinct degrees of tension 
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or of vitality’ (Bergson 2005a: 170) in which the past is re-arranged and 
fragmented. 
By this logic, the ‘rules of law exist at various virtual tensions’ 
(Lefebvre: 159) and, from a psychological perspective, appear to be 
structured differently on each and every one of those virtual tensions. 
Moreover, the support a signifying event gains from the past is not simply 
that of remembering the law, but consists in a whole work of elaboration 
and contextualisation by which memory selectively associates the present 
act with different regions of past experience. Recognising the “law” that 
masculinity is only performed by male bodies and femininity is only 
performed by female bodies is, in this way, never simply a matter of 
repeating the discursive structures of that law. It involves an evocation of 
images which affirm those associations, but which also interpret law 
differently depending on the specific type of memories which are 
actualised. 
From this perspective the double existence of law refers, on the one 
hand, to the ‘reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that 
it regulates and constrains’ (Butler 1993: 2). This existence regulates the 
‘matrix of gender relations’ (7) on a socio-historic level because it 
constitutes the ‘enabling cultural condition’ (7) of socially shared 
processes of signification. On the other hand, the psychological act of 
conceiving this matrix can, in principle, draw the meaning of law from 
different virtual potentials. Law can, for instance, ‘take a more common 
form when memory shrinks most, more personal when it widens’ (Bergson 
2005a: 169), so that any specific repetition implicates the self in the 
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exclusionary norms of gender in different ways. In addition, because 
associations which are grouped ‘together on one plane may be separated 
or allocated to different regions on another’ (Al-Saji 2005: 225), the 
memory content by which the past supports the present may vary radically 
from one act of signification to the next. 
What Butler’s exclusive attention to the actual structures of 
discourse misses is precisely that there is no simple and uniform 
invocation of law and its conventions. Her conflation of memory with 
discourse implies that there is a single sedimented preservation that 
provides a continual source of psychic motivation for the repetition of law. 
Although this psychic sedimentation is unstable insofar as it also 
internalises ‘an abjected outside, which is, after all, “inside” the subject as 
its own founding repudiation’ (Butler 1993: 3), my point is that mental 
concepts of law are not sedimented at all. The important ordering 
principles of law – the conferred authority of convention and the structuring 
of an abject outside to discourse – are recreated anew with each 
signification.  
They are recreated, that is, at different tensions, and with different 
inflections of meaning, which redistribute both the psychic representation 
of acceptable gender borders and the authoritative force of convention 
which fortifies their presumptive truth. For example, the regulatory force of 
gender norms may appear less strict if a memory inflects the present 
moment of signification with specific images which exceed the norm in 
some way. In turn, the same result may occur if a memory of having being 
personally excluded inclines a hegemonic subject towards a sympathetic 
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identification with what Butler would otherwise call an abject subject 
position. However, a narrower plane of consciousness may only produce 
generalised images of normative gender performances which, pace Butler, 
will confer naturalising presumptions upon the present moment of 
signification. 
The point is, at any given tension both the meaning content and the 
normative authority of gender changes because the past inflects the 
present in different ways. It thus provides different resources for processes 
of interpretation and judgement. Part of my argument here, then, is that it 
is the variable dynamics of memory, as much as it is the ‘constitutive 
instabilities’ (Butler 1993: 10) of discourse itself, which means that gender 
law constitutes a ‘revisable criteria of intelligibility’ (14). The way 
convention subsists within a contemporary citation occurs differently 
according to the tension by which memory inflects its authority as 
meaningful, and, in this way, Bergson’s notion of memory ‘can account for 
both the conservative and the creative capacities of judgement’ (Lefebvre: 
142).35 
                                                 
35 I have previously discussed how Gaston Bachelard has criticised Bergson’s general 
concept of duration for conceiving consciousness in terms of continuity instead of 
dialectical opposition. However, it is worth re-framing this critique in the terms of memory 
at stake in this section. If, in this way, we centre the issue not on the nature of duration 
itself, but on how we ‘grasp the mind in its essential act of judgement’ (Bachelard: 33), a 
more precise view of some of the issues at stake in Bergson’s concept of memory can be 
grasped. 
First of all, there is the valid question of ‘whether Bergsonism has given [a] 
rightful place to psychological negativism, coercion, and inhibition’ (29) within processes 
of thought. In Bergson’s texts there is, in particular, little sense of how the psychological 
or social dynamics of coercion might be explained. Even in The Two Sources, where he 
describes regulatory structures, the submission to law is described primarily in terms of 
willing acquiescence. In this sense, then, Bachelard’s critique has its merits in drawing 
attention to violent and conflicting aspects of social and psychic life. 
Nonetheless, Bergson’s texts are not alien to the ideas of dis-continuity and the 
comparative nature of judgement. In the case of forming general ideas, for instance, 
‘dissociation is what we begin with’ (Bergson 2005a: 165), and this primary act of 
dissociation has an inhibitory effect of memory. In turn, Bachelard would surely approve 
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Action, Constraint and Repression: 
 
I will discuss the dynamics of these creative potentials and 
normative tendencies in my following sections, thinking them through as 
an immediate process of responsiveness. What I want to briefly elaborate 
on here is the way this model of the psyche offers a different 
understanding of how discourse constrains the self, and how processes of 
repression develop in contingent situations. 
For Bergson, ‘memory is a function of the future [which is] called up 
and actualized to help us act’ (Lefebvre: 153). We ‘remember only as 
much as we need to, as much as the situation demands’ (163), and it is 
ultimately the body’s relationality that ‘determines at which tension [laws] 
will be sought’ (159). Part of what this means is that the determination of a 
tension ‘has nothing to do with a selection made between options’ (161). It 
is a spontaneous response to the moment of action, and this suggests for 
                                                                                                                                     
of the contention that ‘an idea […] is the more distinct the better it is isolated and 
differentiated from all the others’ (Bergson 2007: 180). At any rate, while this is not the 
kind of negativism and inhibition Bachelard has in mind, the important point is that 
Bergson’s model of memory can have important things to say about the process of 
dialectical exchanges.  
If, along with Bachelard, we say that ‘all judgements […] are essentially negative 
judgements’ (32), and that ‘knowledge [is] essentially a polemic’ (32), we have described 
the ostensible characteristics of judgement. If, for instance, someone presents us with an 
idea we disagree with we are, of course, immediately caught in a polemical dialectic of 
negation and conflict. However, explaining ‘the power of conviction’ (32) in terms of the 
‘the negating powers of the mind’ (18) is not enough to explain the actual psychic 
processes involved in producing an argument. We still have to explain what prompted 
one negation rather than another, and how the details of specific arguments emerge into 
consciousness and change over the course of an argument. 
What Bergson’s model of memory provides in this respect is a basis for 
understanding how meaning is contingently produced throughout the course of a dialectic 
exchange. This is to say, his work implies that a negative judgement is, in the first place, 
dependent on the progresses of an internal selective process by which memory produces 
meaning. As I will discuss in my next section, this is important in relation to gender in 
order to show how negation and opposition develop in response to subversion, and is 
formed in different ways on different tensions of memory. 
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Lefebvre ‘a nonvoluntaristic concept of choice’ (161) and a ‘theory of 
judgement without decision’ (161). 
Lefebvre’s argument is not only that the potentiality of memory is 
radically situated and constrained by the immediate state of the body, but 
that there is no ‘externality’ (141) between the moment of action and the 
memory which sheds light on it. There is no externality, that is, which 
would freely allow an individual to ‘deliberate on which level [of memory] to 
call’ (Lefebvre: 141). Such radical deliberation would imply that they could 
transparently adjudicate on how the past informs the present from a 
neutral, self-determined stand point within that present, but this is not the 
case. The “choosing” self is always already deliberating from a specific 
tension of memory; one which already delimits the possibilities of 
conceiving gender law, and therefore of enacting judgements on the 
intelligibility of gender. Moreover, in the context of gendered social 
relations, memory is always in some sense responding involuntarily to 
pressures of action which are beyond control. 
From this perspective, the gender self emerges from conditions of 
responsiveness which can never be fully mastered, but a difference must 
be noted here in respect to Butler’s own image of non-voluntaristic 
intentionality. What Butler refers to is the repetition of ‘a discourse which 
precedes and enables [the] “I”’ (1993: 225), and therefore ‘forms in 
language the constituting trajectory of [an individual’s] will’ (225). Gender 
is, in this way, not voluntaristic within Butler’s framework because 
intentionality is confined in advance by socio-historical limits.  
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While I am not opposing this view of discursive constraint, what I 
am drawing from Lefebvre and Bergson is slightly different. The self does 
not choose its tensions of memory because, it could be said, the self is 
contingently re-created on each different tension. It is derived from 
associations between the past and present which are called upon and 
delimited by the contingent moment of action. My non-voluntary image of 
choice thus refers to limitations to the autonomy by which individuals can 
influence the spontaneous psycho-physical processes by which law is 
variably and contingently re-conceived, and through which self-identity is 
formed. 
Part of this limit is, of course, the actual structures of discourse. In 
order to facilitate communication, the mental concepts of law must be 
translated into shared structures of language, without which they would 
not be socially intelligible. Thus, while the virtual potential of memory can, 
in principle, radically reform an individual’s contingent image of gender, 
discursive practices still inhibit this potential on a social level. Indeed, 
during the movement of actualisation, the meaning of memories will tend 
to ‘receive powerful assistance […] from the word, which will […] furnish 
[the psychic] representation with a frame in which it can fit’ (Bergson 2002: 
55) and, as such, constrain the social efficacy of individual processes of 
memory. 
My formulation of gender law as psychically virtual, then, does not 
impose a libertarian view on Butler’s ideas of discursive regulation. It 
suggests that there are many more psychic states of hegemony and ways 
to interpret the borders of discourse than Butler accounts for, but it does 
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not contradict the idea that ‘agency [is] conditioned by those very regimes 
of discourse’ (Butler 1993: 15). The importance of this variable image of 
gender representation is, instead, to show how the efficacy of subversive 
repetition is dependent on influencing the psychic malleability of law in the 
right way, and in my following sections I will reflect on some of the different 
possible impacts subversion can have. My final remarks here will further 
prepare for these discussions by re-evaluating Butler’s rather 
monomorphic views on the dynamics of dissimulation and repression. 
In a present moment of signification, ‘certain situations call up not 
merely different recollections’ (Lefebvre: 162). They ‘precipitate us into 
different processes of memory altogether’ (162). In situations which tend 
to circulate the repetition of habits, the call to action ‘overwhelmingly 
solicits the lowest planes of memory’ (Lefebvre: 164). It therefore 
precipitates individuals into representations which naturally tend to 
conceal the regulatory structures of gender, but only because they are 
more or less unreflective repetitions of past behaviours. In contrast, when 
the body becomes less disposed towards an immediate action, particularly 
in response to a subversive repetition, the resulting indeterminacy means 
that the psychic representations of law become more unstable.  
As consciousness expands, an individual’s reflexive relation to 
gender regulation thus becomes less easy to conceal. Indeed, while this 
indeterminate responsiveness potentially enables their relation to gender 
convention to become fluid enough to effect re-signification, the 
spontaneous production of memory images may also cause conflicts of 
identification. For instance, I argued above that memory can lessen the 
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presumptive force of law by contextualising the present with images which 
exceed the norm. Nonetheless, I must also stress that the spontaneous 
leap into such denaturalising excesses may, in order to facilitate their 
translation into the distinct borders of discursive intelligibility, undergo 
concealment during the movement of their actualisation. In such cases, we 
are certainly faced with a psychic repression, but one derived from a 
contingent relation between the present moment of action and the specific 
tension of memory by which the past is re-arranged. 
In any act of conscious representation ‘knowledge […] is the effect 
of a sudden dissociation’ (Bergson 2007: 137). Consciousness 
spontaneously contracts and expands in response to the present moment 
and selects, ‘from the immensely vast field of our virtual knowledge, […] in 
order to make it into actual knowledge, everything which concerns our 
action upon things’ (137). This dissociation, therefore, implies that gender 
representation inherently involves psychic acts of repression in which 
whole regions of the past are inhibited from consciousness at any 
moment. However, this is not first and foremost the laboured repression of 
a ‘haunting spectre’ (Butler 1993: 244) that is sedimented in the 
unconscious but which constantly threatens to return and de-constitute the 
subject. While this kind of instability exists insofar as rigid gender identities 
struggle to conceal the instabilities of gender relationality, this struggle is 
not stored in the past, but produced in response to the present. 
My point is that different tensions of memory facilitate different acts 
of dissociation. They therefore produce different psychic relations to the 
exclusions and instabilities of discourse, only some of which function 
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through the kind of haunting repressions which Butler describes. For 
Butler, on the other hand, such repression forms the decisive 
characteristic of a psyche in which memory internalises an abject and 
excluded outside as its most basic function. 
As a working model for understanding the lived changes which a 
psyche undergoes in response to subversion, Butler’s perspective 
conveys only a generalised relation to law. It is a relation which is sharply 
polarised between a full scale repression and a dissolution of the psyche 
that occurs when the repressed is exposed. This perspective, then, not 
only loses sight of the far less extreme relations which most heterosexual 
subjects have to the transgression of gender law, it also makes it difficult 
to see how this kind of complex can develop into a productive response to 
subversion. The idea of ‘a thousand […] diverse repetitions’ (Bergson 
2005a: 241) of the past, on the other hand, enables an equally diverse 
image of psychic relations to law; one in which hegemonic subjects repeat 
gender norms in multiple ways, and have multiple possible responses to 
subversion.  
In conclusion, this model continues to say that ‘a contemporary 
“act” emerges in the context of a chain of binding conventions’ (Butler 
1993: 225). However, the way these binding conventions are ‘fortified and 
idealised as law’ (14) within the psychic representation of gender are 
contingent upon the variable dynamics of memory which actively enable 
the past to contextualise the present moment.  
Law, in this sense, is unstable not only because its ‘reiterative labor’ 
(10) must continually conceal the constitutive excesses which threaten its 
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coherence, and because this is ‘a repudiation whose consequences it 
cannot fully control’ (3). Its authoritative force is also permeable because, 
in memory, law has only a virtual existence. It thus carries the inherent 
possibility of recognising the conventions and judging the expectations of 
gender differently. In the following section I will apply Bergson’s psycho-
physical process of memory more directly to an analysis of the immediate 
process of recognition, and to the persistent stability of gender norms. In 
section three I will then turn to an analysis of less stable processes of 
identification and the disruptive effects of subversion. 
 
Embodied Recognition. 
 
 
 As a concept, performativity originally revolved around the idea that 
gender identity and recognition is a regulated ‘effect of discursive 
practices’ (Butler 2008: 24), and it is this aspect of Butler’s work which has 
been my primary object of analysis. In this section, however, I will discuss 
my critique in relation to the notion of Hegelian recognition which she 
increasingly turns to in her later work, and which asserts the ‘ontological 
primacy of relationality itself’ (2004: 150). Here, it is not only that ‘the terms 
which make up one’s own gender are, from the start, outside oneself’ (1), 
given by structures of discourse which historically pre-exist any individual. 
In addition, Butler articulates a decentred notion of the self which, equally, 
is ‘beyond itself from the start’ (150), but which points towards a ‘perennial 
and irresolvable aspect of human psychic life’ (147). 
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In this framework, ‘whatever consciousness is, whatever the self is, 
[it] will find itself only through a reflection of itself in another’ (147). This 
means for Butler that a vulnerable, dependent and ambivalent relation 
towards the other is a fundamental and on-going dynamic of 
consciousness. The self is ‘never […] free of the Other’ (148), and this 
relationality is constitutive of what Butler calls an ‘ek-static’ (14) self who is 
‘necessarily outside itself, not self-identical’ (148).  
This ek-static self, therefore, undermines the normative 
assumptions of subject positions, and the ‘conceit of autonomous self-
determination’ (149) which they enforce. Insofar as the other presents the 
‘possibility of both securing and undermining self-knowledge’ (148), this 
dynamic of recognition suggests a shifting polarity between ambiguity and 
the conceit of self-certainty. That is, the self’s relationality continually 
plunges identity into ambivalence, but this ambivalence can also be seen 
to drive violent relations to otherness which aim to ‘shore up what it knows 
[and to] expunge what threatens it with not-knowing’ (35). 
As I noted in Chapter One, my critical perspective on this stage of 
Butler’s work is not that her image of a decentred ontology lacks 
coherence or insight. Indeed, Butler’s polarity between the conceit of self-
determination and ambivalence ultimately emphasises the important 
ethical imperative of a social responsibility which ‘lives with its 
unknowingness about the Other’ (35). Nonetheless, if this polarity is 
considered purely in terms of the immediate responsiveness of a 
hegemonic subject, it can be seen to draw focus away from other 
dynamics of the self which are important within the processes of 
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performativity and subversion. That is, it excludes other factors which are 
involved in the dynamics of relationality, but which cannot be readily 
characterised in Butler’s terms of a self who ‘must pass through self-loss’ 
(147) in order to be itself. 
My concern in this section is that Butler does not attend to the 
manner in which recognition is ‘the concrete process by which we grasp 
the past in the present’ (Bergson 2005a: 90), and that such acts of 
recognition are embodied processes which bring familiarity to the present 
in order to aid action. Broadly speaking, my aim in incorporating this 
perspective into the dynamics of performativity is to explore the idea that 
gender relationality is not unstable in precisely the way Butler contends. 
More specifically, I will re-describe the immediate processes by which 
recognition unfolds as a movement from relatively stable gender repetition, 
into a process of unstable identifications, and back again to the normative 
conceits of identity. 
In my Bergsonian model, the process by which bodies are 
recognised as gendered can take place through an inattentive motor 
recognition, but also through an attentive recognition which develops 
through a more spontaneous and variable relation between the body and 
memory. As a re-examination of relationality, it thus discloses a set of 
processes which are different to the polarity of decentred ambivalence and 
illusory autonomy which characterises Butler’s model of recognition. It 
thereby provides an alternative way to explore the stability and instability 
of process of gender identification and investment. 
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The primary interaction between self and other suggested by 
Bergson’s framework unfolds in relation to action rather than the ideal of 
self-knowledge. The body’s tension towards action is, of course, involved 
in contingently producing meaning and self-knowledge insofar as it 
grounds processes of memory. However, my point is that the disruption of 
action does not necessarily result in a crisis of ambivalence. This is to say 
that while Butler argues that the self is haunted by its ek-static 
ambivalence – just as it is haunted by the constituent instabilities of 
discourse – I will examine the extent to which a subversive repetition can 
actually utilise this ambivalence effectively. In short, I will explore Butler’s 
aim to ‘disrupt what has become settled knowledge and knowable reality’ 
(Butler 2004: 27) in terms of psycho-physical responsiveness rather than 
the ek-static structure of self-knowledge. 
In my previous chapter I argued that living bodies are not 
autonomous entities because their contingent existence is constituted by 
the material movements which act upon it. A living body, in this sense, is 
not the self-contained origin of its own relation to the world. It ‘borrows its 
physical properties from the relations which it maintains with all others’ 
(Bergson 2005a: 24), and is therefore determined by a kind of decentred 
relationality of responsiveness. 
This suggests a different dynamic of relationality to Butler’s ‘ek-
static notion of the self’ (2004: 148) because it refers to the sensory-motor 
dynamics of the body rather than psychic processes of self-conscious 
awareness. Although we can say that the body is ontologically decentred, 
part of its nature is also to selectively discern its environment according to 
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its needs of action. Bodies ‘seize form their surroundings that which 
attracts them, that which interests them practically, […] simply because the 
rest of their surroundings takes no hold upon them’ (Bergson 2005a: 159, 
160). From an experiential perspective, they thus diminish the ‘decentering 
effects that […] relationality entails’ (Butler 2004: 151) by constraining the 
way the other emerges as an object in which the self can be reflected. 
As the body performs actions it adopts itself as a distinct centre of 
its relational environment and, through the formation of motor habits, 
develops naturalised attitudes towards the world which constrain its 
tendencies of recognition. In respect to gender, I want to argue that this 
means relationality is rarely experienced as ambivalent because, prior to 
the conscious representation of self and other, there is ‘an instantaneous 
recognition, of which the body is capable by itself’ (Bergson 2005a: 92). 
Within any given situation the initial contact we have with our environment 
is through our bodies; and insofar as motor recognition ‘goes straight to 
the resemblance’ (158) which can be found in the bodies of others, it 
brings stability to relationality. This selective discernment extracts points of 
similarity from a broader realm of difference and, in effect, ‘cares little for 
[the] individual differences’ (158) which may destabilise relationality.36 
                                                 
36 Bruno Latour describes a process of bodily discernment which depicts an ever 
increasing capacity to differentiate stimuli rather than a tendency to perceive only 
similarity, and in this sense runs in the opposite direction to Bergson’s framework. 
Nonetheless, there are compatible alignments in the way Latour understands the body 
which makes his work relatable to Bergson. What I want to draw out in these respects are 
the points where Latour’s perspective becomes applicable to the sensory-motor 
conception of gender recognition I have focussed on. 
 Using the example of becoming a “nose” – that is, someone in the perfume 
industry who is adept at distinguishing aromas – Latour presents an image of how the 
body can be ‘acquired’ (207) through ‘a progressive enterprise’ (207). In short, training to 
become a “nose” requires the use of an ‘odour kit’ (206) which is made up of ‘sharply 
distinct pure fragrances’ that are ‘arranged in such a way that one can go from sharpest 
to the smallest contrasts’ (206). Over the course of ‘a week-long session’ (206), the 
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Habit, of course, does have a fundamental relation to the external 
world insofar as is the stimulus of other bodies which both provoke its 
reactions and sustain its actions. In effect, this means that the stability of 
the self is dependent upon the body’s relational congruence with other 
bodies. Indeed, as a basis of normative repetition, the instability of habit 
lies precisely in its reliance on other bodies mutually accommodating and 
circulating its expectations. We might still agree, then, that the self is 
‘ambiguously installed outside itself’ (Butler 2004: 150). 
                                                                                                                                     
trainees learn to become increasingly sensitive to the contrasts between these 
fragrances. In effect, the session has ‘taught them to be affected’ (207; my italics), so that 
their bodies come to inhabit a ‘richly differentiated’ (207) world where, before, there was 
only uniformity. Indeed, during the course of the training process, a “nose” becomes 
‘someone able to discriminate more and more subtle differences and [to be able] tell them 
apart from one another, even when they are masked by or mixed with others’ (207). 
The important point for my concerns is the insight Latour provides into the body’s 
capacity to register the world in new ways; and therefore the potential to develop an 
increased sensitivity to gendered stimuli. In contrast to Bergson’s understanding of motor 
recognition – which discovers similarity through a suppression of difference – we must 
also acknowledge the ability to endlessly refine our bodily experience of the world and 
our capacity to be influenced by and recognise stimuli in more and more subtle and 
differentiated ways. In other words, while the ‘utilitarian origin of our perception’ (Bergson 
2005a: 158) tends to favour uniformity and resemblance insofar as familiarity facilitates 
economical modes of action, this is not the body’s only potential of recognition.  
While a depiction of sedimented tendencies of the body and sociality needs to be 
a fundamental part of an embodied account of performativity in order to account for the 
dynamics of regulation, it must ultimately also include the potential for the body to expand 
beyond regulatory tendencies. Latour’s framework, then, is one possible way this may be 
achieved. With this in mind, it can be said that what makes Latour’s model relatable to 
Bergson’s is the association of learning to become affected with an articulation of the 
world in terms of new attitudes and acts.  
Bergson’s habit ‘goes straight to the resemblance [and] cares little for individual 
differences’ (158). As such, it produces the same action in response to relatively diverse 
stimuli. Similarly, before the training session ‘different odours elicited the same behaviour’ 
(Latour: 210). The subjects were thus inarticulate in the sense that individual differences 
were not recognised, and therefore ‘produced the same general undifferentiated effect’ 
(207). Singular aromas were experienced by the trainees ‘without making them act, […] 
rendering them attentive [or] arousing them in precise ways’ (207). After the session, 
however, ‘it is not in vain that odours are different’ (207): ‘the odours […] make the 
trainees do something different every time – instead of eliciting always the same crude 
behaviour’ (207). 
Equally, then, my point is that the capacity to articulate the body’s relation to the 
world in terms of increasingly differentiated recognitions and responses might potentially 
be incorporated into the embodied dynamics of gender. What would need to be examined 
in this respect is the way ‘hitherto unregistrable differences’ (209) become part of the 
body’s naturalised tendencies of recognition. This, in effect, would recuperate diversity 
into familiarity – but not in order to homogenise that difference. Rather, the body’s 
processes of selective discernment would be proliferated to include a broader range of 
gendered stimuli and actions. 
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Nonetheless, my point is that there is no ambivalent otherness in 
the moment of habitual performance. The decentring effects of this 
relational dependency are withheld from experience so long as the 
process of recognition is immediately transformed into an action, and 
therefore remains inattentive.  
This tendency of perception to selectively discern and isolate only 
aspects of established familiarity also transfers to the conscious 
representation of the gendered self and other. By Bergson’s account, ‘the 
characteristic phenomena of intellectual recognition are first prepared and 
then determined [by the body]’ (2005a: 116). In my context, this means 
that when we actively interpret our relation to a gendered other the 
potential ambivalence and psychic uncertainty of this interaction is 
radically diminished so long as the body maintains a stable relation 
towards its potential actions. 
Once we have taken up a bodily disposition ‘we jump at once into a 
certain class of abstract ideas’ (Bergson 2007: 167), to a certain plane of 
consciousness, and construct meaningful images according to the 
‘intellectual tone’ (167) of this plane. While Bergson’s point here 
emphasises the possibility of transparent communication, my own 
reinterpretation suggests a tendency to appropriate the excesses and 
contradictions presented by otherness into the mental concepts enabled 
by that plane of consciousness. In effect, the reflection of the self, by 
which ‘the Other […] secures that self’s existence’ (Butler 2004: 149), will 
be biased towards a specific way of making the other reflect the self.  
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This can, of course, be understood as another way of explaining the 
conceit of self-identity. However, insofar as it is precisely an alternative 
way of characterising the appropriation of the other, it conveys different 
aspects of how psychic processes unfold. In Bergson’s model, processes 
of consciousness are not predicated on a primary desire to know the self 
as such. Rather, we ‘aim at knowing [to find out] what kind of action, step 
or attitude [an object] should suggest to us’ (Bergson 2002: 177). Memory 
aids the process of recognition by offering associative images which 
constitute the conceptual content of consciousness and, in principle, this 
operation allows into consciousness ‘just enough idea […] to be able to 
lend useful aid to the present action’ (Bergson 2005a: 163). Knowledge of 
self and other, therefore, overcomes the instabilities inherent in 
relationality insofar as the projected ideas make sense of our possible 
actions.  
As I suggested in my previous section, memory-images will tend to 
converge upon the ready-made structures of language. The containment 
of ambivalence will, in this way, also ‘receive powerful assistance’ 
(Bergson 2002: 55) from the constituting effects of discourse. However, 
the point I want to emphasise is that the appropriation of the other into 
constrained and normative acts of recognition is supported primarily by the 
translation of mental images into a coherent action. 
As a rethinking of the way self-knowledge changes in response to 
immediate social interactions, this perspective focusses on the active 
production and use of meaning rather than the impossibility of knowing 
which concerns Butler. These psycho-physical processes – by which 
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memory projects images into an object of recognition – cannot suitably be 
characterised by a decentred, dialectical movement in which self-
knowledge is ‘divided and spanned’ (Butler 2004: 148) by its ‘enthralment 
with the Other’ (149). Rather, it premises a ‘centrifugal’ (Bergson 2005a: 
130) movement in which memory flows towards the object of recognition, 
and attempts to synthesise the past with the present. As a unilateral 
process, the flow of memory itself is thus never lost in ‘the external status 
of [its] reflection’ (Butler 2004: 147). It is simply drawn towards 
consciousness or inhibited. 
Nonetheless, insofar as it is the object of action which calls upon or 
inhibits memory, the stability and instability of gender representation is still 
vulnerable to the relational responsiveness of the other. The difference 
between my model and Butler’s is, in this respect, the degree which 
instability leads to ambivalence, and the specific way meaning changes in 
response to subversion.  
As I have discussed in my previous chapters, all ‘action is an 
encroachment on the future’ (Bergson 2007: 5), and it is the experience of 
the future which determines both an individual’s experiential sense of 
instability and the efficacy of memory to enable the stable production of 
meaning. Part of what it means to recognise or to be familiar with 
something is to ‘sketch out the movements which adapt themselves to it’ 
(Bergson 2005a: 93, 94), and therefore to project an expectation into the 
future. Conversely, part of what it means to be unfamiliar with an 
environment is that ‘there is nothing in one [body] attitude that foretells of 
future attitudes’ (93). In this sense, the body not only prepares the content 
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of consciousness but, as its expectations lean over into the future, it also 
grounds a primary mode of investing in the immediate dynamics of 
sociality. 
In the lived experience of habit, the conscious feeling of nascent 
movements provides a sense of continuity and consonance between the 
present moment and the immediate future. It thereby enables a sense of 
‘individual and social well-being’ (Bergson 1935: 39). This perspective has 
implications for understanding how subversive repetitions affect both the 
conscious representation of gender norms and the relationality between 
self and other. This is because, thought of in terms of a hegemonic 
subject’s immediate responsiveness, subversion disrupts the comfortable 
expectations of action as much as it does the coherence of discursive 
structures. In particular, this is to say that the instability of gendered 
relationality is initially – that is, prior to conscious representation of 
subversion – experienced as uncertainty in respect to the moment of 
action. 
The importance of this is that the psychic process of identification 
becomes, and remains, unstable insofar as nascent actions cannot be 
resolved into an accomplished act. While memory responds to this 
indeterminacy of the immediate future by evoking different regions of the 
past, and thereby changing the way self and other are represented, its 
underlying aim is to foretell possible actions. In Butler’s terms, on the other 
hand, the efficacy of subversion is premised only on disrupting the ideal of 
self-knowledge.  
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The binary norms of sexual difference provide an ‘epistemological 
and ontological anchor’ (Butler 2004: 35) for the relational dynamics of 
recognition in Butler’s model. This means, for her, that when the 
intelligibility of this anchor is subverted it enables ‘moments of productive 
undecidability’ (142). It thus forces ‘the norms of “sex” into a potentially 
productive crisis’ (Butler 1993: 10). However, given the primacy of action 
in constituting the associative content of meaning and the investment in 
gender, my aim is to reconsider the efficacy of subversion to enable such 
responses. 
 
Attentive Recognition as an Appropriation of Subversion: 
 
In the following section I will focus on how productive the effects of 
subversion may or may not actually be when a hegemonic subject’s 
responsiveness is thought of in terms of emotions, such as anger or 
anxiety, which affect the way meaning is produced differently. What I want 
to concentrate on here is the way memory restores the loss of coherence 
by leaping into a succession of different tensions, by which it pre-empts 
the crisis of identification which subversion aims for. This is possible 
because ‘memory, capable, by reason of its elasticity, of expanding more 
and more, reflects upon the object a growing number of suggested 
images’ (Bergson 2005a: 104, 105) until the gender norm can be re-
affirmed. The elasticity of memory thus allows hegemonic identifications to 
quickly adapt to the disruption of ‘settled knowledge and knowable reality’ 
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(Butler 2004: 27) simply by forming a more complex mental representation 
of gender. 
What, perhaps, makes this re-appropriation a complex and 
unpredictable process is the continued influence of the subversion on the 
potential for action. Insofar as the relational dynamics of the body work in 
conjunction with memory, the successful actualisation of any new concept 
is dependent on the ability of its meanings to enable action. It is not only 
that memory aids action by presenting possibilities of recognition, but that 
‘memories, as they become actual, […] tend to urge the body towards 
action’ (Bergson 2005a: 130; my italics). In my context here, then, this 
means that a psychic representation can only appropriate subversions 
when the virtual actions it prompts can be translated into familiarised 
social expectations. Insofar as memory does not restore the experience of 
continuity between present and immediate future, the attempt to actualise 
a stable image of gender remains on-going. 
If, in this way, the immediate psychic response to subversion fails to 
bring forward a suitable association then, I want to argue, something like 
Bergson’s notion of attentive recognition takes place. In general, what I 
mean here is simply that when action remains indeterminate the process 
of interpreting gender is forced to become more self-reflective and 
deliberative, and thus more susceptible to ‘the decentering effects that […] 
relationality entails’ (Butler 2004: 151). That said, what is more directly at 
stake is the way this deliberation is constrained within a specific dynamic 
of psycho-physical relationality. The emphasis I want to draw out in this 
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respect is the analogy that ‘attentive recognition is a kind of circuit’ 
(Bergson 2005a: 116). 
A ‘reflective perception’ (104), Bergson writes, ‘is a circuit, in which 
all the elements, including the perceived object itself, hold each other in a 
state of mutual tension’ (104). In other words, the object is held in tension 
by the body’s nascent actions, which allows memory to be focused in a 
determined direction. This, in turn, means that the interpretive processes 
of memory are also held in tension with the object of recognition. Thus, 
reflection is ‘effected by a series of attempts at synthesis’ (102) by which 
memory launches ‘various analogous images’ (102) towards the object. 
However, because each of the elements is in a circuit of mutual tension, 
changes in one dimension affect the system as a whole. 
What I first want to convey through this mutual tension is a specific 
manner by which the social conditions in which a psychic response takes 
place exercise a measure of influence on its final outcome. Because the 
actualisation of memory is held in tension by the scene of subversion, its 
re-interpretive potential cannot freely appropriate the object of recognition. 
Its meanings must be foreshadowed in a potential act which may, in turn, 
be inhibited by the on-going dynamics of relationality.  
Although, as a phase in undermining the movement of 
actualisation, we might conceive this inhibition in terms of ambivalence 
and ‘unknowingness about the Other’ (Butler 2004: 35), two issues 
prevent this mutual tension from being properly analysed as ek-static 
relationality. Firstly, the other does not constitute a wholly ek-static 
influence because, in the psycho-physical process of recognition, 
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‘dissociation is what we begin with’ (Bergson 2005a: 165). Attentive 
recognition is therefore always enacting some kind of selective process of 
exclusion and discernment upon the other. Secondly, although the 
influence of the other can disrupt the meanings produced by attentive 
recognition, memory nonetheless continues to abate the effects of 
ambivalence by projecting virtual images of knowledge into the object of 
recognition.  
If we take a specific example of gender undecidability, in which it 
‘becomes difficult to say whether the sexuality of a transgendered person 
is homosexual or heterosexual’ (Butler 2004: 142), then it can be argued 
that such ambiguity fundamentally subverts the hegemonic categories of 
gender. A normative response to this undecidability might simply be to 
declare transgendered sexuality homosexual, where homosexuality is a 
punitive slur which carries the weight of illegitimacy. In such cases, the 
dismissive attitude towards subversion is enabled by a narrow circuit of 
attention in which gender norms are re-asserted through a generalised 
resemblance between the present moment and conventional expectations. 
The other is thus familiarised through a simple representation of law which 
overcomes the instabilities of relationality by asserting the illegitimacy of 
the subversion. Coherent action is restored insofar as this interpretive 
meaning can be projected into the object of recognition. 
However, if the social situation disenables such a resolution, 
indeterminacy persists. For instance, if the situation of subversion 
demands a more justifiable response, through argumentation for instance, 
then the psycho-physical state of gender representation cannot remain 
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stable. Indeed, the very participation of an active antagonist, who resists 
the appropriative meanings of a response, denies the circuit of attention a 
stable object of recognition. Attention thus passes into ‘states of higher 
concentration’ (Bergson 2005a: 104), and these higher states create ‘so 
many new circuits which envelop the first and have nothing in common 
between them but the perceived object’ (104).  
This is to say that each circuit constitutes new conceptual 
representations of the subversion which memory ‘launches in the direction 
of the new perception’ (102). In each circuit different aspects of the 
present situation are either discerned or diminished, and so each 
broaches the imposed incoherence of gender through a different set of 
associations and familiarities. Each presents a different possibility for 
acting within the on-going relational situation because they are drawn from 
different arrangements of the past, and respond to different aspects of the 
subversion. Ultimately, then, these different formations of memory work to 
adapt new categorisations of law which attempt to eradicate undecidability 
and incoherence, whether by forming the basis for a complex argument or 
simply self-evident justification. However, while they begin to enable 
hegemonic subjects to re-affirm a knowable reality, they still do not 
necessarily have the effect of entirely assimilating subversions.  
In some circuits, memory may produce images which are more or 
less identical to the present situation, simply allowing ‘other details that are 
already known […] to project themselves’ (101). In the example above 
these details might include selective recollections of the way transgender 
has been previously represented, or of the way normative sexuality is 
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usually regulated. Such images may function to prevent ‘unknowingness’ 
(Butler 2004: 39) from developing into a radical experience of 
ambivalence, but do not necessarily reconstruct the categorisations of law 
in a way which forecloses upon the undecidability. 
Alternatively, other circuits may produce associations with the 
original moment that are, in Bergson’s words, ‘only more or less distantly 
akin it’ (103). Perhaps a loose association is invoked between transgender 
and debates concerning gay marriage which, in turn, categorises 
transgender through complex arguments revolving round the legitimacy of 
gender. Perhaps a specific memory of an individual’s gendered past is 
recalled, and thereby enables an affirmation of their heterosexuality that 
simply displaces the effects of undecidability and renders the imposition of 
the subversion null. In such cases, the recognition draws into it a greater 
complexity and variability of context, but is therefore perhaps less likely to 
form the basis of a coherent rationale that can withstand scrutiny from a 
resistant polemic. 
At any rate, when an appropriative image cannot immediately be 
found recognition becomes, in Andrew Papanicolaou’s words, ‘a sort of 
evolving template’ (114). While gender identification ‘simplifies or 
complicates itself according to the level on which [memory] chooses to go 
to work’ (Bergson 2005a: 105), the important point is that a countless 
number of such levels may suggest themselves to consciousness. The 
psychic response to subversion thus keeps on evolving, its images 
remaining to a large extent virtual, until some combination of those images 
can be transformed into a resolute action.  
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Part of what I want to emphasise in this respect is, over and above 
any radical experience of incoherence, the inevitability of memory 
producing meaning. Indeed, my point is that the gendered self only 
becomes truly unstable during the specific circumstances of anxiety which 
I will discuss in my next section. More commonly, I would suggest that 
hegemonic identity and recognition only becomes unstable in the sense 
that it necessitates an on-going struggle to sufficiently categorise an 
indeterminate realm of subversion.  
When associations produce complex virtual identifications, but are 
confounded by the disruptive influence of relationality, this is not because 
the self undergoes an internal crisis. The virtual images are not 
‘nonthematisable’ (Butler 1993: 39) in the sense that they threaten the self 
with dissolution, and the psyche does not necessarily undergo a struggle 
to repress them. They remain virtual simply because they fail to 
circumvent the constraints of action and representation conditioned by the 
object of recognition. In other words, within the process by which memory 
is drawn towards an object of recognition there is a continuous 
transformation of nebulous images into nascent motor actions, and finally 
into a real movement. Memory must pass through this inhibitory route in 
order to verify the efficacy of its meanings because, in general, only those 
images which are capable of preparing an actual movement can be 
actualised. 
Aside from the idea that this relational tension with the object of 
action forms a relatively indifferent act of repression, a further vital detail 
must be clarified here. It is not just the virtual images which evolve, but the 
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nascent actions which discern different aspects of the object and, finally, 
the actual relational tension which inhibits or facilitates the actualisation of 
memory.  
As the circuit of attention develops, memory and its projected motor 
actions, as it were, ‘careen the one behind the other’ (Bergson 2005a: 
103), testing each other for their compatibility until a befitting image can be 
found. During the evolution of this reciprocal process each makes 
concessions to the other, so that a compromise is inevitably achieved. In 
effect, this process works to form a body attitude which, eventually, will 
facilitate a mental image capable of developing into an action. Therefore, 
as a result of the on-going interaction between the different elements of 
the circuit, the original relational resistance to actualisation is gradually 
reformed.  
To put this a different way: as the circuit of attention ranges 
between different tensions of memory, and returns to the object, ‘the 
original draft of the “object” is modified’ (Papanicolaou: 114). Having been 
modified, the object of recognition is then able to ‘accommodate other 
memories that are congruent with its modified version’ (114) but were not 
congruent with the original perception. In this way, the resistant object of 
subversion gradually yields to the appropriation of memory because the 
act of discerning it as a realm of potential action is transformed. The 
psycho-physical response transfers the issue of subversion into a more 
intelligible problem, whereby it becomes easier to restore familiarity.  
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SEEKING as an appropriative response to subversion: 
 
In closing, before I move onto an analysis of more complex 
responses to subversion I want to suggest one way in which the circuits of 
meaning can appropriate the object of recognition even more readily. I 
have argued that a large part of the investment in gender norms is based 
on the expectations of a familiar environment in which to act, and it is this 
drive to re-familiarise action which characterises my above analysis of 
subversion. However I want to briefly add a further source of investment 
which, in response to subversion, can develop during the spontaneous 
production of gendered meaning I have just described. This investment is 
derived from the SEEKING system of emotion which I introduced in 
Chapter Three.  
As I explained, this emotion is a motivational invigorator that 
‘contributes to many distinct aspects of our active engagement with the 
world’ (Panksepp 1998: 145), and in my following section I will reflect upon 
its general influence in everyday social interactions. In the context of 
ineffective subversions at stake here, I want to invoke its more specific 
involvement in ‘the impulse […] to extract meaning from our various 
circumstances’ (145). My primary point, then, is that because it plays a 
part in the search for meaning this emotion can be spontaneously invoked 
by the tensions and processes involved in responding to subversion. 
As an excitatory impulse, SEEKING produces experiential 
characteristics unlike those described above. Firstly, it engenders a form 
of anticipation which should be differentiated from that which is provided 
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by habit. It is not an expectation of familiarity, and of a comfortable sense 
of coherence between the present and the prefigured future which, in turn, 
forms a ‘pleasure of well-being’ (Bergson 1935: 39). Rather, the ‘pleasant 
energy’ (Panksepp 1998: 15) of SEEKING is a kind of stimulated wanting 
affect which anticipates by its nature as a feeling state. That is, rather than 
being the expectancy of a past familiarity, the feeling is sustained by, and 
sustains, an on-going urge towards an indeterminate future which holds 
the expectancy of a promise yet to come.  
In this way, once the indeterminacy of action and intelligibility has 
initiated the SEEKING system, the processes of memory are motivated by 
a positive expectancy of discovering an apt meaning by which to respond 
to subversion. Secondly, then, insofar as the SEEKING system, to put this 
in Panksepp’s words, ‘drives and energises the search for higher meaning’ 
(145), then the psycho-physical dynamics of the circuit of attention 
changes.  
On the one hand, the relational other is, to some degree, deprived 
of its influence as a disruptive force which interrupts the moment of 
actualisation. This is because the motor attitude of SEEKING, as it were, 
liberates the tension towards action from the need for familiarity. On the 
other hand, because the processes of memory are energised by pleasant 
expectancies, the rationalisation and categorisation of gender becomes a 
source of exhilarated enjoyment rather than a means to resolve 
indeterminacy and ambivalence. 
When ‘memories, as they become actual, […] tend to urge the body 
towards action’ (Bergson 2005a: 130), the motivational force of the 
288 
 
emotion supports and facilitates the process of actualisation more readily 
than the motor projections of habit. Insofar as the invigorated feelings of 
SEEKING orientate the self within its moment of action, there is less need 
for the circuit of attention to be translated into familiarised social 
expectations. The virtual actions suggested by memory are thus less 
prone to be disrupted by the actions of other bodies because SEEKING 
does not need to accommodate their relational tensions in the way motor 
recognition does. The body allows greater caprice to the processes of 
memory because it is less concerned with holding a specific object in 
attention than it is energising an attitude of exploration and stimulating a 
more autogenetic search for meaning. 
Moreover, the pleasant energy of SEEKING not only provides a 
motivation for knowing gender, but is its own self-stimulating rationale for 
the validity of such knowledge. It provides an energised sense of self-
assurance for the ideal of self-determination and the projective process of 
assimilating difference. Indeed, the invigorated expectations of this 
emotion ‘may be a major source of “conformational bias”, the tendency to 
selectively seek evidence for our hypotheses’ (Panksepp 1998: 145). They 
provide a certain pre-emptive investment in the contingent associations 
and discernments of memory which affirms their cogency.  
In conclusion, my underlining point in this section is that Butler’s 
more recent images of the self and consciousness do not supply the 
necessary framework to examine the dimensions of subversion which are 
posited in her earlier work. The idea that ‘the self invariably loses itself in 
the Other’ (Butler 2004: 149) conveys a sense that there can be no stable 
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point of reference for self-determination. However, in simply asserting the 
fundamental instability of the self, Butler demonstrates only a 
monochromatic spectrum of psychic life which is polarised between the 
conceit of autonomy and ambivalence. It therefore does not demonstrate 
how the passages from one to the other involve differentiable processes 
which vary the force of relationality and the development of self-
knowledge. 
I have argued that a more pertinent object of analysis are the 
psycho-physical actions by which memory, in response to subversion, 
produces the conceptual content of consciousness and restores the 
coherence of action. This provides a more diverse way to diagnose how, 
through ‘a series of attempts at synthesis’ (Bergson 2005a: 102), memory 
may first fail but ultimately succeeds to appropriate subversions through 
spontaneous gender representations. What remains to be analysed in 
respect to subversion is a more differentiated and intensive view of how 
relationality unfolds, and which can provide greater insight into the 
potential for transformative responses. 
 
The Emotional Dynamics of Responding to Subversion. 
 
 
Broadly speaking, my formulation of subversion is underlined by the 
idea that gender investment is contingent upon the way the future is 
anticipated, and particularly the way the indeterminacy of action is 
experienced emotionally. In relation to this principle, this section will re-
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introduce Panksepp’s emotions of FEAR, RAGE, and PANIC which I 
outlined in Chapter Three, and the formulation of Bergson’s concept of 
aspiration as an experiential openness towards the future which I 
developed in Chapter Two. This will allow me to reflect upon a range of 
potential responses by which hegemonic subjects relate to the instabilities 
of gender norms, and in which subversion has a more disruptive impact 
than the one I conveyed in my previous section.  
As a practical intervention in Butler’s work, part of my point is that 
the experiential context of subversion is vital to its transformative potential. 
As I discussed in my previous sections, Butler designates only very narrow 
parameters to the psychic life of gendered subjects. Her specific 
contentions are that exposing the conceits of gender relationality plunges 
the self into ambivalence, and that hegemonic identification inherently 
‘creates the valence of “abjection” […] as a threatening spectre’ (Butler 
1993: 3). She thus leaves little room to consider how the impact of 
subversion can provoke various types of psychic response, each of which 
contextualises it differently by virtue of the reflexive experience it 
produces.  
In the context of this section, what is particularly at stake in this 
respect is Butler’s psychoanalytic theory of gender melancholy. This 
perspective makes the claim that ‘rigid gender boundaries invariably work 
to conceal the loss of an original [homosexual] love that, unacknowledged, 
fails to be resolved’ (Butler 2008: 86). It thus places the dynamics of 
repudiation and abjection within an inaugural moment that originates an 
individual’s fundamental investment in gender. The gendered ego is 
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thought to be nothing other than ‘the precipitate of abandoned object-
relations’ (Butler 2004: 146) which preserves repudiated identifications as 
a source of unconscious motivation. The nature of identification, as an on-
going psychic process, becomes such that the only possible experience of 
an effective subversion is an uninhabitable identification which exposes 
unresolved relations to lost objects. 
My Bergsonian model suggests that hegemonic investments in 
norms are not sedimented in the psyche. Rather, the psychic 
representation of gender always occurs on contingent planes of 
consciousness, which reform the past in response to the present moment 
and therefore recreate an individual’s relation to law and otherness. This 
means that the psychic economy of abjection and repression does not 
follow strictly from the actual structures of law, but is created anew with 
each different tension of memory.  
Different planes of consciousness involve a greater or lesser 
complexity in the movement from nebulous images into the actualisation of 
distinct representations. Each plane, therefore, requires and develops 
through different types of psychic repression, some of which may haunt 
the self internally in response to subversion but many of which do not. 
Indeed, what I will explore below is how a model of gender investment 
based on contingent emotional responses can maintain images of 
melancholy and ambivalence which echo Butler’s models, while 
demonstrating other possibilities which produce very different psychic 
economies. 
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Freeing the psychic identification with gender from Butler’s model of 
unconscious investment means that the disruptive potential of subversion 
can be considered in relation to a more variable range of responses, which 
allow a greater or lesser efficacy of its de-naturalising effects. As with my 
analysis in section two, the basic psychic response to the disruption of 
habit is for memory to form a circuit with the object of subversion, and to 
launch a series of images towards it that help to ‘understand the present 
and anticipate the future’ (Bergson 2007: 141). However, insofar as 
emotional states of responsiveness cause the indeterminacy of action to 
be experienced through different types of intensive anticipation, the impact 
of subversion may orientate the dynamics of memory in different ways. 
Like habit, emotions lean into the future and project nascent 
actions. However, as sensory-motor body attitudes, they are not a set of 
organised actions which cohere to a definite object domain. Rather, they 
are generalised motor tensions which guide spontaneous action. Each 
emotion produces a stereotyped tension towards action, but nonetheless 
involves ‘an invitation to act, with at the same time leave to wait and even 
do nothing’ (Bergson 2005a: 17, 18). This means that consciousness of 
the emotional tension expands during the moment of indeterminacy, 
allowing greater spontaneity of response. It also means that the emotional 
state intensifies with sustained indeterminacy. 
Thought of from a more phenomenological perspective, each 
emotion constitutes a temporal reflexivity which dwells on the past and 
anticipates the future through a feeling. The urgency of feeling thus affects 
the circuit of memory by inflecting the object of indeterminate action with 
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an intensive importance which, in turn, facilitates different kinds of 
associations. That is, it creates an object of attraction for memory which is 
different to the discernments of projected habits or imitative movements. 
This, then, can have diverse effects on both the virtual regions of the past 
which are called upon and the moments of inhibition which allow their 
actualisation. At any rate, whatever the manner in which emotion 
complicates the relational dynamics of attention, it heightens the intensity 
by which the indeterminacy of action calls upon memory to produce 
gender representations. 
Each emotion which I will discuss responds to different ways in 
which the temporality of action is disrupted and, depending on the specific 
circumstances, forms different responsive relations to the norm. For 
instance, my most central aim will be to demonstrate that PANIC causes a 
leap into radically different tensions of memory than RAGE. While the 
former can produce melancholic identifications and repressions, the latter 
enacts a highly volatile and unproductive economy of abjection. 
Ultimately, this suggests a need to consider the experiential context 
and effect of subversion as part of its transformative strategy. Rather than 
simply negating or exposing the conceits of gender on the level of 
discursive intelligibility, subversion should take into account how the 
recipient’s emotional tension towards action will facilitate more or less 
efficacious responses. With this in mind, I will conclude the section by 
returning to the idea that ambivalence is not the only means of 
transforming an individual’s relation to gender norms, and that subversion 
may have more expansive effects if it is able to produce aspiration. 
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Emotions of Anticipatory Regulation: 
 
I want to begin with a re-consideration of the ‘tacit, collective 
agreement to perform […] discrete and polar genders’ (Butler 2008: 190). 
The first point I will make regards the manner by which the emotion of 
FEAR, as a ‘generalised apprehensive tension’ (Panksepp 1998: 212), is 
involved in concealing the inconsistencies of gender norms. I will then 
examine the SEEKING emotion as a source of investment in the general 
realm of social interaction which is enabled by gender norms. Ultimately, 
my point is that neither of these states involve complex melancholic 
identifications, but are nonetheless prevalent dynamics in the preservation 
of gender hierarchy. They should therefore be considered in thinking 
through the transformative potential of subversion. 
As a collective agreement, part of the idea of performativity is that 
gender norms are repeated because of ‘the punishments that attend not 
agreeing to believe in them’ (Butler 2008: 190). The fear of such 
punishment must, in this sense, play some part in maintaining gender 
norms; specifically, by motivating and sustaining the complicity of 
hegemonic subjects. What I want to particularly draw out in this respect is 
a brief image of how fear may sometimes sustain an unspoken 
acceptance of gender hierarchy even when individuals recognise the 
illegitimacy of such structures.  
In relation to the de-naturalising effects of subversion, for instance, 
we might consider a situation in which a subversive repetition does indeed 
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compel an individual to re-think gender norms, but in which others respond 
to the same subversion with reactive attitudes. If such is the case, then the 
regulatory force of such attitudes may be turned towards the individual 
who receives the subversion productively, opening up that individual to 
punitive devices such as ridicule or ostracism. 
What I am pointing towards here is the way an anticipatory fear of 
such consequences motivates reluctance to openly question gender 
prejudices. Simply put, the ‘anticipatory anxiety’ (Panksepp 1998: 212) 
involved in experiencing apprehension ‘beckons one to escape situations 
that intensify the anxiety’ (212). Indeed, as the feeling state of fear 
intensifies it invokes an ‘increasingly precipitous flight response’ (213), so 
that the impulse towards complicity becomes more intense in the proximity 
of situations which actually necessitate change.  
What is important here is that this anxiety does not stem from a 
‘dreaded identification’ (Butler 1993: 3) with an abject other, but from a 
more mundane form of intimidation. It involves a repudiation, but one 
which takes place on a conscious and self-reflexive level rather than one 
in which an unconscious identification must remain repressed in order for 
the self to be thematically coherent.  
My reason for addressing this kind of complicity is it that suggests a 
need to facilitate and nurture productive relations to gender rather than 
solely producing de-naturalising effects. In effect, I am asserting that a 
certain manner in which gender hegemony persists comes from an 
adaptive response to the anticipated social repercussions of regulatory 
dialogue. This responsiveness promotes a passivity which allows 
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exclusionary attitudes to remain unchallenged from within certain 
hegemonic communities. As such, an important lynch-pin of transformation 
concerns simply destabilising the regulatory force of such discursive 
practices, as opposed to Butler’s primary aim of de-naturalising the very 
coherence of gendered selves. For instance, subversive repetitions which 
parody the overt behaviours of punitive regulation might have the broad 
social impact of dissipating the banal power they have in producing FEAR, 
and thus allow more inclusive attitudes to develop. 
In contrast to this apprehensive mode of complicity, I have argued 
that gender conformity is more generally maintained through the ‘pleasure 
of well-being’ (Bergson 1935: 39) experienced through the gentle 
repetition of habits. What I want to add to this sense of willing 
acquiescence is an image of the SEEKING system as a further source of 
emotional investment in the socially accepted norms of gender. 
In my previous section I suggested that the SEEKING system can 
drive responses to subversion by invigorating the search for meaning, and 
I will return to this issue again later. What I want to emphasise here is a 
more commonplace social mediation by which the ‘pleasant energy’ 
(Panksepp 1998: 150) of this emotion is involved more generally in the 
‘impulse to become actively engaged with the world’ (145). Specifically, I 
want to suggest that the vivacity of this emotion augments the investment 
in the inattentive repetition and acceptance of gender by combining the 
pleasure of familiarity with a dimension of stimulated social interest. 
From my embodied perspective, the accumulated circulation of 
habitual acts means that gender norms are often repeated inattentively, 
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and provide a pervasive medium of social interaction. As an emotion 
which, in Panksepp’s words, is active whenever we have ‘a feeling that 
something very interesting or exciting is going on’ (149), SEEKING must 
therefore inevitably take gendered characteristics as an object of 
attraction.  
In other words, the sheer pervasiveness of gender in our everyday 
lives means that many of our emotional interests are driven towards 
incentivised activities which are gender differentiated. For instance, we 
might consider gender stereotyped activities such as the feminised 
excitement of shopping for clothes or the masculinised atmospheres 
involved in anticipatory build-ups to a sporting event. Insofar as the sense 
of interest which drives activities like these comes from an ‘invigorated 
feeling of anticipation’ (145), then this emotion helps to develop and 
sustain an investment in the gender associations and differentiations 
which characterise them as cultural domains. 
Indeed, Panksepp explicitly notes how the arousal of SEEKING 
‘spontaneously constructs causal “insights” from the perception of 
correlated events’ (161), and thus helps ‘yield a consensual understanding 
of […] a “reality” that most of the social group accepts’ (162). In short, I 
want to contend that because SEEKING motivates through anticipation, it 
tends to form associative connections between the correlated events and 
behaviours which provide stimuli for the emotion. Thus, we come to invest 
in certain gendered associations because they promise to induce 
invigorated expectancies. We thereby help cement the idea that there is 
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an inherent causal connection between gendered bodies and certain 
socio-historically constructed behaviours. 
We can, in this way, discern one reason why ‘discrete and 
asymmetrical oppositions between “feminine” and “masculine” […] are 
understood as expressive attributes of “male” and “female”’ (Butler 2008: 
24). The arousal of SEEKING during anticipatory events such as shopping 
or sport promotes an illusory belief in the naturalness and necessity of the 
gender stereotypes that characterises those activities. It tends to enact 
and enforce the appearance of an exclusive causal connection between 
female bodies and the stereotypically feminine behaviours of shopping, 
and between male bodies and certain types of masculinised spectator 
sports. 
Perhaps more important than this mode of belief, however, is the 
specific way SEEKING augments the expectancies involved in gender 
performances. Whereas the pleasure of habit is tied to the gentle 
satisfaction of an expectation, the anticipations of the SEEKING system 
are categorically not linked to ‘the consummatory phase of behavior’ 
(Panksepp 1998: 147). That is, the expectancies this emotion produces 
involve only an immanent intensity of wanting, and are not related to the 
feelings which might be involved in actually attaining the wanted object. 
This means that while the invigorated anticipations of SEEKING are 
enabled by the circulation of various gendered domains – so that gender 
repetition is a necessity for those expectancies – the actual incentive is 
sustained by the continued stimulation of a promised reward rather than 
the repetition itself. 
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It is not, in other words, the actual moment of repeating the norm 
which constitutes this type of investment. The enjoyment which is taken 
from each repetition lies precisely in the on-going promises which linger in 
the future. As such, this investment in gender dissipates when anticipated 
rewards such as finding a new outfit or winning a sporting event are not 
immanent, but tends to increase in relation to expectancies, such as 
wedding dresses or cup finals, which are more valued. The force and 
intensity of this mode of attachment is thus capable of fluctuating 
according to the excitatory influences available in any specific 
environment, and is very much contingent to the moment of social 
interaction.  
 
RAGE as an Uncompromised Abjection: 
 
Part of what the excitatory investments of SEEKING means is that 
when a subversive practice is enacted within the midst of a particularly 
fervent social situation it is not just the habituated familiarity of gender 
which is disrupted. It also arrests an invigorated emotional expectation 
which, in comparison to habit, instils in the recipient a potentially much 
stronger intensity of investment. It thereby increases an individual’s 
sensitivity and vulnerability to the subversion.  
Part of the relevance of this is that while the de-familiarisation of 
gender recognition can be considered an inherent aim of subversion, the 
interruption of highly affective states of expectancy is an avoidable effect 
which has potentially counter-productive consequences. Indeed, by 
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Panksepp’s account, the ‘rapid suppression of activity within the SEEKING 
system […] should unconditionally promote the arousal of the RAGE 
system’ (191; my italics).  
In short, the disruption of vigorous emotional expectations is, by 
way of an initially autonomic physiological response, likely to produce 
feelings of frustration. As a sensory-motor response, subversion would be 
experienced purely and simply as an obstructing stimuli which, as it were, 
restricts the freedom of the body’s expectant movements. Insofar as the 
activation of the RAGE circuit is an inherent response to such bodily 
restrictions, then, any resulting aggression aimed towards the object of 
subversion is primarily compelled by the force of the emotion rather than a 
psychic relation to the incoherence of discursive intelligibility.  
As the emotional response of RAGE calls up memory-images in 
order to psychically represent gender, the psyche no doubt leaps into 
tensions of law and convention relevant to the present moment of 
subversion. As such, aggression is likely to be directed towards the 
‘domain of abject beings’ (Butler 1993: 3) which ‘circumscribe the 
[discursive] domain of the subject’ (3). The emotions of angry and 
frustrated aggression may, in this way, exacerbate the abjection which is 
socio-historically pre-established by those structures. However, the 
psychic economy of abjection does not, in this specific case, originate in 
unsettled dynamics of an internalised prohibition and repudiation. The 
specific force and quality of abjection is not, that is, initiated by ‘an anxious 
and rigid belief that a sense of world and a sense of self will be radically 
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undermined’ (Butler 2004: 34), but simply by the compelling force of the 
sensory-motor state. 
What I am concerned to emphasise here is a sense of ‘internal 
pressure’ (Panksepp 1998: 191) which affirms the externalisation of 
otherness, but is not bound up with a psychic conflict which represses the 
other as a ‘threatening spectre’ (Butler 1993: 3). As a distinctive force of 
externalisation, RAGE aims to aggressively dominate the field of action. It 
thus motivates relational tendencies such as scorn and degradation which 
fiercely differentiate self and other, and which can therefore be readily 
nourished by the exclusionary structures of discourse. Nonetheless, 
insofar as memory reproduces mental images of an abject other which 
reflect discursive prohibitions, they are not selected in a way which reveals 
their constitutive instabilities. The images are drawn from regions of the 
past which are contingently created in order to clarify an already tangible 
and well defined emotional border. Their actualised representations, 
therefore, are elicited by an unambiguous tension towards action which 
fully and effectively inhibits ambivalent and spectral identifications. 
In effect, the sensory-motor impulse and emotional feelings of 
RAGE operate independently of discursive intelligibility, so that psychic 
representations of gender do not proceed from a need to consolidate the 
coherence of the norm. This means that subversions which provoke this 
emotional response directly do not facilitate a ‘troubling return’ (Butler 
1993: 23) of the kind of repressed conflicts and internal instabilities which 
Butler designates as the necessity of hegemonic psychic life. Rather than 
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opening up the psyche to the inconsistencies of gender, they only work to 
re-affirm rigid boundaries. 
The important issue in this respect is that aggressive 
responsiveness must be avoided because they re-enforce the 
exclusionary structures of gender norms without coming close to 
destabilising them. They therefore have entirely counter-productive 
effects. Indeed, ‘aggression will increase in proportion to the level of 
frustration’ (Panksepp 1998: 191), so that the more forceful and insistent 
the subversion is the more rigid gender boundaries will become. This 
perspective thus suggests a need to contextualise the moment in which 
subversion takes place in such a way that the tendency towards RAGE 
responses is reduced, hence enabling more receptive responses. For 
example, I would certainly not recommend subverting the hetero-
normativity of marriage during an actual wedding ceremony, where 
invigorated SEEKING investments would be particularly high. 
Media such as film or television are useful in this context because 
they provide a way to influence the emotional context of subversion 
through narrative. As a brief illustration of this we might consider the film 
Billy Elliot, in which the eponymous character shuns the masculinised 
hobby of boxing and takes up a comparatively feminised career as a ballet 
dancer. In the film, Billy’s father, Jackie, is initially enraged by the 
revelation, and it is possible to read this response as a sudden dissipation 
of Jackie’s expectancies of Billy. When Jackie later comes to support Billy, 
we can equally read this change in terms of his SEEKING attachments 
becoming re-invested in ballet. The main point I want to make, however, 
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concerns the way the specific subversions at stake within the film are 
experienced by the viewer. As a text which draws us into identifications 
with the characters, we do not experience the relational dynamics of 
gender through the same tensions towards action that we experience in 
everyday life. In effect, our sensory-motor relation to the film is guided by 
its narrative movement, so that our identification with gender is simulated 
through different forms of organisation than it would be in everyday life. 
Our experience of subversion can therefore be influenced and cultivated 
by the context in which it develops. Situations which, in directly 
experienced social situations, may lead to the sudden suppression of 
SEEKING can be experienced in more receptive ways. 
At any rate, the final analysis here is that while Butler implicitly 
assumes that subversive de-naturalisation will, by its very nature, 
productively de-stabilise the psyche of hegemonic subjects, the possibility 
of actually producing such instability is a more delicate matter than she 
considers. As I have argued, Butler psychoanalyses the discursive 
instabilities of the subject, and concludes that the gendered psyche 
inherently assumes the structure of a ‘melancholic identification’ (Butler 
1997a: 133). That is, all hegemonic identification requires a repudiation of 
the desires and identifications which are foreclosed by gender law. What 
Butler argues, more radically, is that because their loss has not been 
mourned they haunt the self as unconscious identifications. The abject 
and repudiated other thus persists as an internal instability of the 
hegemonic psyche, and this melancholic ambivalence constitutes a 
vulnerability of gender ideals to sustain their rigid structures. 
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Butler herself wants to use the vulnerability of the subject’s ‘self-
grounding presumptions’ (1993: 3) as ‘a critical resource in the struggle to 
rearticulate the very terms of symbolic legitimacy and intelligibility’ (3). 
However, because the emotional force of abjection is not necessarily a 
defence against the spectral effects of unconscious identifications, 
drawing focus to a repudiated domain of abjection through subversion may 
only exacerbate those abjections. My contention is that the psychic conflict 
of melancholic ambivalence only arises under specific experiential 
conditions. It is not an inherent and on-going unconscious structure of 
hegemonic identification, but a contingent process which develops in 
relation to the emotion of separation anxiety designated by Panksepp’s 
PANIC system. What I will now examine, therefore, is how this contingent 
experience develops in response to subversion.  
 
PANIC as Melancholic Identification: 
 
Aside from the inattentive familiarities of habit and the heightened 
expectancies of the SEEKING system, subversion can also disrupt an 
individual’s means of social bonding. In other words, disrupting the 
coherence of masculinity and femininity is not simply a matter of 
undermining an abstract conceptual framework. It may also unsettle and 
confuse the intimacy of real relations which are enabled by gender norms, 
and which thereby provide a source of emotional dependency. For 
instance, insofar as gender boundaries form the bedrock of marriages and 
familial relations, as well as broader social relations which involve close 
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bonding rituals and experiences, effectively subverting them may upset 
the feelings of social acceptance and re-assurance achieved through 
them. In such events, a subversive act may trigger the PANIC emotion 
which ‘mediates such negative feelings as loneliness and grief’ (Panksepp 
1998: 212).  
Thought of from a broad perspective, there might be many ways in 
which separation anxiety is involved in the performance of gender, and I 
will discuss below how the ‘behaviors and feelings of separation distress’ 
(262) might become involved in impulses to transform the hegemony of 
gender norms. However, the main issue here is analysing the specific way 
in which the contingent activation of the PANIC system produces a 
complex process of melancholic identification. 
As a bodily source of feelings of loss and grief, PANIC constitutes a 
primary component of melancholia but not the essential characteristic 
which makes it into a psychic complex. Strictly speaking, melancholia is 
‘the suppressed and ambivalent alternative to mourning’ (Butler 2004: 
159), and arises when a loss cannot be grieved. What I want to consider in 
this respect is a process in which subversion sets in motion the psycho-
physical processes of separation anxiety, but in which the associative 
memory-images drawn out by the tension of anxiety cannot be consciously 
represented. 
To the extent that identifying as masculine ‘requires repudiating the 
feminine’ (Butler 1997a: 137), a whole array of relational dynamics and 
behavioural characteristics are prohibited from this identification. As such, 
they remain unincorporated into the habituated performances of 
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masculinity and, to varying degrees, are disavowed as being part of the 
on-going dynamics of more spontaneous, indeterminate, or private 
aspects of gendered life. Particularly relevant to the context here is the 
feminisation of feelings of love and tenderness which are, to some extent, 
inherent to the formation of all personal relationships. Yet, insofar as such 
feelings are indeed feminised, love and tenderness remain repudiated 
modes of attachment for many cases of masculinity.  
Butler’s ideas on psychoanalytical origins and repudiated 
homosexual desires notwithstanding, then, she is quite right to emphasise 
the importance of forms of love which cannot be avowed in constituting the 
social dynamics of gender. Indeed, an objective of subversive repetition 
might be to parody the shortcomings and expose the inconsistencies of a 
rigid masculinity which, as a hierarchical and hyperbolic ideal, denies the 
primary importance of love and disavows the sensitive vulnerabilities 
involved in loving attachments. 
Using such repudiations as ‘a critical resource’ (Butler 1993: 3) may 
potentially expose uncomfortable points of disjunction between the ideal of 
masculinity and the reality. Nonetheless, because melancholia is not a 
fundamental structure of the psyche, but a contingent emotional process, 
such subversions may only disrupt the coherence of masculinity as a 
conceptual representation. Rather than producing a radical crisis of 
identification, this may prompt a psycho-physical response which, as with 
my discussion in section two, can easily adapt to the subversion and 
disavow its intended incoherence. 
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For subversions to expose and reproduce the effects of discursive 
injunctions as a melancholia which ‘erodes the operations of language’ 
(Butler 1997a: 143), specific experiential conditions must be met. That is, I 
want to suggest, the response must be bound up with a disruption of the 
intimacy and complexity of concrete social bonds. Rather than simply 
disrupting the conceptual regularities of masculinity and femininity, they 
must produce a state of PANIC which complicates the tendency to re-
appropriate the subversion.  
 This might be enabled simply by parodying the vulnerable points of 
identification, such as the prohibition on masculine tenderness, in a way 
which inadvertently echoes the complexity of a past experience. For 
instance, a subversion which parodies the masculine discomfort with 
tenderness may invoke a spontaneous leap towards memory-images in 
which similar gender dynamics have caused an unresolved rift in a 
personal relationship. In this light, I want to premise a situation in which 
the initial leap produces virtual images of love and loss which, in order to 
begin facilitating their actualisation, initiates the actual bodily tension and 
emotional feelings of PANIC.  
While the state of PANIC draws these images towards the surface 
of conscious representation, what can begin to make this a specifically 
melancholic process is the relational tension involved in the psycho-
physical act of attention. An obvious effect of separation anxiety is that it 
compels individuals towards interactions which alleviate the emotion. 
However, as I have been discussing, such actions may not be congruent 
with the accepted domain of masculinity. If, as with my analysis of FEAR 
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above, the immediate social environment remains one of hegemonic 
appropriation, then the emotional tension of separation anxiety will be 
unlikely to discover a direct object of attachment. The relational dynamics 
of the present moment, therefore, impedes the action tendencies of 
separation anxiety and interrupts the actualisation of memory. 
Indeed, insofar as the broad social response to subversion remains 
one of masculine disavowal, the dynamics of relationality will continue to 
inhibit the identifications suggested by PANIC. This is, at least in part, 
because the body attitudes which facilitate action will tend to be those of 
habituated motor recognition. The only images which can form distinct 
representations of gender will, therefore, be those which facilitate the 
normative masculine performances that are habituated and accepted 
within that particular environment. Nonetheless, while habituated relational 
dynamics initially tend to diminish the psycho-physical tendencies of 
PANIC, my point is that it does not necessarily enact a complete 
suppression of them. 
Depending on the intensity of the initial response, anxiety continues 
to influence the appropriative tendency of the recognition circuit. It 
produces a complication in the hegemonic process of responding to 
subversion whereby both PANIC and habit project nascent actions during 
the moment of indeterminacy. Both therefore preside over the direction in 
which memory progresses. Thought of in this way, what I want to 
specifically convey is a sense of how the circuit of attention undergoes a 
much more complex and urgent process than the one I discussed in 
section two. The bodily relationality which prevents the actualisation of a 
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distinct representation does not, in this case of masculine melancholia, 
stem simply from a resistant other who inhibits memory by disrupting 
normative actions. Rather, the conflict arises more directly in the motor 
tendencies of the recipient himself. 
While the involuntary aim of memory is to restore action by 
supplementing the present moment with past experience, action is here 
implicated in two different directions. The attraction of the present, which 
marks out the general direction of ‘what it is important to know to 
understand the present and anticipate the future’ (Bergson 2007: 141), is 
directed by a dual and conflicting influence. It is as a result of this 
dynamic, I want to argue, that gender norms can produce complex 
melancholic performances which, pace Butler, are motivated by a dynamic 
of love and loss that cannot be avowed within the bounds of the 
performance.  
Separation anxiety ‘tends to motivate thoughts about the lost object’ 
(Panksepp 1998: 212). However, such thoughts are subject to the 
relational tensions of habit and discursive injunctions, both of which, in 
effect, ‘demand […] that those losses not be avowed, and not be grieved’ 
(Butler 1997a: 135). Thus, as the circuit of memory continues to re-
produce new tensions, each forming associations of varying complexity, 
each more or less akin to a complex of repudiated tenderness and loss 
which formed the initial response, those nebulous associations must 
remain virtual images. They cannot form a plane of consciousness which 
is useful in relation to the present moment of hegemonic action because 
they suggest identifications which transgress from the norm. 
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For instance, in one circuit explicit memories of a gender related 
disagreement may be recalled which, at the time, were an unsettling and 
discordant moment in a relationship. Only, now, due to the call of 
separation anxiety, the images may be selected in a way which opens up 
the masculine position to the other’s side of the argument. They therefore 
affirm the intentions of the subversion because they implicate the self in 
identifications with femininity. Alternatively, another circuit may begin to 
‘compel a reconsideration of the place and stability of the masculine and 
feminine’ (Butler 2008: 189) because they recall possible actions in the 
past which might have strengthened social intimacies, but were regrettably 
not taken. Others may produce more general memories of grief or loss 
which trouble the borders of the self simply because such vulnerability is 
emasculating. Others still might revolve around the more specific 
repudiations which structure the dialogue of masculine bonding, such as 
those which designate even platonic love as a “gay” or “girlish” sentiment. 
These virtual images will then form an ambivalent relation towards the way 
‘a masculine gender is formed from the refusal to grieve the masculine as 
a possibility of love’ (Butler 1993: 235), albeit by a different route and in a 
different way than Butler suggests.  
In any case, these nebulous associations are drawn out by an 
impulse to regain an immediate sense of social attachment, but cannot be 
translated into distinct images. They are inhibited in the final moment of 
actualisation because the ambivalent identifications they promote cannot 
be avowed within the discursive framework of intelligibility and legitimacy, 
or acted within a normative relational environment. However, I want to 
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argue that a fully melancholic complex only emerges here to the extent 
that these virtual images cannot be effectively concealed. Rather than 
simply repudiating feelings of love and loss through an inhibitive process, 
therefore, consciousness actually begins to be ‘haunted by the love it 
cannot grieve’ (Butler 1997a: 138). 
Insofar as the images suggested by memory aim to resolve anxiety, 
they force themselves upon consciousness in proportion to the urgency of 
the emotional feeling. Insofar as they fail to be actualised, and the 
representational images which can be actualised do not resolve anxiety, 
the emotion state not only persists but grows in intensity. This is to say 
that the feeling of anxiety escalates with continued indeterminacy. It thus 
builds a pressure on the self in which the relational attitude of motor 
recognition, as well as the constraints of language, becomes increasingly 
less effective in inhibiting repudiated identifications.  
Unlike with my example of RAGE, we have here the dimensions of 
an on-going psychic complex in which ‘a sense of self [is] radically 
undermined’ (Butler 2004: 34). The associative images and emotional 
pressure of anxiety effect a conflict with the repudiations of normative 
representation which insistently draws the self towards ‘uninhabitable’ 
(Butler 1993: 3) zones of meaning, and perhaps even threaten the self 
with ‘psychotic dissolution’ (243). At the very least it is likely to have 
erosive effects on the borders of that self’s masculinity.  
In this context, then, subversion becomes truly effective in the way 
Butler intends. It produces the kind of ‘inassimilable remainder’ (Butler 
1997a: 29) which she accredits to the unconscious in general, and causes 
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the repudiations of regulatory structures to have ‘consequences it cannot 
fully control’ (Butler 1993: 3). However, because this is not necessarily the 
end effect of the process, but a stage in a complex response, it may not 
finally be the productive crisis subversive practices hope for.37 
As I discussed in section two, circuits of attention evolve. As they 
do so, the elements involved make concessions and compromises which, 
as it were, change the course of recognition. In the context here, I want to 
suggest that if the kind of melancholic conflict I am discussing reaches a 
dangerous impasse the circuit begins to evolve in a different manner. It 
necessitates a complex psychic repression which no longer simply inhibits 
specific tensions of memory from becoming actualised. Rather, in order to 
facilitate actualisation it transforms and displaces the subject matter of 
their imagery into active figures of abjection. 
For instance, if the direction of memory continues to implicate a 
masculine identity in un-avowable feminine traits, then these nebulous 
images may be brought into consciousness by an act of repression which 
projects those traits onto a figure of animosity. What the complex 
repression does in this case is allow the nebulous images to be actualised 
on a plane of consciousness in which the implicating aspects of those 
                                                 
37 It is important to re-iterate that the internal conflict I am discussing is formed in 
response to the present moment. It does not, that is, ‘restage […] primary scenarios’ 
(Butler 1997a: 10) which are internalised in a Freudian unconscious during infancy. While 
the discursive injunctions at stake here are historically sedimented and socially pervasive, 
they are usually repeated habitually. An individual’s psychic relation to them is, therefore, 
generally passive rather than conflicted.  
Gender melancholy, in this sense, is not a psychic complex inherent to normative 
signification; it is not a ‘sedimentation of objects loved and lost’ (133; my italics) which 
can be, as it were, dug up in order to unsettle normative identities. It is a struggle borne in 
the present moment of anxiety – one which rearticulates the past as an ambivalent and 
melancholic internalisation of regulatory power. As such, the troubling effects of 
melancholy are contingently created, and are just as likely to bring forth defensive 
responses which strengthen the regulatory force of repudiation than they are to weaken 
it. 
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images are displaced from the individual and placed onto someone else. 
In other words, a virtual melancholic conflict between masculinity and 
femininity – which is internal to the individual’s psychic process of anxiety 
– becomes refigured as an actual conflict between himself and a specific 
object of abjection. The repression of troubling images is thus effected by 
a projection of the repudiated, and now reviled, aspects of femininity onto 
an actual person who embodies those characteristics. Following this, the 
aim of thought will be to vigorously ‘elaborate the difference between him 
and her’ (Butler 1997a: 137), and to ‘discover and install proof of that 
difference’ (137). Anxiety is then resolved by re-discovering, in the gender 
differentiations of identification, a form of social comfort which re-
establishes the individual’s sense of place. 
The point is that while Butler rightly argues that such gender 
differentiation is already fundamental to discourse, the way these 
differentiations are actively lived as a psychic and emotional economy can 
take a decidedly unproductive turn during contingent melancholic 
processes. What, in habitual processes of recognition was a passive 
repudiation, can become a forceful and determined abjection if a process 
of separation anxiety is resolved badly. 
In short, the dynamic of separation anxiety provides a definite 
means to trouble hegemonic identification, but the internal conflict it 
causes is only effective as a process of de-naturalisation insofar as it 
produces an impulse to re-articulate gender. If such self-conflict leads to 
an active abjection it may still be quite problematic as a means of social 
transformation.  
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The outcome of a PANIC response to subversion depends on the 
immediate moment of relational action. If, for instance, the social context 
of the subversion is not particularly normative then the relational dynamics 
of the ensuing memory circuits may allow subverted images of gender to 
emerge more freely into conscious representations. In such cases, the 
feelings of loss and the correlative longing for social bonds can potentially 
provoke responses which motivate an impulse to re-negotiate discursive 
borders and relations to otherness. Indeed, if we extrapolate upon 
Panksepp’s suggestion that the kind of ‘emotional bonds’ (1998: 262) 
enabled by the PANIC system can also ‘help explain the sources of 
human empathy [and] altruism’ (262), provoking such responses may yield 
radically transformative processes. Rather than producing an ambivalence 
which must be repressed, separation anxiety might facilitate powerful 
empathic insights into how the hierarchical borders of gender affect other 
people. 
Perhaps equally important in this context is Panksepp’s assertion 
that anxiety can have an ‘excitatory influence’ (53) on SEEKING. If the 
social conditions of subversion allow the emergence of empathy, then the 
troubling effects of de-naturalisation would not be the psychotic dissolution 
of hegemonic positions. It would be an attitude which is ‘willing […] to 
allow [gender] to become something other than what it is traditionally 
assumed to be’ (Butler 2004: 35). The dynamic effect of anxiety might, in 
this case, elicit an emotional resolve for more inclusive gendered 
meanings. As an amalgamative blend of PANIC and SEEKING, it would 
provoke the feeling of a kind of uneasy yearning which, in Butler’s words, 
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would ‘embrace the destruction and rearticulation of [gender] in the name 
of a more capricious […] world’ (35). 
 
The Emotional Dynamics of Effective Re-Signification: 
 
Following this last point, I should re-emphasise that because 
SEEKING is a ‘motivationally generalized’ (Panksepp 1998: 155) 
emotional impulse it does not have any intrinsic social bias or normative 
intent. Thus, while I argued above that it plays a role in the naturalisation 
of gender, and I argued in section two that it plays a role in assuring the 
self-presence of meaning during the appropriation of subversion, it can 
also potentially be utilised productively in the process of re-signification. 
As with the example I used earlier of Billy Elliot’s father, for instance, 
anticipatory expectancies can be used to re-invest an individual’s relation 
to gender boundaries.  
In this respect, I want to suggest that a credible aim of subversion 
might be to inspire SEEKING directly in order to fully utilise its pleasant 
energy. What is at stake in this idea is the contention that not all 
subversion needs to have an antagonistic impact which aims to disturb the 
very mental stability of the self. Indeed, I have argued that Butler’s idea of 
using the threatening disruption of dreaded identifications and 
ambivalence as a resource for re-articulating gender presents a very 
narrow possibility of transformation. If the fundamental aim of subversion 
is to denaturalise gender in a way which allows its discrete borders to be 
re-signified, a more effective resource might be to invigorate SEEKING. 
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Such emotional responses would facilitate more receptive and incentivised 
attitudes to the ‘disorganisation and disaggregation’ (Butler 2008: 185) of 
gender. 
As responses to subversion, the tendencies of PANIC and 
SEEKING are definitely preferable to that of RAGE. However, I want to 
conclude here, firstly, by suggesting a specific practical limitation to their 
transformative potential. I will then returning to the idea of aspiration as a 
different kind of transformative process. 
As sensory-motor processes, feeling states, and focal guides for 
attention alike, FEAR, RAGE, SEEKING and PANIC are adaptive 
emotions which have definite objectives. Each is a tension at work on our 
wills which directs the indeterminacy of action along a specific anticipatory 
path and, as it does so, drives the associative processes of memory in a 
certain direction. As such, even the progressive potential of empathy 
remains tied to the production of a distinct object domain. Therefore, 
insofar as it manifests as a conceptual representation, ‘sympathy involves 
a substitution […] that may well be a colonization of the other’s position as 
one’s own’ (Butler 1993: 118).  
Empathy, in this way, ultimately becomes appropriative when its 
sensibilities as a feeling state are translated into the realm of identification. 
Indeed, more generally, this kind of appropriation is for Butler ‘the cost of 
articulating a coherent identity-position’ (113) in the name of political 
transformation. Not only does it attempt to ‘attribute a false uniformity’ 
(116) to diverse attitudes and needs, but it can lead to the regulatory 
‘policing of identity’ (117). This kind of tendency, then, would also be a 
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danger when SEEKING motivates political transformation. The 
conformational bias its emotional impetus produces would perhaps tend 
protagonists towards closed identity-positions and attitudes. 
In contrast to the adaptive emotions which I have focussed on, 
which constitute relatively closed tensions towards action, Bergson 
envisions a different kind of emotion in The Two Sources. It is a creative 
emotion of aspiration in which, as I have re-described it, the future is 
experienced as open-ended because the present moment is experienced 
through the direct apperception of duration. This source of emotion ‘does 
not yield to the attraction of an object’ (Bergson 1935: 27). Rather, it 
moves within the on-going growth of duration.  
This process has generalizable effects which, in Chapter Two, I 
argued can be important in relation to gender regulation. Primarily, the 
apperception of the self is attained from the qualitative differentiations that 
characterise the underlying durational movement of consciousness. In this 
movement there is a ‘mutual […] interconnexion and organisation of 
elements’ (Bergson 1971: 101) which is ‘inexpressible’ (129) in the terms 
of language, but nonetheless intelligible as a deep-seated experience. The 
coherence of the self, therefore, and its relation to others, no longer 
revolves around familiarity and stable positions of identity. It can be 
derived from a process of change in which moments of experience 
‘dissolve into and permeate one another without precise outline’ (132).  
In such moments, the motivating source of action is no longer 
derived from ready-made or adaptive tendencies, but from the ‘inner 
causality’ (219) of this qualitative movement of duration. The tension 
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towards action grows spontaneously in an open-ended relation to the 
immediate future. This openness then facilitates a ‘faculty of adapting and 
re-adapting oneself to circumstances, in firmness combined with 
suppleness (Bergson 1935: 195) rather than in brittleness combined with 
vulnerability. Finally, because such fluidity of experience reveals gender 
norms to be false resting places, there is a subtle impact on the eventual 
representation of gender whereby the deep apperception of the self 
‘vitalises […] the intellectual elements with which it is destined to unite’ 
(34). 
In everyday life, this kind of differentiation and emotional impetus is 
usually constrained because the body fixes the psyche on a specific 
expectation of action. It is therefore inherently difficult to attain. 
Nonetheless, what I convey here is a brief speculation on how artistic 
media might be utilised to produce aspiration as a strategy of 
transformation. 
A broad characteristic of experiencing most media of art or 
entertainment is that, as a sensory-motor experience, the body can be 
highly active in terms of stimulus but is not called upon to act. It thus 
produces nascent actions which are, as it were, relaxed because they do 
not need to be translated into actual responses. In this way, 
consciousness is potentially allowed to expand more freely than in the 
direct social experience of gender.  
Film and television, in particular, can take advantage of this 
sensory-motor engagement through various different strategies, potentially 
producing responses in the viewer which echo the various tensions of 
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action I have used to describe the underlying dynamics of gender 
investment. Thus, while this is only one of many diverse theoretical 
perspectives which can be used to interpret visual media, I would like to 
speculate on how an understanding of such sensory-motor tensions can 
be used to enrich and elucidate subversion theory. Specifically, I want to 
focus on the potential of film and television to produce kinaesthetic 
identifications with characters in order to invoke a range of diverse 
experiential responses. For example, at one end of the scale, kinaesthetic 
identifications allow adaptive emotional responses to intensify because 
they cannot be abated through the direct actions of the viewer. Less 
prominently, at the other end of the scale, directors such as Andrei 
Tarkovsky produce prolonged visual imagery which, because of their 
diminished narrative direction, can potentially draw attention to the on-
going growth of duration and facilitate much more variable and 
undetermined psychic responses. 
Films exploring gender regulation, particularly those such as Boys 
Don’t Cry or The Crying Game which contain provocative scenes of 
ambivalence and undecidability, often intend to invoke adaptive emotional 
responses such as fear, anxiety and anger in order to convey the plight of 
exclusion. In this respect, I do not intend to be critical of the ability of such 
strategies to simulate identifications with gendered others that would not 
be readily possible in everyday life, and therefore to promote acceptance 
of difference and outrage at their abuse. Moreover, it should be said again 
that my reading of these films in terms of adaptive emotional responses is 
only one possible theoretical interpretation of how gendered films produce 
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meaning. It is thus not intended to be a comprehensive perspective on the 
films, nor of a viewer’s potential experience of them, but only a way to 
gather insight into the nature of subversion.  
In that specific context, then, the tendency of gender orientated 
films to produce provocative emotional situations means that the 
subversions effected in such scenes are more likely to be experienced in a 
way which eliminates the possibility of aspiration. More generally, it could 
be argued that the positions of such scenes within the narrative movement 
of the film also tend to abate the effects of ambivalence and undecidability, 
which it would be Butler’s concern to prolong. 
For instance, in The Crying Game, Fergus’s heterosexually 
orientated attraction to Dil is subverted by the revelation, for Fergus and 
the viewer, of Dil’s male genitals. Fergus’s response of revulsion then 
provides a definite direction for the motor response of the viewer which 
detracts from the moment of ambivalence. Alternatively, the sustained 
ambivalence of sex and sexuality in Boys Don’t Cry is, in the end, 
domesticated into a much more comprehensible image of gender. When 
the pre-operative female-to-male Brandon, identifying as a boy, 
orchestrates a heterosexual relationship with Lana, but through the use of 
prosthetics which Lana is at first unaware of and then disavows, the 
experiential dynamics of the unfolding plot is extremely hard to conceive 
within a normative gender framework. However, textual and emotional 
clarity is achieved through the brutal rape of Brandon, which not only 
initiates an entirely un-ambivalent emotional climax to Brandon’s plight, 
but definitively positions Brandon as a woman. Indeed, ‘the film, caving in, 
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wants to return him […] to a “true” feminine identity which “comes to terms” 
with his anatomy’ (Butler 2004: 143). At any rate, the point is that the 
planes of consciousness invoked by the end of these films are initiated 
primarily by adaptive emotions which draw us into definite positions 
towards gender regulation. As such, they prevent states of motor tension 
which would facilitate more creative responses to the themes they convey. 
An episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation, Season 5, Episode 
17, entitled “The Outcast,” can provide an initial insight into how a film 
might produce such creative responses. In this episode, the crew 
encounter an androgynous race of people, the J’naii, who are described 
as being both male and female simultaneously. Having introduced the 
J’naii as a people who constitute an entirely different experience of sexual 
differentiation, there is a brief conversation in which characters from each 
race reflect on the impossibility of comprehending their differences. It thus 
gestures towards the premise of an ‘acceptance of the limits of knowability 
in oneself and others’ (Butler 2001b: 34). 
Similarly to the examples above, this sense of unknowability is 
quickly over-shadowed. Specifically, there is an outpouring of dialogue in 
which various characters attempt to define meaningful distinctions 
between the binary sexes. This, in turn, tends to provoke the same search 
for gender categorisation in the viewer, and it initiates SEEKING as an 
emotional investment in the episode’s theme of gender difference and 
prejudice. My speculative question is: what if a greater textual focus had 
been placed on creating a sense of how the J’naii’s reality is unknowable? 
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For one thing, the displacement of issues of gender onto an 
analogous but fabricated context would allow sexual difference to be 
organised differently without directly aggravating naturalised 
preconceptions. It would thus simulate an experience of disaggregated 
borders of masculinity and femininity without provoking the adaptive 
responses which are likely to follow such de-naturalisation in real social 
conditions. If, in addition, these images were cultivated specifically to 
promote undecidability, purposely attempting to withhold the need for 
adequate definition, the withdrawal of narrative coherence might facilitate 
more creative interactions with the text. Rather than initiating SEEKING as 
a drive towards meaning, or RAGE, FEAR and PANIC as means of 
simulating an identification with an excluded other, the sensory-motor 
relation to the text becomes more open.  
The Next Generation is certainly not the format for such 
experimental cultivations of psycho-physical responses to visual and 
conceptual imagery. However, the underlining point here is, firstly, simply 
that surreal images can simulate identifications and experiences in a 
different way to direct representations of gender regulation. Insofar as they 
provide no ground to expect what their immediate future will be, and no 
sensory provocation which demands such anticipation, they can dissipate 
the practical tensions of the body. Psychic processes are therefore less 
inclined towards practical knowledge, and the selective discernment and 
diminishments of projected motor acts are less inclined to isolate a distinct 
object domain. 
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Secondly, my point is that texts do not necessarily have to confirm a 
position on such images to create an ethical relation to difference, 
especially when such images would re-affirm a distinct objective. Finding 
coherence from the movement of duration, the gendered self can suspend 
the borders of identity and manage its relations through qualitative 
differentiations which implicate the self in the other creatively. Thus, when 
the immediate past and present is experienced through an apperception of 
qualitative differentiations, and when the experience of the immediate 
future is released from the constraints of expectation and anticipation, 
undecidability can be its own productive force. Memory no longer 
produces images with the aim of foretelling future attitudes and 
categorically knowing the present, but is called forth by an immanent 
perception of inexplicable change. The process through which mental 
concepts are eventually created becomes a much more variable process, 
facilitating freer process of association which are less inhibited in the 
moment of actualisation. 
In effect, such creative emotional and psychic tendencies are only a 
momentary transitional experience. This is because the necessities of 
action inevitably return consciousness to the production of a distinct object 
domain. What I want to emphasise is simply that ‘risking the incoherence 
of identity’ (Butler 1993: 113) does not necessarily imply an ambivalent 
dissolution of the self. There are other means of self-coherence than that 
of distinct identities, and other means of experiencing indeterminacy and 
undecidability than that of ambivalence or conflict.  
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Butler’s ethical imperative – that we ‘learn to live in the anxiety [of 
unknowingness towards the other]’ (Butler 2004: 35) – might, therefore, be 
fruitfully supplemented by the less heavy hearted imperative that we learn 
to withhold adaptive responsiveness. Aspiration, in this way, can be 
cultivated as a potential response to subversion in which ‘something other 
than a simple assimilation into prevailing norms’ (Butler 2004: 27) can take 
place, but without risking melancholic or aggressive dynamics of identity.  
Indeed, my prominent point in this section is that the nature of 
subversion runs the risk of producing adaptive emotional responses, and 
that it is important to understand these responses in order to utilise 
subversion as a transformative strategy. In Gender Trouble Butler asks the 
question: ‘What performance where will […] compel a radical rethinking of 
the psychological preconceptions of gender identity and sexuality?’ (2008: 
189). However, what she primarily has in mind here is the conditions by 
which a subversive repetition, as a signifying event, stands out as 
irreducible to the thematic coherence of gender discourse. I have, then, 
attempted a different kind of answer to this question which focusses on 
how the “what” and the “where” of subversion provoke different emotions 
which provide varying degrees of resistance or receptiveness. 
What unifies my analysis of these different emotions is the idea that 
knowledge is contingent upon action, so that the potential for a radical 
rethinking of gender is different for each emotion. Because neither the 
experienced force of a subversion nor response of memory is concerned 
with self-knowledge, the dynamics of identification are driven by the 
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sensory-motor response and the feeling states which accompany them 
rather than the incoherence of meaning.  
In short, in order to disrupt the preconceptions of gender effectively, 
it is necessary to provoke the proper emotional force which impels a 
change in attitude. While the apprehension of FEAR may prevent 
progressive responses, the initiation of SEEKING may facilitate a drive for 
new gender formations only to re-affirm self-determination and exclusion. 
While RAGE and PANIC may both exacerbate abjection, the former 
aggravates and exaggerates exclusionary and externalising tendencies 
without hope for transformation. The latter, on the other hand, is a much 
more unstable, and perhaps transformative, process because its 
contingent dynamics are derived from an internal conflict which can unfold 
in different directions. It should be noted in this respect, then, that my own 
analysis of melancholy is very much preliminary. 
In closing, all of these dynamic responses should be considered as 
part of a complex relationality through which gender sociality revolves. 
Along with the deeper tendencies of duration and the inattentive 
tendencies of habit, they form a vital part of understanding how the 
instability of gender unfolds, and how it can be worked productively into a 
more inclusive re-signification of regulatory power. 
 
Conclusion. 
 
 What I have attempted in this chapter is a preliminary re-evaluation 
of the way hegemonic gender identification develops during performative 
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acts and subversive repetitions. Thought of specifically from the 
perspective of a psycho-physical process, I have reflected upon the way 
the immanent dimensions of gender identity are anchored in the temporal 
dynamics of responsiveness. The intelligibility of regulatory law and 
convention can thus be seen as a variable process which is contingent 
upon the relational experience of the present and the apperception of the 
immediate future.  
This perspective shifts the focus of analysis away from the 
discursive matrix, as an ‘enabling cultural condition’ (Butler 1993: 7) for 
gender identity which constrains in advance the possibilities of agency. It 
also deviates from Butler’s concern with how discourse itself is a ‘revisable 
criteria of intelligibility’ (14). It focusses instead on how individual relations 
to discourse are revisable because they are determined by the immediate 
social dimensions of bodily relationality and the processes of memory 
which respond to the present moment of action. 
I have argued, then, that the conscious representation of gender 
law has a certain fluidity which allows its repetitions to develop in much 
more diverse ways than Butler’s model suggests. On the one hand, the 
elasticity of memory allows hegemonic identifications to quickly adapt to 
the subversion of ‘settled knowledge and knowable reality’ (Butler 2004: 
27). From this perspective, I have questioned the way the efficacy of 
subversion is presented in Butler’s texts, particularly insofar as it is based 
only on exposing the inconsistencies of discourse and the ambivalent 
dependencies of relationality. On the other hand, however, insofar as my 
model reconfigures the way the past is sedimented in the present, the 
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elasticity of memory also provides the possibility of individuals 
transforming their relation to gender norms. 
What is broadly at stake here is the idea that, in order to actually 
denaturalise the psychic representation of gender, subversion must 
instigate the proper change in the dynamics of memory necessary to 
recognise gender undecidability. It cannot rely on simply exposing the 
‘constitutive instabilities’ (Butler 1993: 10) of discourse, and presume that 
this will inherently throw gender norms into a ‘productive crisis’ (10). It 
must effectively provoke a tension of memory which allows the recipient to 
comprehend the intentions of the subversion, and therefore question the 
validity of gender norms.  
Such a ‘radical rethinking’ (Butler 2008: 189) is dependent on the 
tension towards action by which the recipient experiences subversion, and 
particularly on avoiding adaptive emotional responses to indeterminacy 
which promote unreceptive responses. In order to begin exploring such 
responses thus I have drawn upon Panksepp’s emotions of SEEKING, 
FEAR, RAGE and PANIC, and Bergson’s notion of aspiration. I have then 
depicted several different experientially contextualised subversions which 
have varying degrees of efficacy or unreceptiveness. 
While I consider these to be prominent tendencies or potential ways 
to produce transformation, my reflections here are not intended as a 
comprehensive insight into psychic and emotional relations to gender. 
Rather, they provide some general parameters for thinking about the lived 
experience of performativity. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
From a broad perspective this thesis has contributed to debates 
regarding how to determine the body’s role in subjective experience. In 
particular, my research began with a concern about the shortage of 
productive ways to theorise the body in relation to language. My most 
general aim in this respect has been to provide a framework that can 
facilitate a dialogue between biology and cultural theory, and I have used 
Butler’s theory of gender performativity primarily as a case study to 
demonstrate the benefits of such dialogues. 
Significantly, then, my recourse to the body has been limited to 
elucidating a highly specific set of problems, which have, in turn, been 
driven by my own critical response to Butler’s work. This is to say, firstly, 
that my use of Bergson’s psycho-physical framework, and Panksepp’s 
neurological theory of emotion, is not intended to provide a comprehensive 
image of how the body can, and should, be understood. Secondly, Butler’s 
understanding of discourse is by no means the only way to characterise 
the role of language in subjective experience and, therefore, the body’s 
relationship to language. 
In short, following Butler’s own framework of exclusionary subject 
positions, I have focussed on the rather narrow realm of experiential 
dimensions which address the benefits and limitations of her model. There 
are, of course, many other theoretical paradigms for understanding the 
body, just as there are other ways to use and interpret the work of 
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Bergson and Panksepp, and other ways to define the nature of gender 
and language. I will therefore touch upon such alternative possibilities 
below in order to discuss the parameters of my thesis within a broader 
context. At any rate, given the important political focus of Butler’s work, I 
present this thesis as part of a necessary area of analysis which explores 
the body’s role in circulating and transforming the regulatory norms of 
gender signification. 
I have argued that these historically sedimented norms work upon 
individual bodies, in part, by forming habits. From an early age, the 
persistent repetition of gendered stimuli sets up mechanisms in the brain 
which result in ‘organizing together movements and perceptions’ (Bergson 
2005a: 94). Thus, habits of motor recognition are formed which work upon 
the body’s tendency to selectively discern its environment. The prevailing 
norms of masculinity and femininity become sedimented into a general 
disposition of perception which ‘cares little for individual differences’ (158), 
and towards a disposition towards inattentive action which continues to 
naturalise historically produced arrangements of gender hegemony. 
 As a theoretical model, this reconstruction of performativity sets up 
the issues of repetition, instability and subversion in a more nuanced way. 
Pace Butler, gender norms are repeated collectively through the mutual 
sustainment and validation of sedimented expectations, but can be 
strategically subverted by inconsistent and parodic performances. 
However, because the naturalisation of a habit does not internalise the 
discursive structures of prohibition as a mode of attachment, the 
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experiential instabilities of gender can be viewed in a more variable way 
than Butler’s theory of melancholia allows. 
The investment in gender is grounded primarily in the familiarity by 
which motor recognition orientates action, and the expectations this 
familiarity projects into the future. This means that the authoritative force 
of gender hegemony is not given purely by the ‘reiterative power of 
discourse’ (Butler 1993: 2). Structures of law have a virtual existence in 
the memory of each individual, and its normative meanings vary according 
to the way memory responds to the present moment of action. An 
individual’s psychic economy of gender investment and differentiation is 
therefore contingent to the body’s response to indeterminacy. It re-
distributes the meaning effects of the gendered self and their repudiated 
other in a different way according to this response. Responses to 
subversion can, therefore, be seen to unfold in multiple ways depending 
on the emotional experience of indeterminacy which it produces.  
Thought of in this way, Bergson’s framework of the psycho-physical 
tensions of action, consciousness and memory provides a unique type of 
insight into unstable processes of gender identification.  Nonetheless, as I 
suggested above, my sensory-motor perspective is not intended to be 
comprehensive of the body’s involvement in the experience of gender 
norms and their instability. While I have presented the tensions of habit, 
SEEKING, RAGE, PANIC, FEAR and aspiration as principle tendencies 
involved in the politics of re-signification, the processes of performativity 
and subversion are by no means exhausted by my thesis. 
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 On the one hand, within the actual framework of my text, there is 
much room for development and need for clarification. In particular, there 
has been little chance to explore in depth how the idea of different ‘planes 
of consciousness’ (Bergson 2005a: 241) can re-construct a psychology of 
identification which responds to the body’s varying tensions. Further 
reflections on this issue might include a more rigorous examination of how 
identification develops as an on-going process; both as a relation between 
individual processes of memory and the shared structures of discourse, 
and as a relation between psychological processes of repression and the 
conscious production of meaning. On the other hand, different theoretical 
perspectives on the body may have brought to light aspects of gender 
experience which have been excluded from my model, but could elucidate 
important factors of gender naturalisation and relational instability. It is 
thus useful to discuss some of these possibilities in order to contrast them 
to my own framework. 
 
The Intricacies of Affective Relations: 
 
 One alternate possibility for approaching the body might have been 
to draw upon the emerging field of affect theory, which is largely inspired 
by Deleuze but often cites Bergson as one of its influences. For instance, 
Brian Massumi (2002), Dorothea Olkowski (2000, 2002), and Luciana 
Parisi (2004) have each, in their various ways, used Bergson to invoke 
heterogeneous images of the body which aim to disrupt the ideal of 
normative, self-present bodies. As such, their frameworks provide a 
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different way of using Bergson and, more generally, a different way to 
understand the body as a social and a biological phenomenon. 
Affect theory is extremely diverse, and therefore difficult to 
categorise succinctly. However, it is possible to discern a prominent 
tendency which distinguishes it from my own reference to emotional 
experience. While emotion can be understood as ‘a subjective content 
[that is] owned and recognised’ (Massumi: 28), affect tends to denote a 
realm of changing force-relations and receptivity which is ‘unassimilable to 
any particular, functionally anchored perspective’ (35). In other words, 
affect theory aims to explore certain aspects of the body’s relational 
affective capacities which take place in excess of consciousness and of 
any fully tangible experience of the body. 
As a cursory note on the explanatory possibilities of affect, I simply 
want to draw out a limitation of my own approach. There are, no doubt, 
other ways in which we are influenced by the relational experience of other 
bodies than my own model of habitual and emotional tensions towards 
action is able to accommodate. What affect theory might have been able 
to show in this respect is some of the experiences of gender relationality 
and instability which, as it were, take place on a different stratum of 
experience.  
For example, I argued in Chapter Three that the gender 
discernments of habit are not an absolute and deterministic process. All 
bodies exceed the norm in some way, but motor recognition helps sustain 
the appearance of discrete and pervasive gender norms because it tends 
to diminish the impression of stimuli which does not quite conform to those 
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ideals. Nonetheless, the inconsistencies of gender performances may still 
persist as vague, nebulous perceptions on the fringe of consciousness. As 
such, many of our everyday encounters with otherness are not forceful 
enough to interrupt the outward activities of habit, but may still influence 
the body and self in subtle and indirect ways. 
My point is, then, that theorising the body’s affective capacities may 
offer a method to explore the way peripheral experiences of gender modify 
the dynamics of power. While I have focussed on emotional responses to 
sudden and abrasive experiences of difference, affect theory might 
consider the way less perceptible forms of receptivity influence a subject’s 
relation to the borders of gender. They may, for instance, produce slow 
accretions which are less tangible than adaptive feeling states, but still 
influence gender investment in profound ways. 
In contrast, experiences such as being in a crowd of gendered 
bodies, or negotiating a complex social dynamic, might outstrip my model 
in a different way. Such events often involve an ambiguous multiplicity of 
stimuli and force-relations which, therefore, act upon the body in ways 
which are too overwhelming to articulate into a meaningful narrative of 
subjective experience. They may, in turn, produce affects which are too 
chaotic and implacable to be characterised in terms of my model of 
adaptive emotional responses. In this context, the theorisation of affect 
can provide a means to traverse a more complex image of the body’s 
relational dynamics than I have described. Indeed, it might facilitate a 
more radical re-interpretation of ‘the ontological primacy of relationality’ 
(Butler 2004: 150): one in which the body does not simply dissipate the 
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effects of its dependency through its motor discernments, but is always in 
some way ‘ambiguously installed outside itself’ (Butler 2004: 150) through 
its affective capacities.  
Despite the broader possibilities for exploring the inter-dependency, 
heterogeneity and instability of the body, reflecting upon the subtle 
modulations and unassimilable characteristics of affect is perhaps 
unnecessary to my specific project. For instance, my use of emotion to 
define a tangible realm of action tendencies and overt behavioural 
characteristics covers the most important affective dimensions of Butler’s 
work, which are aggression and anxiety.  
Moreover, there is a tendency for theorists of affect to sweep aside 
the issues of language and regulation, and invoke a radical 
‘reinterpretation of “everything” concerning the relations between subject 
and discourse’ (Olkowski 2000: 81). It thus propagates a ‘new approach to 
body politics […] that moves beyond the critical impasse of the politics of 
representation’ (Parisi: 45) but, in doing so, creates its own limitations in 
understanding the political dimensions of the body. Thought of specifically 
in relation to Butler, it fails to consider how the body itself has normalising 
tendencies which are formed in relation to the politics of representation. 
 
Images of the Lived Body: 
 
Another different direction my engagement with the body might 
have taken is that of the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty who, as I 
explained in Chapter Three, condemns Bergson for reproducing an 
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objective image of the body. As I argued there, Bergson evades this 
charge in the sense that his work also requires a direct apperception of the 
body’s lived tensions and attitudes. However, what I want to signpost here 
are some dynamics of sexual differentiation which are accessible 
specifically through a phenomenological approach to the lived body. 
In an early article on Merleau-Ponty, Butler herself has noted that 
his philosophy of the body ‘offers certain significant arguments against 
naturalistic accounts of sexuality’ (1989b: 85). Merleau-Ponty, she writes, 
‘rejects any account of sexuality which relies on causal factors’ (88). He 
conveys, instead, the possibility of investigating sexuality in terms of a 
‘shared domain of the flesh’ (97) which has no necessary form except for 
that of an opening out onto a concrete situation of intimacy.  
Sexuality, in other words, should not be thought of as an 
autonomous biological function or essence. There is, rather, a ‘sexual 
drama’ (Merleau-Ponty 2007: 193) in which the biological drive ‘has 
internal links with the whole active and cognitive being’ (182) and, 
therefore, with both an individual’s whole past and their ‘momentum of 
existence towards others, [and] towards the future’ (191). Perhaps more 
profoundly, sexuality is a ‘form of original intentionality’ (182) which 
dramatises our ‘consonance with the world’ (192). For example, the 
sensuous allurement of the other – what Merleau-Ponty calls a ‘sexual 
physiognomy’ (180) – is bound up in a relation of reciprocal 
responsiveness and elicitation with the carnal impulses and gestures of 
the desiring body. As part of a concrete situation, then, neither self nor 
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other have self-present or isolatable desires. They form an ‘ambiguous 
setting of […] inter-communication’ (193). 
From this perspective, phenomenology opens up reflections on the 
body to the sensuous and sensual intensities of attraction and sexual 
tactility, and thus extends far beyond Bergson’s sensory-motor framework. 
In particular, the image of a sexual drama suggests to Butler a profound 
malleability and openness which, potentially, allows a fully historicised 
account of sexuality. Thus, rather than confining the embodied elements of 
performativity to habits of motor recognition, even phenomena as 
seemingly “natural” as tactile sensations can begin to be examined in 
terms of historically constituted variables. Feelings of pleasure and desire 
only arise within concrete situations which, as a form of being-in-the-world, 
exceed the ideal of autonomous individuals. Sexuality is thus performative 
in the sense that the concrete situation is always constituted and 
constrained within a historical moment. 
Ultimately, despite its overt leanings towards a historicised lived 
body, Merleau-Ponty’s text itself does not fulfil the criterion of what this 
means for Butler. Indeed, Butler argues that his work can in fact be viewed 
as ‘an expression of sexual ideology’ (93): it tacitly prioritises a naturalised 
masculine sexuality which is, in turn, ‘reduced to the erotics of the gaze’ 
(93). This is to say, on the one hand, that the embodied subject of the 
sexual drama he describes is, by default, only a male body. On the other 
hand, Butler suggests that ‘the female body is seemingly […] always 
already a fixed essence rather than an open existence’ (94). 
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While this may be a harsh reading, it rightly emphasises the danger 
that using direct experience as a basis of knowledge may result in 
affirming the dissimulated power formations of which that experience is a 
part. Yet, Iris Young has to some extent addressed this concern by 
explicitly examining the socio-historical conditions which produce a 
differentiated phenomenology of the female body. Her appropriation of 
Merleau-Ponty is informative in this respect, but not only because it 
demonstrates how recourse to direct phenomenal experience can expose 
the hierarchical experience of the lived body. It also further suggests some 
of the broader dynamics of embodiment involved in gender performativity. 
Like Butler, Young picks up on the idea that, ‘insofar as I have a 
body, I may be reduced to the status of an object beneath the gaze of 
another person’ (Merleau-Ponty 2007: 193). This is, for Merleau-Ponty, 
part of the ambiguity of having a body. It is an aspect of embodiment 
which inhibits the achievement of consonance and which, as both Butler 
and Young observe, women have been traditionally been made more 
susceptible to. However, while Butler accuses Merleau-Ponty of implicitly 
reifying the subjection of women to the status of object, Young actually 
explores how this subjection works from a phenomenological perspective. 
In doing so, she provides an insight into the possibilities of analysing the 
phenomenal experience of regulation which, again, is not readily 
accessible through Bergson. 
The stereotype that, generally speaking, women ‘are not as open 
with their bodies as men’ (Young 2004a: 262) is, Young argues, not the 
manifestation of an irreducible biological difference. It is traceable to the 
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socio-historical conditions of a ‘patriarchal society which defines woman 
as object, as mere body’ (270). In effect, Young argues that the historical 
structures and conditions of gender relations ‘delimit the typical situation of 
being a woman’ (261); but rather than deconstructing those regulatory 
conditions, as is the case with Butler’s method, she provides insights into 
how they are lived.  
Reflecting on her own phenomenal experience, Young witnesses 
how, from an early age, girls are encouraged to conform to ideals of 
‘feminine bodily comportment’ (270). In part, this means learning to 
actively ‘hamper her movements’ (270), and developing a ‘bodily timidity’ 
(270) in which ‘she takes herself to be fragile and immobile’ (270). 
Moreover, ‘the ever-present possibility that one will be gazed upon as a 
mere object’ (270) intensifies this kind of actively restrictive bodily 
comportment because it forces women to take up a self-conscious 
distance from their actions. The effect of these regulatory situations is that 
‘feminine bodily existence is an inhibited intentionality’ (266) which often 
‘severs the connection between aim and enactment’ (266), and therefore 
disrupts the consonance of being-in-the-world. 
Revisiting her initial essay twenty years later, Young concedes that 
‘a great deal has changed’ (2004b: 286). She observes that her own 
daughter has a much freer relation to her body’s intentionality, and cites 
greater sporting opportunities for women and changes in ‘acceptable 
norms of male street behavior’ (286) as sources of this liberation of female 
embodiment. As such, the lesson to be learned is not that Young’s original 
reflections ‘might seem antiquated’ (286). It is the demonstration that, as 
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the socio-historic regulations of masculinity and femininity changes, so 
does the lived phenomenal experience of people’s bodies. 
The point I want to make here in regards to my own framework is 
that the kind of experiences at stake in Young’s subject matter cannot be 
fully characterised by Bergson’s psycho-physical model. At a stretch, the 
transformation from the hampered movements of a more restrictive 
femininity to the freer bodily comportment facilitated by sport and less 
intrusive forms of masculinity might be understood in terms of the 
development of new motor habits. However, on its own, this perspective 
does not convey the experience of living through a situation of constraint, 
nor that of feeling the body as a medium of unfettered intentionality. 
Indeed, what Young’s politicised image of intentionality brings to light is a 
broader sense of how different positions along the regulatory borders of 
gender are lived as a phenomenal experience of the body.  
Within such a perspective, the habituation of a body style is not 
simply the sedimentation of an inattentive process of repetition. It is a 
‘power of dilating our being-in-the-world’ (Merleau-Ponty 2007: 166). The 
body, for Merleau-Ponty, is ‘essentially an expressive space’ (169), and 
breathes significance into phenomena through its capacity to form a 
‘harmony between what we aim at and what is given, between intention 
and performance’ (167). Habit, thought of as a ‘form of this fundamental 
power’ (169), can thus be understood as a potentiality of response that 
extends this expressive dimension of the body and forms new harmonies 
with the world.  
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As a means of unison and unanimity, the consonance of this 
expressive body must be understood as part of ‘what makes my own life 
[liveable and] what makes, or ought to make, the lives of others bearable’ 
(Butler 2004: 17). Whether we are concerned with women under 
patriarchal conditions or homosexual and transgendered individuals 
placed within heteronormative situations, this sense of unity between life 
and world is disrupted by the intrusive gaze of hegemonic expectations at 
certain junctures of their lives. Phenomenology can, from this perspective, 
offer insights into the multiple experiences and struggles involved in the 
embodiment of gender hierarchies, and therefore derive a potentially much 
more expansive view of performativity than my own perspective. 
In closing, Merleau-Ponty’s work on the body provides a diverse 
range of ways to explore the dynamics of performativity as an embodied 
event. It can reveal the intimate dimensions of pleasure and sensuous 
perception as historically contingent modes of experience. It can also 
produce clarity of understanding into the kind of experiences undergone 
by those who feel their bodies to be restricted by the norm, and thus point 
towards imperatives and strategies to expand such subject positions which 
would not be apparent through Bergson’s methods. Nonetheless, while 
phenomenology has these benefits, this kind of approach to embodiment 
does not translate particularly well into the issues I will discuss below 
concerning complex processes of identification and responses to 
subversion.  
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The Discursive Matrix and the Production of Meaning:  
 
The examples of affect and phenomenology above do not just 
contextualise the limitations of my Bergsonian model of the body within a 
broader domain of contemporary research. They suggest just a few 
different directions in which Butler’s theory of performativity might be 
problematized or expanded.  
As a ‘reiteration of […] a set of norms’ (Butler 1993: 12), 
performativity encompasses a broad domain of relevant subject matter 
which ranges from the analysis of discursive structures, to the lived 
attachments and instabilities of hegemonic subjects, to the frustrations and 
suffering of those excluded. Each of these, in turn, can be studied through 
various methodological approaches, and can be seen to have multiple 
aspects and interconnections. In the final analysis, the innumerability of 
these possibilities makes it ‘difficult to say precisely what performativity is’ 
(Butler 2008: xv). While I might have included a phenomenological 
account of the body’s ‘melodic unity’ (Merleau-Ponty 2007: 67), or an 
image of affect to explore how the body, like self-recognition, is ‘always 
other to itself’ (Butler 2004: 149), each would have brought the formulation 
of performativity into focus in a different way. It is thus informative in this 
respect to re-assess how my own account diverges from Butler’s.  
As would be the case with any integration of the lived experiences 
or processes of the body, I have shifted the centre of attention from the 
idea of performativity as the ‘reiterative power of discourse to produce the 
phenomena that it regulates and constrains’ (Butler 1993: 2; my italics). 
342 
 
However, as much as possible, I have attempted to maintain Butler’s 
political focus on the ideal of masculinity and femininity as regulated and 
exclusionary subject positions. My explanation of repetition and 
identification as a psycho-physical process is not, in this sense, a 
purposeful attempt to by-pass Butler’s characterisation of discourse and to 
offer a more volitional account of language. Rather, it has aimed to re-
examine the issue of how normative attachments to gender develop within 
the actual temporal dynamics of sociality. 
Thinking through the embodiment of a gender norm as a habituated 
act, I have examined the basis of repetition as the movement of a lived 
process rather than as a signifying effect of the body’s surface; but this 
habituated act of repetition is still ‘a kind of “citing” of the law’ (Butler 1993: 
108). In turn, the psychic process by which an individual consciously 
represents self and other can be seen as a variable process insofar as it 
develops in relation to the body’s different responses to indeterminacy. 
Yet, the dynamics of aspiration aside, the possibilities of new psychic 
categorisations of law I have described are in essence only nuances of the 
pre-existing ‘grammar that governs the availability of persons in language’ 
(Butler 2008: xxvi). 
Primarily, these possibilities denote the way different tensions of 
memory can inflect the meaning and regulatory expectations of gender 
through more or less personal or generalised images. Individual acts of 
identification can thus interpret the acceptable borders of gender 
differently depending on the images available within these tensions. In 
effect, though, these interpretations are still re-citations of an established 
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realm of intelligibility, and continue to circulate within a regulated domain 
of power formations. Even aspiration, as process which does indeed 
enable radically different forms of differentiation, remains constrained by 
the constituting effects of discourse insofar as it can only be articulated 
through language. 
The intention of this model is to provide a more focussed 
demonstration of how individual conceptions of law are susceptible to 
transformation. Psychic processes of intelligibility are not radically outside 
the ‘nexus of power and knowledge’ (Butler 2004: 216), but they do show 
how the effects of power can circulate differently depending upon the way 
memory reproduces knowledge. As an attempt to address the dynamics of 
discourse, however, this psycho-physical insight into performativity has 
some disadvantages which are worth noting. 
On the one hand, it detracts from the idea of regulatory discourse 
as a condition of possibility and legitimacy granted to some but not others. 
In my analysis, Butler’s concern with the restrictions placed on the 
intelligibility of gender has been considered only from the point of view of 
hegemonic subjects. For instance, the image of abject subjects who are 
dependent on structures of intelligibility that ‘make life unliveable’ (Butler 
2004: 4) for them has certainly been pushed to the periphery of my 
concerns. Therefore, something of the urgency, pathos and ethical 
responsibility which resonates in Butler’s work is lost in my translation of 
performativity. 
On the other hand, re-imagining gendered acts and processes of 
identification as a dynamic of psycho-physical tensions hinders a more 
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sustained attention to how discursive practices are structured. In truth, ‘the 
rule-governed discourses’ (Butler 2008: 198) which constitute the 
intelligible assertion of a gendered self are not formed in the manner of a 
simple, uniform exclusionary border. They are a highly complex matrix in 
which ‘discourses present themselves in the plural’ (198) and, by the fact 
of this plurality, produce the possibility of ‘instituting unpredictable and 
inadvertent convergences’ (198). 
In other words, the singular image of a gender law – which I have 
focussed on to demonstrate how that law appears differently according to 
the psychic act which represents it – is something of a misnomer. As a 
socio-historical phenomena, the spatial and temporal operations of gender 
discourse stretch across multiple organisations, authorities and ritual 
performances. There are, to name but a few instances of such operations: 
religious narratives which morally oppose same-sex marriage; conflicting 
genetic, hormonal and anatomical categorisations of sexual difference; 
marketing campaigns propagating ideals of a perfect body or lifestyle; 
traditional kinship practices, such as the different male and female roles in 
child rearing. Each of these discourses can be understood as ‘part of a 
regulatory practice which produces the bodies it governs’ (Butler 1993: 1), 
but each creates and reiterates subject positions through its own 
vocabulary and its own grammar. Each has its own institutional apparatus 
of production and its own history, but nonetheless co-exists with the others 
within a broad socio-political domain of gender. 
Butler’s contention here is that the multiplicity of their co-existence 
occasions necessary points of disjunction. Moral oppositions to same-sex 
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marriage and hormonal definitions of sex, for example, may both authorise 
normative positions of identification. However, because the institutional 
basis of their authority – that is, religion and science – has a long history of 
conflict, the truth effects of each practice may be unsettled by the other. 
The inadvertent or strategic convergences of such regulatory practices 
can thus produce a ‘variety of incoherent configurations’ (Butler 2008: 199) 
which, through purely discursive routes, contest the naturalised status of 
subject positions.  
What I ultimately want to stress in this respect is that the structural 
dynamics and implications of these disjunctions can only be marginally 
revealed by my psycho-physical account of how meaning is produced. My 
model can show how an individual responds to the incommensurability of 
two discourses by undergoing different types of psychical and emotional 
processes, each of which reform the incommensurability in different ways. 
However, what this perspective excludes is the way the different 
grammars and institutional authorities of discursive practices converge 
upon each other by way of their own constitutive structures and 
operations.  
The matrix of gender discourses indicates spatial and temporal 
dynamics which are full of fragile interplays and discontinuities. Different 
domains can operate separately or in collusion at some junctures, yet still 
bring competing authorities into tension at others. Their reiteration may 
function smoothly at some points, but at others we may find that the 
‘reproducibility of [their] conditions is not secure’ (Butler 2004: 27). It is 
thus ‘necessary to track the way in which [each domain] meets its 
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breaking point, the moments of its discontinuities, and the sites where it 
fails to constitute the intelligibility it promises’ (216). 
Although these discontinuities and failures will certainly provoke 
psychological and emotional reactions such as rationalisation, melancholy 
or anger, tracking them is not a matter of understanding how these 
reactions unfold. Indeed, a psychological account of meaning provides no 
way to map the actual complex of convergent arrangements of discourse 
and power from a more panoramic perspective. Such a project requires 
analysing discourse precisely as a network of convergences and limits 
which operates everywhere, without centre, and demonstrates instabilities 
and repercussions that are much broader than any individual experience. 
More generally, my model of intelligibility does not encompass 
Butler’s sense of how the circulation of signifying effects is impossible to 
control. While an individual subject can recognise and re-interpret how the 
borders of a discourse are structured through a variable process of 
actualising memory images, ‘the subject does not exercise sovereign 
power over what it says’ (Butler 1997b: 34). In other words, their actual 
use of discourse to communicate a point of identification outruns the 
meanings they give to it because the intelligibility of speech ‘neither begins 
nor ends with the subject who speaks’ (34). For example, Butler cites ‘the 
queer appropriation of “queer” and, in the United States, the rap 
appropriation of racist discourse’ (2004: 223) as instances in which the 
ramification of a signifying practice outruns its normative usage and 
becomes re-signified. 
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At any rate, tracking the convergences and implications of 
discursive practices should be considered a vital part of expanding Butler’s 
project; and recourse to the body or psyche is unnecessary to such 
deconstructive purposes. The venture to explore the lived, embodied and 
psychological dimension of performativity only becomes necessary in 
order to undertake more thorough examinations of how experience is 
constituted in relation to regulatory practices. When faced with issues such 
as how investments in the norm persist despite the incongruent 
convergences of discursive borders, or how exactly such borders relate to 
the events of both gender harmony and instability, or how such relational 
experience unfolds as a bodily process, Butler’s primary focus on the 
‘reiterative power of discourse’ (1993: 2) quickly shows its limitations. It is 
thus beneficial to alternate the methodology which brings performativity 
into focus and to expand the kind of subject matter which is open to 
analysis. 
In particular, I have argued that the issue of gender investment and 
identification requires different methods of analysis. This is the case both 
in relation to Butler’s discursive account of the subject and her Hegelian 
and psychoanalytical models of the psyche and is, I have further argued, 
necessary for exploring the possible conditions of re-signification in 
greater depth. This is to say, while a psycho-physical model of meaning 
and identification does not illuminate the way the matrix of discursive 
practices converge and change, neither does the deconstruction of 
discourse account for the necessary transformation of hegemonic gender 
attachments. 
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If social transformation entails ‘a radical rearticulation of the 
symbolic horizon’ (Butler 1993: 23), then part of facilitating change is 
subverting the historicity and coherence of gender hegemony. For Butler, 
the point is that practices of parodic or appropriative repetition can 
denaturalise the constructed hierarchies of gender discourses, so that new 
configurations of gender can proliferate and the possibilities of legitimate 
identifications can be expanded. Such tactics of subversion are effective, 
then, insofar as they allow normative signifying practices to ‘become 
rattled, display their instability, and become open to resignification’ (Butler 
2004: 28).  
However, thinking through social transformation as a process of re-
citation presents the dynamics of change only from the perspective of the 
socio-historic matrix of discursive practices. It does not explore how the 
force of re-articulation is experienced by individuals, who either accept or 
refuse the re-signifying intentions of subversion to varying degrees.  
While re-signifying the term “queer” as a celebratory rather than 
derogatory phrase can be a rallying point from which previously abject 
subjects gain a sense of legitimacy, it only becomes fully effective as 
social transformation insofar as that positive representation of 
homosexuality becomes part of hegemonic signifying practices. This, in 
turn, can only occur insofar as the de-naturalising effect it has on 
normative gender expectations can impact productively on the responsive 
investments of individual hegemonic subjects.  
As an immediate social dynamic, subversion is thus not only a 
matter of appropriating the normative language of discourse and 
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discovering its breaking-points. It is also a matter of negotiating the 
variable possibilities of response by which individuals adapt to these 
appropriations and breaking-points, and form diverse processes of 
identification that are contingent and unique to each response. 
In short, understanding the efficacy of subversion as a strategy 
requires an equally diverse image of the psychic processes of 
identification which, specifically, can account for both its failures and 
successes. For all of Butler’s poignancy in conveying the positions of 
those excluded from coherent or liveable subject positions her portrayal of 
the psychic life of hegemonic subjects is, in this respect, detrimentally 
reductive to her own project. Her image of gender melancholy implicates 
the heterosexual psyche in a necessary repudiation and abjection of the 
other. It takes the most violent interpretation of an exclusionary subject 
position as the basis of everyday hegemonic identification, and does not 
account for the multiple ways in which the borders of gender can be 
experienced. Similarly, her Hegelian model of recognition provides an 
image of the psyche polarised between the conceit of autonomy and a 
crisis of ambivalence, leaving little room for a more diverse account of 
identification. 
While my use of Bergson’s psycho-physical model is certainly not 
the only possible way to address the need for a more thorough account of 
gender investment and identification, it provides an inroad towards such 
ends which contributes relevant insights into performativity. The framework 
of inattentive acts of habit as a basis of sedimented expectations, and of 
the emotional tensions which arise in response to subversion, facilitates a 
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more nuanced way to conceive the nature of gender investment. The 
psychology of different planes of consciousness, which reform the way the 
past inflects and authorises individual representations of discourse, 
specifies a more diverse way to theorise how identification unfolds. Finally, 
the understanding of duration, as a potential of ‘psychical life unfolding 
beneath the symbols which conceal it’ (Bergson 1960: 4), demonstrates 
one possible resource for changing the way hegemonic subjects conceive 
the normative borders of gender. While this potential for aspiration cannot 
free the gendered self from the constituting effects of discourse, it 
nonetheless ‘vitalises […] the intellectual elements with which it is destined 
to unite’ (Bergson 1935: 34) in a way which dissipates tendencies towards 
exclusion. 
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